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Abstract 
This thesis examines the involvement of lawyers in Israel Defence Forces operational decision- 
making. By linking the legal requirements of international legitimacy to the institutional relations 
within Israel, the thesis reveals a dynamic of Israeli civil-military relations that connects the demands 
of Israel's external environment to its internal political relations and exposes the role of the IDF 
lawyers as an important locus of Israeli civil-military relations. 
The traditional approach to civil-military relations in Israel employs a framework of analysis that 
relies heavily upon domestic legitimacy, rooted in the requirements of representative government. In 
so far as such an analysis considers the role of law and lawyers at all, the domestic perspective 
focuses on the importance of the Israeli Supreme Court as a mechanism of civil control of the 
military. However, this level of analysis alone fails to explain the growing importance of military 
lawyers in operational matters. This study argues that Israeli civil-military relations cannot be 
properly understood without an examination of the requirements of international legitimacy and the 
largely unexplored field of legal-military relations. 
It is the conclusion of this thesis that there has been a rapid growth in the involvement of lawyers in 
IDF operational decision-making since the start of the Second Intifada in 2000 that can be only 
partially explained in terms of an institutional response to a growing involvement of the Israeli 
Supreme Court in matters of security at a time of heightened military activity. The increased power of 
the military lawyers is further explained by a domestic political response to the growing external 
demand for military compliance with international humanitarian law by the Israeli military as a pre- 
requisite of legitimate military action and the legitimacy of the Israeli state itself. The result has been 
a strengthening of the position of the military lawyers that has secured for them a veto over 
operational decision-making. Analysis of international reaction to Israel's military operations during 
the Second Intifada, which began in 2002, the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Cast Lead 2008-2009 and 
the 2010 Turkish Flotilla reveals a growing appreciation among Israeli elites of the importance of 
defending Israel's legitimacy that is likely to lead to greater empowerment of the military lawyers and 
increase their importance to the study of Israeli civil-military relations. 
A legal analysis reveals not just a strengthening of international humanitarian law, but also the extent 
to which the balancing of humanitarian and military requirements in conflicts involving non-state 
actors politicises the processes of construction of judgments of the legality of IDF military operations. 
The analysis exposes the opportunity for military behaviour to be constrained or enabled by the 
exercise of choice in the selection of legal advice. The case studies and previously unpublished 
accounts of the legal actors show that, to date, the International Law Department of the IDF has acted 
to empower the military. However, the increasing pressures of international and domestic civil 
institutional constraints, which are driven by a growing recognition of the need to use international 
humanitarian law to defend the legitimacy of Israeli military operations against non-state actors, 
suggests that the unbridled support of the military lawyers for their military employers may soon 
become a thing of the past with the choice of law to be applied a matter of political contestation rather 
than military preference. 
In short, the role of lawyers in the military is a new area of research. The methodology brings together 
legal and IR scholarship with original variations. The thesis examines previously neglected aspects of 
the Israeli legal environment, analysing previously unexplored and highly topical developments 
including the Universal Jurisdiction arrest warrants for Israeli political and military elites travelling 
abroad, the legal controversies surrounding the Goldstone Report and the Israeli responses to the Gaza 
flotillas. While the research focuses on Israel, the analysis and many of the conclusions are of wider 
application for those interested in the uses of law in promoting and condemning military strategies 
employed in military conflict against non-state actors, and more generally law and the employment of 
lawyers as a mechanism for the civil control of the military. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Military lawyers are understood to spend their time and energies enforcing military 
discipline. In Israel, their most visible function has been to administer a military court system 
through which violent Palestinian opposition to the occupation is criminalised and punished'. 
Meanwhile, the increasing involvement of Israeli military lawyers in operational decision 
making has, until recently, largely gone unnoticed. 
The close relationship between the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and its lawyers became the 
subject of political debate in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war. The role of the IDF 
lawyers was publicly revealed in the Israeli responses to international legal condemnation of 
various military operations that had taken place during the war. At the Hebrew University in 
Jerusalem on 6, September 2007, when Human Rights Watch launched its report on the 
Israeli conduct of the 2006 Lebanon war2, Daniel Reisner3, former head of the IDF 
International Law Department (IDL), replied to the Human Rights Watch allegations of 
disproportionate killing of Lebanese villagers by reassuring the gathering that every Israeli air 
force target had been vetted by the military lawyers before approval. Reisner described how 
the lawyers had sat in the `pit' (Israeli military command centre) with the military planners 
and if a lawyer said that an operation was not legal it was called off no matter how late in the 
1 The Israeli military court system remains largely unresearched, but see Michael Sfard (ed. ), Backyard 
Proceedings: The Implementation of Due Process Rights in the Military Courts in the Occupied Territories (Tel 
Aviv: Yesh Din- Volunteers for Human Rights, 2007) and Lisa Hajjar, Courting Conflict. The Israeli Military 
Court System in the West Bank and Gaza (California: California University Press, 2005) 
2 Human Rights Watch. Why They Died: Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War. Available at, 
www. hrw. orR/en/node/10734/section/1. Last accesssed 4 Febuary 2011. 
3 Colonel Reisner served as a legal adviser in the Israel Defence Forces Military Advocate General's Corps for 
19 years. Between 1995 and 2004 he held the position of Head of the International Law Department. In this 
capacity, Reisner was responsible for advising the IDF General Staff and other senior IDF officers, the Ministry 
of Defence and the Prime Minister's Office on a wide variety of issues including the framework of internal legal 
oversight of Israel's targeted killing operations. (Author's interview with Daniel Reisner, Jerusalem, 24, May 
2009). 
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day. This operational involvement of military lawyers had already attracted the attention of 
the Winograd Commision, which had been appointed by the Israeli government to report on 
the conduct of a war that was popularly perceived as a failure. With all eyes on the criticism 
of Prime Minister Olmert, little attention had been paid to the concluding sections of the 
report discussing the involvement of lawyers in military decision-making- comments that 
have yet to be translated from the Hebrew4. 
In fact the Weinograd Commission, whose focus was on uncovering reasons for the IDF's 
poor performance in the 2006 Lebanon War, was very critical of the growing involvement of 
military lawyers in operational matters. The commission demanded live testimony from the 
Israeli Attorney General Menachem Mazuz and the Military Advocate General Brigadier 
Avihai Mandelblit. Commission member Ruth Gavison, a distinguished and influential Israeli 
constitutional lawyer, was highly critical of legal involvement in IDF. Her concerns were 
twofold; firstly, that legal involvement would inhibit the soldier on the ground and prevent 
efficient response to changing circumstances and secondly, that unnecessary legal restrictions 
would be imposed through the application of perceived legal restraints where, in her view, 
few in fact exist. In short, involving lawyers was dangerous and unnecessary. The Winograd 
Report records that the commission found no evidence that the military lawyers had caused 
adverse military outcomes but did recommend that the growth of legal involvement be 
arrested: 
`[W]e fear that the increasing leaning on legal advisors during military action can 
divert responsibility from the elected figures or commanders to the advisers, and can 
disrupt both the essential nature of the decisions and the military activity. It seems to 
us, that it is appropriate that fighting forces, certainly at field ranks, concentrate on 
fighting and not consulting with legal advisers'5. 
° The Winograd Commission official site including the report and testimony (in Hebrew) can be accessed at 
http: //www. vaadatwino. org. il/statements. html#null. (Last accessed 4 Febuary 2011). My quotations of 
testimony and findings are based on my own unofficial translations. 
5 Ibid, Winograd, Chapter 14: The Conduct of Israel in the Light of International Law. 
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In fact, research presented in this thesis shows that the involvement of the IDF International 
Law Department in operational decision-making has accelerated rather than slowed. This 
adds urgency to the task of understand the role of the IDF military lawyers within a domestic 
and international context. 
1) Methodology, research question and hypotheses 
In examining the significance of the increasing involvement of IDF military lawyers in 
operational matters, this thesis, which is based on empirical research into the involvement of 
Israeli military lawyers in operational matters and which draws heavily on exclusive 
interviews with IDF lawyers past and present, is an attempt to understand the operational role 
of Israeli military lawyers within the wider context of Israeli civil-military relations and its 
neglected sub-field of legal-military relations. Using a New Institutional approach, the IDF 
lawyers are seen as simultaneously part of legal institutions and military institutions with a 
network of connections with civil and military actors that puts them at the focal point of a 
power struggle for control of the military. This struggle between the military and power 
centres within Israeli society uses law and lawyers to promote power, empowering the 
military lawyers in the process. 
Existing civil-military relations scholarship at the level of the Israeli state and society, within 
a context of weak civil control of the military, reveals an increasing legal control of the 
military by civil elites through the medium of the Israeli Supreme Court. However, this 
domestic institutional struggle between the Supreme Court and the military is only a fragment 
of a much larger picture. To reveal the wider complexity of military-legal relations, this thesis 
extends existing scholarship of legal-military relations from the domestic to the international. 
The additional level of analysis, the international level, reveals the increasing importance of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) as part of a wider discourse of legitimacy of military 
3 
operations and the states that conduct them. Indeed, this thesis argues that it is legitimacy as 
understood within International Relations scholarship that gives IHL the traction that legal 
scholarship struggles to explain. These processes impact at the state level demanding the 
implementation of Israeli foreign policy in defence of Israeli legitimacy and the legitimacy of 
its wars and military operations. Such strategies in defence of legitimacy are increasingly 
dependent for their effectiveness on a legal defence of Israeli military operations and a 
demonstrable legal control of a military fighting non-state actors within the law. With its 
emphasis on the domestic, current civil-military relations scholarship fails to recognise this 
important dynamic relationship and cannot explain the role of the military lawyers. 
While stopping short of offering a theory of international relations that explains the domestic 
and international interaction of security and legal regimes6 as predictors of state behaviour, 
by adopting a dual level of analysis, the approach adopted by this thesis suggests linkages 
between domestic politics and foreign policy that complicates the institutional struggle for 
control of the military and offers a framework within which to study the role of the IDF's 
lawyers and the legal regime of international humanitarian law within the discipline of 
international relations. In so doing, the thesis argues for a rebalancing of Israeli civil-military 
relations by adding greater weight to research into legal-military relations as a key to 
understanding the power relationships between the military and its wider environment. While 
this thesis is firmly grounded in an international relations approach, there is necessarily an 
interdisciplinary aspect to the research and analysis that reveals the political within the 
apparently legal. Consideration of IHL relating to targeting reveals a breadth of choice 
available to the military legal advisor in the construction of International humanitarian law 
that informs the discussion of the exercise of power by the military lawyers. Having 
6 Regime is used here in the sense of Krasner's generally accepted formulation of a set of `implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations', Stephen D. Krasner, (ed. ) International Regimes, ( Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1983), p. 2. 
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established the breadth of choice in the construction of legal advice on targeting, this thesis 
uses Legal Realism to recognise the political function of law and, by extension, the legal 
advisor. While legal realism recognises legitimacy in its discussions of why laws are obeyed 
domestically, an IR understanding of legitimacy allows for greater traction and recognition 
that legality and legitimacy is not the same thing. This position relies to a large extent on Ian 
Clark's work on the connections and disconnections between international legitimacy and 
international law. 
The requirements of international legitimacy may, depending on the particular consensus 
position they reflect, demand constructions of international humanitarian law that differ from 
those of the Israeli courts, the Israeli military or the Israeli government. Adopting Emanuel 
Adler's concept of `communities of choice', which enables law, legitimacy and security 
policy to be tailored to the consensus position of preferred communities, allows for a political 
discussion of the choice exercised by the lawyers in areas of pluralistic international 
humanitarian law. This analysis allows the question not just of which law to apply but the 
more nuanced enquiry of whose law to apply? In these circumstances, the application of IHL 
to IDF targeting decisions expected by the Israeli government amounts to a policy preference 
that exerts a further level of institutional pressure on the IDF military lawyers that may or 
may not conflict with the policy preferences of other institutional actors that are also 
expressed in legal terms. 
The question then arises of how the military lawyers reconcile the differing institutional 
pressures and roles ascribed to them and how this affects the exercise of their judgment. As 
such, this thesis sets out to examine, within the context of international humanitarian law and 
values, the increasing role of lawyers within military decision-making, how Israeli military 
lawyers act when faced with the conflicting institutional requirements of the law and the 
5 
military, and the extent to which this process affects the balance of Israeli civil-military 
relations. In the process, this thesis will test the following hypotheses: 
1) The IDF military lawyers exercise choice in the construction of their advice and apply a 
permissive construction of international humanitarian law to IDF targeting decision making. 
2) Their choice of IHL accords with a consensus among states conducting military actions 
against non-state actors and conflicts with legal positions adopted by communities of NGOs 
and UN commissions of enquiry. 
3) The increased involvement of lawyers in Israeli military decision-making is an institutional 
reaction by the IDF to the following changes in its external environment: 
a) The application of international law by the Israeli Supreme Court. 
b) The threat of foreign prosecutions of Israeli decision-makers for war crimes. 
c) The increased use of humanitarian law as a measure of the legitimacy of military 
actions. 
The following sections of this chapter will examine civil-military relations scholarship and its 
sub-field of Israeli legal-military relations before concluding with an outline of the remaining 
chapters. 
2) Civil-military relations literature 
A historical approach to the review of the literature charts developments in a field that has 
moved from old-style institutionalism, with its normative emphasis on constitutional 
arrangements, to the more recent employment of rational choice theory and the behavioral 
tools of cognitive, sociological and cultural methodology. The field of enquiry has widened 
from a discussion of how the military is to be kept from seizing political power, to an 
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exploration of the connections between civil and military actors and the power of military 
ideology. While a sub-field of legal-military relations is identified, the subject is under- 
researched and fails to recognize the importance of international humanitarian law as a 
measure of the legitimacy of Israel's military operations and as a regime that is contested by 
Israel and its military in international and domestic forums. As such, the existing scholarship 
fails to capture the role of both law and the Israeli military lawyers in understanding the 
relationship between the Israeli military and civil actors. 
The study of civil-military relations really took off in the 1950s in an effort to explain the 
rash of military coups. The question posed by this generation of scholars was whether such 
coups could be explained and predicted within an analysis of the power and role of the 
military. If military coups could be understood in terms of a failure of the institutional 
relationship between the military and civilian society, then a proper ordering and 
restructuring of the relationship would amount to a prescription for the preservation of 
democratic government. This reasoning led scholars to seek a normative system to govern the 
relationship between the military and their civilian superiors in mature democracies. They 
adopted an institutional approach that promoted an instrumental model of decision making 
with the military the instrument of the state. The military were seen as having operational 
autonomy and freedom in return for keeping out of the political sphere. Coups were to be 
avoided not just by legally constraining constitutional arrangements but also, more 
importantly, by a professional military internalising the need for political neutrality and 
absolute civilian authority. Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz and Samuel Finer were the 
most prominent of this generation of scholars. 
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Samuel Huntington's contribution in the 1950s and 1960s was the most influential. His The 
Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil- Military Relations 7 built on his best- 
known work The Soldier and the State8. Analysing the Prussian military tradition, he made a 
key distinction between professionalism and statesmanship, concluding that military officers 
need to be professionals. His model of civilian control over the military uses concepts of 
subjective and objective control. Subjective control is achieved through rules and principles 
and objective control through the internalising by professional officers of the imperative that 
they must operate exclusively in the military domain and be politically neutral. Subjective 
control maximises the power of the civil over the military while the objective control reduces 
the power of the military. The basis of his scholarship is that `the principal form of civil- 
military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the state' and that `the modem officer 
corps is a professional body and the modern military officer is a professional man'. 
Huntington defines `professionalism' as comprising expertise, responsibility and 
corporateness (group identity). Distinguishing officers, who are skilled in the management of 
violence, from enlisted men who are skilled in the application of violence, Huntington 
identifies two levels of analysis: the operating level where policy is implemented and the 
institutional level, which formulates policy. He considers the institutional level, where the 
nation's military security policy is made, as crucial to the study of civil-military relations. 
These institutional arrangements provide the model for civilian control of a military that 
knows its place. 
Morris Janowitz, in The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait 9, first 
published in 1960, looked at American civil-military relations post WWII and during the cold 
war. Although making greater use of a sociological analysis, his approach, like Huntington's, 
7 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1964). 
8Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1964). 
9 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, (New York: Free Press, 1960). 
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relies on a strong professional ethic to maintain the supremacy of the civil over the military 
without destroying its professional autonomy. His analysis, while recognising the 
responsibility of the military to be professionally autonomous, emphasises the requirement of 
the military not just to keep out of politics but also for the politicians to limit their 
involvement in military affairs. Janowitz argues that the requirement of the military to stay 
out of politics has been over-emphasised and the over-involvement of politicians in the 
military needs equal attention. 
The third major scholar of this period is Samuel Finer, who in The Man on Horseback: The 
Role of Military in Politics 10, published in 1962, accepts that the military exert influence but 
are barred from choosing or seizing government. The key to his analysis is that the military is 
more likely to take over if the civil institutions are weak or lacking in legitimacy. The degree 
of civil control of the military depends on `the political culture'. He focuses his study on the 
third world with its high incidence of military coups, applying a sociological classification of 
societies according to their level of political culture and type of regime. His central thesis is 
that political cultures can be graded by reference to the level of respect, support and 
importance accorded by the population to the institutions and processes of government, the 
degree to which the regime's legitimacy is founded on popular support and the degree to 
which there exists a civil society. He argues that the lower the level of political culture, the 
higher the degree of military intervention in public affairs. Israel was seen as having a 
`developed political culture' with both objective and subjective civil control. 
This idea of political culture as a measurable variable led later scholars to analyse and 
categorise military arrangements and to produce models, other than Huntington's subjective 
and objective control, to describe the roles that the military may play in politics. Huntington's 
subjective-objective model was- generally thought to describe North American and some 
10 Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, (London : Pall Mall, 1962). 
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Western European democracies where the military may influence but do not control the 
choice or policy of government. Janowitz's constabulary concept was used to describe the 
arrangements in advanced industrial nations such as Switzerland where civilian political 
power significantly exceeds that of the military. Military arrangements in authoritarian 
regimes where described by an `apparat model' formulated by, among others, Ghita lonescu 
in The Politics of the European Communist States 1. This model has the power of the party 
balancing the army with strictly enforced institutional boundaries. The nation at arms model 
of universal conscription, which could be further refined to the revolutionary nation at arms, 
distinguished arrangements that rely on mass mobilisation. In 1962 Rapaport described the 
characteristics of the nation at arms model in A comparative Theory of Political and Military 
Types, 12. Typically, the professional army is small and civilians are conscripted for periodic 
military duties and in times of crisis. The military are integrated into civilian society. Israel 
was seen to typify the `nation at arms' model with strong civilian control of the military. The 
revolutionary variant, applied to states such as North Vietnam, relies on popular political 
support and a shared ideology to sustain the loyalty of the military to the civilian government. 
In 1941, Harold Laswell's The Garrison State 13 developed the concept of the garrison state 
as a society where the needs of the military are so strong that the military is in a position of 
political pre-eminence. This pre-eminence enables the military to get its way without taking 
seizing power. 
Amos Perlmutter, in his 1977 The Military and Politics in Modern Times: on Professionals, 
Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers 14 sought to extend Finer's catagories. In common 
11 Ghita Ionescu, The Politics of the European Communist States, (New York: Praeger, 1967) 
12Samuel Huntington (ed. ), Changing Patterns of Military Politics, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 
1962). 
13 Lasswell, Harold, `The Garrison State', American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4, (1941), pp. 455-468. 
See also, Harol Lasswell, `The Garrison State Hypothesis Today' in Samuel Huntington (ed. ) Changing 
Patterns of Military Politics (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962). 
14 Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: on Professionals, Praetorians, and 
Revolutionary Soldiers, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). See also, Amos Perlmutter and Valerie 
10 
with later scholars, he was critical of earlier scholarship's reliance on `the classical tradition 
of administrative theory', that assumes that professionalism removes the military from 
politics and maintains a policy making /policy implementation dichotomy. For him, the 
professional military share with the political elites the formulation of national security policy 
and also work together in maintaining the bureaucratic-hierarchical system. This forces the 
military to espouse a political attitude. He has a different definition of professionalism 
extracting corporatism as a separate independent variable: a group consciousness with 
professional associations. He uses this in relation to the officer corps. He distinguishes 
praetorianism from militarism. Praetorian states are where the military is motivated to replace 
the civilian regime. He was satisfied that Israel was not a garrison or praetorian state. His 
contribution is to provide three categories of civil- military arrangements: `professional' 
where there is civil control of the military, `praetorian' where the military control the civil 
and `professional revolutionary' where the military is independent from and co-equal part of 
the government in a country where a strong ideological component encompasses the whole of 
society. His examples of professional revolutionary military are China and Israel. Israeli 
soldiers are seen as ideologically an instrument of Zionism and subordinate to the 
party/regime. The military has been created by its ideological partners and the post- 
revolutionary tensions are resolved in favour of the political masters. Critically, the universal 
recruitment of the officer class produces a `nation in arms' that prevents praetoraenism. 
This generation of scholars came to be criticised as being overly reliant on administrative 
theory. Where they had considered Israel, their enquiry had been into the capacity of Israel to 
maintain democratic arrangements during almost constant military activity. Their scholarship 
had been informed by the view that the civil and the military are two separate systems and 
Bennett, The Political Influence of the Military: a Comparative Reader, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1979) and Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-Building and Role Expansion, (New York: 
Praeger, 1969). 
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their conclusion was that, in Israel, the civil system was in control of the military. The focus 
of Israeli academic investigation now began to shift to the degree of militarization' 5 of Israeli 
civil society. In Israel the question now was not so much why the military had not taken over, 
the nation at arms model with its civilianised military being the generally accepted answer, 
but rather a questioning of the nature and extent of military involvement in civilian society 
and the extent of civil control of military strategic decision-making. Working within the 
dominant model of Israel as a `nation at arms' with a `civilianised military', which relied 
heavily on the universal nature of Israeli military service, scholars now observed the 
dominance of military elites in civilian decision-making bodies. The emphasis shifted from 
the civilian reservists to the professional soldiers who run the military and their links with 
various sectors of civilian society. Israeli scholars developed a model of exchange of 
influence that allowed for a militarization of civil society and a civilianisation of military 
society. This was conceptualised in terms of various forms of permeability or fusion allowing 
gradual or interrupted exchange. The models of imperfect exchange enabled distinctions to be 
made in the degree of the exchange of influence depending on the sectors of society or 
military under examination. Among the most prominent scholars of this school are Baruch 
Kimmerling, Dan Horowitz, Moshe Lissak, Yoram Peri, Uri Ben-Eliezer and Amos 
Perlmutter. Their studies developed in an atmosphere of academic challenge to Zionist 
orthodoxy where `new historians' contested the orthodoxy of Israel's `defensive' military and 
radical sociologists revealed social cleavages to expose a fragmented Israeli identity. 
15 For a discussion of militarism in these terms, see Uri Ben-Eliezer, The Making of Israeli Militarism, 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), who uses militarism as a `cultural 
phenomenon' or ideology. For Ben-Eliezar, `Militarism comes into being only when the use of military force 
acquires legitimation, is perceived as a positive value and a high principle that is right and desirable, and is 
routinized and institutionalised within society. '(p7). It is thus less about choices than the cultural assumptions 
and interpretations of reality that inform choice. 
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Scholars, such as Yoram Peri, who tend towards a historical institutional analysis, review 
Israeli history to examine the relationship between the political elite and the military. The 
developments are usually examined historically starting with the socialist-Zionist nation 
building eras of the pre-state Yishuv and the early formative years till 1967. The period from 
1967 till 1973 is seen by many as the high water point of Israeli military prestige. There then 
follows the period of the rise of the right wing and the Lebanon Wars and Intifadas to the 
present day. Such scholars note the influence of the military in Government with senior 
former military leaders parachuting into positions of political power, the influence the Chief 
of General Staff (CGS) and the pre-eminent role of the military in the formulation of 
intelligence and strategy. A historical institutional approach enables the scholarship to 
identify those occasions when the Israeli military has appeared to control civil decision- 
making. Here attention is given to pressures on Ben Gurion to push for greater expansionism 
in 1948, the near coup on the eve of the Six Day War when Prime Minister Eshkol was 
pressurised by the military to expand his government and appoint Moshe Dyan, Sharon's 
keeping the Government in the dark over military planning for an expansionist first Lebanon 
War, the tensions between the military and the government over withdrawal from Lebanon16, 
the Oslo Accords, combating the intifada'7 and the disengagement from Gaza. Another area 
of speculation among these scholars concerns the extent to which the declining prestige of the 
army and erosion of collective values is eroding the nation at arms model of universal 
service. Strategies of avoidance of conscription and decline in reserve service are traced to 
popular opposition to the first Lebanon war, which is usually seen as Israel's first war of 
choice. Further decline in military prestige is linked to the contested role of the military 
during the intifada and the perceived failure of the 2006 Lebanon war. For some scholars of 
16 CGS Mofaz was holding out for a withdrawal to a defensible border which would have meant holding some 
Lebanese territory while PM Barak was opposed to this. Failing that, Mofaz was openly campaigning against a 
withdrawal without a treaty with Syria. 
17 The IDF was widely seen as failing to implement PM Barak's policies when they required military restraint. 
13 
this school the revolution in military affairs, the avoidance of military service and the move 
towards a professional military that is no longer a nation at arms, raises the old concerns to 
considerations of pretoreanism and the viability of the Israeli democracy without a mobilised 
society. 
Yoram Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy 18 
focuses on the Al Aqsa intifada to research the relationship between Israeli generals and 
politicians tracing the relationship through the history of the state. Peri has a special interest 
in the role of the media in military affairs, which leads him to attach particular importance to 
the influence of real time battlefield images so that modern wars are conducted under 
`politically saturated circumstances'. Peri argues that the post Cold War expansion of the 
humanitarian role of the military and the `new wars' inevitably lead to a greater politicisation 
of the military. He describes the Israeli civil-military relationship as a `pattern of political 
military partnership'19, which, in the context of the Al Aqsa intifada, developed into a 
dominant role for the military20. With the government weakened by the failure of the peace 
process and reliant on the military for intelligence21 and strategic assessments, the 
government effectively gave the military a free hand so that the division between operational 
and strategic decision making evaporated. Further, the military decided that it was essential to 
bolster the morale of the Israeli population to stand firm in the face of an unprecedented wave 
of terrorism. This caused senior military figures to appeal to the populace over the heads of 
18Yoram 
Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room : How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy, (Washington, D. C. : 
United States Institute of Peace, 2006). This work continues Peri's earlier historical review of the Ben Gurion 
to Begin era analysed in Yoram Peri, Between Battles and ballots, ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983). 
19 Ibid, p. 8. 
20 Ibid. Pp. 123-127. 
21 The CGS has at his disposal the intelligence products of the Military Intelligence Directive (MID) whose 
primary function is to warn the government of threats of war and its research arm the Planning and Policy 
Directive. These uniformed advisors present assessments directly to the PM and Minister of Defence and 
prepare an influential annual assessment (NIE) which includes policy recommendations. The NIE is presented to 
the Cabinet and Knesset Foreign Affairs Committee. This militarization of intelligence assessment and advice 
which provides the military with critical influence over the policymakers has been frequently criticised by 
observers and commissions such as the Agranat Commission into the military failures in the 1973 Yom Kippur 
war but the IDF has always successfully defended its position. 
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the politicians and even advocate policies opposed by the political echelon, resulting in open 
dispute between the CGS and the Minister of Defence/Prime Minister22. This leads Peri to 
suggest that an increased political role for the military is a feature of low intensity warfare, 
requiring the military to develop a military doctrine that includes political elements. 
Peri's institutional analysis enables him to identify the weakness of Israel's coalition system. 
This acts as a bar to political decision-making, creating a vacuum that is filled by the military 
at times of unresolved crisis. Peri identifies four factors that produce tension in the 
relationship between the military and the politicians and which resulted in an increase in 
military involvement in politics during the intifada: the first is the ongoing political crisis that 
is reflected in the weakness of the political echelon, which finds expression in the 
government's inability to formulate clear directives and its tendency to dodge responsibility 
casting it on the military. The second is the weakness in the structural constitutional 
mechanisms of civilian control over the military. The third is the nature of the citizen's army 
that blurs the boundaries between the civilian population and the military; the fourth is the 
nature of the low intensity conflict with the Palestinians. The combination of these factors has 
deepened the IDF's involvement in the political process and in policymaking both in matters 
related to the conduct of the war and in diplomatic negotiations. Peri sees a resulting security 
culture that is at odds with a diplomatic culture. 23 
Other scholars of this later generation are concerned to explore Israeli militarism from a 
sociological or cultural perspective. They looked at how state institutions impinge on society 
and institutionalise violence. Much of this scholarship is built on work of the state formation 
school, which links the development of civil-military arrangements to the process of state 
22 Israeli Pime Ministers also act as Minister of Defence unless coalition politics result in the appointment of a 
political rival. Peri has a strong historical analysis of the political role of GSS Mofaz under Barak and Sharon 
and GSS Ya'alon under Sharon. 
23 Peri, Generals, p216. 
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formation. 24 The emerging radical school of Israeli sociology of the 1980s highlighted the 
contested nature of Israeli identity and in the process began to cast a more critical eye over 
Israeli militarism and the role of the military. They explore the processes whereby Israeli 
culture becomes infused with militarism. They look at the creation of Israeli militarism 
through an examination of the creation of myth and ideology and their influence on Israeli 
culture. From this perspective, the fragmenting of Israeli society becomes central to the 
formation of militaristic ideology and the evolving institutional nature of the military. With 
Israeli identity fractured by cleavages between Ashkenazi and Mizrachi, secular and 
religious, Russians, Ethiopians, Druz, Arab, Settlers etc sociological considerations of 
identity are used to analyse the relationship between these groups and the institutions of state. 
While some scholars treated the military as a political actor, others saw the military itself as a 
site of social interaction and examined the composition of the military from an ethnic 
religious class gender etc perspective. The military has always been important in these studies 
because of its role in state formation when a combination of collectivist ideology and military 
prestige made it a powerful force in Ben Gurion's 1950s mamlachtiyut project of moulding a 
Western orientated secular Jewish homogeneous society. Baruch Kimmerling has been 
influential in examining the processes whereby ideology and social constructions of security 
produce Israeli cultural militarism. 
Kimmerling's early scholarship concentrated on an institutional analysis of Israel's 
`interrupted system' to explain Israel's mobilisation of recourses and social mechanisms by 
which the demands of the military are normalised25. This is an interrupted system because the 
normal functions of a mobilised nation grind to a halt following mobilisation. His later work 
24 See in particular, Charles Tilley (ed. ), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975) and Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence: A contemporary 
Critique of Historical Materialism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985). 
25Baruch Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory: The Socioterritorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics. (Berkeley: 
University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1983), Baruch Kimmerling, The Interrupted System: 
Israeli Civilians in War and Routine Times. (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985). 
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traces the spread of militarism throughout Israeli society. In Political Subcultures and 
Civilian Militarism in a Settler-Immigrant Society26 Kimmerling sees the civil sector as the 
source of Israeli militarism. The macho nature of Israeli society is `cognitive militarism'. 
Here military considerations and national security issues are placed above economic political 
ideological problems. He contrasts this `civilian-militarism', which sees war as a continuation 
of diplomacy and domestic policy, with `professional-militarism', which contracts the role of 
the military to its most restricted military tasks. Kimmerling regards the period from 1956 till 
1967 as being particularly influential when the military came to represent the state in popular 
belief systems. 
From Kimmerling's perspective, it is Israel's concept of national security that leads to its 
cultural militarism. Kimmerling recognises national security is a constructed term with its 
roots in social and cultural conditions. Kimmerling sees Israel's national security doctrine as 
based on democratic asymmetries, with the use of settlements as a tool to determine the 
state's geographical and political boundaries and offence. These doctrines construct realities: 
`National security doctrines are part of the society's belief- system, perceptions of reality, 
dominant ideologies and reflect the interests of diverse groups and other societal categories', 
but the doctrines also construct realities. Military mentality and military culture is absorbed 
into Israeli culture so that it becomes impossible to distinguish between them. Civilian values 
are also absorbed by the military. He observes that, `This intermingling between civilian and 
military cultures in both the institutional and cultural spheres created what should be regarded 
as a military-cultural complex which penetrates and connects all the societal spheres (private 
and collective) in Israel. ' He concludes: 
26 Baruch Kimmerling, `Political Subcultures and Civilian Militarism in a Settler- Immigrant Society', in Daniel 
Bar-Tal, Dan Jacobson and Aharon Klieman, eds., Society Concerns: Insights from the Israeli Experience. 
Contemporary Studies in Sociology, Vol. 17 (Stamford, Conn.: JAI Press, 1998), 395-416. 
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Israel has developed as a culturally and materially recruited militaristic society in which the 
component of national security has shaped its culture, values and ideologies and which has 
needed an extensive construction of a convenient social reality. In turn the ideologies, politics 
and culture interfere with the `professional' military and national security considerations until 
it is almost impossible to differentiate between them27. 
Avishai Erlich, Israel: Conflict War and Social Change, 28 has taken the cognitive militarism 
model further to argue that Israeli society at all levels is dominated by modes of thought that 
are dominated by security considerations. 
Uri Ben-Eliezar, The Making of Israeli Militarism29, also stresses a sociological and cultural 
approach to the study of Israeli militarism. His detailed analysis of the Ben Gurion era is used 
to show not only how military ways of thinking have come to dominate everyday Israeli life, 
but also how the early national leaders made use of militarism in the course of nation 
building. His definition of militarism stresses a sociological approach that explores militarism 
within a broad political, sociological and cultural context rather than using Marxist 
determinism that links production to destruction. Nor does he confine himself to a liberal 
critique that relies on `a system of interlocked arrangements- political constitutional and 
procedural... to prevent the army's intervention in civilian decision making and ensure its 
supervision by the civilian level'. His thesis is that, 
[I]n the course of Israeli history military practices gradually became institutionalised and 
habitual part of life's routine until finally the idea of implementing a military solution to 
Israel's national problems was not only enshrined as a value in its own right, but also 
considered legitimate, desirable and indeed the best option. 
He locates the development of a militarist ideology within the pre-state yishuv and during the 
early pre-1956 years of state formation when the military and political are interwoven to form 
a militaristic view of society. This produces a mobilised society; a structure of a `nation at 
27 Kimmerling, 'Political Subcultures', p. 415. 
28 Avishai Erlich, 'Israel: Conflict War and Social Change', in Colin Creighton and Martin Shaw (eds. ), The 
Sociology of War and Peace. (London : Macmillan, 1987) 
29 Uri Ben-Eliezar, 'The Making of Israeli Militarism', (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998) 
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arms', which is exemplified by conscription, reserve duty and parachuting former generals to 
the top ranks of politics. This nation-at-arms form of militarism acts as a buffer to 
praetorianism. Militarism is described as `relatively broad range of behavioural patterns'30 
including an aggressive foreign policy, army interference in civilian life, political 
mobilisation of society for war, coups, reverence for order, discipline, hierarchy, force, 
courage and self-sacrifice. These are all symptoms of a multifaceted concept. This is a 
cultural phenomenon producing the habitual viewpoint that organised violence or war is the 
optimal solution for political problems. For Ben-Eliezar `the dynamics of social processes 
practices and interactions that render a military solution legitimate self-evident necessary and 
desirable so that it becomes integral to the formation of national policy'. The distinctly Israeli 
version is marked by eight characteristics: 
1) military solutions to national problems but no coup attempts. 
2) Militarism crosses all societal divides. 
3) Non-ceremonial with an emphasis on active service. 
4) Voluntaristic but with a sense of duty 
5) Militarism of both the ruled and rulers 
6) Thrives on the blurring of the distinction between civil and military sectors. 
7) It often appears as a civilian militarism but is the product of the interaction between 
the army and politics. 
8) Since 1950s has been a nation at arms. 
Ben-Eliezar distinguishes two different strands; firstly, praetorianism as the seizure of power 
or determining the leader and secondly, the solution of political problems by military means 
30 Ibid p. 7 
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which he calls `cultural militarism'31. His detailed historical analysis identifies the pre-state 
military arrangements and tensions between the young fighters and the political elite as 
exposing the polity to a real danger from praetorianism, which then diminishes following the 
1948 war with the influence of universal conscription and cultural militarism. His concern is 
with the decline in the nation-at-arms model that brings with it an increasing danger of 
praetorianism. 
Dan Horrowitz and Moshe Lissak have been hugely influential in the development of modern 
Israeli scholarship. Their institutional analysis adopts a fusion model examined from a 
sociological perspective. Using a centre and periphery analysis, the military is placed at the 
centre with fragmented boundaries between the military and social elites. Penetration of the 
military into the civilian sphere has been matched by the civilianisation of the defence sphere. 
This civilianisation of the military has come about as a result of army reserve duty and the 
linking of civilian and military elites in common social networks. Ideology is seen as creating 
militarism through a combination of creating a security consciousness of Israel under 
existential threat and the nation at arms military model. The incongruence between ethnic 
identity and territory and the high degree of legitimacy accorded to the military, results in the 
uniquely Israeli nation at arms form of militarism. National service and reserve duty are seen 
as part of the process whereby the centre creates shared experience and consciousness- 
producing militarised ideologies. In Trouble in Utopia32, they observe a close contact 
between military and civilian elites operating within a political system that is overburdened 
by the competing expectations and demands of a fractured society. Their analysis of the 
Israeli political system as fundamentally flawed by its inability to produce majority 
governments, or even coalitions that last more than two years, is central to their conclusion 
31 Ibid p. 10 
32Dan Horrowitz and Moshe Lissak, Trouble in Utopia: Overburdened Polity of Israel, (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1989). 
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that the militarization of Israeli society has produced a military that shares an agenda with 
civil elites rather than civil control of the military. Indeed, this fragility of Israeli government 
has become the context of all modern studies of Israeli civil-military relations. Horrowitz and 
Lissak's influence has been such that the dominant institutional conceptualisation of Israeli 
civil-military relations accepts the fusion model and militarised ideology. Scholars differ in 
the extent to which they delve into a sociological or cultural model to describe the processes 
involved and indeed the extent to which they attach any conceptual value to a civil-military 
divide. 
Scholars who tend towards a cultural approach are represented in Eyal Ben-Ari and Edna 
Lomsky-Feder (Eds. ), The Military and Militarism in Israeli Society33. The editors divide 
their contributions into three sections: Cultural Sites, The Construction of Life-Worlds and 
Gender, Hegemony and Resistance. This collection of essays has as its general theme, 
`uncovering the manner-the processes and mechanisms- by which militarism is constructed'. 
Sites are seen as places and occasions where groups create their identities by telling to 
themselves stories about themselves in narrative or performance terms. The contributors 
examine these processes with reference to Massada, Independence Day parades and 
Museums. The social construction chapters deal with childhood military rituals as well as the 
individual encounter of the soldier and reservist with the military; military orientation is 
naturalised through the officers and NCOs as `reality constructors'. The periodic stints of 
reserve service are seen as revalidating the values and experiences of youth. The final section 
deals with gender issues examined through Israeli poetry, film and nursing. These scholars 
are representative of a growing trend in Israeli scholarship, referred to by Sheffer and 
33 Eyal Ben-Ari and Edna Lomsky-Feder (Eds. ), The Military and Militarism in Israeli Society. (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1999). 
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Barrak34 as `The New Critical Approach', which is influenced by post-modern traditions to 
concentrate on cultural aspects of Israeli society to reveal a greater militarization of Israeli 
society than had been earlier recognised. Here, the emphasis is on informal aspects of the 
civil-military relationship. The nation at arms model is seen as over-civilianising Israeli 
society and failing to reveal its high level of militaristic values. The very idea of boundaries 
between civil and military in Israel, whether fragmented porous or otherwise penetrated, is 
seen as unhelpful since the civilian sector is viewed as being almost non-existent in Israeli 
society. There is no agreement as to whether Israeli militarism enables or precludes effective 
civil control of the military but there is agreement that in many civil spheres the military is 
hegemonic35. The problem with this approach is that the absolute concentration on culture to 
paint all things militaristic blunts the analytical tools available to differentiate between 
institutions. Sheffer and Barrak, themselves adopt a networked institutional approach that 
recognises the complexity of webs of civil and military contact as a `security network'. 
The dominant threads of the modern civil-military literature reviewed thus far, whether 
adopting a historical or sociological/cultural institutional approach, share key common 
concepts of an inefficient Israeli civil political arrangement that is unable to reach and take 
responsibility for strategic military and security decisions, a militarised culture and a closely 
connected if not fused civil-military relationship. This has become the accepted context for 
Israeli civil-military relations research. While sharing this common ground, Yagil Levy uses 
rational choice36 institutionalism, grounded in state formation theory and the republican 
contract, to understand the relationship between the military, sectors of Israeli society, and 
34 Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer, 'The Study of Civil-Military Relations in Israel: A New Perspective', Israel 
Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, (2007), p. 28-52. 
35 For articles selected by Barak and Sheffer reflecting the `New Critical Approach' see: Israel Studies, Vol. 12, 
No. 1, (2007). 
36 For a discussion of rational choice see Hugh Ward, 'Rational Choice', in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker 
(eds. ), Theory and Methods in Political Science, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 65-89.. 
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individual recruits. Levy constructs a methodology of civil groups outside the military 
bargaining with the military. Further, this rational choice model is extended to a second level 
of analysis to examine the relationship between the individual and the military through a 
bargaining process. The analysis sits well with the apparent decline of Israel's republican 
ethic and rise of a liberal ethos that is based on individualist consumerism. 
In The Other army of Israel; Materialism Militarism in Israel 37, Levy adopts the fusion 
model and builds on the work of the state formation school and in particular Tilley. Central to 
this analysis is the republican contract, whereby the citizenry sacrifices body and wealth in 
war in return for state rights. For Levy this process both legitimates the military and provides 
a bargaining model within which to analyse the relationship between individuals and sections 
of society to the military. Levy calls this `materialist militarism' as opposed to state 
militarism. The bargaining position of the military fluctuates with its prestige. Levy uses a 
historical review of the prestige of the Israeli military to chart the decline of state militarism 
and the drift away from the military of the Ashkenazi elite, which he attributes to the 
displacement of the collectivist discourse by a neo-liberal discourse. Economic globalisation 
has produced structural changes in the Israeli culture and economy with a liberal agenda of 
individualism, privatisation and competition undermines the status of the military. This 
erodes the traditional Israeli use of military service as the determinant of entitlement to social 
goods and justification for social dominion, and results in a drift of the socially dominant 
Ashkenazi groups away from military service. The concomitant growth of ethno-nationalism 
results in an over-representation of ethno-nationalists and marginal groups in the military 
producing an `army of the peripheries'. This representation of the modern IDF accounts for 
the continued role of the military in social formation following the collapse of Ben Gurion's 
statist mamlachtiyut project. 
37 Yagil Levy, The Other Army of Israel; Materialism Militarism in Israel, (Tel-Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books, 
2003) 
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Levy develops this theme in Israel's Materialist Militarism 38 to explain why levels of 
militarism fluctuate in society. His approach is to analyse the relationship of the military with 
groups that supply its manpower and legitimise its activities. On the level of the individual 
recruit, his contribution is to use a model of individuals bargaining with the military to 
describe the benefits available to individuals in return for military service and how these 
change with fluctuations in military prestige and the social benefits of military service. 
Different groups are able to negotiate differing degrees of power within the military with 
relative material and symbolic reward. This then reinforces their status in civilian society so 
that, `privileged groups are able to invoke their military status to legitimate their social status 
while marginal groups gain trust through military responsibility'. Levy charts a process that 
moves from mercenaries to republicanism, to materialist militarism, and finally to post- 
materialist militarism. In this latter stage the value of military sacrifice drops to the level that 
the military has to adopt strategies to improve its legitimacy. 
This analysis arrives at the concept of a `market army', which is very different from the 
traditional narrative of an IDF composed of citizens motivated by collective values and 
individual sacrifice. Levy argues that an understanding of the multiple rewards for the 
recruits and the social networks from which they come, is a better analytical tool to 
understand the problems of control of the military than an old-style institutional analysis. 
Levy's approach enables an analysis of the relationship between the army and elites as well 
as between the army and individual members of elites and between the army and members of 
marginal groups. Sacrifice becomes a negotiable commodity. 
38 Yagil Levy, `Israel's materialist militarism', (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007). 
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In `From "Obligatory Militarism" to "Contractual Militarism" - Competing Models of 
Citizenship' 39, Yagil Levy, Edna Lomsky-Feder and Noa Harel, writing in 2007, consider 
the `motivational crisis' that has seen increasing avoidance of Israeli military service. The 
authors build on the conventional wisdom of Israel's shift from socialist collectivism to 
liberal individualism by research into the educational and pre-military sites of socialisation. 
Here Levy combines historical, rational choice and sociological/cultural institutionalism. The 
research indicates changes in school memorial ceremonies that reflect a growth of 
individualism, contrasting the publicly funded Gadna one-week youth preparation course 
with the exclusive private one-year Yair course to illustrate the growing acceptance of 
individualistic ambition rather than communal motivation. The thesis here is that the 
motivational crisis which has been brought about by the growth of liberal individualism finds 
expression in negotiations between recruits in the military concerning the role (combat, 
technical, administrative etc. ) that the recruit will play in the army the unit (elite or 
otherwise) and even whether to serve at all. The research falls short of exploring the 
bargaining processes or their outcomes. 
In Alternative Politics and the Transformation of Society-Military Relations; the Israel 
Experience, (2005) 40 Levy and Shlomo Mizrachi use contractual militarism to link Israel's 
growing individualism, unresponsive political processes and the reduced prestige of the 
military to explain alternative political action designed to influence the behaviour of the 
military. Sacrifice becomes unacceptable where the rewards are seen to be insufficient. The 
authors use the political participation model of quasi-exit strategy, which is itself grounded in 
economic theory, to argue that where bargaining fails to produce an acceptable equilibrium 
39 Yagil Levy, Edna Lomsky-Feder and Noa Harel, `From "Obligatory Militarism" to "Contractual Militarism" 
- Competing Models of Citizenship', Israel Studies, Vol. 12, no. 1, (2007), ppl27-148. 
40 Yagil Levy and Shlomo Mizrachi, `Alternative Politics and the Transformation of Society-Military Relations; 
the Israel Experience', Administration and Society, Vol. 40, no. 1, (March 2005), pp25-53. 
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between sacrifice and reward, and where conventional channels of political action are 
blocked or unresponsive, individuals and groups resort to quasi-exit strategies or alternative 
politics41. The form of the alternative political participation varies with the political culture. 
Here again Levy is combining rational choice with cultural investigation to understand 
political behaviour. Using a historical lens, the authors link the growth of disillusion among 
the liberal Ashkenazi elites to the development of various protest groups including Yesh Gvul 
, 
Courage to Refuse, and Machsom Watch (an organisation that monitors military behaviour 
at checkpoints). The point here is that Levy charts the fluctuating prestige of the military, and 
links it to the rise of individualism to predict exit/protest behaviour and negotiating strategies 
that are an expression of the relative power of the army and its recruits. 
In his analysis of the Second Lebanon War of 200642, `The Second Lebanon War: Coping 
with the "Gap of Legitimacies" Syndrome' Levy describes a `gap of legitimacies', with 
militarism producing a political legitimacy for the use of force while individualism, economic 
liberalism and social cleavages have eroded the legitimacy for sacrifice43. Levy's sees the 
decline in the legitimacy of sacrifice as being behind the military strategies of force 
protection seen in Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2009 and the reluctance to deploy ground 
forces`. These strategies are reinforced by philosophical positions that prioritise the 
protection of Israeli soldiers ahead of enemy civilians45 and result in military operations that 
41 Albert Hirschman, Exit, voice, and loyalty, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). 
42 Yagil Levy, `The Second Lebanon War: Coping with the "Gap of Legitimacies" Syndrome', Israel Studies 
Forum, No. 23,2009, pp. 3-24. 
43 Ibid p. 7, Levy avoids any real discussion of legitimacy and relies instead on Weber. For Levy `Legitimacy is 
not based on the circumstances of a given time and place. Rather it reflects the deeply rooted values of society. ' 
44The author's interview with Levi, 7 February 2009. 
45 Asa Kasher and Amos Yadin, 'Assassination and Preventative Killing', SAIS Review, Vol. XXV, no. 1 
(Winter-Spring 2005), pp. 41-57. See also, Amos Hare], The philosopher who gave the IDF moral justification 
in Gaza', Haaretz, 9 February 2009 accessed at http: //www. haaretz. com/hasen/spages/1062127. html. Last 
visited 24 March 2009. 
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can cause high levels of civilian casualties. Such operations are legally controversial and 
undermine the legitimacy of the military and its operations. This insight is particularly 
relevant to this thesis as it identifies an important element of Israeli civil-military relations 
that mandates a legal and ethical position for force protection. Connections will be made in 
the course of the thesis between force protection as a military strategy in conflicts between 
the IDF and non-state actors fighting from within their own civilian communities, force 
protection as an ethical philosophical Just War position promoted popularly and within the 
IDF by influential Israeli philosopher Asa Kasher46 and force protection as a frame for rival 
constructions of international humanitarian law and the exercise of choice between them. 
Returning to Barak and Sheffer, they explain the security network as, 
a complex and fluid type of relationship between security and civilian actors, but one 
that is ultimately capable of shaping the policymaking process as well as determining 
concrete policies. The boundaries between these actors are utterly blurred, significant 
overlapping areas are created, and the civilian actors are neither equal in their power 
to the security actors nor able to exercise effective control of them or significantly 
reduce their impact on policymaking. In addition, movement between the defense 
establishment and each of the civilian spheres remains frequent, if not natural. 
Probably most importantly, actors from both types of realms who are members of the 
Network share values, interests, goals, discipline, and behavioral patterns47. 
The authors call for research into the connections and attitudes of the members of the 
network, and see value on the concepts of domestic communities of practice and epistemic 
communities. In common with, recent Israeli scholarship, the emphasis is on `security' rather 
than `military' or `defence', enabling the inclusion of sociological and cultural insights. 
46 Kasher's work will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
47 Barak and Sheffer, `The Study of Civil-Military Relations in Israel', p. 23. 
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3) Legal-military relations 
Legal-military relations can be identified as a neglected sub-field of civil-military relations. It 
is not immediately apparent why this field of study should receive so little attention. The 
cognitive and behavioural revolution led to powerful criticism of institutional scholarship's 
use of legal regulation to analyse institutional arrangements. Formal legal arrangements are 
seen as a poor guide to the power relationships between civil and military actors. Perhaps as a 
consequence, modern Israeli civil-military scholarship steers clear of consideration of the 
constitutional normative regulation of the military. Where the law is considered, discussion 
draws on legal scholarship to consider the effects of Supreme Court rulings on military 
matters. This amounts to a historical consideration of whether the Supreme Court's 
application of international law to the Occupation constrains or merely validates military 
action48. Such considerations merit no more than the occasional reference or short chapter in 
the civil-military literature. To be sure, the apparent competition between the military and the 
judiciary for the last word in security matters is of considerable importance, but concentration 
on the domestic impact of a regime of international law fails to capture the significance of 
recent changes in the wider legal environment. Currently, Israeli military and civil elites 
avoid travelling to many parts of the world for fear of arrest for war crimes under the 
Universal Jurisdiction. UN bodies and private NGOs produce a constant flow of reports and 
observation in the language of international humanitarian law condemning Israeli military 
operations. In this hardening legal environment the Israeli military faces testing challenges to 
combat non-state actors that fight among their own civilians. In these circumstances what is 
legal in war becomes subject to harsh political contestation. This politicisation of law and the 
role of IDF military lawyers in the processes cannot be understood without a deeper 
48 David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, (Albany: State University Press, 2002) is often cited to conclude 
that the apparent legal regulation has a legitimising effect. 
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understanding of the legal environment than is currently offered separately by the civil- 
military literature of its legal counterpart. This thesis seeks to address this gap in the civil- 
legal scholarship by bringing together legal and IR scholarship to provide a framework for 
the examination of original research into the workings of the IDF International Law 
Department. The following chapter will draw on a wider scholarship and explore in greater 
depth the legal environment in which the IDF carries out its operations. 
4) Conclusion 
Israeli civil-military relations are best understood as a complex web of relationships that 
defies any model of clear separation between civil and military. Cultural and sociological 
scholarship reveals a pervasive cultural militarism that privileges military solutions to 
political problems. The context is one of an ethnically and religiously divided society where 
the democratic structures are inefficient and where opposition groups have found a partner in 
the Israeli Supreme Court in a process of juridification of military security issues. This 
involvement of the Court relies on the application of an Israeli construction of international 
humanitarian law that operates through the civil institution of the court and the law to set 
limits on the power of the Israeli military. The increasing use of an international legal regime 
of foreign courts, NGOs and UN fact finding missions, legal opinion all using a discourse of 
international humanitarian law adds an international dimension that has been ignored by the 
scholarship. Identifying the conferring and denial of the legitimacy of military operations as a 
key function of the regime reveals its importance to the Israeli state and military. As such, 
this is an important aspect of civil-military operations that has been overlooked by the 
scholarship. Examination of the processes involved will shed light on the role played by 
Israel's military lawyers in operational decision-making. To this end, this thesis is arranged 
by chapter as follows: 
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Chapter two considers the legal environment, both domestic and international, within which 
the military carries out its operations in order to show how and why judgments about the 
legality of military operations matter in practice. The material is divided between the 
domestic Israeli Supreme Court, the Universal Jurisdiction and the international courts. While 
all three merit separate discussion, the argument will be made that their importance and 
traction with the military and political elites can best be understood in terms of their impact 
on the legitimacy of Israeli military operations. 
Having considered the legal environment, the discussion turns in chapter three to the law by 
which the military is held to account. This concerns several key provisions of International 
Humanitarian Law. There have been very few court decisions and the law relating to 
targeting decisions can be readily understood. The point to be emphasised here is the extent 
to which grey areas of imprecision require a balancing of humanitarian and military values 
that allows military lawyers and legal scholars a choice between contradictory legal 
constructions that each have a claim to legality. 
International Humanitarian Law is an uneasy balancing of military and ethical values. 
Chapter three has identified `grey areas' where legal judgment is understood to allow practice 
determined by contradictory ethical positions. Chapter four explores the extent to which the 
construction of legal advice on targeting is a matter of moral judgment. This involves critical 
review of Just War Doctrine and its relationship with law, realism, consequentialism and 
militarism. Just War Doctrine can be understood as a specialist area of the philosophy of law 
that frames the discussion of how law ought to regulate the conduct of war and as such is an 
important element of the regime of IHL. Adopting a methodology that understands the law of 
war as a regime that includes philosophical positions that seeks to influence the development 
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of law and frames the political development of law in philosophical terms allows a deeper 
insight into the processes of legal choice and legal development. The main point here is that 
modern Just War scholars from Walzer onwards are struggling to identify the extent to which 
soldiers should risk their lives to reduce harm to enemy civilians that have been deliberately 
endangered by non-state actors. Ethics is seen as both informing legal decision-making and as 
easing its acceptance. The argument is made that this does not make the exercise of choice in 
constructing legal advice any less political, rather ethics inform political decision making 
expressed by the military lawyers in legal terms. Israeli constructions of security, in the 
context of conducting military operations against non-state actors that do not respect the laws 
of war, have led to popular Just War positions that influence the political decision-making 
over the construction and use of International Humanitarian Law that tips the balance 
between civilian protection and force protection in favour of the military. The various Just 
War positions on the right way to fight a war against terrorists and insurgents provide the 
legal practitioner with ethical choice that precedes and informs legal choice. 
Chapter five explores the plurality of International Humanitarian Law beyond the `grey areas' 
and uses Reisman's legal realism to identify the law applied by elites and communities of 
purpose to make the point that, in approving an attack, the legal advisor is doing more than 
identifying the lawful and the unlawful; once the obviously illegal has been eliminated, legal 
advice on targeting is a political choice between different constructions of the legal. With this 
insight established, the way is open to consider how the IDF lawyers are making their 
choices 
Chapters six, seven, eight and nine present case studies of the Second Intifada, the 2006 
Lebanon War, Cast Lead and the 2010 Turkish Flotilla to identify the growing involvement 
of military lawyers in targeting decision, analyse their advice and their role both before and 
after the fact. These chapters look at the role of the military lawyers in practice. Aspects of 
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the operational decision-making remain secret. However, the thesis makes use of extensive 
interviews with the key legal actors to establish their role in the operations and the fact that 
their advice was followed. Published reports provide detailed accounts of the operations and 
the legal criticisms and justifications of the IDF actions. This makes it possible to reconstruct 
the legal advice given to the military commanders and subject it to analysis to show the 
constructions that were applied and whether the advice was enabling or constraining. 
Chapter ten tests the hypotheses to reveal the IDL as the focal point of both civil and military 
institutional power. The thesis adds to existing legal-military relations scholarship by 
identifying the growing importance of the IDL and linking it to the processes whereby 
International Humanitarian Law is being used and contested as a measure of international and 
domestic legitimacy. The argument is made that the IDF lawyers are developing legal 
positions designed to enable the IDF to fight non-state actors while engaging in strategies of 
force protection that endanger enemy civilians. This requires choices of International 
Humanitarian Law that are constrained by the demands of international and domestic 
legitimacy- choices that on the international level reflect the consensus positions of those 
communities of purpose most valued by the Israeli political elites. In short, the role of the 
IDF lawyers is understood within a wider civil-military context that reveals the political 
significance of the choices of their legal advice. 
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Chapter 2: the IDF's legal environment 
1) Introduction 
As was observed in the previous chapter, there has been a tendency to view the IDF's legal 
environment in purely domestic terms with an emphasis on the tension between the IDF and 
the Israeli Supreme Court. Clearly this is an important aspect of the legal environment, but as 
has already been argued, represents only as fragment of a larger picture. The proceedings of 
the Winograd Commission and their report are remembered for their apportionment of blame 
between the political and military echelons for the failings of the IDF in the Second Lebanon 
War. In fact, the disagreement between the Commission and the Israeli Attorney General and 
Military Advocate General sheds considerable light on IDF and Israeli government 
perceptions of the IDF's legal environment. This chapter begins by examining the 
Commission proceedings before discussing the legal environment in terms of the Israeli 
Supreme Court, the threat of foreign prosecutions under the Universal Jurisdiction and in the 
International Courts and the requirements of international and domestic legitimacy, in order 
to inform a more detailed methodology for the consideration of the role of military lawyers 
than is presently offered by civil-military relations scholarship. 
2) The Winograd debate 
The Winograd investigation of the contribution of the IDF's lawyers to the conduct of the war 
was based in a large part on the testimony of the Israeli Attorney General Menachem Mazuz 
and the Military advocate General Brigadier Avihai Mandelblit. The record of their evidence 
gives unprecedented access to the views of Israel's two top military and government lawyers 
on whether the IDF should be taking international law seriously and whether the military 
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lawyers should be involved in operational decision making. This material has not previously 
been the subject of academic attention. References are to the author's translation. 
The sharp difference of opinion between the Commission members, particularly 
constitutional lawyer Ruth Gavison, and their principal legal witnesses about the proper role 
of military lawyers is obvious from the start. It is clear from the record of their testimony that 
both witnesses were relentlessly challenged to justify the involvement of lawyers in 
operational decision-making. It is worth examining the record of the proceedings in some 
detail because of the unique insight they present into the thinking of such senior legal and 
military figures when pressurised to justify their institutional roles in the face of such obvious 
disapproval. 
The commission began taking evidence from Attorney General Mazuz on 14`h January 2007 
and got straight to the point by describing their interest as, `The central question related to the 
campaign that we would like to discuss is the development of relations between legal 
consultation and military operations, as it manifested itself in this campaign and possibly also 
in previous campaigns, and in parallel campaigns'. 
Mazuz responded by describing the Lebanon campaign as having the greatest involvement of 
lawyers of any war in the history of the State of Israel. The political and military echelons 
had required concrete answers concerning the application to specific targets of the key 
international humanitarian law principles of proportionality. The involvement of the military 
lawyers at both the strategic and the operational level was described as an `unprecedented'. 
This was a legal presence in forums approving targets and legal answers were given `on the 
spot'. Challenged by the Commission that he was taking international law too seriously, 
Mazuz argued that international law has a growing importance in relation to both state, `in 
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order for the State of Israel not to be exposed to international criticism', and individual 
responsibility- `a personal and important price tag'. 
There was no longer any question that international law was irrelevant; Israel had to take it 
seriously. On the subject of personal liability, Mazuz alluded to the principle of 
complementarity, whereby the International Criminal Court (ICC) and foreign domestic 
courts, exercising a universal jurisdiction to try war crimes, give preference to recognised 
criminal procedures of the courts of the defendant's home country. For Mazuz this was good 
reason for Israeli law to take international law seriously and avoid facing allegations of war 
crimes `in a forum outside of the State of Israel'. 
Mazuz also emphasised the importance of the internal legal pressure from the Israeli Supreme 
Court determining petitions from the occupied territories according to international law. In 
his terms, `there are petitions for everything to the High Court of Justice, and therefore in 
order to be able to give a better answer tomorrow to the High Court of Justice, we and the 
military system prefer to clarify things today before the operation'. Having explained his 
view of the need to comply with international law, Attorney General Mazuz spelt out that the 
military decision-makers did not want to be responsible for actions that breach international 
law and in any event could not be trusted to get it right without legal input. 
The Commission saw MAG Mandeiblit two days later on 16`h January 2007 when they 
invited him to describe the involvement of his officers in military decision-making. As head 
of the IDF legal corps, Mandeblit confirmed that he and his officers were present in the 
Headquarters Forum, with the Chief of Staff, at the operations level and generally: `we are in 
the home front, in the air force, in the navy, in the intelligence, we have a tight legal adviser 
to many of the questions that rise there'. 
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Mandelblit traced the increased involvement of military lawyers to 2000 when the military 
fought against the second intifada in circumstances where the residents of the occupied 
territories were able to petition the Israeli Supreme Court alleging breach of their rights. Here 
Mandelblit is referring to the Supreme Court's application of international humanitarian law 
to these cases and the necessity of defending those cases in order to maintain military 
legitimacy: 
`[I]n light of the great involvement of the Supreme Court, which is very unusual on this 
matter, in many rulings. This simply puts us in a position where we had to give many answers 
to petitions, a lot of them- and there are patterns, as you know, that with some I can perhaps 
specifically disagree, but we must act accordingly'. 
Mandelblit went on to describe how Israeli military lawyers advise on banks of targets and, 
within those banks, families of targets and indeed, individual targets. This related to the 
protracted air war against Hezbollah with targeting of villages in Southern Lebanon, regarded 
by the Israelis as legitimate targets of Hezbollah activity. The Commission was troubled by 
this degree of legal involvement in military decision-making and again suggested that the 
army should be left to internalise legal norms and get on with the fight without involving the 
lawyers. Commission member Major General Menachem Einan (rtd. ) expressed this view in 
blunt terms: `the question that bothers me the most, it's what you raised, your involvement in 
the goals, targets. You are a part of the decision-making. Actually, I think you turned into an 
operational echelon rather than a legal echelon'. 
Mandelblit fought his corner denying that he and his corps of military lawyers had usurped 
the decision making function: 
I am a part of the decision making. I am not an operational rank. What happens is that they 
present me with propositions of the operational rank, and I give my opinion whether it is 
within the reasonable and the legal. I do not suggest targets. I do not pretend to do it. I don't 
want to, and I warn myself and my people not to do so. I am a legal adviser. Now, the fact 
that I am involved in decision making is only on a consulting level. I do not replace them. I 
don't say attack here or there. I have never proposed anything and I insisted on it. Never. And 
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in the Headquarters forum's deliberations there are several possibilities, in different types of 
issues: we will do this, we will do that. I just forbid myself not to express an opinion on 
operational matters, because I am not an operational man. 
The lawyers on the Commission were not going to let him off the hook so easily. They 
challenged the simplicity of this explanation by pointing to the breadth of interpretation 
available when considering principles of humanitarian law. There could be a wide or 
restrictive interpretation when applying concepts like proportionality. In response, Mandelblit 
was forced to accept that his lawyers had a wide discretion, but when push came to shove 
they were there to help the IDF win the war. His clear message to the Commission was that 
the legal restrictions were permissively interpreted and loyalty to the IDF was not in question: 
`Now I need to help the IDF win, like any army officer. I want the IDF to win the war, and 
that's why I want to help the operational body to succeed as much as possible'. 
While laying claim to a culture of support for the military, Mandelblit struggled to justify his 
role in operational decision making to a Commission that was making clear its own view that 
legal questions in operational decisions should be left to suitably trained commanders, whose 
internalisation of the rules of war would enable them to exercise their own judgment. 
Mandelblit responded to this by playing the legitimacy card. Legitimacy is a powerful word 
in Israeli discourse resonating with the challenges to the right to the state of Israel to exist and 
it is worth looking in some detail at its use by Mandelblit and the Commission. Mandelblit 
was making the case that the military needed his lawyers to retain its legitimacy and 
developed the point as follows: 
The big change started in the year 2000 when we entered deeper into the field of legal 
advisory. Legal advisory and legal guidance And this is to say that we actually need to 
support the army's actions with a front I call the front of legitimacy. Giving back this 
legitimacy. Legitimacy is a term wider than the sentence but it actually contains four- what I 
truly agree with, at that time Boogie Ya'alon explained it- four fronts: military front, political 
front, conscious media front, and the internal and international legitimacy front. Now, our part 
is in all fronts, but naturally more focused on the matter of legitimacy. You cannot win a war 
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today, without simultaneously keeping legitimacy inside the country and around the world. 
(my emphasis) 
Mandelblit claimed credit for the decision to drop leaflets on the Lebanese villages warning 
non-combatants to leave, which in his view was not strictly required in law but was essential 
in order to maintain the legitimacy of the operation: 
We could have reached this situation (no warning and large numbers of civilian casualties), 
and then we wouldn't have had any legitimacy for this type of operation after a few days, and 
the army wouldn't have had the means to operate...... There is a scope for some or I would 
say even dozens of legal advisers at the division level today. No western army works any 
differently. I believe the world made a progress on this matter. That all together, these are 
things that aim to keep the legitimacy of the forces working in the field, because if they don't 
work with legitimacy, their attack will be stopped very very quickly, I have no doubt..... 
Mandelblit claimed that his involvement in decision making was necessary for the 
preservation of military legitimacy while carefully avoiding the trap of claiming that all 
things legal are therefore legitimate: 
Dror: Is the legitimacy you refer to from the public perception or legal norms? 
Mandelblit: Both. They are non-identical, definitely not, and the example of Qana shows 
this, because legally Qana' was fine in the legal perception. It did not pass the public 
legitimacy. 
Despite this robust defence of the role of the military by both the MAG and the AG, the 
commission, perhaps predictably, maintained its own view of military lawyers and indeed 
international law. Their report has nothing good to say about the relationship between the 
military and their lawyers. While conceding that they had found no evidence of operations 
having been damaged by military reliance on legal advice, they recommended that 
commanders rely on their own judgment. Humanitarian concepts were to be internalised by 
the IDF and inform decision making without having to take legal advice. Their conclusions 
1 The attack on Qana had resulted in the death of refugees who had been sheltering in the UN compound. 
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accuse the military of paying too much attention to lawyers and holding international law in 
too high regard. The findings include: 
Even the Military Advocate General (and respectively the Attorney General of Israel) was not 
satisfied with only writing down general guidance, but he also participated in the general staff 
meetings, and his representatives were present at the general headquarters, in some cases they 
advised in real time to the commanders of smaller units. As mentioned, sometimes the 
initiative to get legal approval before or during an operation came from the decision makers 
or the units themselves. 
The natural tendency to be assisted by legal advisory is clear to us- from personal liability 
reasons- and perhaps even and especially in real time; all in all, we fear that the increasing 
leaning on legal advisors during military action can divert responsibility from the elected 
figures or commanders to the advisers, and can disrupt both the essential nature of the 
decisions and the military activity. 
It seems to us, that it is appropriate that fighting forces, certainly at field ranks, concentrate on 
fighting and not consulting with legal advisers2. 
Having looked at this testimony and the Commission findings in some detail, several themes 
emerge. There is common ground between the Commission and its witnesses that the power 
of the lawyers in the military has been increasing to the extent that lawyers have become 
involved in operational decision making. The debate is about whether or not this should be 
welcomed or curtailed. On the one hand, there is the Commission saying that military 
efficiency is in danger of being compromised by unnecessary reliance on legal advice, and on 
the other there is the MAG maintaining that legal involvement in operational decision- 
making is essential to military efficiency in order to preserve military legitimacy at home and 
abroad. The AG, whose remit has a greater international element than that of the MAG, 
understands legal involvement in decision-making as being essential to the production of 
decisions that can be defended in international forums and that do not risk war crimes charges 
against military decision-makers travelling abroad. The argument that military legitimacy 
requires compliance with international law is not surprising, but it is the linking of the 
2 Winograd, Chapter 14: The Conduct of Israel in the Light of International Law. The Winograd Commission 
official site including the report and testimony (in Hebrew) can be accessed at 
http: //www. vaadatwino. org. il/statements. htinl#null. (Last accessed 4 Febuary 2011). 
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legitimacy of the IDF's operations in the occupied territories to the application of 
international law by the Supreme Court, coupled with the outbreak of the Al Aqsa intifada in 
2000, that appears to both the MAG and the AG to have been the engine of change. 
The following areas of the IDFs legal environment will now be examined in turn: the Israeli 
Supreme Court, the threat of foreign prosecutions of Israeli decision-makers for war crimes 
and international legitimacy. 
3) The application of international law by the Israeli Supreme Court. 
At the start of its occupation of Arab lands captured by Israel in the June 1967 war the IDF 
was given the job of administering the occupied territories. The territories were not annexed 
although the application of Israeli law to East Jerusalem and parts of the Golan Heights 
amounted to a de-facto annexation3. Annexation of the whole of the territories would have 
caused an international outcry and the incorporation into sovereign Israel of over one million 
mostly Palestinian Arabs would have soon put an end to Israel's claim to being both Jewish 
and democratic. Instead, Israel sought the best of both worlds: control without annexation. 
This was achieved by refraining from annexation while adopting an ambiguous position 
regarding the applicability of the laws of war and occupation (international humanitarian 
law). The major elements of this body of law comprise the Hague regulations and the Geneva 
Conventions4. The basic framework of the regulations is that the Hague regulations concern 
3 Israel has not annexed East Jerusalem but by alteration of the city boundaries applying Israeli law to East 
Jerusalem and making `United Jerusalem' there has been de facto annexation. See David Kretzmer, The 
Occupation of Justice: the Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories, (New York: SUNY Press, 
2002), p. 6. 
4 The main treaties are the Hague Treaties, and especially the Fourth Hague Treaty and the annexed regulations 
of 1907, and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and their additional protocols (I and I1) of 1977. 
[Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 
12,1949,75 U. N. T. S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,1949,75 U. N. T. S. 85; Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,1949,75 U. N. T. S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,1949,75 U. N. T. S. 287. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 
12,1977,1125 U. N. T. S. 3,16 I. L. M. 1391; Protocol 11 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
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sovereign rights of warring parties while the Geneva Conventions protect the civilians. The 
Israeli state developed the legal strategy of recognising The Hague regulations as customary 
international law while arguing that the Geneva Conventions were binding only on the 
signatories in the strict terms of the convention and that this was not an occupation to which 
the Geneva Conventions applied. As early as 1968 influential Israeli Professor Yehuda Zvi 
Blum advanced the argument that Article 2 of Geneva IV refers to sovereign territory 
belonging to warring contracting parties and since the Occupied Territories were never 
recognised as sovereign Jordanian territory the convention does not apply to the occupation .5 
The Hague Regulations, which focus on the rights of the sovereign power in control of 
territory, were selectively applied to enable the IDF to enact the regulations it needed for 
strict military control of the territories. The point to be emphasised here is that without 
annexation Israeli law did not apply to the territories, this denial of the applicability of the 
Geneva Convention turned the territories into a space where only the IDF had rights. 
While Jordanian law remained in place to regulate inter-personal Palestinian disputes and 
Israeli law was confined to Israel sovereign territory, settlements and Israeli citizens, the IDF, 
as the military governing authority, used Article 43 of the Hague Regulation to enact decrees 
establishing a military system of government in the territories6. Under this system of 
governance the normally separate administrative, legislative and judicial organs of state 
coalesced within the IDF. The military commander was the sole legislative authority and, in 
the absence of annexation, the Knesset was denied effective oversight of IDF legislation. 
The IDF was no stranger to military government. Until 1966 it had been the governing 
authority over Israel's Arab population with a system of control relying on permits and 
1949. Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dcc. 12,1977, U. N. Doc. 
A/32/144.1125 U. N. T. S. 513,161. LM. 1442(1977). ] 
s Yehuda Zvi Blum. 'The missing Revisioncr. Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria', Israel Law 
Review, Val.: , (1968). pp. 279-301 at p. 279. 6The 1907 Hague Regulations give the military commander full legislative and administrative authority. 
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curfews7. This long standing political arrangement amounted to an administrative blue print 
for the occupation; it was a model whose longevity was not compromised by the assumption 
central to the Geneva framework that occupation is temporary. 8 With strong prestige within 
Israel and little control by the Knesset or the government, the IDF assumed hegemonic 
powers in the occupied territories. 
While denying the enforced applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the Occupied 
Territories the Israeli government heightened the legal ambiguity by adopting the reassuring 
position that it voluntarily applied the humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. This ambiguity was not just to provide legal cover for the IDF, but was the 
product of a profound failure of the Israeli polity to agree on what to do with its captured 
territories. Were they being held to be used as bargaining chips in peace negotiations or were 
the territories Israel's recaptured homeland- the miraculous deliverance of the missing 
portion of the Land of Israel? Was the territory to be settled or traded for peace? Many 
politicians referred to liberation rather than occupation. This debate charged the very term 
"occupation" with additional meaning and "administration" became the accepted parlance 
outside the court room1°. The legal ambiguity was not limited to the applicability of the 
Geneva Conventions; there was also the matter of international human rights law (IIIL) that 
seeks to universalise liberal values of individual freedom through a regime of human rights. 
The Israeli government and international human rights bodies have taken opposing positions 
7 The British Mandate Defence Regulations 1949 had been left in place by the Israeli's and provided the IDF 
with the powers it needed to control suspect populations within Israel and indeed were Later used in the 
occupied territories on the basis that they had been part of Jordanian law. 
' See for instance, Idith Zcrtal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land: The Settlers and the State of Israel 1967- 
2004. (New York: Nation Books. 2007) 
9 Kretxmcr. David. The Occupation of Justice: the Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories, (New 
York: SUNY Press, 2002). chapter 2. 
10 This ambiguity is well illustrated by the rapid withdrawal of an initial proclamation that notified the 
population that the military courts would observe the provisions of the Geneva Convention 1949. The 
proclamation was replaced by a similar notice that omitted reference to the Convention. See, Zertal and EWar, 
Lords of the Land, pp. 133- 134. 
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on the applicability of HRL and IHL to the Occupied Territories with massive consequences 
for the Palestinian communities living there. 
IHL deals with the protection of individuals and groups against violations by governments of 
their internationally guaranteed rights. International Institutions have been created since 
World War II to safeguard and promote such rights that apply to all individuals. Enforcement 
is achieved by institutions empowered by treaty to monitor complience, international courts 
and by domestic jurisdictions that have signed up to operate the framework. All human rights 
conventions recognise the right to life as the most important human right and one which 
cannot be derogated from even in a national emergency. This absolute right is accepted as a 
binding norm from which no state is permitted to deviate even if they are not signatories to 
the relevant conventions. Israelis a signatory to six international human rights conventions: 
1. International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
2. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
3. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
4. Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) 
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
6. Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
The most important international instrument is the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICESCR), which by Article 2(1) states: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised within the present 
Covenant, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
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The conventions operate within a framework of reporting and investigation. Compliance with 
the ICESCR is monitored by the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and 
the ICCPR by the UN Human Rights Committee. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 formulates the right to life as: 
`Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of life'. This prohibition against arbitrary killing effectively requires a 
judicial process and is designed to prevent extra judicial use of lethal force by state agents 
and to require state agents to be accountable for the use of such force. Exceptions include 
action to prevent unlawful violence or self-defence. 
Interpretation and international judicial enforcement of such rights has been seen in the cases 
brought to the European Court of Human Rights alleging breach of the European Convention 
of Human Rights. Here rulings have decided that self-defence requires the threat to life to be 
immediate and the lethal response to be proportionate. Further, there is a requirement for 
accountability that implies a need for some form of procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of 
the use of force. In addition to the prohibition of arbitrary killing there is the right to fair trial 
as guaranteed by Article 14 ICCPR. Consequently, international human rights law is unlikely 
to sanction Israel's policy of targeted killing. 
However, despite signing up to the conventions and implementing their requirements within 
the Green Line, Israel traditionally maintained that the Convention obligations do not extend 
to the Occupied Territories because those areas are not Israeli sovereign territory or within its 
domestic jurisdiction and because the main civil powers and responsibilities have been 
transferred to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Consequently, the treaties should be interpreted 
as applying only to Israeli sovereign territory since Israel has passed the responsibility to the 
PA. The Israeli argument has been that Human Rights Law is founded on the social contract 
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between citizen and the state which does not apply in conflict and that Humanitarian Law is 
the specialist body of law for conflict which displaces the peacetime Human Rights Law. 
This is not a position that is accepted by the various UN human rights treaty bodies. The 
position amounts to a standoff between Israel and the UN human rights establishment over 
the legal responsibility of Israel to respect the human rights of the citizens of the Occupied 
Territories with Israel refusing to cooperate with the UN human rights monitoring bodies and 
rejecting the legitimacy of their conclusions. By adopting this position Israel has attempted to 
resist the creeping universality of human rights in an effort to limit its obligations in the 
Occupied Territories to those imposed on an occupying force by Humanitarian Law in 
general and the Fourth Geneva Convention in particular. 
However, there is no longer any doubt that human rights law applies during occupations. " 
This was confirmed in the Nuclear Weapons case12 that concluded that the use of nuclear 
weapons was not automatically unlawful and was applied by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in an advisory on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in The 
Occupied Palestinian Territory. 13 Here, the court had to determine the relevant law to be 
applied to the legality of the construction of the wall. The court confirmed that the Hague 
Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention apply. The court analysed the human rights 
treaties entered into by Israel and reviewed Israel's long-standing argument that the treaties 
do not apply outside Israel's sovereign territory. Relying on the fact that the occupation was 
longstanding and that Israel occupies effective control and the need to protect occupied 
11 David Kretzmer, 'Targeted Killing of suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of 
Defence', EJIL, 2005, pp. 171-212. 
Steven R. Ratner, `Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The Challenges of 
Convergence', European Journal of International Law, (2005), 16/4 at p704. 
12 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons[ I 996]ICJ Rep 66. 
13 The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in The Occupied Palestinian Territory [2004]ICJ 
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population, the court found that the occupation did not preclude the parallel application of 
human rights law and humanitarian law. Human rights law applied to the territories because 
of Israel's effective jurisdiction. The court then applied the 1907 Hague Regulations, the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the CRC finding Israel in breach of 
the humanitarian law and various human rights instruments. Specifically, the court found 
Israel in violation of: 
Hague Regulations Articles 46 and 52 and Fourth Geneva Convention Article 53 by 
destruction and requisition of property, Fourth Geneva Convention Article 49(6) contributing 
to demographic change, ICCPR Article 12(1) by impeding Palestinian freedom of movement 
as well as various breaches of ICESCR and CRC by impeding the right of Palestinians to 
work, health, education and an adequate standard of living. 
By ruling that the human rights instruments complement humanitarian law the court found 
that it was not enough for Israel to simply rely on compliance with the Laws of War. Human 
rights law is filling the gaps left by humanitarian law not displacing it but since IHL is the lex 
specialis it has primacy where there is a direct conflict. What is left unclear is how this 
convergence will work in practice. As a consequence, the ambiguity continues. In practice, 
Israel has continued its policy of not cooperating with human rights monitoring bodies. 
Israel had chosen not to take part in the ICJ proceedings, whose judgment was strictly 
advisory rather than binding on the parties. Instead they chose to communicate the security 
imperatives of the separation barrier by parking outside the court the remains of a Jerusalem 
bus that had been blown apart in a suicide attack. At the same time as the ICJ ruled that the 
wall was illegal, the Israeli Supreme Court accepted the legality of the wall by applying IHL 
balancing tests of military necessity and proportionality to property disputes arising from the 
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routing of the Wall. 14 The Supreme Court found that the security threat to the state was so 
severe that the harm done to the Palestinian population by constructing the wall was not 
excessive and, having found that there was no breach of IHL, what would otherwise be a 
breach of HRL became irrelevant. In other words, Israel's security needs meant that IHL 
displaced HRL in practice. To be sure, the ICJ had taken a different view of Israel's security 
and found a breach of both legal codes. Further legal analysis is not required in order to make 
the point that although the Supreme Court has pulled the rug out from underneath the Israeli 
state argument that HRL does not apply in the territories, the privileging of Israeli security 
suggests that Palestinian human rights will only be recognised where there is no threat to 
Israeli security. This amounts to a continuation in practice of Israel's refusal to recognise the 
application of HRL to the territories and the continuation of a policy of legal ambiguity. 
However, the points to be emphasised here are firstly, that although we are considering the 
domestic jurisdiction it is international law that is being applied by the Israeli Supreme Court 
and secondly, the court is effectively substituting its judgment of the right balance to be 
struck between the security needs of the state and the rights of the Palestinian residents of 
theWest Bank. Significantly, the court has encouraged evidence from non-serving security 
experts and NGOs to second guess the security assessments submitted by the military. In 
these circumstances the view of the Supreme Court as the arbiter of the balance between the 
rights and obligations contained in the conflicting legal codes assumes added significance. In 
fact, the increased uncertainty adds to the power of the court as the ultimate arbiter of the 
legality of the exercise of power- assuming that it is prepared to take on the role. In fact, the 
mechanism whereby Palestinian citizens of the Occupied Territories access the Supreme 
Court to present legal grievances about the actions of the IDF was established without 
significant public comment some four years into the occupation. 
14 Beit Sourik Village Council v the Government of Israel and The Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank 
HCJ 2056/04. Also see, Yuval Yoaz, `Court Orders West Bank fence re-routed at Bili'in', Haaretz, 04/09/07. 
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In the absence of effective legislative and executive control of the IDF, 15 it is highly 
significant that the Israeli Supreme Court decided that residents of the occupied territories 
were entitled to directly petition the Supreme Court. After all, without popular access to the 
court, the judges are starved of opportunity to exercise their power. This decision of the court 
to accept petitions was not opposed by the AG who may have been motivated by the 
attraction of an appeal system that implied a Palestinian acceptance of the legitimacy of the 
Israeli court system in its relations with the occupied territories. 16 In fact, it has been the flow 
of these petitions from the occupied territories to the Supreme Court that has provided the 
Court with the opportunity to use international law to regulate the IDF's rule'7. Studies of the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court agree that it was not until the mid- 1980's that the court 
began to use international law to critically review the activities of the army 18. Before that, the 
court used the state's voluntary adherence to the humanitarian aspects of the Geneva 
Convention to review the procedural aspects of the IDF's decision making while steering 
clear of examining the proportionality issues raised by security considerations. 
The political significance of these developments have not been overlooked by Israeli legal 
scholarship. Writing in the Israeli Law Review in 2005, Amichai Cohen observed: 
It would have made little sense for the court to strictly apply the international law of 
occupation, when everyone understood that this law was but an instrument for the IDF to 
implement its independent policies. The court considered its role to be quite different. Its task 
was to ensure that the IDF, as an administrative institution, was not abusing its powers. In 
effect, the court thus adopted much the same paradigm of supervision that it applied to 
15 I will be discussing the weak civil control of the military later in this thesis. 
16 When the first legal challenges to the legality of actions taken by the military in the Occupied Territories 
came to court in 1971, jurisdiction was assumed by the Court and not challenged by the state. For a 
comprehensive discussion see, David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: the Supreme Court of Israel and the 
Occupied Territories, (New York: SUNY Press, 2002). 
17 Aharon Barak, 'Human Rights in Israel', Israel Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 12 (2006) 19-21 and at p24, "Since 
1967 the Supreme Court has heard thousands of petitions pertaining to the Occupied Territories. Most were 
brought by Arabs and a small number of them where brought by Israeli settlers. " 
18 See in particular, Menachem Mauter, Law and Culture in Israel: The 1950's and the 1980's, (Aldershot: Cass, 
2002) and Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice. 
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administrative agencies: it assumed that the agencies possessed the substantive expertise, and 
hence reviewed only their procedural conduct. 
Hence, decisions of the Supreme Court (almost always sitting as a first and last instance of the 
High Court of Justice) followed, until the middle of the 1990s, quite a regular pattern: the 
court would accept jurisdiction in almost all cases of appeals by Palestinian residents of the 
territories, and would try to adjudicate them according to international law. However, the 
court limited itself to a procedural supervision of military action. Substantive decisions taken 
by the army were almost never overturned. 19 
Cohen's point is in the period up to the 1980's the Supreme Court paid only lip service to the 
substantive provisions of international law, preferring instead to base its review on procedural 
irregularity. Rather than rule demolitions, internment and deportations unlawful as breaches 
of the Geneva Convention, it compelled the army to change its decision making process to 
include hearings that allowed for representations by the victims of these procedures. This was 
not so much to give the Palestinians a voice as to demonstrate a balancing of security and 
humanitarian values required by IHL. However, while there is healthy disagreement among 
Israeli legal scholars about whether the Court was limiting or legitimating the IDF regime, it 
is beyond doubt that as the occupation continued the involvement of the Supreme Court 
increased. During the relaxed 1990's when the Oslo Accords seemed to be heralding peace 
and in the context of a growing individualism and rights based culture, Chief Justice Barak 
increasingly applied the principles of international law to the IDF's rule in the territories20. 
This judicial intervention continued both during and after the Al Aqsa Intifada that broke out 
in 200021. While it has been argued that the Supreme Court seldom found against the state and 
has refused to rule on the legal status of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, it 
remains the case that there was a willingness to call the IDF to account over issues including 
19Amichai Cohen, `Administering The Territories: An Inquiry into the Application of International 
Humanitarian Law by the IDF in the Occupied Territories', Israel Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 3, (2005), p56. See 
also Kretzmer, Occupation of Justice, p. 56. 
20 This included international human rights law which Barak saw as applicable to the Territories in so far as it 
was not displaced by specific requirements of IHL. This position is at odds with Israel's international legal 
discourse that denies the applicability to non-sovereign Israel. See Orna Ben-Naftali and Yuval Shany, 'Living 
in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories', Israel Law Review Vol. 37, (2004), 
p. 
'p. 
17-118. 
This continuing process is illustrated by ongoing petitioning to the Supreme Court challenging the route of the 
wall. Barak refers to eighty outstanding petitions. Barak, `Human Rights in Israel'. 
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seizing land for settlements, house demolitions, human shields, deportations, interrogation 
techniques, targeted assassinations and the route of the security barrier. Sometimes the court 
hears appeals while the fighting is going on, as was the case during the Israeli siege of the 
Nativity Church in Bethlehem, when the Supreme Court effectively ran the negotiations over 
the release of Palestinian fighters in a politically and religiously charged battlefield22. 
Irrespective of whether the Court has been a restraining of legitimizing influence, it is the 
growth of Supreme Court litigation concerning petitions based on international law alleging 
IDF wrongdoing that explains why Mandelblit would say that, `This simply put us in a 
position where we had to give many answers to petitions'. 
It is worth pausing to consider why this involvement of the Supreme Court has come about. 
David Kretzmer traces the growth of the court involvement from 1977 when Menachem 
Bagin's right wing Herut party came to power. The new government's policy of establishing 
settlements in the occupied territories to tie the territories to Israel resulted in a spate of legal 
challenges23. As Kretzmer put it, `In the period soon after the Begin government came to 
power, petitioning the Supreme Court in an effort to curb government actions in the 
Territories began to gain wide acceptance'. 24 
This development of petitioning the Supreme Court coincides with the shattering of the left 
wing collectivist consensus and increasing social cleavage in circumstances where those 
opposing government policy in the Territories were powerless to affect change25. Israeli 
22 H. C. 3436/02 La Custodia Internazionale di Terra Santa v. The Commander of Israel (20020. 
23 The most famous decision was the 1979 Elon Moreh case, reported as Dawikat v. The State of Israel, H. C. J. 
390/79, when the Court overruled the seizure of private Palestinian land for settlement, rejecting the IDF 
security arguments. Thereafter, land expropriation was confined to public Palestinian land. Zertal and Eldar, 
Lords of the Land, ch. 7 for a full discussion. 
24 Kretzmer, Occupation of Justice, p. 8. 
u See Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, Trouble in Utopia: The Overburdened Polity of Israel (New York: 
SUNY Press, 1989). 
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sociologists of this period describe an `overburdened' political system unable to meet the 
demands of a society increasingly divided between Ashkenazi/Mizrachi, secular/religious, 
rich/poor, greater Israel and those who regarded the return of the occupied territories as 
essential to peace. Israeli scholars Shlomo Mizrahi and Assaf Meydani link the fragmentation 
of the political system, the growth of Israel's civil society and the development of a policy 
among NGO's who, finding the Knesset and the Government unresponsive to their concerns, 
resorted to the Supreme Court. Mizrahi and Meydani import from the study of economics the 
concept of quasi-exit behavior26 and apply it to Israeli political engagement so that, `people 
who are dissatisfied with various policies, and are unable to conduct, or have no faith in the 
efficiency of democratic forms of protest such as petitions, demonstrations and strikes, or are 
unable to exit from the society, create an alternative supply of a certain public good. ' 27 
Cohen identifies a number of complementary developments: loss of political power by the 
left, increased settlement in the Territories, a growing culture of rights within Israel, and a 
questioning of the methods used during the first intifada28. 
Menachem Mauter29 sees the Western democratic values of the Supreme Court and its Chief 
Justice Barak3° as being increasingly at odds with the policies of the Government. Barak , 
unlike Shamgar31 his predecessor, had no military background and espoused liberal 
democratic constitutional notions, at least within sovereign Israel. He was responsible for the 
`constitutional revolution' which, in the absence of an Israeli constitution, elevated Israel's 
26 Albeit O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Finns, Organizations, and States, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1970) and Samuel N. Lehman-Wilzig, `Loyalty, voice and quasi-exit', Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 24, pp. 97-108 (1991). 
27 Shlomo Mizrahi and Assaf Meydani, `Political Participation through the Judicial System: Exit Voice and 
Quasi-Exit in Israeli Society', Israel studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, (2003), p. 128. 
28 Cohen, 'Administering The Territories, pp. 60-63. 
29 Menachem Mauter, Law and Culture in Israel: The 1950's and the 1980's (Aldershot : Cass, 2002) pp. 175- 
217. 
30 President of the Supreme Court from 1995 till 2007. 
31 Meir Shamgar was MAG from 1961 until 1968 when he became AG He became a justice of the Supreme 
Court in 1975 and became President of the Supreme Court in 1983 until his retirement in 1995. 
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Basic Laws to constitutional status thereby enshrining Israeli human rights. 32 Mauter's 
argument is that the court's values were shared by a powerful liberal elite that enabled the 
Court to exercise its institutional power to challenge the power of the IDF. Thus the Supreme 
Court functioned both to promote its own institutional power as a major political actor and to 
33 act as a venue for civil groups and individuals seeking to challenge the power of the IDF 
This can be understood as a process of judicialisation whereby the judiciary takes over from 
the legislature and the executive in democratic states where the democratic decision making 
processes have become paralysed . 
34 
Writing from an American perspective David Kennedy observes a dynamic process whereby 
humanitarians use law to infiltrate into the military rules and procedures to `regulate swords 
into ploughshares'. Whether, within the Israeli context, this is a process of `regulating swords 
into ploughshares' or a struggle for control over the use of the swords there is certainly a 
deployment of a regulatory framework. On this analysis, liberal critics of the IDF found a 
willing ally in the Supreme Court at times when there was sufficient support from 
sympathetic sectors of Israeli society35. Clearly, the power of the Court to legislate for change 
is limited by the constraints on its legitimacy occasioned by the need for public approval of 
32 See Aharon Barak, `Human Rights in Israel', Israel Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 2, (2006), p. 12 for Barak's 
description of his 1992 constitutional revolution. 
33 Ibid. p. 32, Barak denies that the court is seeking to promote its own power and argues that the increase in 
judicial power is incidental to the role of the judiciary protecting human rights in a democracy: "Judicial 
protection of democracy, in general and of human rights in particular, characterizes the development of most 
modern democracies. The phenomenon is general, the result of the events that occurred during World War II 
and the Holocaust. Legal scholars often explain this phenomenon as an increase in judicial power relative to 
other powers in society. This change, however, is merely a side effect. The purpose of this modern development 
is not to increase the power of the court in a democracy, but rather to increase the protection of democracy and 
human rights. An increase in judicial power is an inevitable result, because judicial power is one of many factors 
in the democratic balance. " 
34 See: Kenneth Holland (Ed. ), Judicial Activism in a Comparative Perspective, (London: Macmillan, 1991). 
The best example in Israel is the torture case The Public Committee against Torture in Israel and Others v. The 
Israeli Government, HCJ 4054/95 5100/94, where the court ruled that certain interrogation techniques were 
illegal in circumstances where the Government had failed to enact legislation recommended by the Landau 
Commission. See Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, pp. 135-143. 
35 For an analysis of the fluctuating prestige and power of the IDF, see Yagil Levy, `Israel's Materialist 
Militarism' (Lexingtion: Lexington Books, 2007). 
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its decisions. Recent opposition to the Court has shown that this is a sophisticated political 
judgment and that the social divisions that paralyze Israeli policy- making also act to limit the 
power of the court36. To be sure, there is a complicated dynamic at work here whereby 
widespread public support for civil control of the military has to be matched by an elevated 
prestige of the Supreme Court before the court can effectively assume the role of controller of 
the military. Of course, as with most things Israeli security remains the key variable when 
assessing the vulnerability of the military to judicial intervention. 
Returning to Amichai Cohen, Cohen adopts an institutional analysis that understands the 
Supreme Court as being involved in a struggle with the IDF as an institution which has 
struggled to retain its control over the occupied territories. His focus is on the question of 
when and why has the IDF been taking notice of international law but this approach can 
equally be employed to understand when and how the IDF deploys its lawyers. He argues that 
one crucial factor is the extent to which international law accords with the IDF's institutional 
culture: `its traditions, dominant professions and main objectives'. The other main variable is 
the external environment of political, social and judicial pressure to comply. Consequently, 
From this it follows that in order to understand the actual legal regime in the territories we 
should search not for constitutions, legislation or judicial precedent, but for administrative 
action, behavior and design. We ought also to appreciate that the attempt to impose 
administrative control over the territories (which in this case is in effect military control) has 
not gone unchallenged by the other traditional domestic institutions. Hence, the story of the 
implementation of international law can be viewed as a struggle between two camps. One 
consists of the army and its political allies, whose aim is to retain the army's autonomy over 
the exercise of its authority in the territories. The other is made up of other domestic forces, 
external to the military, such as the judiciary, politicians, and societal institutions (e. g. the 
media and NGOs)37. 
36 See for example, Tomer Zarchin, 'Justice Minister Blasts Publicity Hungry High Court', Ha'aretz, 25 July 
2008, for a report of Friedman's comments. Barak's scholarship since retiring from the bench can be seen in this 
context as his defence of his legacy. 
37 Cohen, 'Administering The Territories, p. 25. 
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Cohen argues in favour of Koh's internalization model 38 whereby international law becomes 
incorporated into domestic law through a process of socialisation, albeit adapted to include the 
military: 
However, what Koh seems not to have included in his model, is that domestic institutions, 
their autonomy threatened by international law, will take steps to recover their autonomy, and 
in that process might cause international law to be rejected. In the Israeli experience, the IDF 
used the security crisis generated by the renewed outbreak of violence in September 2000 to 
overturn many of the policies that had earlier been adopted in more peaceful times. However, 
the process of internalization was not halted because of these moves. After a short period of 
judicial hesitation, the Israeli Supreme Court started adjudicating actions of the army even in 
the midst of fighting and, moreover, did so with reference to international law. 39 
Cohen's methodological conclusion is interesting: 
Analysts who seek to study Israel's human rights record in the territories have really been 
looking in the wrong place. Precisely because the territories are "administered, " we have to 
study the internal institutional culture of the administrators-in this case the IDF. Only when 
we analyze what this body's motives and interests are can we find ways in which it can 
perhaps be pressured and/or motivated to change its behavior. Further research should be 
undertaken into the exact place of the Military's Advocate's unit; the strategies and impact of 
INGOs; the role of the media; and the influence that transnational judicial networks exert on 
the Supreme Court. Only thereafter might we really understand the process by which 
international law becomes part of domestic law 40 
The point to be emphasised here is that legal scholarship examining the jurisprudence of the 
Israeli Supreme Court goes further than simply identifying a process of development of 
judicial review of the executive. Examination of the cases shows an increasing willingness of 
the Supreme Court Judges to become involved in security matters. The scholarship reveals a 
political dynamic whereby law and the courts are an essential element of a liberal attempt to 
impose civil control of the military in its administration of the occupied Territories. This legal 
scholarship has to some limited extent been incorporated into an embryonic legal-military 
scholarship but of itself reveals only a small part of the larger legal environment in which the 
38 See, Koh, Harold. `Why Do Nations Obey International Law? ' Yale Law Journal, Vol. 106 (1997), pp. 2599- 
2656. Koh, Harold. "Transnational Legal Process", Nebraska Law Review, Vol. 75 (1996), pp181-207. 
Koh, Harold. "Bringing International Law Home" (1998) 35 Houston Law Review, Vol. 35 (1998), p p. 623-681. 
39 Cohen, `Administering The Territories, p. 78. 
40Amichai Cohen, `Administering The Territories, p. 29. 
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Israeli military carries out its operations. The domestic perspective is too narrow to reveal the 
political contestation over the law to be applied to Israeli military actions or the processes 
whereby an international legal regime impacts on Israeli civil-military relations. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court is clearly a key feature of the IDF's external environment. 
Looking at the Supreme Court, both as an institution with its own institutional interests at 
variance with those of the IDF and as a channel available to other civil actors seeking to 
change IDF policy, is essential to an understanding of the response of the IDF and the role of 
its lawyers. Viewed in this way, the IDF's use of its resources, in this case its lawyers, can be 
analysed in terms of an institution defending its interests from civil encroachment- primarily 
its semi-monopoly of policy making and its implementation in the Territories. This dynamic 
process of judicial regulation of the military and the defence by the military of its institutional 
power lends support for the first hypothesis, which will be further tested in case studies: that 
the increased involvement of lawyers in Israeli military decision-making described by the 
MAG and the AG is a reaction to the application of international law by the Israeli Supreme 
Court. 
4) The threat of foreign prosecutions of Israeli decision-makers for war crimes. 
The globalisation of human rights and humanitarian law in the last twenty years has seen an 
increasing involvement of international courts exercising an international jurisdiction and 
foreign courts exercising a universal jurisdiction that Israel has been unable to ignore. This is 
the gradual strengthening of international criminal law as an adjunct to humanitarianism. 
The main development has been the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 
(ICC statute) establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the prosecution of war 
crimes. This was the culmination of a long process with which Israel was closely involved on 
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both a diplomatic and technical level. 41 Israel's experience of legislating for and actually 
conducting war crimes trials of both Nazis and Jewish collaborators had given the Israeli 
jurists both prestige and expertise in the field42. The ICC has jurisdiction for prosecutions of 
specified war crimes which have been referred to the court for prosecution either by 
resolution of the UN Security Council, by a state that is a party to the statute or by the 
prosecutor. The prosecutor can only refer for prosecution if the state where the crime is 
alleged to have been committed, or the state of which the alleged perpetrator is a citizen, is 
either a party to the statute or has given consent to the prosecution. In effect, in the absence of 
a Security Council resolution, only citizens of states that have ratified are at risk of 
prosecution. Even then, the principle of complementarity whereby the ICC complements 
rather than replaces the local state jurisdiction, means that the ICC will not prosecute where 
the domestic state judiciary is itself prosecuting. Indeed, the court is required to prompt the 
state authorities by giving the state notice if the court finds that there are reasonable grounds 
to commence an investigation. Having been so involved in the legitimisation of war crime 
prosecutions and the drafting of the ICC statute, Israel, like America, has signed but not 
ratified the statute and in the absence of Security Council referral remains free of the threat of 
prosecution of her citizens. Protected by the US veto, Jerusalem sees the ICC as a troubling 
indication of the growing influence of international humanitarian law than as a direct threat. 
The Supreme Court finds it useful from time to time to refer to the ICC to justify its own 
readiness to rule in cases involving security matters43 
41 Author's interview with Irit Kahn, formerly Head of the International Law, Department of the Justice, Tel 
Aviv, 8 September 2007. 
42See, Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 ILR (1968) 18,26 (Isr. Dist. Ct. ), Demjanjuk v. Isarel, 47(4) P. D. 221, 
and Israel's Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 1950. 
43 See for example Orna Ben-Naftali, `A judgment in the shadow of International Criminal Law', Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2007), p. 322 for an argument that by setting out guidelines for 
targeted killings, the Supreme Court is inviting prosecutions within Israel to avoid prosecutions abroad. 
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In fact, it is the highly politicised universal jurisdiction that is much more of a threat to 
Israel's military. This jurisdiction arises from the obligation imposed by Article 146 44 
Geneva IV which requires states to amend their penal code to allow prosecution of war 
crimes committed anywhere in the world. As far as Israel is concerned, the most dramatic use 
of the universal jurisdiction took place in Belgium. In 1993 Belgium had amended its 
criminal code, allowing prosecution of certain serious breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols45, including war crimes committed abroad 
that did not involve Belgian perpetrators or Belgian victims. This was an unusually pure form 
of universal jurisdiction and amounted to a power to prosecute any individual for a war crime 
committed against anyone anywhere. Moreover, since the Belgian system allows 
prosecutions to be initiated by private citizens, the Belgian courts were thrown open to 
homemade war crimes prosecutions46. In June 2001 NGO's representing Palestinian victims 
of Sabra and Shatillah launched a prosecution in Belgium of Israel's Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon and Amos Yaron for war crimes allegedly committed in 1982 in Lebanon when 
Sharon had been Defence Minister and Yaron had been the commanding officer of the Beirut 
sector. 
Following Sharon's indictment, the Belgian courts found themselves host to cases against 
Yasser Arafat, Saddam Hussain, Abduldaye Yerudia and Rafsanjani. Then in 2003 there were 
charges against Bush senior, Cheney, Powell and Schwarzkopf for 1991 Gulf War actions. 
44 Article 146, 'The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective 
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present 
convention defined in the following article'. 
45 Steven Ratner, `Editorial comment', American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97 (2003), p. 888, and Sean 
Murphy, `Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law', American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 97 (2003), p. 962. 
It has been widely suggested that this embrace of the universal jurisdiction was motivated by Belgian guilt 
about its failure to prevent the Rwanda genocide, Belgium being the former colonial power. In fact the Belgian 
state expressed no enthusiasm for war trials and it was left to a Belgian NGO to mount a prosecution which was 
eventually taken over by the state resulting in 2001 in the conviction and imprisonment of four Rwandans, 
including two nuns involved in genocide. 
57 
After two years of legal manoeuvring, in 2003 the Belgian courts threw out the case against 
Sharon on the grounds that customary international law prevented proceedings against heads 
of state and government while in office. Israel, unhappy with the prospect of the action being 
revived after Sharon left office, withdrew its ambassador. Meanwhile, the American 
diplomatic offensive got into full swing. The main thrust was to threaten to remove NATO 
from Belgium47. This diplomatic arm twisting was thinly disguised as concern for visiting 
delegates at risk of arrest. The Belgians rapidly caved in and amended their law so that only 
the federal prosecutor could bring proceedings. Israel returned its ambassador but the US 
demanded and got further amendments to the law to limit proceedings to cases with a direct 
link to Belgium. Visitors and serving ministers and heads of state were given immunity from 
prosecution. Even if these requirements were met, the case would not proceed if the state 
where the act occurred had a functioning independent judicial system. Consequently, all 
pending cases were dropped. This requirement introduced into Belgian law whereby charges 
are not laid if there is a functioning legal system in the jurisdiction of the offender clearly 
demonstrates the need for Israel to be seen to have a functioning independent judicial system. 
The fact that the case was brought against Sharon at all was damaging to both Israel's and 
Sharon's international prestige. That the case was only dropped years later after heavy 
American pressure on the Belgians, rather than as a result of a legal defect in the procedure, 
must have been alarming. Meanwhile politically motivated lawyers and their NGO clients 
were busy examining their Geneva Convention inspired legislation. From a UK perspective, 
The 1957 Geneva Conventions Act allows for prosecution in the UK of war crimes 
committed by non-UK citizens abroad. It is this legislation that has enabled Palestinians 
living in the West Bank and Gaza to dissuade members of the Israeli military and political 
47 Author's interview with Irit Kahn. 
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elite from visiting Britain. In 2005 Sharon was widely reported as refusing invitations issued 
by Tony Blair with playful comments about jail conditions48. 
The UK legal procedure is not complex. The Geneva Conventions Act combined with the 
Magistrates Courts Act has the effect that, notwithstanding that any prosecution cannot be 
started without the direction or consent of the Attorney General, an arrest warrant can be 
issued by a magistrate at the request of a private individual. The arrest is to enable a criminal 
investigation not a prosecution and thus the very emotive step of arrest can be taken without 
recourse to the Government. This was the procedure used by Daniel Machover, ex-patriot 
Israeli citizen and UK solicitor, acting in conjunction with the Gaza based Palestinian Centre 
for Human Rights on behalf of residents of Gaza, when on 9 September 2005 at Bow Street 
Magistrates Court in London Machover persuaded District Judge Timothy Workman to issue 
an arrest warrant for Major General Doron Almog (retired) for suspected war crimes 49 
Presumably unbeknown to Almog, Machover and his staff had helped assemble evidence 
files relating to alleged Israeli human rights abuses in Gaza and these files had been presented 
to the anti-terrorist and war-crimes unit of the Metropolitan police on 26 August 2005. The 
files contained detailed allegations of war crimes against an unknown number of Israeli 
individuals including Almog who had been GOC Southern Command of the IDF from 8 
December 2000 till 7 July 2003. The allegations filed by Machover concerned Almog's 
command role in the Shehadeh killing, demolition of 59 houses in Rafah on 10 January 2002 
and two other killings. This process of having lodged evidence with the police enabled 
Machover to lay in wait for any of his targets to arrive on UK soil. Machover had learned that 
48 Sam Knight, `Sharon Snubs Blair Over War Crime Warrants', Times Online, available at 
http: //www. timesonline. co. uk/tol/news/uk/article567323. ece., "I would really like to visit Britain, " the Yediot 
Aharonot newspaper quoted Sharon as replying, jokingly. "The trouble is that I, like General Almog, also served 
in the IDF for many years. I too am a general. I have heard that the prisons in Britain are very tough. I wouldn't 
like to find myself in one. " 
49 Author's interview with Machover, London 17 August 2007. 
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Almog was due to speak at a children's charity function at a synagogue in Solihull in 
Birmingham on 11 September 2005. Machover first tried unsuccessfully to get the police to 
act and then used his evidence file to persuade the District Judge to issue the warrant. The 
outcome is well known. While the police waited at the Heathrow immigration gate the Israeli 
military attache spoke to Almog by mobile phone and instructed him to stay on the El Al 
plane until it returned to Israel. Machover accused the police and the British government of 
tipping off the Israelis. 
Had Almog been arrested he would have been brought to court and released on bail pending 
the outcome of police enquiries. Unlike the Sharon case in Belgium, charges against Almog 
in the UK could only have been brought with the consent of the Attorney General. Machover 
had no expectation of a prosecution. His post-arrest strategy was going to be to pressurise the 
Attorney General to authorise the police to charge Almog and take them to court by way of 
judicial review proceedings if they failed to do so. According to Irwin Cutler, 5° who was 
Canadian Minister of Justice at the time, Cutler contacted the UK Attorney General and the 
Lord Chancellor and was told that the Government would not have authorised a prosecution 
and it therefore seems likely that this refusal would then have triggered Machover's judicial 
review application to the High Court. In the event, this legal strategy came to naught when 
the El Al plane took off back to Israel with Almog still on board. 
The Israeli response to these legal maneuvers has been to warn its military and political elites 
against foreign travel where there is a risk of arrest. On Mandelblit's advice Brigadier- 
General Aviv Kochavi cancelled his place on a security course in London. Moshe Ya'alon 
was reported to have cancelled a trip to England on hearing that a Yesh G'vul spoksman had 
50 Interview with Irwin Cutler, Jerusalem 2 August 2007. 
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announced that Ya'alon was among eight Israeli's subject to war crimes files lodged with the 
police in Londons' 
Machover is not the only UK lawyer promoting Universal Jurisdiction cases in the UK. UK 
human rights lawyer Loran Khan caused Sharon's Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz to leave 
London in a hurry in 2002 by presenting a legal dossier to the Crown Prosecution Service 
alleging war crimes. This cat and mouse game came to a head after a warrant for Tzipi 
Livni's arrest was issued in December 2009. The Labour government promised reform but 
made no real effort to change the law before losing the 2010 election. In November 2010, 
Willian Hague, on his first official visit to Israel as Foreign Secretary, promised that his 
government would amend the UK law to enable Israelis to visit the UK without fear of arrest 
for war crimes. This followed the cancelleation in the preceeding week of a planned trip to 
the UK by Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor who had been warned of the threat of 
arrest in the UK over his role in the interception of the Mavi Marmara in May of that year. At 
the time of writing, it is likely that legislation will be passed to require the approval of the 
Attorney General before the issue of proceedings, including the issue of arrest warrants, 
which would give government control of the process. 
The proceedings in Belgium and England are not isolated incidents but part of a coordinated 
politicised legal process aimed at senior Israeli military officers travelling abroad. There is a 
network of political lawyers and NGO's sharing evidence across Europe and Commonwealth 
countries. This became evident when former IDF Chief of General Staff Moshe Ya'alon 
visited New Zealand in 2005. During his stay a warrant was issued for his arrest on 
"suspicion of committing a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949, " a criminal 
51 Caroline Glick, 'Gaza's Long Shadow', Jerusalem Post, 15 September 2005. 
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offense in New Zealand under the Geneva Conventions Act 1958. However, diplomatic 
pressure resulted in the warrant being withdrawn at the direction of the direction of the 
attorney General52. In fact, Human Rights Watch is operating a resource centre and 
newsletter from their Brussels office aimed at coordinating and encouraging war crimes trials 
under the Universal jurisdiction 53. It remains the position that senior Israeli military and 
political figures are advised by the Israeli government not to travel to the UK. This theme 
was explored by the Committee when taking evidence from the AG: 
M. Mazuz: Again and again, before all of the echelons of decision making in various 
forums, [we] return and point out that beyond all of the other considerations, [we] need to 
know that also for war criminals this is not just politics and condemnation in the UN. Today 
there is also a personal and important price tag to be aware of. 
Y. Dror: On this point, did you advise about the psychological contradiction between 
officers' sensitization to the fear that they could not enter England, and the demand that they 
will risk their lives in battle? 
M. Mazuz: Yes. My sense is that risk seems to be natural for every human in the realm 
of their occupation, and there are risks that are unnatural. An officer takes, obviously by 
himself, every soldier, obviously by himself takes risks that stem from his military operations. 
In contrast to that, the fear that he travels for the weekend to London in order to see a play, 
and he is arrested, this is something that is much scarier to him, the fear of the unknown. 
Mazuz is actually suggesting that because of the universal jurisdiction an Israeli officer may 
find a weekend in London `scarier' than battle! This is a fear of personal liability for military 
actions that a foreign court may find to constitute a war crime. In his view this risk of 
prosecution is reduced if the Israeli judicial system, including the military courts, is seen to 
prosecute actions that may be characterised as war crimes. In this way NGOs acting on behalf 
52 Talia Dekel, `Ya'alon Adamant After Arrest Warrant', Jerusalem Post, 30 November 2006. 
53 
Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, The Principle and Practice of Universal Jurisdiction: PCHR's work in 
the occupied Palestinian Territory, 2010, p. 31 `PCHR and our international partners continue to prepare files, 
and have established a comprehensive network of lawyers in numerous jurisdictions throughout the world. 
Significant progress was made in 2009'. (emphasis added), available at, 
http: //pchr ag za. org//files/Reports/English/pdf spec/PCHR-UJ-BOOK. pdf. [Last accessed 12 March 2011]. 
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of victims of IDF actions use the threat of judicial proceedings abroad to force the Israeli 
courts and the IDF to take seriously allegations of breaches of international humanitarian law. 
This argument has frequently been made by the Supreme Court justices to defend, in patriotic 
terms, their application of humanitarian law to regulate the IDF. 54 
The point to be emphasised is not just that Israeli civil and military elites are fearful of 
surprise arrest abroad but also that Israeli and Palestinian groups opposed to Israeli military 
actions take their case to foreign courts under the universal jurisdiction. This means that 
Mizrahi and Maydani's thesis can be extended, to recognise that sections of Israeli and 
Palestinian society, opposed to the power of the IDF, are using a political exit strategy that 
takes them not just to the Supreme Court but also to courts abroad willing to apply the 
international jurisdiction. In fact, there is a neat congruency in the argument that an 
inefficient political system in Israel leads activists to the Israeli Supreme Court and an 
inefficient international system, where the ICC is ineffectual, leads them to foreign courts. 
This trend accounts for an increased concern by military decision makers about their personal 
liability under international law which goes a long way to explaining why military 
commanders taking operational decisions are seeking legal advice. 
This review of the scholarship and recent legal developments has shown that the Universal 
Jurisdiction and its impact on Israeli elites and their policy decisionsis completely under- 
researched. Legal scholarship pays little attention to the jurisdiction because it only rarely 
produces legal precedent. Political manouverings that seldom reach court are of little interest 
to mainstream legal scholarship. Civil-military scholarship, locked into a domestic level of 
analysis misses the impact of the international on the domestic and pays little heed to the 
Universal Jurisdiction. In fact, it is having a much greater impact than the International 
Criminal Court whose jurisdiction Israel continues to circumvent. If the Israeli Deputy Prime 
54 Orna Ben-Naftali, `A judgment in the shadow of International Criminal Law' 
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Minister cannot visit London because of the military tactics employed in maintaining the 
Gaza blockade, it surely followes that choice of international humanitarian law has when 
taking military operational decisions matters. Equally, it matters to the Israeli military 
lawyers. Original research, to be presented in the course of this thesis, confirms that the IDF 
military lawyers also fear prosecution abroad over their advice to the military. 
The above analysis clearly suggests that there is significant support for the second 
hypothesis: that the increased involvement of lawyers in Israeli military decision-making 
described by the MAG and the AG is an institutional reaction to the threat of foreign 
prosecution of Israeli decision-makers for war crimes. 
5) The increased use of international humanitarian law as a measure of 
legitimacy of military action 
Mandelblit's words bear repetition here: `You cannot win a war today, without 
simultaneously keeping legitimacy inside the country and around the world'. Notice, that 
legitimacy is seen as important both domestically and internationally. His concept of the 
IDF's domestic and international `front of legitimacy' invokes a powerful image of military 
lawyers battling on the front line protecting the IDF's essential interests- a development that 
has not been analysed as impacting on Israel's civil-military relations. 
While the involvement of the lawyers may at first sight be surprising, the existence of the 
`front' should be anticipated by social scientists. After all, Weber famously observed `Every 
power seeks to establish and cultivate a belief in its legitimacy'55. Nevertheless, this raises a 
number of questions, particularly: What is the IDF's legitimacy? Why and how and in 
relation to whom, does it need defending? Clearly the legitimacy of IDF military operations 
impact on the legitimacy of the state and vice versa so that judgments of the importance of 
55 Max Weber, Economy and Society, (California: University of California Press, 1968), p213. 
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legitimacy affect and reflect political positions and military objectives. In more general terms 
political assessments of the importance of international legitimacy are reflected in globalised 
and anti-globalised responses to external judgments of Israel's military actions. As will be 
discussed in relation to the legal fallout from Cast Lead, the outcome of these debates are 
clearly seen in Israel's current tentative moves towards co-operation with UN fact-finding 
missions following the failure of the policy of non-cooperation with the Goldstone Mission. 
The link between legitimacy and law is complicated by the hegemonic status of a legal 
discourse in the expression of approval or disapproval of Israeli operations56. Given the 
apparent weakness of international law, it is not immediately apparent why this should be the 
case. After all, these are political, moral and economic judgments about the resort to force 
and its use by a sovereign state. Nevertheless, UN missions, private NGOs and governments 
compile lengthily reports in legal terms as though a legal discourse raises the debate above 
the political and Israel responds in similar terms. It will be a continuing theme of this thesis 
that there is a false separation between the legal and the political in this context that must be 
understood before the role of the lawyers in the military can be analysed. As Mandelblit 
argues, legitimacy is important but the nature of legitimacy and its relationship with law 
require clarification before legitimacy can be used as an organising principle linking the 
international and domestic legal and political environments. 
Legitimacy takes on different meanings within different academic disciplines, most notably 
those of legal scholars, philosophers and social scientists57. In simple terms, legitimacy is 
seen as a tool to analyse power relationships and explain why the dominant claim power over 
56 See, David Kennedy, Of Law and war, (Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 2006) for a discussion of law 
as the language of political legitimation of war. 
57 See Jean-Marc Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) who 
argues that legitimacy, as the right to govern, is based on consent and an ethical basis for the power of the state. 
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the subservient and why the subservient obeys58. Legal scholarship tends to think in terms of 
formal rule compliance as the source of legal legitimacy and, since most law legal theory is 
grounded in domestic law, the enquiry seldom ventures beyond the municipal constitutional 
framework. However, a focus on the domestic level of analysis misses the role of legitimacy 
in international relations, where legitimacy is a measure of acceptance of state actions and the 
conferring or withholding of legitimacy is itself a form of coercion and reward. Viewed from 
this perspective it is less a question of why the subservient obey than why other actors, who 
are not necessarily subservient, see the exercise of power in question as appropriate. This is a 
much bigger picture. 
While it is commonly accepted that legality is a pre-requisite of legitimacy, there is no 
consensus about the moral and ethical content. Political philosophers argue that there must 
be some element of consent by the subservient to legitimise the power relationship, and that 
the rules (or laws) by which power is exercised must accord with the widely held beliefs of 
the particular society under investigation, but there is disagreement about the ethical 
universality or culturally specific moral basis to the concept59. Weber preferred instead to rely 
on the belief in legitimacy as a measure of the rightness of power relations60. Among legal 
scholars the domination of legal positivism requires that the rules that govern power relations, 
which for optimal results are enacted as laws, are brought into being in accordance with 
constitutional legal process and that the dominant act in accordance with those laws. Failure 
by the dominant to act in accordance with the law will thus result in a degradation of 
legitimacy. However, those promoting the inclusion of shared values in the definition of 
legitimacy point to the paucity of legality alone as a measure of legitimacy. They argue that 
58 See Dennis Wrong, Power. - Its Forms Bases and Uses, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) for a 
discussion of the exercise of power by societies, 
59 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1991), p. 16 rejecting Webber, defines 
legitimacy as comprising three levels of established rules, shared beliefs and consent. 
60 Max Weber, Economy and Society, p. 213. 
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failure to act lawfully may not result in degradation of legitimacy if the law does not reflect 
shared values. Equally, the argument runs, compliance of the dominant with a law that does 
not represent shared values serves to delegitimise the power relationship. One has only to 
compare the mixed response to an EU-wide ban on smoking in restaurants to see the 
contextual variations in legitimacy reliant on shared values. 
What exactly those shared values are is an investigation of legitimacy in context. From the 
point of view of the IDF, its own institutional legitimacy and that of its operations are 
interdependent. The context of its operations during the occupation and when at war give rise 
to judgments about its legitimacy by a number of possible actors. In the absence of 
universally held values, legitimacy like beauty is in the eye of the beholder and, depending on 
context, may or may not need to be defended. Take for instance a decision by the IDF to 
block a road connecting a Palestinian village to the highway. The villagers' beliefs about the 
occupation in general and the power of the IDF to close the road in particular, will doubtless 
be totally at variance with those of the IDF. For the villagers, the military order will not be 
legitimate. From their perspective, the fact that the military order has been issued according 
to the proper procedure mandated by the Hague Convention, and that the decision can be 
defended on grounds of military necessity, is not of itself enough to confer legitimacy. 
However, the majority of Israeli society would most likely believe the operation to be legal 
and necessary on grounds of security. For them the operation would be legitimate. Indeed, 
those on the Israeli right may believe that security needs, as constructed by the IDF, 
legitimate the operation even if it were to be illegal. On the other hand, sections of Israeli 
society, including those who espouse liberal views and oppose the continuation of the 
occupation, may not be convinced that the IDF is correctly balancing security needs with the 
harm done to village life by blocking the road in this particular instance. They may draw their 
opposition from a belief that road closures are part of a political strategy designed to weaken 
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a Palestinian administration. These views challenge the legitimacy of the IDF operation and 
the legitimacy of a key element of the IDF's administration of the territories. Here legitimacy 
is contested and the IDF will defend its legitimacy by defending both its values and its 
lawfulness. While it is easy to see that the IDF would use security as a shared value on which 
to base its claim to legitimacy, for this claim to succeed among all but its ardent supporters, 
the IDF must also persuade its critics of the legality of the operation. This process would 
have to be repeated wherever the IDF sought to defend the legitimacy of its operation, 
whether at home or abroad where differing strategies of legitimization will be employed in 
differing forums. 
With the IDF defending its legitimacy on security grounds, its critics are in the position of 
having to challenge the IDF's construction of Israel's security needs. This is a formidable 
task since, as Michael Kobi has observed, the IDF has the status of an epistemic authority in 
matters of security61. Here, the wider civil-military scholarship suggests that the military will 
be assisted in arguing their case by the militarized nature of Israeli society. It will be recalled 
that sociologists have persuasively argued that military ideology imbues Israeli culture. 
Baruch Kimmerling observed that: 
Israel has developed as a culturally and materially recruited militaristic society in which the 
component of national security has shaped its culture values and ideologies and which has 
needed an extensive construction of a convenient social reality. In turn the ideologies, politics 
and culture interfere with the `professional' military and national security considerations until 
it is almost impossible to differentiate between them62. 
61 Michael Kobi, `Military Knowledge and Weak Civilian Control in the Reality of Low Intensity Conflict -- 
The Israeli Case', Israel Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 2007. Kobi, drawing heavily on interviews with former 
Chief of General Staff CGS Ya'alon, finds weakness in civil control of the military, with the military having a 
hegemonic role in Israel's security discourse. He uses the sociological concept of `epistemic authority' to 
account for the reliance on the military as suppliers of truth. According to Kobi, the protracted low intensity 
conflict has enabled the military to create a body of knowledge unmatched by the political echelon, which has 
resulted in a progressive weakening of political control. As an epistemic authority, the Israeli military is able to 
apeal directly to the Israeli public and shape political opinion. 
6T Baruch Kimmerling, Political Subcultures and Civilian Militarism in a Settler-Immigrant Society (1998) 
p244. 
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This `cognitive militarism', based on a shared construction of security, provides the common 
values that constitute the IDF's legitimacy and accounts for its high level of institutional 
legitimacy within Israel. However, this is not to say that the IDF's construction of security is 
inviolate. Yagil Levi has charted an erosion of the IDF's prestige which he attributes to the 
rise of individualist materialism in place of the earlier collectivism that privileged national 
63 service and the institution of the army. Israel's burgeoning civil society with its vociferous 
NGOs successfully challenged the IDF's policy of maintaining a security zone in Southern 
Lebanon thereby precipitating the withdrawal from Lebanon in March 2000 64. Israeli civil 
rights groups monitor the behavior of troops at checkpoints and retired Generals publicly 
challenge the IDF's security justifications for the root of the security barrier. Nevertheless, 
Israel remains a securitized society where all aspects of personal security, but particularly 
personal and state security from terrorist attack inform all aspects of policy assessment. With 
compulsory military service and permeable boundaries between the military and civil society, 
the IDF remains well placed to defend the constructions of shared values necessary for the 
legitimation of its operations65. How these shared values inform IDF constructions of 
63 Yagil Levy, Israel's Materialist Militarism, (Madison, MD: Rowman & Littlefield/ Lexington Books, 2007). 
64 Avram Sela, 'Civil Society, the Military, and National Security: The Case of Israel's Security Zone in South 
Lebanon', Israel Studies, Vol. 12, no. 1, (2007), pp. 53-78. Sela examines Israeli civil opposition to the security 
discourse in the context of the withdrawal from Lebanon in March 2000 which was undertaken despite the 
apparent conviction on the part of the military that in the absence of an agreement with Syria the security zone 
on South Lebanon was essential to the security of Northern Israel. Defining civil society as 'those individuals, 
social groups, voluntary associations, and institutions located in an independent space beyond the close control 
of, and largely in contrast to, the state', Sela contrasts the largely compliant civil society of the first two decades 
of the state with Israeli civil society since 1970. The social cleavages and decline of collectivism saw the growth 
of protest movements after 1970, with the emergence by the 1990s of an active and diverse open and critical 
public discourse. It was into this environment that the growing protest against the continued occupation of 
Southern Lebanon emerged. Using a detailed chronology of Israel's involvement in Lebanon, and noting the 
very public opposition of CGS Moffaz to Prime Minister Barak's commitment to withdrawal, Sela argues that 
Israeli civil society led by the Four Mothers Movement forced a change in the perception of the value of the 
security zone in the face of opposition by the military to any withdrawal without an agreement with Syria. 
65 As is discussed in chapter 1, Israeli scholars favour a model of exchange of influence that allowed for a 
militarization of civil society and a civilianisation of military society. This was conceptualised in terms of 
various forms of permeability or fusion allowing gradual or interrupted exchange. Among the most prominent of 
this school are Kimmerling, Horowitz, Lissak, Maman, Peri, Ben-Eliezer and Perlmutter. 
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international humanitarian law and affect the legitimacy of operational decisions will be the 
subject of detailed consideration throughout this thesis. 
How taxing is it to defend military legitimacy on legal grounds? As with any legal defense 
this is a function of the action complained of and the law to be applied. Legality will depend 
on the interpretation given to the imprecise formulations of humanitarian law by those whose 
judgment of legitimacy is being examined. This will include both domestic and foreign 
constituencies or to adapt Mandelblit's formulation, the domestic and international fronts of 
legitimacy. On the domestic front, we have seen that the Supreme Court has imported 
international humanitarian law to regulate the activities of the IDF. The Court has made full 
use of the imprecision of the humanitarian concepts behind humanitarian law to negotiate its 
own domestic version of international law that demands at least procedural accountability of 
the IDF. In this process the Court has engaged in a struggle with the IDF setting its own 
legitimacy against that of the army in order to create law that has become the domestic 
yardstick of the legitimacy of the IDF. This legal and political process suggests that the legal 
defense of legitimacy requires the IDF to take the position of the Supreme Court seriously 
when considering the legality of proposed operations. However, law and legitimacy that are 
informed by a securitized society and a reasonably compliant Supreme Court cannot be 
viewed in isolation. To do so would create the false impression that the state's external legal 
environment fails to influence power relations internally. The role of law in these processes 
can only be understood by examining the nature and dynamics of external legitimacy. 
On the international front, an analysis of legitimacy that is based on the willingness of 
individuals to follow rules fails to provide a framework that enables a clear understanding of : 
a) What international legitimacy does, and 
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b) The strategies that states adopt to promote and defend their legitimacy and the legitimacy 
of their actions. 
c) What is the relationship between legitimacy and law? 
Those who seek to equate legitimacy with compliance with international law have a problem 
explaining the 1999 NATO Kosovo campaign against Serbia, which many commentators 
regard as unlawful but legitimate66. The conflict between law and legitimacy is evident at 
both the level of the legality of the campaign (ad bellum) and at the level of the legality of the 
individual military operations (in Bello). Russian opposition to military intervention had stood 
in the way of UN authorisation of the use of force against Serbia to end the Serbian campaign 
of ethnic cleansing. The NATO four month bombing campaign proceeded without UN 
authorisation based on tenuous legal arguments of self defence and humanitarian assistance. 
In the absence of a ground invasion, NATO flew more than 38,000 sorties at a minimum 
height of 15,000 feet with the inevitable mistakes resulting in the death of civilians as well as 
controversial targeting of civilian infrastructure. Many legal commentators have suggested 
that NATO breached international law by failing to take adequate measures to distinguish 
between civilian and military targets, and that there was adequate evidence of criminal 
involvement that was not perused because the campaign was widely regarded as a legitimate 
use of force irrespective of the legal position. To be sure, there are many who regard the 
campaign legitimate and legal, although Robert Sloane, writing in the Yale Journal of 
International Law, makes a strong argument that it is because the war aims were regarded as 
legitimate that a favourable legal interpretation was applied67. In any event, there is a wide 
body of opinion that the NATO Kosovo campaign was unlawful but legitimate. In short, there 
67 Robert D. Sloane, `The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the 
Contemporary Law of War', The Yale Journal of International Law, 2009, Vol. 34, p. 93-96. This was made 
possible by the imprecision of the key provisions of IHL and will be further discussed in chapter 4. 
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is weighty academic support for the view that the action was legitimate despite being 
unlawful and for the rather more nuanced view that the operation was judged to be legal 
because it was legitimate. The former position separates the legal judgment from the 
legitimacy of the operation, while the latter has the law contingent on a judgment of 
legitimacy. 
Conversely, military action can be viewed as lawful but illegitimate- a position adopted in 
relation to the Israeli interception of the Turkish Flotilla on 31 May 2010 by thows who 
accept the legal form of the blockade but not its morality. The Flotilla interception will be 
considered in greater detail in chapter six, but for the purposes of the present discussion it is 
sufficient to recall that in May 2010 six ships sailed from Turkey to demonstrate solidarity 
with the people of Gaza by delivering humanitarian aid by sea direct to Gaza in contravention 
of the Israeli blockade. Five ships were intercepted by the Israeli navy and diverted to the 
Israeli port of Ashdod without injury. However, Israeli commandos killed nine activists 
during the interception of the Mavi Marmara. Israel has defended its actions in terms of the 
legality of the maritime blockade, compliance with the laws of the sea and, once on board, 
the legal right of self defence. Nevertheless, there is a tacit understanding that good legal 
arguments are not going to deliver legitimacy among those whose sympathies are with the 
suffering people of Gaza. Equally, those who accept the Israeli narrative that the Turkish 
NGO that organised the flotilla, the Human Relief Foundation (IHH), is a front organisation 
for supporters of a Hamas, are unlikely to be deterred by legal argument from their belief in 
the legitimacy of the Israeli navy interception. In practice, those who are in favour of the 
interception characterise it as legal, while those who are against regard it as illegal. The point 
to be emphasised here is that, either the law (whether the interception was legal) is 
constructed through a political process of choice informed by notions of legitimacy or it is 
actually displaced by legitimacy. This means in practice that parties, whether combatants or 
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those sitting in judgment of them, can insist on an exception where the law fail to deliver 
what they regard as a legitimate outcome. If this is the case, it might be wondered whether 
law matters. In fact, it is the understanding that a disconnection between law and legitimacy 
is the exception that proves the rule that we expect a connection between the two and that law 
does matter. 
It follows that, when looking at legitimacy as a feature of Israel's external environment, an 
allowance must be made for the potential disconnection between law and legitimacy. In 
support of this position, I propose to adopt, with minor adaption, Ian Clark's persuasive 
analysis of legitimacy as argued in his Legitimacy in International Society68. Clark's thesis, 
simply stated, is that international legitimacy is in a hierarchical relationship with the norms 
of law, morality and constitutionality whereby legitimacy incorporates all three but is greater 
than their sum. Clarke sees legitimacy as a politically mediated expression of law, morality 
and constitutionality intended to convey a judgment of the entitlement to exercise power 
and/or the entitlement to exercise power in a particular way. The hierarchical positioning of 
legitimacy recognises the political space in which a consensus judgment is formed. This 
identification of a political space allows for political contestation, which attributes relative 
importance to considerations of law, morality and constitutionality as well as mediating 
differing conceptions of each. The process of political contestation allows considerations of 
law to be taken into account along with moral positions and the informal rules of political 
interaction that produces a position that is different from the sum of all three. In this way 
legitimacy may reflect a moral position that differs from the legal. This is not because 
legitimacy has a normative measure of its own that can be applied to legality; rather it reflects 
the result of political contestation whereby normative positions are mediated and greater 
weight may be given to other considerations. 
68 Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003). 
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To be sure, the particular normative positions of law, morality and constitutionality are also 
the subject of political contestation informed by the perceived political preferences of the 
actors involved. To arrive at a position on the legitimacy of military action requires 
consideration of the legality of the action, which is itself based on a particular view of IHL. It 
will be an ongoing theme of this thesis that IHL requires the balancing of the requirements of 
military efficiency and civilian protection that produces grey areas of legal imprecision that 
allow for pluralistic interpretations of IHL to particular facts- in other words a choice of law. 
The core international law principles of distinction, proportionality and military necessity are 
subject to the pushes and pulls of actors with differing views of what the law allows in war. 
Consequently, legal positions on the same events differ and are themselves subject to political 
contestation in the process of arriving at a consensus position on the legitimacy of the acts in 
question. As will be seen in later chapters, in Israel the conduct of military operations is 
regulated by a particular view of what the law allows when fighting non state actors who 
conceal themselves among their civilians. This legal position is both informed by, and 
consistent with, an ethical position on the limits of the IDF's duty to protect such civilians 
from harm. 
Of course, the moral position itself is the subject of contestation both in Israel and abroad. 
Just War theory is the specialist area of the moral consideration of acts of war and, as will be 
explored in greater detail later in this thesis, there are divergent opinions between traditional 
and modern strands of the discipline on crucial issues such as the degree of personal risk that 
soldiers should assume in order to reduce the risk of harm to enemy civilians and, even more 
fundamentally, whether the obligations of combatants should vary according to the justice of 
their cause. 
Clark's category of constitutionality is a catch all for expectations of the organisation of 
behaviour that lack normative force; expectations of behaviour in war, such as a preference 
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for multilateralism over unilateralism are influential in constructing a consensus for 
legitimacy. The fact that action was taken against Serbia by NATO rather than as unilateral 
state action went a long way towards compensating for the lack of a UN resolution 
authorising force. Similarly the construction of a coalition against Iraq that included Arab 
states helped compensate for the failure to secure a second UN resolution. This assumes that 
an importance is given to multilateral action as an expected mode of behaviour, which is then 
fed into the normative mix that produces the consensus on the legitimacy of the campaign. 
An alternative constitutionality view can be found in US constructions of legitimacy that 
attach less importance to the views of international institutions on the grounds that 
international input lacks democratic credentials and expectations of behaviour are modified 
accordingly. To be sure, expectations of behaviour change and are constantly being 
negotiated and re-negotiated so that, as with law and morality, the aspects of constitutionality 
that helps form the consensus position on legitimacy is subject to continuing political 
contestation. 
The importance of the foregoing analysis is that it identifies the political space for actors to 
engage in the processes of the construction of consensus legitimacy through the adoption of 
strategies of legitimisation. Clark's analysis links legitimacy to conceptions of international 
society to capture the dual role of legitimacy as a measure of entitlement of state actors to 
join a wider society of states and of legitimacy as a judgment of the entitlement to exercise 
power in a particular way. Seeing legitimacy in the role of gatekeeper enables an 
understanding of state legitimacy in international terms that allows a discussion of the 
legitimacy of the Israeli state as setting benchmarks for admission to international society 
rather than Israel's right to exist. This raises the strategic questions of: whose society does 
Israel want to be a member of, what strategies of legitimisation are employed and where does 
the political contestation take place? 
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This thesis adopts the position that international society is composed of a number of centres 
of power with differing institutional arrangements and adopting differing consensus positions 
on the legitimacy of the behaviour of states. In communitarian terms, this is seen by Emanuel 
Adler as overlapping international and transnational communities of shared values and 
expectations of behaviour69. Communities exercise power through exclusion and inclusion 
with legitimacy as a measure of acceptability. As Adler puts it, `Knowledge is rarely value- 
neutral, but frequently enters into the creation and reproduction of a particular social order 
that benefits some at the expense of others. In this reading, power is primarily the 
institutional power to include and exclude, to legitimise and authorise'70. 
Legal scholarship, missing legitimacy as an organising principle, can only identify a major 
fault line running between military legal practitioners and humanitarian lawyers in their legal 
critiques of military conflict. Observing strategies in defence of legitimacy reveals the 
dynamics whereby institutions and actors form consensus positions on the legitimacy of 
particular actions in response to the pushes and pulls of political interaction. Institutions and 
communities differ so that the EU, the US, the Arab League, the Organisation of African 
States and NGOs of differing persuasions, to name but a few, have differing consensus views 
of the legitimacy of state actions. The policy implication of this analysis is that the question is 
not so much whether Israel values its international legitimacy, so much as whose legitimacy 
judgment counts and how is it influenced. 
Put simply, although law cannot be equated with legitimacy, law matters to the promotion 
and defence of legitimacy and has become the dominant discourse for the expression of the 
legitimacy of military conflict. It is this interaction between law and legitimacy that gives law 
the coercive power so often missed by the legal scholars. There are policy implications to 
69 Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International 
Relations, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). 
70 Ibid, p. 194 
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how to respond. Where international legitimacy is seen as important, law and lawyers are 
mobilised in support and choices made about whose law matters. As will be observed in the 
course of this thesis, UN fact finding missions are becoming a major factor. The Goldstone 
Mission can be understood to be a site of political contestation that is important to the 
construction of consensus views of Israeli legitimacy. To be sure there is a long history of 
Israeli distrust of the UN and its humanitarian agencies but Israel's decision not to cooperate 
with the Goldstone Mission's investigation of compliance with IHL during the 2009 war in 
Gaza is now regarded by most Israeli commentators as having been a mistake. This is not a 
reversal of Israel's oft stated position on the bias of UN involvement in the region, but rather 
a growing awareness that the Mission's findings of Israeli breaches of IHL have been very 
damaging to Israel's international legitimacy71. Those Israelis who care about the outside 
world worry about Israel's declining legitimacy. As Tony Blaire put it in 2009, `This leads 
me to my final point. It is our collective duty - yours and mine - to argue vigorously against 
the de-legitimisation of Israel. It is also our collective duty to arm ourselves with an argument 
and a narrative we can defend and with which we can answer the case against Israel, with 
pride and confidence'. Increasingly, the argument is a legal one and the narrative is 
international humanitarian law. 
The Goldstone Mission's findings, and the Israeli responses to them, will be closely 
examined in the course of this thesis to test the third hypothesis: that the growing 
involvement of military lawyers in IDF operational decision-making is in response to the 
demands of internal and external legitimacy and the strategic defence of legitimacy by the 
Israeli state. 
71 See, `Tony Blair welcomes re-start of direct peace talks during Herzlya speech', the Office of Tony Blair, 
available at, http: //www. tonyblairoffice. or: /news/entrv/tony-blair-welcomes-re-start-of-direct-peace-talks- 
durin -hg erzliya-specch/. Last accessed 3/2/2010. 
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The foregoing analysis supports the hypothesis that the increased involvement of lawyers in 
military decision-making is, in part, an institutional reaction to the increased use of 
humanitarian law as a measure of the legitimacy of military action. 
6) Conclusion 
Any meaningful examination of the role of the IDF military lawyers requires an 
understanding of the legal environment and its political significance. The foregoing analysis 
has considered a municipal legal environment dominated by the Israeli Supreme Court and an 
international environment featuring strengthening, but largely inefficient, legal institutions 
that are given added traction by activist employment of the universal jurisdiction and the 
legal reports of the UN and private NGOs. Examination of each of these aspects of the legal 
environment provides support for the hypotheses to be tested in this thesis concerning 
changes to the IDF's external environment: that the increased involvement of lawyers in 
Israeli military decision-making is an institutional reaction by the IDF to the following 
changes in its external environment: 
a) The application of international law by the Israeli Supreme Court. 
b) The threat of foreign prosecutions of Israeli decision-makers for war crimes. 
c) The increased use of humanitarian law as a measure of the legitimacy of military 
actions. 
However, to view these as separate legal environments is to miss the dynamic relationship 
between domestic political actors, including the courts and those who use them, and the 
international, whereby political judgments about Israeli military actions are informed by and 
determine legal opinion. Neither Israeli Supreme Court, not Israeli civil and military actors, is 
remote from the international legal environment. Law matters to the military throughout the 
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legal environment and it matters because of the relationship between law and legitimacy, 
without which the IDF cannot win its wars. This makes the strategies in defence of legitimacy 
important; not least the legal defence of military operations and the choice of law with which 
to seek mount the defence. It follows that a clearer picture of what IHL actually requires of 
the military is needed before these processes can be subjected to empirical examination. 
The next chapter will examine the key provisions of IHL that seek simultaneously to allow 
the efficient conduct of warfare and the protection of civilians. It is this balance that is at the 
core of the legality of the IDF's operations and meat and drink to the military lawyers. If, as 
is argued throughout this thesis, the lawyers and communities of practice are exercising 
choice in their distinction between the lawful and the unlawful, it can only be understood and 
measured by first stripping the legal provisions of their mystery. The following chapter will 
expose the `grey areas' of legal provisions that attempt to regulate military targeting and 
which are conventionally seen as the source of legal disagreement. 
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Chapter 3: Advising in the Grey Area. 
1) Introduction 
This chapter examines the extent to which military legal advisers exercise choice in the 
construction of their advice on what is legal and what is illegal in war. With the legitimacy of 
warfare increasingly contingent upon the extent of civilian suffering in war, the chapter 
focuses on the legal restraints on targeting civilians. The investigation takes the form of a 
separate consideration of the principles of distinction and proportionality that inform IHL 
regulation of targeting. 
There is a tension at the heart of IHL between enabling the business of war (military 
necessity) while seeking to protect civilians (humanity) that produces an imprecision, which 
generates contradictory understandings of the legality of military operations. A brief review 
of the legal opinions expressed in relation to NATO's 1999 air campaign against Serbia and 
Israel's 2009 military conflict in Gaza illustrates the plurality of legal positions. An 
understanding of the law relating to targeting reveals an area of legal uncertainty that is 
sometimes called the `grey area' between the obviously legal and the obviously illegal. This 
chapter focuses on the grey areas of proportionality and distinction in targeting decisions to 
illustrate the extent and nature of the grey area and to consider the latitude available to 
military lawyers in deciding what is legal and what is illegal when presented with details of a 
planned attack. 
It will be argued that the interpretation of legal provisions that require a balancing of the 
value of civilian life against that of military objects demands a moral and ethical judgment by 
the legal advisor in deciding what is legally permissible. A clear understanding of the 
interplay of law and morality in war is therefore essential if the adoption of a legal discourse 
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of legitimacy in relation to acts of war is not to obscure the essential role of morality and 
ethics in military decision-making and inhibit a proper understanding of the role of military 
lawyers. While legal commentators are quick to recognise the moral and ethical content of 
decisions made by military commanders, lawyers are reluctant to recognise the moral and 
ethical influences on their own decision-making in the course of their construction of their 
legal advice. The argument will be developed to assert that the legal advisers themselves, in 
formulating their targeting advice, are in practice making the ethical choices identified and 
discussed by Just War theorists and that the process of ethical evaluation is concealed within 
a legal discourse. The contribution of Just War scholarship will be examined in the following 
chapter in order to create a synthesis of legal and Just War scholarship that will aid the 
understanding of the process of construction of military legal advice. 
This recognition of the ethical choices inherent in the construction of legal advice on 
targeting then raises questions, which will be addressed later on in the thesis, concerning how 
these moral and ethical choices are made and what institutional influences shape and 
constrain them. Further, the investigation leads to an understanding that by relying on IHL 
and the lawyers to confer, defend and challenge the legitimacy of military decision-making, 
the essential moral and ethical debate remains unexplored, undeveloped and dangerously 
ignored. These issues, the instrumental reasoning behind confining the debate to a legal 
discourse and the dangers inherent in such an approach, will be explored in later chapters. 
In short, the point to be emphasised here is that the legal investigation reveals grey areas of 
IHL, particularly as they apply to targeting decisions, which creates space for the exercise of 
choice by the IDF lawyers in the construction of their legal advice to the military. How this 
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choice is exercised in practice is the subject matter of this thesis and will be explored in later 
chapters. 
2) The legal principles of distinction and proportionality 
As was discussed in chapterl, the legitimacy of going to war, and indeed continuing the war, 
is increasingly conditional on defending the legality of civilian suffering. Until the twentieth 
century war was usually fought by armies against armies in areas remote from civilian 
populations. With the advent of total war civilians became caught up in the killing with 
increasing frequency. This trend has gathered pace with modern warfare often conducted in 
centres of population where combatants mingle with civilians. This style of warfare increases 
the likelihood of death and injury to civilians and devastation of civilian property and 
infrastructures. These developments, coupled with the exposure of war to twenty four hour 
news media, make the legality of targeting decisions a key judgment in war. 
Legal advisors brought in by the military to advise on the legality of targeting decisions are 
applying the jus in Bello principles of distinction and proportionality. The traditional 
distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is between the law concerning going to war 
and laws concerning the way wars are conducted. When jus ad bellum fails to prevent war, 
jus in bello seeks to minimise its brutality'. IHL jus in bello, principles of distinction and 
proportionality are central to the legal assessment of targeting decisions. Distinction separates 
civilians and civilian objects, that cannot be intentionally targeted, from combatants and 
military objectives that can. Having decided that the target is a military objective then, and 
only then, the proportionality test comes into play, allowing the incidental unintended killing 
' The structure of IHL and the extent to which this separation between the two legal codes is a legal fiction is 
discussed in chapter 5. 
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of civilians and destruction of civilian objects unless it is excessive in relation to the 
anticipated military advantage. The civilian victims of the proportionality calculus are 
popularly referred to as collateral damage- a term far too crude to be included in the legal 
discourse. Distinction and proportionality will now be considered in greater detail to 
understand how these principles work in practice. 
2.1) Distinction 
The legal codification of the requirement to avoid civilian injury 2 can be traced back to the 
Lieber Code prepared at Lincoln's request as a guide for the conduct of the Union forces 
during the American Civil War3, and appeared in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations4, the 
1947 Geneva Conventions5 and in its modern form in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I of 
19776. The articles referring to distinction are accepted by non-signatories as an expression 
of customary international law and are therefore binding on all states, not just the treaty 
signatories. Customary international law is a general practice accepted as law by states and 
respected legal commentators so that key provisions of treaty obligations such as the 
1977Additional Protocol 1 are accepted as law by states such as the US and Israel who are 
not signatories. 7Article 48 provides that, 
2I use `civilian injury' to include death and injury to civilians and damage and destruction to civilian property. 
3 War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in 
the Field, General Orders No 100, Lieber Code, 24 April 1863, Art22. 
4 Convention [No II] with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with annex of regulations, Art 22, 
29 July 1899,32 Stat 1803,1 Bevans 247; Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
annex to Convention (No IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, 18 Oct 1907, Art 22,36 Stat 2277,1 Bevans 631. 
5 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field (12 Aug 1949) 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed 
Forces at Sea (12 Aug 1949) 75 UNTS 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(12 Aug 1949) 75 UNTS 135; and Geneva Convention 
6 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Armed Conflict usually abbreviated to API. 
7 Customary international law is "a general practice accepted as law". Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, 1945, Art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055. See also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, `Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict', 
International Review of the Red Cross, 87(857), 2005,175-212. 
83 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the 
parties to the conflict at all times shall distinguish between civilian population and combatants 
and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives. 
Further, Article 51(2) provides that, `The civilian population as such, as well as individual 
civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of 
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited'. 
The same article goes on to provide that, `attacks shall be limited strictly to military 
objectives'. Civilian objects are defined by Article 52(1) as `all objects which are not military 
objectives'. Questions then arise in relation to who exactly is a civilian and what are civilian 
objects and military objectives. As will be seen, the answers are far from clear. 
Modern asymmetric warfare with its blurring of distinction between irregular forces and 
civilians leading to confusion over who can be targeted, and the fact that war is increasingly 
conducted in cities rather than remote battlefields, brings added urgency to the need for an 
agreed measure of distinction. Civilians are defined as persons other than combatants and are 
protected from attack so long as they are not taking a direct part in hostilities. Combatants 
are defined by Article 4(a) Geneva Convention (III) of 1949 as only those: 
1. Commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, 
2. Displaying a fixed distinguished emblem recognisable at a distance, 
3. Carrying arms openly 
4. Conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
On customary international law generally, see Yoram Dinstein, "The Interplay between Customary International 
Law and Treaties", 322 Recueil des Cours 246 (2006) and Michael J Matheson 'The United States Position on 
the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions', (1987), 2, American University Journal of International Law and Policy, p. 419 
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It is very difficult for a guerrilla group to meet these requirements. The position was radically 
altered by Additional Protocol 1 of 1977 (AP 1) which reduces the requirements to be met by 
irregular forces in order to be treated as combatants. The requirement is reduced to that of 
carrying arms openly during hostilities. However, the protocol was not ratified by, among 
others, the US and Israel who objected to a redefinition that conferred combatant status and 
privileges to groups that many saw as terrorists. Consequently, the reduced requirements for 
irregular forces are not seen as part of customary international law. This leaves a degree of 
uncertainty about the status of irregular combatants that do not comply with the Geneva 
formula. This raises the question of the status of people engaged in hostilities who do not 
meet the combatant criteria. In particular, how do you differentiate them from civilians and 
when can they be intentionally targeted? 
The US concept of `unlawful combatant' is absent from the Conventions. Instead, the status 
is determined by loss of protection from attack normally accorded to civilians. Article 51.3 
AP I provides that civilians shall enjoy protection against the dangers arising from military 
operations `unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities'. There is no clear 
consensus on the correct legal definition of direct participation in hostilities so that, again the 
status of irregulars remains uncertain. When can a supporter of Hamas be targeted by the 
military? What amounts to `direct participation' and how long is `for such time'? The Israel 
High Court of Justice, the only Supreme Court of international standing that has examined 
the issue8, found that the provision covered all persons that performed the functions of 
combatants, including, 
a civilian bearing arms (open or concealed) who is on his way to the place where he will use 
them against the army, at such a place, or on his way back from it' as well as `a person who 
collected intelligence on the army, whether on issues regarding the hostilities ... or beyond 
those issues...; a person who transports unlawful combatants to or from the place where the 
8 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel, HCJ 769/02, pp. 34-35. 
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hostilities are taking place; a person who operated weapons which unlawful combatants use, 
or supervises their operation or provided services to them, be the distance from the battlefield 
as it may. 
This definition, although adopted by the Israeli Supreme Court, has not been universally 
endorsed and is wider and more permissive than the practice of some other jurisdictions. 
Notice in particular the breadth of `provided services to them, be the distance from the 
battlefield as it may'. The Court had been in particular pains to interpret `for such time as' the 
provision in such a way that there was no protection for civilians who were in between 
combat operations. This wide interpretation of the circumstances in which civilians lose their 
privileged status is particularly relevant to targeting decisions where organisations such as 
Hamas make no clear distinction between their combatants and civilians and the practical 
consequences will be examined in greater detail in the case studies. Suffice to say, at this 
stage, that the IDF lawyer has a large degree of choice about where to draw the line between 
the legal and the illegal targeting of civilians who are in some way associated with military 
attacks on Israel. 
The loss of civilian protection from attack through participation in hostilities enables a 
distinction to be made between voluntary human shields who are civilians participating in 
hostilities and involuntary human shields who are not9. Having established who can be 
targeted, the distinction tends to create rather than resolve confusion in the case of detention. 
While there is a general understanding that civilians who have lost their privileged status can 
be killed as combatants, there is a widespread reluctance to allow them the `privileges' of 
combatants in the event of their capture1°. This leads to differing standards of detention on a 
case by case basis that has required domestic legislation by the detaining state. In Israel, 
9 See, Michael N. Schmitt, 'Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law', available at, 
http: //www. marshallcenter. org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/HShlds-Schmitt. pdf . (Last accessed 
1/12/09). 
10 See Kenneth Watkin, 'Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, And The Struggle 
Over Legitimacy', 2 Occasional Paper Series (Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard 
University, Winter 2005), at: http: //www. hpcr. org/pdfs/OccasionalPaper2. pdf. (Last accessed 1/12/09). 
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relevant law is the Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002, which allows for 
the detention of civilians that have taken direct or indirect part in hostilities". However, the 
legal controversy over the US treatment of detainees has tended to overshadow the import of 
the interpretation of the provision for the prior crucial decision of whether or not civilians 
have lost their privilege of immunity from attack. The point to be emphasised is that the 
imprecision of the provision means that despite the contribution of the Israeli Supreme Court, 
such targeting decisions are made in a grey area of legal imprecision. 
In order for state practice and international law to keep up with the changing demands of 
warfare, in 2003 the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) convened forty 
experts in international law to consider changes to the law relating to combatants. According 
to Professor Michael Schmitt who participated in the study, the conclusions, published in the 
form of Interpretive Guidance by the ICRC in 200912 after six years of discussion, represent 
the view of the ICRC but not all of the participants and is unlikely to be adopted by sufficient 
states to become an accepted statement of international law13. In fact none of the experts 
would put their name to the finished document! The problem was that there was no 
agreement on the correct balance to be struck between the humanitarian values championed 
by the ICRC and the interests of states in the efficient conduct of their military operations. 
The document itself states that the guidance cannot be an expression of law until it is written 
into treaty or becomes the accepted practice of states and lack of endorsement by its 
consulting experts does not bode well for a rapid transition of the recommendations into law. 
Nevertheless, the opinions of the ICRC are important guides to state conduct and will be 
11 The full text is available at, http: //www. iewishvirtuallihrary. ori/isource/Politics/IncarcerationLaw. pdf. (Last 
accessed 12/1/10). 
lz `Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian 
Law', ICRC, May 2009, available at, http: //www. icrc. org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0990. pdf. (Last 
accessed 1/12/09). 
13 This view was expressed by Professor Michael Schmitt at a conference on 'Operationalizing the Geneva 
Conventions' at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law on 13 October 2009 attended by the 
author. 
87 
influential on at least some operational decision-making. The Guidance addresses the 
problems of identifying combatants and the circumstances in which civilians lose their 
protected status, becoming unlawful combatants or unprivileged civilians. The key provision 
under review is the condition of protection of civilians, `unless and for such time as they take 
a direct part in hostilities'. 
In considering combatant status the Guidance distinguishes between international armed 
conflict and non-international armed conflict. It adopts the position that in international 
armed conflict the well known four requirements of regular armed forces of, (a) responsible 
command; (b) fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) carrying arms openly; and 
(d) operating in accordance with the laws and customs of war do not apply to irregular forces 
for the purpose of distinguishing combatants from civilians 14. For this purpose, `all armed 
actors showing a sufficient degree of military organization and belonging to a party to the 
conflict must be regarded as part of the armed forces of that party' 15 
The Guidance also addresses the issue of how to regard armed groups in non-international 
armed conflicts. Here the Guidance intends to limit the loss of civilian status by 
distinguishing members of non-state parties to hostilities from civilians that take occasional 
part in the fighting. This is achieved by applying the requirement that combatant status only 
applies to those members of a non-state party armed group who are part of its military wing 
14 These requirements being relevant to entitlement to certain privileges after capture such as prisoner of war 
status but are not required for combatant status itself. 
See Michael N. Schmitt, `The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A 
Critical Analysis', Harvard National Security Journal 1: 5-44, `The concept of civilian status is the greatest 
source of controversy, albeit principally with respect to the IHL governing detention. Reduced to basics, the 
issue, which surfaces only in international armed conflict, is whether civilians who take up arms qualify for 
treatment as: 1) prisoners of war under the 1949 Third Geneva Convention; 2) civilians under the 1949 Fourth 
Geneva Convention; or 3) "unlawful combatants" who enjoy only basic protection, such as that set forth in 
Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 75 of Additional Protocol I. ' Available at, 
htti): //www. harvardnsi. com/wl2-content/uploads/2010/05/Vol. -1 Schmitt Final. pdf. (Last accessed 2/12/09). 15 Interpretive Guidance, p22. 
88 
and whose `continuous function is to take a direct part in hostilities'. Controversially, 
membership is not enough, and members in a reserve capacity who await the call to duty do 
not qualify. It can readily be seen that the intent of the guidance is to resolve uncertainty over 
combat status of non-state actors in non-international armed conflicts by increasing the 
entitlement to protected civilian status. A similar approach is taken to the circumstances in 
which civilian protection from attack is lost. This turns on the interpretation of `for such time 
as they take a direct part in hostilities' and the Guidance expressly records that there is no 
international consensus on the correct interpretation of this requirement: 
`Treaty IHL does not define direct participation in hostilities, nor does a clear interpretation of 
the concept emerge from State practice or international jurisprudence. The notion of direct 
participation in hostilities must therefore be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to its constituent terms in their context and in light of the object 
and purpose of IHLi16. (emphasis added) 
As we have seen, the ICRC is the first to admit that there is no accepted ruling on where the 
boundaries lie between `support for and assistance to an armed group' and `direct part in 
hostilities', nor is there any consensus on when the involvement can be said to have ended. If 
the ordinary meaning of the words of the provision where clear there would be no 
uncertainty. Since they are not, the legal advisor is directed to `good faith' and `the objects 
and purposes of IHL'. The Guidance lists examples of possible involvement that would reach 
the threshold criteria and seeks to maintain protection from attack for civilians whose 
involvement is seen as removed from involvement by time or causation. The Guidance 
concludes by applying the principles of military necessity and humanity to require that 
civilians are given the benefit of any doubt and protected from no more suffering than is 
`actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing 
circumstances'. 
16 Interpretive Guidance, p. 41. 
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The Guidance seeks to justify the `revolving door' of repeated civilian participation in 
hostilities without loss of civilian protection by defending the distinction between belonging 
to an armed group and infrequent involvementl7. This immunity from attack during `rest and 
recreation' is unlikely to find universal acceptance. There is a widespread distaste for the idea 
that civilians can repeatedly take part in armed conflict without loss of civilian status. The 
guidance that the smuggling and hiding of weapons18 is not taking a direct part in hostilities 
and the requirement that the involvement in hostilities has to reach a threshold of harm, are 
equally controversial. The guidance concludes by considering the degree of force to be used 
against a civilian that has lost protection from attack. In these circumstances the degree of 
force should be no more than `actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose 
in the prevailing circumstances' 19. In arriving at this conclusion the Guidance relies on the 
IHL general principles of humanity and military necessity to extend a presumption in favour 
of protection. This was clearly a step too far for many of the experts. Nevertheless, the fact 
that there are divergent views on whether such an approach is required by law shows the 
breadth of legal choice to be exercised by the lawyers when constructing their legal opinions. 
This review of the 2009 ICRC Guidance shows that, despite the ICRC's best efforts and those 
of its forty experts, there remains imprecision and uncertainty at the heart of the principle of 
distinction when applied to the crucial issues of civilian immunity from attack. Perhaps the 
point to be emphasised is that the level of disagreement between the experts was such that the 
Guidance has been published without any record of their identity lest they be construed as 
agreeing with the contents. Michael N. Schmitt, who was one of the experts, has published 
detailed criticisms of the content and regards the framework as being so skewed towards 
17 Interpretive Guidance, p. 70. 
'$ Interpretive Guidance, p. 66. 
19 Interpretive Guidance, p82. 
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humanitarian principles as to be impractical20. Schmitt identifies a `grey area' where there is 
no precision about what constitutes `direct participation', 
But what of doubt as to whether conduct being engaged in by a civilian (or one presumed to 
be a civilian when status is unclear) amounts to direct participation? As should be apparent 
from the disagreement surrounding the various particular examples cited earlier, many 
activities fall into a grey area where reasonable observers differ. 21 
If reasonable observers differ on whether a civilian can be legally targeted, there is a choice 
to be made by the military lawyers in constructing their legal advice. This is advising in the 
grey area. As will be discussed throughout this thesis, and particularly in the case studies, 
these issues are central to the legality of Israel's conduct of its military operations against 
groups such as Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon who fight without uniforms and 
conceal their fighters and their military equipment among their civilians. 
There are similar problems in the other key area of distinction, that of identifying military 
objectives and distinguishing them from civilian objects. In other words, not who but what 
can be legally attacked? When, for example, is a Hamas government building or a Lebanese 
power station a lawful military target? 22 
Additional Protocol 1, Article 52 (2) describes military objectives as, 'those objects which by 
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage'. 
20 Michael N. Schmitt, `Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements. New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics', 2010,42: 697-739, available at, 
http: //www. law. nyu. edu/ecm-dlv3/groups/public/@nvu law website journals__ journal of international law 
and politics/documents/documents%cm pro 065931, pdf. Last accessed 3/12/09. 
21 Ibid. p. 737. 
22 These specific operations will be analysed in the case studies. 
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It can be seen that an object can be regarded as military object by reference to its nature, 
purpose or use. This definition begins with those objects whose very nature is military. 
Discussing nature, Dinstein lists sixteen categories of military object which he regards as 
non-exhaustive, including power plants that serve the military and mainline railways and 
motorways23. `Purpose' denotes an established intention to use an object for military 
purposes. Finally, there is actual use. This latter category brings in what would otherwise be 
civilian objects that have been shared with or taken over by the military and are usually 
referred to as `dual use' targets. These dual use objects have a capacity to expose civilians to 
harm. 
Article 52(3) is intended to provide some protection to civilians by requiring that if there is 
doubt about the military use of civilian objects, the presumption must be in favour of civilian 
use. The provision is further limited by the requirement that the object must `make an 
effective contribution to military action' and its destruction must offer a `definite military 
advantage'. 
Dinstein discusses a list of problem areas including: retreating troops such as those targeted 
during the Gulf War, targeting individuals, police, industrial plants, oil and other minerals, 
electricity grids, airports, trains, trucks and bridges, civilian TV and radio stations, 
government offices and political leadership. Dinstein argues that in certain circumstances all 
the foregoing can be deemed military targets24. This means that targeting decisions become 
less about a list of types of object than they are about looking at the use to which the object is 
being put. This militates from the general to the specific and there are few if any objects that 
have not been at one time or another used for military purposes. 
23 Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conduct, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 88-89. 
24 Ibid, p 94-99. 
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As Fenwick observes, 
`There has been relatively little discussion in the relevant literature of what constitutes a 
military objective and why, since the adoption of Protocol I in 1977. To the extent that a 
debate has occurred, it has tended to consist of quoting the Protocol I definition, listing the 
target categories, and affirming that the objects within the categories are or are not military 
objectives' S. 
In Fact, although there is little discussion in the literature, these issues are continuously 
discussed in another strand of the legal discourse, NGO reports, including those of UN 
mandated missions and state responses to them. This was certainly the case in the aftermath 
of the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia, which took place between 24 March 1999 
till 9 June 1999, when bodies, including Human Rights Watch26 and Amnesty27, that had 
reported that NATO had committed clear war crimes, petitioned the Prosecutor for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to investigate allegations of 
NATO war crimes. With a court and prosecutor in place, this was an opportunity to 
demonstrate the strength of IHL. The Prosecutor established a committee to review the 
allegations but to the outrage many commentators the Review Committee reported that there 
were no grounds for an investigation, let alone prepare charges28. 
The aim of the military operation had been to demonstrate NATO's opposition to Serbian 
aggression, deter Serbian attacks on civilians and damage Serbia's capacity to wage war29. 
The NATO bombing campaign, Operation Allied Force, which was conducted without 
u W. J. Fenrick, `Targeting and Proportionality during the NATO Bombing Campaign against Yugoslavia', 
European Journal of International Law, (2001), vol. 12 No. 3,489-502. 
26 Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, (2000). 
27 Amnesty International, Collateral Damage' or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO 
During Operation Allied Force, (2000). 
28 `International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor for the Committee 
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', 8 June 
2000,39 International Legal Materials, (2000), p. 1257. 
29 Cohen and Shelton, `Joint Statement on Kosovo after Action Review in the US Mission to NATO', Security 
Issue Digest, 14 October 1999. 
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NATO loss of life, was criticised by Amnesty and Human Rights Watch both in terms of 
choice of target and the height at which the air force operated. The target list comprised: 
military forces, security forces, command and control facilities, integrated air defence system, 
military-industrial infrastructure, the media and broadcasting system, supply routes, lines of 
communications, bridges, government ministries and refneries3o 
Michael Schmitt links the strategy to the development of `effects based' targeting and its 
influence on US targeting doctrine31. This is largely derived from Colonel John A. Warden, 
USAF (ret. )'s `Five Strategic Rings Theory' which advocates skipping over the armies in the 
field and attacking the enemy `inside out'32. This targeting of political leadership, economic 
systems, and supporting infrastructure as well as military forces seeks to degrade both the 
ability and the political will to fight. Provided that civilians are not the target, degrading 
popular support for war is a legitimate military object. While there is nothing new in targeting 
infrastructure, the important point here is the doctrinal shift of emphasis away from degrading 
military assets. Inevitably, according to Schmitt, this type of warfare amounts to an indirect 
targeting of the civilian infrastructure from a distance. 
The legal disagreements concerning the deliberate NATO targeting of RTS, the Serbian state 
television headquarters and studios on 23 April 1999 illustrate the value judgments implicit in 
the application of the distinction principle. As in all areas of IHL legal dispute, the argument 
is between those legal commentators who attach greater importance to the humanitarian 
principles and those who lean towards the achievement of military objectives. The attack was 
condemned by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch on the grounds that RTS had 
30 Cohen and Shelton, 'Joint Statement of Kosovo Air Action Review in the US Mission to NATO', Security 
Issues Digest, 14 October 1999. Quoted by W. J. Fenrick, 'Targeting and Proportionality', at p. 495. 
31 Michael N. Schmitt, 'Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues', Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, 
33, pp. 59-104,2003. See also, Michael N. Schmitt. 'Effects Based Operations and the Law of Aerial Warfare', 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 2006,5: 265-293. 
32 J. W. Crawford, 'The Law of Non-combatant Immunity and the Targeting of National Electrical Power 
Systems', Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 21, (Summer-Fall, 1997), p. 101. 
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been targeted as a source of propaganda. While the Committee accepted the NATO position 
that the broadcasting system was capable of use as part of the Serbian command and control 
network and therefore a military object, the Committee went on to consider the position were 
the broadcasting station only to have been involved in the dissemination of Serbian 
propaganda directed towards its own people. Their conclusion that such an attack 'might well 
be questioned by some experts in the field of IHL' itself stands as a measure of the 
uncertainty that attaches to the status of dual use targets 33 
The fact that RTS was state controlled and used to bolster civilian support for Serbian war 
aims shows the difficulty of protecting the media from attack on grounds of dual purpose. 
Clearly, there is no consensus that targeting civilian media engaged in the dissemination of 
propaganda would amount to a war crime34. That Amnesty lawyers take the view that it is a 
war crime and the Committee did not, serves to illustrate the plurality of interpretation. This 
legal imprecision is neatly captured by Fenwick while a Senior Legal Advisor to the Office of 
the Prosecutor of the ICTY, who observes, `It is, to say the least, highly debatable that the 
media in the FRY, which was state controlled to a degree, constituted a legitimate military 
objective even if it was relabelled as a propaganda source'35. It should be noted that if it is 
accepted that the media is a lawful military target, the legal requirement that the attack is 
intended to `result in substantial military benefit' fails to prevent the operation since it is 
clearly right that actions that undermining civilian support for war are of substantial military 
benefit. As Michael N. Schmitt puts it, `Whether media facilities constitute military 
objectives remains unsettled. '36 The fact that the legality of the attack is `highly debatable' is 
of little comfort to the 16 injured and 16 dead in the attack. Nevertheless, it is necessary to be 
33 Committee Report para76, quoted by Benvenuti, The ICTYT Prosecutor, at p. 522. 
34 Amnesty International, Collateral Damage, pp. 41-48. 
35 Fenrick, Targeting and Proportionality, p. 495. 
36 Michael N. Schmitt, 'Fault lines in the law of attack', in Susan Breau and Agnieszka Jachec-Neale, (Eds. ) 
Testing the Boundaries of International Humanitarian Law, (British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, 2006) pp. 277-307, Available at SSRN: http: //ssrn. com/abstract=1610016, p283 (last accessed 7/3/10). 
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aware of the political, ethical and legal nature of the legal debate. This is a discussion that 
will be continued in the course of this thesis with regard to the Israeli targeting of media 
outlets during the 2006 Second Lebanon war. 
Michael N. Schmitt stresses the pressure for a more expansive definition of military 
objective37. This arises from a number of factors including the technological advances in 
precision guided weaponry that enable technically superior forces to target at will. Given that 
there is the capacity to disrupt essential systems that support both civil and military activity, 
the collateral affect of degrading civil support for war is attractive to some practitioners. This 
is referred to by the US military as effects based targeting (EBS) which stresses the longer 
term and cascading effects of destroying the target. Typical examples of this approach are 
infrastructure and command targets which affects essential systems without necessarily 
hitting them directly. The relevance of this thinking to the present discussion is the increased 
concentration on dual use targets. As will be discussed later in this thesis, Israeli Chief of 
Staff Dan Halutz was a powerful advocate of this style of warfare in Lebanon in 2006. There 
is a potential for this type of operation to be used as a coercive tool. In modern asymmetric 
warfare the aims of the technically superior party are frequently coercive, designed to 
persuade the other side to act in a particular way or desist from particular actions. Here, 
degrading the support of the civilian population for their government's war aims becomes a 
very real military advantage. The often quoted words of Lieutenant General Michael Short, 
Air Component Commander for Operation Allied Force, `I felt that on the first night the 
power should have gone off, and major bridges around Belgrade should have gone into the 
Danube, and the water should be cut off so the next morning the leading citizens of Belgrade 
37 Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues, 34 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 
(2004) at 59 - 104 
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would have got up and asked `Why are we doing this? ' and asked Milosevic the same 
question. 8. '3 
This approach comes perilously near to direct targeting of civilian objects and indeed 
collective punishment of a population for failing to oppose its leadership. A charge levelled at 
the Israeli government by the Goldstone Mission. 39 As will be discussed in greater detail in 
the Cast Lead case study, the Goldstone fact finding report finds that Israel breached the 
requirements of discrimination, conducting unlawful attacks on Gaza's civilian population 
and its civilian infrastructure. The attacks on the Parliament building and Ministry of Justice 
are seen by Goldstone as unlawful attacks on civilian objects while Israeli Government 
report, The Operation in Gaza Factual and Legal Aspects40(hereafter called the Israeli 
Government Report), on the legality of the operation came to opposite conclusions on similar 
facts. As the Israeli Government Report puts it, `With respect to each particular target, IDF 
made the determination that the attacks were lawful under international law. 41 Nevertheless, 
the legality of the targeting of the Gaza police on the first day of the operation is also the 
subject of major disagreement between Goldstone and the Israeli Government Report. These 
specific targeting issues will be explored in greater detail later in this thesis, but for the 
purposes of the present discussion they serve to illustrate the point that the legal imprecision 
identified in the IHL prohibition on targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure enables 
lawyers to take diametrically different positions on the legality of military operations. 
38 C. R. Whitney, "The Commander; Air Wars Won't Stay Risk-Free, General Says", New York Times, June 18, 
1999, quoted by Schmitt, Targeting and Humanitarian Law, at p65. 
39 Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 15 September 20098, p. 252 
available at, http: //www2. ohehr. or /english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48. pdf. (Last accessed 
4/3/10) 
40 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The Operation in Gaza Factual and Legal Aspects', available 
at: http: //www. mfa. gov. il/MFA/Terrorism- 
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Hamas+war+against+Israel/Israel_strikes_back_against_Hamas_terror infrastructure_ 
Gaza_27-Dec-2008. htm. (Last accessed 4/3/10) 
41 The Operation in Gaza, p. 89, paragraph. 236. 
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For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned at this point that the limiting principles 
of military advantage are equally negotiable. Objects that `make an effective contribution' to 
military action and whose destruction `offers a definite military advantage' can be extended 
to almost all aspects of a nation's infrastructure and certainly include dual-use objects such as 
power stations. 
2.2) Proportionality 
As we have seen, IHL uses the principle of distinction to prohibit the intentional targeting of 
civilians and their property. However, IHL does not prohibit the foreseeable injury to 
civilians and their property arising from targeting military objectives providing that it is 
proportionate. Proportionality refers explicitly to a relationship between civilian injury42 and 
the anticipated `concrete and direct military advantage'. This is not to be confused with 
notions of proportionality between injury to the attacker's civilians or even their soldiers. 
The fact that Israel lost few soldiers in Cast Lead while Hamas lost many has no direct 
bearing on IHL in bello proportionality. 
AP 1, article 57 requires all parties to exercise constant care to spare the civilian population 
and civilian objectives. 
API. Article 57 (2) provides that, 
`(a) those who plan or decide upon an attack: 
(1) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilian nor 
civilian objects... 
(ii) Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and method of attack-with a view to 
avoiding, and in any event to minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects; 
(iii) refrain from launching any attack that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; 
42 Civilian injury is used here to refer to loss of civilian life, civilian injury, damage and destruction of civilian 
property. 
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(b) An attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a 
military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated; 
(c) Effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may effect the civilian 
population, unless circumstances do not permit'. 
Having established the distinction between civilian and combatant, it can readily be seen that 
the whole edifice of civilian protection rests on a proper understanding and application of the 
proportionality test of `loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated'. After all, there is little to be gained from protection from deliberate 
attack if there is no proper protection from `collateral damage' ! However, the extent of this 
protection is contested and turns on a judgment of what is excessive in the particular 
circumstances under review. Although the word proportionality is nowhere to be found in the 
treaties and conventions of IHL, this judgment is nonetheless recognised at the 
proportionality test. 
Governments, NGOs and international institutions constantly publish legal opinions on the 
legality of military operations with diametrically opposing positions. More often than not the 
argument turns on differing judgments of proportionality. This is not surprising since the test 
requires a comparative evaluation of two completely differing concepts whose value is 
incapable of objective determination. As J Holland puts it: 
The major practical and conceptual difficulty with this rule is that it requires that two very 
unlike values be weighed and balanced and a judgment rendered as to which of them is to be 
preferred. The first value is the composite of the loss of civilian life, civilian injury and 
damage to civilian objects expected from the attack. The second value is the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated from the target's destruction. There simply is no 
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objective method to compare the two such disparate notions. Obviously, any such weighing 
has to be extremely subjective........ 43 
The fact that IHL requires an evaluation that imports a high degree of subjective judgment 
makes it very difficult to say when an action is illegal. Clearly, there are obvious examples of 
disproportionate attack but, short of those, it becomes very difficult to criminalise targeting 
decisions. While some operations can readily be seen as either legal or illegal, there are 
others that inhabit the grey area between the two. The limitations on criminalising such 
attacks are recognised in the construction of the criminal offence in the Rome Statute. 
Art. 8(2) (b) (iv) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 provides that a war 
crime is committed during an international armed conflict by intentionally launching an 
attack that will cause incidental civilian casualties, damage to civilian objects or widespread, 
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment, `which would be clearly excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated' (italics added). 
The addition of `clearly' recognises the difficulty of applying an objective measure of excess 
and is intended to avoid the court substituting its own proportionality judgment for that of the 
military commander in all but the most obvious cases. While APi prohibits disproportionate 
attacks, the International Criminal Court can only prosecute the `clearly' disproportionate. To 
be sure the recognition by the drafters of the Rome Statute of a need to limit the role of the 
International Criminal Court in prosecuting military commanders in all but the most clear 
cases does not relieve the commanders and their legal advisors of the need to comply with the 
proportionality rule in difficult or `gray' areas, it just makes prosecution less likely. The 
military legal advisor is not relieved of his duty to advise on the illegality of proposed actions 
simply because prosecution is unlikely. After all, whether an action is illegal and the 
43 Joseph Holland, Military Objective and Collateral Damage: Their Relationship and Dynamics, Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 7,2004, pp. 35-78. 
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likelihood of prosecution are two different questions. The question is one of how to construct 
the advice in these circumstances. 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Kupreskic 
case44 specifically refers to the grey area of proportionality as `the grey area between 
indisputable legality and unlawfulness' and discusses how decisions should be made in this 
area. The court used the Martens Clause for guidance. The Martens Clause, which was 
written into the Hague Convention and which is repeated in slightly more modern terms in 
the Geneva Convention prescribes that in cases not covered by treaties and traditional 
customary international law, `civilians and combatants remain under the protection and 
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience i45. As Nuemenn observes, 
`The Marten's Clause acts as an embedded moral code in the law of armed conflicti46. The 
ICTY in the Kupreskic case recognised the limitations of the Marten's Clause but 
nevertheless felt able to use it to give some guidance to applying the law in the grey area: 
`True, this Clause may not be taken to mean that the "principles of humanity" and the 
"dictates of public conscience" have been elevated to the rank of independent sources of 
international law, for this conclusion is belied by international practice. However, this Clause 
enjoins, as a minimum, reference to those principles and dictates any time a rule of 
international humanitarian law is not sufficiently rigorous or precise: in those instances the 
scope and purport of the rule must be defined with reference to those principles and dictates. 
In the case under discussion, this would entail that the prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58 (and 
of the corresponding customary rules) must be interpreted so as to construe as narrowly as 
possible the discretionary power to attack belligerents and, by the same token, so as to expand 
the protection accorded to civilians. 47 
44Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. (Appeal Judgement), IT-95-16-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 23 October 2001, available at: http: //www. unhcr. orarefworld/docid/40276b7e7. html. 
Last accessed 4112/09). 
as Additional Protocol I Art. l (2). The clause is recognised as binding on non-signatories as it is seen as 
customary international law and has been held to apply to nuclear weapons, see, Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports, 1996, at p. 259, paragraph 84. 
46 Noam Neuman, `Applying the Rule of Proportionality: Force Protection and Cumulative Assessment in 
International Law and Morality', Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 7,2004, p. 95. 
47 Kupreskic, p. 256, paragraph 525. 
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However, this approach has not been followed elsewhere and cannot be used to criminalise 
methods of war except in the most extreme cases48. It may be that the Marten's Clause can be 
used to shrink the grey area but reference to the `principles of humanity' and `dictates of 
public conscience' do little more than remind the decision-maker of the moral content of 
decisions in war. As such, Kupreskic can be read as a plea to the military lawyer to err on the 
side of civilian protection. This expression of embedded values sits well with the ICRC's 
position of interpreting the provisions of IHL `in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to its constituent terms in their context and in light of the object and 
purpose of IHL'. However, it must be remembered that one of the purposes of IHL is to 
enable the parties to military conflict to achieve their military objects and recourse to the 
`object and purpose of IHL' does not immediately assist the effort to discover the correct 
balance between civilian injury and military advantage. The difficulties in agreeing an 
appropriate balance are well illustrated by debates on the place of force protection in the 
proportionality test. 
As has frequently been observed, modern warfare is ever more likely to take place on an 
urban battlefield among civilians with increased risk to civilians. Equally, such a complex 
environment produces increased risk to soldiers with potentially lethal threats contained in 
buildings, alleyways and the detritus of close human habitation accumulating at a time of 
eroded civil services. In parallel with the changes to the battlefield there has been the 
Revolution in Military Affairs whereby technological advances have enabled the attacking 
forces to inflict death and destruction from a distance. Drones are used for both surveillance 
and to launch missile attacks. Laser guided weapons systems provide previously 
48 Theodor Meron, 'The Martens Clause, principles of humanity, and dictates of public conscience', 94 
American Journal of International Law, (2000), pp. 78-89, at p. 88, 'nevertheless, the Martens Clause does not 
allow one to build castles of sand. Except in extreme cases, its references to principles of humanity and dictates 
of public conscience cannot, alone, delegitimize weapons and methods of war, especially in contested cases' 
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unimaginable accuracy. Nevertheless, these systems rely on accurate intelligence and remote 
decision-making with little opportunity for those in the firing line to explain their behaviour. 
Take for example the situation of a prominent building offering opportunities to defending 
forces to fire on enemy lines of communication through the built environment. There may be 
a choice of either using soldiers to clear the building room by room and in the process 
distinguishing civilians from combatants, or alternatively destroying the building by missile 
attack before sending soldiers to the vicinity. In either case the building is first identified as a 
military objective and an assessment made of the expected injury to civilians and military 
advantage to be gained by destroying or securing it. If it is accepted that expected civilian 
injuries are not excessive in either cases, the military planners then have a choice between 
alternative methods of proportionate attack and must choose the method that causes the least 
harm to the civilians. Clearly, the remote option carries a greater risk to civilians. However, if 
it is recognised that the stand-off attack is likely to reduce casualties among the attacking 
force, the military planners have a choice between reducing the risks to the soldiers while 
increasing the risk to civilians or exposing their soldiers to greater risk to reduce the danger 
of injury to civilians. In short, there is a choice between force protection and civilian 
protection. Force protection has come in for a great deal of discussion. As was noted in the 
previous chapter, in Israel, Yagil Levy links Israeli force protection to an accelerating erosion 
of the legitimacy of sacrifice in Israeli society49. He traces a trend from the First Lebanon 
War through the Second Lebanon War to Operation Cast Lead that has seen an increasing 
concentration on force protection to the detriment of enemy civilians. 
49 See for example, Yagil Levy, The Second Lebanon War: Coping with the "Gap of Legitimacies" Syndrome, 
Israel Studies Forum, No. 23,2009, pp. 3-24. 
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It can be seen that the legality of operations predicated on force protection raise two legal 
issues. First, is there a legal requirement to choose the method of attack that is least harmful 
to civilians where the alternatives expose the attacking forces to greater risk? Second, how 
much value should be given to force protection as a military objective when weighed against 
civilian injury? 
At first sight, the IHL requirement to choose the method of attack that is least damaging to 
civilians should privilege civilians ahead of the attacking force, but this is to misread the 
provision. The obligation only applies where each method produces the same military 
advantage. Force protection is a legitimate military advantage and, as Dinstein puts it. 
`victory without loss of soldiers' lives would be perfect providing that the attack is 
proportionate. ' 50 It follows that since force protection is a legitimate military objective and 
the proposed attack is discriminatory and proportionate, there is no legal obligation to choose 
an alternative proportionate method of attack that exposes the soldiers to greater risk. A 
requirement to do so would not be comparing like with like. But that is not the end of the 
discussion since the harm to civilians must not be disproportionate to the benefit of reduced 
risk to the attacking forces. 
This second question of how to weigh force protection against civilian harm has no certain 
answer, but this should come as no surprise since all weighing of civilian harm against 
military advantage is fraught with difficulty. Soldiers are seen as military objects whose 
preservation is a direct military advantage. As Michael Schmitt observes, it is not so much 
the life of the pilot so much as the ability to conduct future attackssl. Proportionality can be 
seen as deciding whether an attack is expected to cause collateral civilian damage that would 
50 Interview with the author 26 May 2009. 
51 Michael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Law of Attack. 
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be excessive in relation to the direct military advantage (including protection to the attacking 
forces) anticipated52 . As will be discussed in the next chapter, ethicists disagree about 
whether there is a moral duty to risk the lives of one's own troops to reduce the danger to 
enemy civilians and, indeed, there are very influential voices in Israel arguing for increased 
weight to be given to the military side of the equation. 
Returning to our example of the prominent building that needs to be secured to protect an 
essential line of communication, suppose a ground infantry operation to clear the building is 
likely to result in the death of ten enemy combatants, two civilians and two of our soldiers, 
while a missile attack is likely to kill ten enemy combatants, eight civilians including two 
children and none of our soldiers. There is certainly an ethical argument in favour of the 
ground attack but lawyers would probably agree that both attacks are proportionate to the 
military objective of securing the building and that there is no obligation to choose the 
ground attack. If securing the building is worth the collateral deaths of eight civilians 
including two children then the attack is proportionate and legal, there is no obligation to risk 
the lives of the soldiers even if it seems right to do so. Looked at from this perspective, the 
proportionality rule provides no answer to the question of how to weigh force protection 
against civilian harm and thus how to choose between the two methods of attack. 
Nevertheless, the fact that proportionality does not provide a guide to how to measure the 
relative values, should not obscure the fact that force protection is part of the proportionality 
matrix or, as Michael Schmitt puts it, `The extent of [own-military] casualties is simply one 
of several military advantage components weighed in the proportionality balance'53. 
52 This formulation is not universally accepted with some commentators such as Fenrick seeing force protection 
as a separate value but the above analysis adopted by Schmitt is clearer and more persuasive. 
53 Michael N. Schmitt, `Ethics and Military Force: The Jus in Bello', Edited transcript of remarks, January 2002 
Carnegie Council workshop on European and North American perspectives on ethics and the use of force ,7 
January 2002, available at http: //www. carnegiecouncii. oriz/resources/transcripts/98. html#. (Last accessed 
6/3/11). 
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The British Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict deals with these questions as follows, 
`[T]he application of the proportionality principle is not always straight-forward. Sometimes a 
method of attack that would minimize the risk to civilians may involve increased risk to the 
attacking forces. The law is not clear as to the degree of risk that the attacker must accept. 
The proportionality principle does not itself require the attacker to accept increased risk. 
Rather, it requires him to refrain from attacks that may be expected to cause excessive 
collateral damage. '54 
The legitimacy of force protection at the expense of civilian harm was raised in the aftermath 
of NATO's 1999 Operation Allied Force bombing of Belgrade55 when NATO's was 
criticised for bombing from above 15,000 feet and apparently valuing its own forces above 
Serbian civilians. The criticism was that bombing from such a height increased the risk to 
civilians such as when a convoy of farm vehicles was mistaken for military vehicles and a 
bridge was bombed when a train was crossing. The committee established by the ICTY to 
review the NATO bombing campaign did not uphold these criticisms and maintained the 
position that there is no obligation to endanger one's own forces providing that the operation 
meets the requirements of distinction and proportionality. In the particular instances 
discussed there was an increased risk to civilians but not disproportionate to the value of the 
military objectives. 
Whether or not force protection is an issue, there remains the problem of applying the 
proportionality test in practice. The Goldstone Mission report on the 2009 war in Gaza 
considered allegations that Israeli forces had carried out disproportionate attacks. Goldstone 
also considers the attack on 6 January 2006 that caused the death of at least 24 people in al- 
Fakhura Street. The Mission finds that even if the Israeli position is correct that they were 
54 UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, paragraph 2.7.1 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004) 
ss See for instance, Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, (2005) and Amnesty 
International, 'Collateral Damage or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the laws of War by NATO during 
Operation Allied Force ', (2000). 
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responding to mortar fire, the use of mortars in response in a heavily populated area `cannot 
meet the test of what a reasonable commander would have determined to be an acceptable 
loss of civilian life for the military advantage sought'56. The Israeli position as expressed in 
the report is that their troops came under repeated mortar attack and they responded with 
precise munitions. Civilians were not targeted and the anticipated risk to civilians was not 
excessive. 
The fact that the same law is applied to differing legal effect is well illustrated by the fact that 
both Goldstone and the Israelis quote the ICTY Committee report in support of their legal 
position: 
`It is unlikely that a human rights lawyer and an experienced combat commander would assign the 
same relative values to military advantage and injury to noncombatants. Further, it is unlikely that 
military commanders with different doctrinal backgrounds and differing degrees of combat experience 
or national military histories would always agree in close cases. It is suggested that the determination 
57 of relative values must be that of the reasonable military commander'. 
In fact Goldstone and the Israeli lawyers cannot even agree whether or not the 6 January 
attack was a close case or not. It is perhaps indicative of the Israeli position that the report 
goes on to quote W. Hays Park, `[un]intentional injury is not a violation of the principle of 
non-combatant immunity unless, through wilful and wanton neglect, a commander's actions 
result in excessive civilian casualties that are tantamount to an intentional attack. '58 This 
position is close to saying that the proportionality rule is irrelevant since it fails to catch 
operational behaviour that stops short of breaching the principle of discrimination. In other 
words, provided that the intended target is military, collateral damage can be ignored. This 
amounts to a very permissive ethical position. If proportionality is negotiable, the decision 
whether or not to attack in circumstances where civilians will be endangered becomes a 
56 Goldstone p198. 
57 Report to the Prosecutor paragraphs 47-50. 
58 W Hays Parks, `Book Review', 28 George Washington. Journal of International Law and Economy, 207, 
218 (1995), quoted with added emphasis at p. 46 para. 124. 
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moral one. As Holland puts it, `This means that military commanders making targeting and 
other law of war decisions must be moral human beings. Many of the most difficult targeting 
decisions, i. e., proportionality, will require a decision that is in essence a moral one'. 
Holland is suggesting a moral and legal disconnection where morality and not law is carrying 
the burden of invalidating a decision that may be legal. However, lawyers who seek to 
maintain the connection between law and morality would argue that morality informs the 
humanitarian/military balancing in IHL and morality points to what is and what is not legal, 
so that there is no disconnection. That may be the case, but it does not stop lawyers for NGOs 
proclaiming the illegality of the same military operations that the IDF legal officers regard as 
legal. The fact that a decision has a moral content does not strip it of its legal significance. 
The point to be emphasised here is that, as with distinction, proportionality generates a grey 
area of imprecision where IDF lawyers construct differing constructions of what is legal 
under international humanitarian law, whether or not they recognise the role of morality in 
what they are doing. 
3) Conclusion: plurality and choice 
The fundamental problem with IHL in practice is that there is no clear line between the 
lawful and the unlawful; separating the two demands a balancing of humanitarian protection 
of civilians with military the requirements of military efficiency. The grey areas of 
distinction, which separate civilian objects from military objects and civilians from 
combatants, and the grey area of proportionality that seeks to place a value on unintended but 
anticipated civilian harm, each result in a plurality of legal positions. This creates a space for 
the exercise of power by the IDF military lawyers who hold a veto over IDF targeting 
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decisions, which may or may not be constrained by the relationship between law and 
morality. 
When looking at the grey area it can be seen that Holland's observation operates on two 
levels: deciding whether an attack is legal and deciding whether to carry out a legal attack. 
The ICTY Committee observation that, `It is unlikely that a human rights lawyer and an 
experienced combat commander would assign the same relative values to military advantage 
and injury to non-combatants', compares human rights lawyers with military commanders to 
expose the plurality of legal positions. In investigating the role of military legal advisers a 
similar point can be made: it is unlikely that a human rights lawyer and a military legal 
adviser would assign the same values to military advantage and injury to non-combatants. It 
follows that they would arrive at differing views of what is legal and offer differing advice to 
the military commander. As Holland puts it, `proportionality will require a decision that is a 
moral one'. As we have seen, the legal uncertainty of dual use targets and the status of 
civilians engaged in combat means that distinction like proportionality becomes a negotiable 
legal concept when applied on the battlefield. There are legal decisions that require a moral 
judgment in deciding what is legal. These are not legal or moral decisions; they are both, and 
the legal is inseparable from the moral. 
Acknowledging the role of ethics and morality in framing legal advice raises questions of 
whose ethics and whose morality and the nature of the constraints on legal advisors when 
constructing the moral elements of their advice. As has been observed, IHL makes reference 
to the Martin's clause to direct the practitioner that, `civilians and combatants remain under 
the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established 
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience'. This 
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direction to the `principles of humanity' and the `dictates of public conscience' while 
acknowledging the role of morality in the construction of legal advice offers little guidance in 
the absence of universally accepted ethical principles. To consider the extent to which there is 
agreement on the principles of humanity, and how ethical positions both inform and assist in 
the application of IHL, requires an exploration of a field that is entirely alien to international 
lawyers- Just War Theory. The next chapter shows how Just War theory assists an 
understanding of IHL and the ethical choices that military legal advisers make in constructing 
their legal advice to the military. A synthesis of the legal and Just War disciplines is then be 
used to throw new light on the role and the political significance of military lawyers both in 
operational decision-making and legitimating military actions. 
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Chapter 4: Ethics 
1) Introduction 
As was shown in the previous chapter, constructing legal advice concerning issues of 
proportionality and distinction requires ethical choice- whether or not it is recognised as such 
by the legal advisor. It follows that the construction of legal advice is not just a matter of law 
but also of moral judgment59. What guidance then, has moral philosophy for the legal 
advisor? Asking philosophical questions about war has a long tradition that has produced a 
body of scholarship usually referred to as Just War theory, which pre-dates and produced 
international humanitarian law (IHL); this body of scholarship prides itself on its practical 
application and can be understood as constituting an important element of a regime of legal 
regulation of warfare. International lawyers recognise the historical contribution of just war 
theory to the creation of IHL but often fail to recognise its contemporary relevance. In fact, 
the Just War tradition informs a discipline of practical ethics that addresses the real problems 
of modern warfare. As such, knowledge of just war theory is essential to understanding the 
principles that inform IHL and account for its basic structure. Indeed, it should be of no 
59 This chapter does not seek to explore the full range of philosophical principles or issues. The focus is on 
ethics in practice and military ethics in particular. I distinguish between ethics and morality only to the extent 
that ethics tends to be used in relation to the morality that is associated with a role or organisation. Hence, we 
have medical ethics and military ethics rather than medical morality and military morality. Nevertheless, there is 
a clear overlap between the moral and ethical positions of military lawyers as individuals and as individuals 
performing a role or holding an official position. While it would be possible to explore at length the significance 
of distinguishing between the personal morality and ethical positions of military lawyers, this is not the place to 
do it. These issues will be addressed when considering the constraints of moral cultures on the individual in the 
decision-making process. 
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surprise that the IDF consulted moral philosophers as well as lawyers when revising its 
military code6o 
The historical context for the development of just war theory from the Middle Ages to the 
modern period is the strengthening of sovereign state power and the move from natural 
ecclesiastic law to secular positive law. Philosophical debate within the tradition sought a 
moral basis for the use of force and universal principles that would enable the construction of 
rules of war. Just war theory developed ways of thinking about just grounds for resorting to 
war (jus ad bellum) and the conduct of war (jus in bello) that coalesced into principles of just 
cause, necessity, proportionality and distinction. These principles, which were formulated to 
provide advice to the sovereign, became the basis of IHL providing law and ethics with a 
common vocabulary and a common analytical structure, which separates judgments about the 
morality/ legality of resorting to war from judgments about the morality/legality of the 
conduct of war. 
This chapter begins with an investigation of traditional just war theory, before considering 
modern philosophical positions that challenge the traditional view. Reference will be made to 
recent conflicts to show how the conduct of armed combat by states against non-state actors, 
who conceal themselves among their civilians, is raising difficult philosophical questions that 
have yet to be answered with any degree of consensus. This ethical debate within just war 
scholarship informs wider moral attitudes to and behaviour in war that demands legal 
positions of military lawyers advising in the grey areas of distinction, proportionality and 
military necessity. The chapter distinguishes just war thinking from realism, 
consequentialism and militarism while recognising elements of all three in just war 
arguments. The discussion concludes with an assessment of the theoretical relevance of just 
war thinking to military decision-making. The point that will be emphasised in this chapter is 
60 Author's interview with Israeli philosopher Moshe Halbertal in Jerusalem, 5 February 2009. 
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that just war theory has a contemporary relevance so that the influence of just war theory on 
current legal practice and the development of IHL as it adapts to the challenges of modern 
styles of armed combat, will be a recurring theme of this thesis. The last chapter revealed the 
extent of choice in the exercise of deciding what is legal in war. The aim of the chapter is to 
examine the role of ethics in the process. 
2) Traditional Just War Theory 
While it certainly true that philosophers have always debated the morality of killing, 
traditional just war theory has its origins in the demands of the Catholic Church to tailor 
Christian morality to the requirements of the exercise of power unfettered by pacifism. As 
such, the theory is closely associated with the evolution of Western Christian thought 
designed firstly to serve the Christian sovereign and latterly the needs of the secular state 61 
Scholars in the Middle Ages and the early modern period developed the fifth century ideas of 
Augustine to counter Christian pacifist theology62. Just war theory is seen as rooted in 
Augustinian thought as developed by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century to emphasise 
the importance of intention rather than action. Viewed in this way, Christian doctrine is more 
about the internal good intention- the desire for peace rather than revenge or domination- than 
it is about the outward act of killing. Hence, war for good reason, or just war, was acceptable 
to the mainstream Christian theologians who based their thinking on Aquinas. Having edged 
pacifism to the theological sidelines, the demand for a philosophical justification for the wars 
waged by sovereigns led to the gradual development of a consensus about the requirements of 
a just war. This process was given greater urgency following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 
with the development of ideas of the legal equality of states and non-interference in the 
61 For a concise history, see Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction to Legal and 
Moral Issues, (New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004). 
62 For a commentary on Augustine, see Herbert A. Dean, The Political and social ideas of St. Augustine, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1963). 
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sovereign territory of other states. In ethical and juridical terms, state monopoly of violence 
came to mean state monopoly of war within a doctrine of just cause. 
The need for the secular legal ordering of relations between sovereigns found expression in 
the seventeenth century writings of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645)63 with natural law giving force 
to just war doctrine. The `good' of the just cause was no longer war in furtherance of 
religious aims but rather a response to prior harm. By secularising the concept of just cause, 
states were no longer to be vulnerable to attack because of religious heresy and some degree 
of equality of states could be maintained. From a legal perspective, just war theory informed 
the understanding of natural law with its recourse to universal norms. 
Early just war thinkers, particularly Grotius and Francesco de Vitoria (1492-1546), listed 
legitimate grounds for going to war. These were considered in terms of self-defence, 
including preventative and pre-emptive action, which was to be proportionate to the harm 
suffered. Law was less about violence in service of God than a defensive reaction to wrongs 
suffered; as Vitoria put it, `Difference of religion cannot be a cause of just war'64. These 
formulations were organised around the idea of violation of collective rights, including 
defence, recovery of stolen property and punishment. In this way aggressive war was 
acceptable only in response to specific wrongs. It can readily be seen that this secularisation 
of the concept of the just war enabled the same jus ad bellum test to be applied to sovereigns 
of differing complexions and met the needs of an international society organised in terms of 
sovereign equality. In limiting Augustine's right intention to self-defence, the tradition is 
accepting of the world as it finds it. Since the religious and political organisation of the state 
is irrelevant to the justice of its cause, traditional Just War theory can be seen to underpin the 
norm of national self-determination and the Westphalian ordering of sovereign states. In the 
63 Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962). 
64 Quoted by Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, (Newhaven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 4. 
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traditional Just War conceptualisation of jus ad bellum stability has become the modern 
morality6s 
As the concept of defensive warfare has become the modern conventional wisdom, finding 
expression in IHL, it is easy to forget that the just war theory of jus ad bellum makes 
additional demands. To be sure, the Just War tradition encompasses centuries' long 
philosophical debates and any generalised account is necessarily partial, but it is generally 
recognised that the further conditions necessary for a legitimate defensive war are: legitimate 
authority, last resort, right intention, probability of success and proportionality. These 
principles are not extra moral considerations that have been left behind by the modem legal 
conflation of self-defence with just cause. Rather, they should be understood as informing a 
correct understanding of the nature of defensive war and who may invoke it. As such, they 
are essential to a proper moral and legal understanding of the very nature of self-defence. 
Examination of the principles shows that they are a much more useful guide for the 
international lawyer than the all too frequent recourse to domestic legal analogy of the 
homeowner's defence of life and property 66 
The principle of legitimate authority confers the right to resort to war to the sovereign. 
Aquinas was concerned with the authority of the head of state and due process. While it is 
tempting to regard the requirement of legitimate authority as a formality, the anti-Iraq war 
demonstrations with their chants of `not in our name' give contemporary meaning to the 
principle. That said, we are now comfortable discussing the concept in terms of the 
constitutional requirements of representative government and for just war theorists to talk in 
65 There are obvious exceptions to these historical generalisations. Triumphalist just war theorists regard 
traditional just war principles as universal norms. Behaviour that does not meet just war criteria is seen as norm 
violation rather than an alternative moral position. This leads to a tendency to overlook the historical prevalence 
of religious wars and to reinterpret them in terms of self defence. Nevertheless, the tradition rightly lays claim to 
the evolution of moral principles that have displaced overt religious justifications for war and it is the just war 
principles that have been given the force of law. 
Discussion of self-defence by international lawyers is replete with analogy with domestic criminal codes and 
the domestic legal treatment of citizens defending their selves, their loved ones and their property. 
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terms of legitimate authority appears self-evident. However, by applying the principle to the 
status of the parties to the conflict rather than to the authority of the sovereign, A. J. Coates 
demonstrates the importance of the principle to modern warfare67. Legitimate authority is 
what first distinguishes a party to war from a party to murder; if terrorists commit crimes, 
rather than acts of war, just war doctrine holds them to a different and more rigorous standard 
of behaviour than parties to a military conflict. Legitimate authority, when viewed in this 
way, is less about sovereign approval than status; the state is to have the monopoly of 
violence. For Coates this is not the basic realist conception of sovereign power, but rather the 
legal source of lawful violence in war and the subjection of power to international laws and 
conventions. Violating this principle leads to all sorts of conceptual difficulties, obvious 
illustration being the US confusion over the status of Al Qaeda detainees. As we shall see, the 
traditional approach is not above criticism; this concentration on the authority of states has no 
place for non-state actors. How does the position change when a terrorist group gains control 
of territory? If Hamas is a non-state terrorist entity in control of Gaza, can it ever meet the Jus 
ad bellum requirements of a just war? We will return to this discussion when considering 
modern critiques of the theory. 
Traditional just war theorists resolved that non-violent political strategies should be 
exhausted before force could be met by force. This is understood as the principle of last 
resort. This is not to deny the right to self defence but rather to exhaust the peaceful 
alternatives first. Having established the moral framework, any consideration of whether 
there is just cause requires a political judgment of the likely effects of non-violent responses. 
These are not easy judgments since, as Walzer observes, wars undoubtedly have long 
political and moral pre-histories and it is not at all clear which time frame to use when 
67 A. J. Coates, The Ethics of War, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 123. 
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assessing them68. A jus ad bellum assessment of Cast Lead in terms of last resort requires 
consideration of whether negotiations could have ended Hamas rocket fire. Of course, this is 
where Goldstone and his critics part company. The Goldstone Report finds that Israel should 
have been negotiating to ease the living conditions of the residents of Gaza as a response to 
rocket attacks rather than embark on Operation Cast Lead. The Israeli position is that 
alternative responses of third party negotiation, tit for tat retaliation and general restraint had 
failed and Operation Cast Lead was the last resort. While the positions of the parties are poles 
apart, it is clear that the jus ad bellum principles of just war theory inform the debate. 
Proportionality in jus ad bellum is sometimes seen as macro-proportionality to distinguish the 
principle from its micro-proportionality jus in bello equivalent. The principle rests on the 
understanding that there is a level of response to violence beyond which it ceases to be 
defensive and becomes aggressive. The principle is linked to the idea of necessity; a 
disproportionate response must logically go beyond what is needed to resist the aggressor. It 
is accepted, though, that the violence can rightly be calibrated so as to deter future attack. 
Clearly, it is not easy to decide when deterrence becomes aggression. For just war theorists, 
whether a deterrent response to an attack becomes disproportionate is determined by the 
application of moral principles informed by political and military assessments of the threat to 
be deterred. Article 5 of the Rome Statute creates the offence of aggressive war without clear 
legal guidance of when self-defence becomes aggression69. The Goldstone Mission had no 
difficulty in finding that Israel had employed disproportionate force in Gaza but stopped short 
of alleging criminal aggressive war within the meaning of the Rome Statute. The jus ad 
bellum requirement of proportionality is sometimes popularly misinterpreted as a device to 
ensure that combatants are playing on a level playing field. While a sense of fair play may be 
68 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p60. 
69 For a discussion of the criminality of war of aggression, see, Yoram Dinstein, War Aggression and Self- 
Defence, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 106-133. 
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offended by the unchallenged deployment of air power, proportionality does not require the 
abandonment of a military advantage, only its proportional use. Traditional Just War theory 
recognises the right to use deterrent force but the dividing line between deterrence and 
disproportionate response is difficult to discern in practice. 
As we have seen, early just war philosophers relied on good intention to counter the pacifist 
argument. Without good intention there could be no war at all. Self-defence suggests good 
intention but self defence is not enough if the intention is to exact revenge. Indeed, there are 
many consequences of war that if intended would deny just cause- not least shoring up the 
popularity of an unpopular government shortly before an election70! The Just War solution is 
to deploy the Doctrine of Double Effect. The bad consequences of war do not make a war 
unjust, provided that the bad consequences are not intended. This is because the Doctrine of 
Double Effect operates to make the unintended consequences count for less than the intended. 
Consequently, claims to self-defence must be able to withstand an inquiry into intention and 
each side the struggles to promote its own narrative understanding of conflict and displace the 
opposing narratives. Those looking for contemporary relevance have only to turn to 
Goldstone's most damning finding at para. 1884, `In this respect, the operations were in 
furtherance of an overall policy aimed at punishing the Gaza population for its resilience and 
for its apparent support for Hamas, and possibly with the intent of forcing a change in such 
support'. The Israeli response is to locate the purpose of the operation firmly within the 
concept of self-defence to deter Hamas rocket attacks. Clearly, this perceived intention of the 
parties is crucial to moral judgments about the Operation and the influence of Just War 
principles is plain to see. 
70 The fact that the ruling Kadima party was facing a difficult election cannot be ignored when looking at 
Israel's decision to launch a major military operation in response to Hamas rocket fire. 
118 
The final jus ad bellum principle, probability of success, concerns the morality of conducting 
a hopeless defence. If the defensive aims of the war cannot be achieved, how can the horrors 
of war be justified? If Israel cannot stop rocket fire from Gaza or Lebanon, is military action 
justified? In practice, this principle is linked to proportionality and can usefully be read as 
providing that if success cannot be achieved without the use of disproportionate force the 
defensive action cannot be just. 
Returning to the principle of just cause, it can be seen that self-defence has been refined 
within the Just War tradition to limit the circumstances in which an apparent defensive 
response to aggression can constitute a just cause. It is clear from the public discourse on the 
UK decision to join the invasion of Iraq in 2003 that the morality of the decision is viewed 
almost exclusively in terms of whether Iraq posed a real threat to the security of the UK. The 
weakness of the case for viewing the invasion in terms of self-defence undermines both the 
legal and the moral claims in support of war. The structure of these debates shows that just 
war doctrine supplies the language and the principles for a moral assessment of the decision 
to go to war. 
Having considered the philosophical jus ad bellum positions we now turn to just war 
discussion of jus in bello or behaviour in war- a discussion that traditional theory isolates 
from the justice of the decision to go to war in the first place. Traditional theory sought to 
determine the appropriate standards for the conduct of war. A key facet of the debate 
concerns whether all parties to the conflict should be held to the same standards. The 
problem, of course, was that if war could only be justified in terms of a response to a wrong, 
there were necessarily just and unjust combatants. If both sides were to be held to the same 
standards, the jus in Bello determinations of just cause somehow needed to be isolated from 
jus ad bellum considerations of rightful conduct. Exploring this dilemma, Francisco de 
Vitoria (1492-1546) and his later followers, the Salamander School, looked to concepts of 
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innocent mistake and doubtful cases to argue that in some circumstances both sides may be 
just. Since human intelligence may not be up to the task of determining the justice of the 
matter, it behoves those fighting the war to do so with appropriate restraint. The problem with 
this approach is that it is devaluing jus ad bellum to enable a universalist approach to jus in 
bello. 
Later thinkers placed greater emphasis on the assumption that soldiers are not privy to the 
affairs of state and developed Vitoria's principle of invincible ignorance. If soldiers were 
ignorant of the reasons for the war, their treatment in war should not vary with the justice of 
their cause. A code of conduct could be formulated for warfare that would be applicable to 
just and unjust combatants alike. Jus in Bello now became the focus of attention and later 
thinkers developed this approach to separate jus ad bellum from jus in Bello and clear the way 
for universal standards of conduct in war- a duality that remains the bedrock of modern IHL. 
This separation is the defining principle of traditional Just War theory". As we shall see, this 
defining principle is under attack from modem just war thinkers. Since it is also a key feature 
of IHL, the debate also influences legal thinking and, it will be argued, legal practice. 
The development of traditional jus in Bello was intended to control the evils of war and 
protect the innocent. This was achieved in the first instance by identifying various classes of 
innocent non-combatant who were to benefit from restraint in war; they are usually 
understood as civilians, prisoners and hors de combat. This led to the development of 
principles of distinction and necessity. Distinction separates civilians and other innocents 
who cannot be killed from combatants who can, while necessity puts some break on the 
degree of force to be employed. 
71 For a concise history of the duality see, Nicholas Rengger, `The Jus in Bello in Historical and Philosophical 
Perspective', in Larry May (ed. ), War Essays in Political Philosophy, (New York: Cambridge University Press 
2008), pp. 30-49. 
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As was observed in the previous chapter, the principle of distinction is well known to 
international lawyers as the organising principle that enables combatants and non-combatants 
to be separated and treated differently in the allocation of rights and responsibilities in IHL. 
The principle, as developed in just war theory, is grounded in the notion that innocents get 
caught up in war and need to be distinguished from combatants for their own protection. 
There has been a great deal of debate within the tradition about how to correctly understand 
innocence. While there have been influential voices in the development of just war theory 
that have seen innocence in terms of lacking guilt, the current consensus of the traditional 
position rejects an understanding of innocence that requires freedom from moral blame. 
Moral blame carries with it a discussion of responsibility for wars that the citizen may have 
no say in and is unhelpful in understanding the limits of innocent involvement in the conduct 
of warfare. For these reasons, the traditional position is now seen as defining innocents in 
terms of threat. Innocents are generally understood as: those who do not pose a threat for the 
time that they are not a threat. 
The vexed question of what is a threat produces much debated problems in just war 
scholarship, which explore the blurred boundary between civilian and military enterprise in 
times of war. The tradition aims to protect civilians from attack while retaining its practical 
application. Defining innocents as all civilians or defining innocents as civilians who do not 
make a contribution to the conduct of war are equally unattractive to a tradition that prides 
itself in being rooted in practice. Nagel's view72 is that civilian contributions to military arms 
and logistics are contributions to military activities while contributions to their mere 
existence as men are not. How direct the contribution has to be to result in the loss of 
innocence is, of course, the problem. This is well illustrated by the debates over the Israeli 
targeting of the Hamas police force in the opening hours of Cast Lead. The Israeli argument 
72 Quoted by Jeff McMahan, Killing in War, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), p. 13. 
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is that the police were part of the armed militia. The counter argument is that they carried out 
only civilian functions. The fact that the police were armed suggests that while the argument 
is ostensibly about status, the real issue is one the extent to which they pose a threat to the 
Israeli forces. 
The traditional concept of innocence underpins the understanding of the distinction between 
legitimate military targets and civilian targets. In IHL the question is one of the use to which 
the target is put- leading to a permissive legal regime of dual use targets. The Just War 
concept of innocence as threat forces the attention away from the status of the target to the 
actual threat it poses attacking military. When is a bridge a threat? Is the whole transport 
system a legitimate target in war or only when it is about to be used by the military? The Just 
War approach militates against the targeting of infrastructure and provides a frame of 
reference both for our revulsion by the scale of destruction in war and for the practical 
limitation of that destruction. 
However, it would be wrong to see just war theory as ignoring military practicalities. 
Innocents are killed in war and the philosophical challenge for the traditional just war 
theorists was how to justify this, while at the same time keeping it to a minimum and without 
denying the parties the opportunity to successfully bring the war to an end. In traditional Just 
War theory of jus in Bello this is achieved by again relying on the moral distinction between 
intended harm and expected harm. 
The dilemma of how to construct a philosophical position that prevents the killing of civilians 
while at the same time allowing it was resolved by traditional Just War thinkers with the 
development of the Doctrine of Double Effect. Thomas Aquinas developed the Doctrine of 
Double Effect to counter Christian positions prohibiting self-defence. His formulation can be 
summarised as: acts that have both a good and bad effect are permissible, provided that the 
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bad effect is an unintended side effect that is proportional to the objectively good effect, and 
that there is no alternative way of achieving the good effect73. The doctrine was originally 
intended to counter pacifist arguments against going to war and therefore part of jus ad 
bellum. Later thinkers, and in particular Francisco De Vitoria in the 16`h Century, 
incorporated the doctrine into jus in Bello thinking to resolve the problem of what we now 
term collateral damage. 
Michael Walzer describes the traditional doctrine as, 
1) The action contemplated should be in itself either morally good or morally indifferent, 
which means, for our purposes, that it is a legitimate act of war; 
2) The direct effect is morally acceptable - the destruction of military supplies, for example, 
or the killing of enemy soldiers; 
3) The intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims narrowly at the acceptable effect; the evil 
is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends; and 
4) The good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect74 
It must be borne in mind that the Doctrine of Double Effect is only employed where the 
principle of distinction has been complied with: in other words, where the intended target is a 
permitted military target necessary for the effective prosecution of the war. This is a situation 
where the outcome of a worthy military operation is likely to conflict with the norm of non- 
combatant immunity. 
The operation of distinction and Double Effect in practice is often explained in terms of a 
bombing operation where an armaments factory is located in a residential area. Suppose that 
to bomb the factory would result in the destruction of the factory and the foreseeable but 
unintended deaths of 100 civilians. Equally, an operation to bomb the civilians to undermine 
civilian morale would result in the death of 100 civilians and the incidental destruction of the 
73 Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace, p. 52. 
74 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p193 
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factory. The result of each operation is identical but the second contravenes Just War doctrine 
because the intent is to attack the innocents, which contravenes the principle of distinction. 
The first meets the requirements of distinction since the intent is to attack a military object, 
but the attack is only just war compliant if the good of the destruction of the factory 
outweighs the evil of the killing of the 100 civilians. In this way the Doctrine of Double 
Effect can operate to give moral approval to the foreseeable killing of innocents in war. 
In philosophical terms, the Doctrine of Double Effect can be seen as an uneasy compromise 
between a subjectivist approach that privileges intention over outcome and a consequentialist 
approach that applies a cost/benefit calculation to the outcome. The doctrine works better at 
the jus ad bellum level of analysis. Here, the evils of war are compared with the justice of the 
cause for war to measure whether the decision to go to war is a proportionate response. 
There is some consensus about the obligation of states to protect their citizens and what sort 
of actions can reasonably lead to war. At the jus in bello level, where judgments are made 
about individual military actions, understanding the correct balance between civilian deaths 
and the attainment of military objectives is far more difficult. 
The question of whether there is a moral duty to choose the less harmful strategy from among 
a range of proportionate responses can lead to a confused understanding of proportionality. In 
fact traditional just war theory uses the principle of necessity to resolve the issue. It is not a 
question of which method of attack is more or less proportionate, but rather a matter of 
causing no more harm than is necessary. In practice necessity and Double Effect cannot be 
separated since the `good' of the Doctrine of Doctrine of Double Effect ceases to be good if 
the desired effect is not necessary. Viewed in this way necessity is an implicit rather than an 
additional to the doctrine. 
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From a political science perspective, the Doctrine and indeed Just War theory itself, can be 
seen today as an uneasy balancing of a liberal approach that seeks to promote the civilian 
right to life on the one hand and, on the other, a realist appreciation of the need to allow states 
to optimise their military outcomes. The growing influence of human rights norms and a 
perceived failure of traditional just war theory to limit civilian suffering in modern warfare, 
has led to sustained criticism by modern just war theorists of both proportionality and 
distinction and indeed the very organising principle of the separation between jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello. 
3) Modern critiques of Just War Theory 
With the rapid development of IHL in the twentieth century, the focus of enquiry became 
juridical rather than philosophical. International lawyers schooled in legal positivism sought 
legal answers to moral problems without regard to natural law or Just War theory75. If 
philosophical principles had become legal principles that could be refined within a closed 
logical system of law, the just war theorists had become obsolete. It took the Vietnam War to 
provide the impetus for a revival of a just war scholarship that challenged the juridical claim 
to exclusivity. International lawyers were in no position to explain the excesses of an 
unpopular war that had been fought and lost with little concern for civilian harm. Rejecting 
the dominant realist thinking of the time, post-Vietnam War scholars, looking for a critical 
theory to understand the My Lai massacre and engage in moral analysis of war, turned to Just 
War theory76. Michael Walzer's publication in 1977 of his seminal Just and Unjust Wars; A 
75 I will be considering the tensions between natural law and legal positivism in greater detail later in the thesis 
in the context of a discussion of the extent to which lawyers are influenced of Just War considerations when 
constructing their legal advice. 
76 For an account of the revival of just war theory as the language of opposition to the Vietnam War, see Walzer, 
Arguing About War, pp. 6-10. 
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Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations77 is generally acknowledged to have revived 
just war scholarship. 
Walzer challenged the realist view of war with its language of self-interest, necessity and 
cost-benefit with a moral analysis that focused on the rights of civilians in war. This approach 
emphasised the right of the civilian not to be harmed rather than the restriction on the 
attacker78. In common with the traditionalists, Walzer's concern was to reduce the horrors of 
war and his approach had to work on the battlefield. His major contribution was to direct 
modern criticism of traditional just war theory towards the failure of the Doctrine of Double 
Effect to protect civilians and to suggest a small but radical revision. 
Walzer argued that the Doctrine of Double Effect is `darkly permissive' and that there must 
be a duty to reduce harm to enemy civilians79. His discussion of the Doctrine of Double 
Effect80 recognises that the traditional formulation of the proportionality rule is a weak 
constraint; the fact that foreseeable deaths are unintended provides little comfort. Instead, 
Walzer set out to construct a moral position on the unintended killing of civilians that would 
go beyond unintended harm and would demand an intention to reduce the foreseeable 
harmful consequences of the intended action. As Walzer put it, `Whenever there is likely to 
be a second effect, a second intention is morally required'. Walzer's reformulation of the 
Doctrine of Double Effect adds an additional element to intention. Expressing the traditional 
formulation of: 
1) The action contemplated should be in itself either morally good or morally indifferent, 
which means, for our purposes, that it is a legitimate act of war; 
77 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (New York: Basic 
Books, 1997); Walzer not only revived the discipline but has also remained the leading contemporary exponent 
of just war theory. 
78 Walzer argues that 'some degree of care be taken not to harm civilians- which means, very simply, that we 
recognise their rights as best we can within the context of war'. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 152. 
79 Michael Walzer, 'Responsibility and Proportionality in State and Nonstate Wars', Parameters, Spring, 2009, 
pp. 40-52, p. 1. 
50 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 153. 
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2) The direct effect is morally acceptable - the destruction of military supplies, for example, 
or the killing of enemy soldiers; 
3) The intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims narrowly at the acceptable effect; the evil 
is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends; and 
4) The good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect81, 
Walzer's addition to requirement 3 is that, `aware of the evil involved, he seeks to minimise 
it, accepting costs to himself'8Z. The big question thus becomes the degree of risk that the 
attacker must take to reduce harm to civilians. Are we expecting heroic war or `fighting 
well'? Building on a discussion of the sabotage by Norwegian members of the British SOE 
on the heavy water plant at Vermork, Norway during World War II, Walzer reaches the 
position that, `The limits of risk are fixed, then, roughly at the point where any further risk- 
taking would almost certainly doom the military venture or make it so costly that it could not 
be repeated. ' This is certainly asking a lot of the military. 
Walzer is concerned not just with the morality of actions in war but also with their 
consequences. Moral acts that have bad consequences need to be avoided. His revision of the 
Doctrine of Double Effect to produce a Doctrine of Double Intention is designed to 
strengthen the principle of civilian immunity without turning the principle into an absolute 
rule that would make the conduct of war impossible. Writing in 1977, Walzer was ahead of 
his time in offering an analysis based on the rights of the individual civilians and combatants, 
although his thinking was in tune with the growing influence of liberal conceptions of human 
rights in international law. 
Walzer's revision has been immensely influential and few contemporary just war thinkers 
accept the traditional version. The pressing question has become the extent to which armies 
should sacrifice military gains to reduce the risk of harming civilians, and in particular risk 
g1Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p193. 
s2Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p155, emphasis added. 
127 
the lives of their soldiers in the process. It is one thing to accept a sub-optimal military 
strategy but quite another to risk the lives of one's troops. In 1977 Walzer was writing about 
Vietnam; in 2009 his focus was on Gaza and the degree to which Israeli soldiers engaging 
Hamas combatants, who were fighting without uniforms among civilians, should be expected 
to assume greater personal risk to reduce harm to enemy civilians. In military terms, this is a 
matter of force protection. 
Influential Israeli philosopher Asa Kasher and Major General Amos Yadlin (formerly head of 
Agaf Modiin, the Israeli military Intelligence Directorate) have analysed the relative weight to 
be given to civilian harm and force protection83. Using social contract theory, Kasher argues 
that the state owes a greater duty to its own citizens than it does to enemy citizens; since 
soldiers are citizens of the state, their protection ranks above that of enemy citizens who are 
not. From this perspective, there is nothing wrong with giving greater weight to force 
protection than civilian harm. Moreover, the force that endangers the civilians in the first 
place is responsible for their harm. This position would tend to lead commanders to avoid 
risking soldiers' lives to reduce the risk of harming enemy civilians while holding the enemy 
responsible for the harm done to their own civilians. Kasher has worked on the IDF military 
code and his views are seen as influential84. Indeed, it has been argued that it is this ethical 
position that provided the Israeli moral justification for the tactics employed in Gaza and the 
legal constructions of IHL that permitted. The Israeli conduct of Cast Lead is analysed in 
detail in case study 3, but for the purposes of the present discussion it can reasonably be 
argued that the IDF relied on warnings and precision weapons as the basis for a strategy that 
gave a high priority to force protection. The suggestion is that Kasher's ethical Just War 
83 Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin, `Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective', Journal of Military 
Ethics, Vol. 4,2005, pp. 3-32. Also Asa Kasher and Amos Yadin, `Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: 
Principles', Philosophia, Vol. 34,2006, pp. 75-84. 
84 Amos Harel, The Philosopher who Gave the IDF Moral Justification in Gaza', Ha'aretz, 6 February 2009. 
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position influenced Israeli thinking and behaviour through the adoption of force protection 
strategies. 
Walzer has taken issue with Kasher and Yadlin in the columns of the New York Review of 
Books85. Walzer argues that the state does not owe a greater duty to its soldiers than to enemy 
civilians and that soldiers are rightly expected to risk their lives to reduce civilian harm. 
Walzer's Doctrine of Double Intention places a positive duty on the military whose soldiers 
can properly be required to risk their lives for others. Soldiers are, indeed, citizens but ones 
whose relationship with the state requires self-risk if not self-harm. Thus, for Walzer the 
question is not whether to risk soldiers' lives to protect enemy civilians, but rather how much 
risk should these soldiers be required to take. Kasher's response to this position is to accept 
Walzer's positive duty to minimise civilian losses even at the cost of reduced military 
advantage, but crucially for Kasher the cost stops short of physical danger: `In our 
understanding of double effect "cost" does not require jeopardy'86. While the Israeli military 
code requires its forces to `do all in their power to avoid causing harm to the lives, bodies, 
dignity, and property [of non-combatants]'87, Cast Lead raises the question of what this now 
means in practice. Kasher seems to suggest that warning civilians of impending attack, which 
sacrifices the military advantage of surprise, can suffice. Certainly, the IDF made 
unprecedented use of warnings to the citizens of Gaza, dropping many thousands of leaflets, 
making telephone calls and adopting a new `knock on the roof' tactic of firing dummy rounds 
before launching the real attack. Depending on the just war position adopted, this effort at 
discrimination is seen either as a very real effort to meet the requirements of discrimination 
and protect enemy civilians from harm or as a poor alternative to risking ground troops. 
85 Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer, `Israel: Civilians and Combatants', New York Review of Books, May 
14,2009. 
86 Asa Kasher and Amos Yadin, 'Israel and the Rules of War: An Exchange', New York Review of Books, June 
11,2009. 
87 Quoted approvingly by Asa Kasher, 'The Gaza Campaign and the Ethics of Just War', Azure, 2009, p. 79. 
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It would be wrong to suggest that Kasher is the only influential moral philosopher in Israel 
advising the IDF or that his position is unchallenged in Israel. Moshe Halbertal88 also advises 
the IDF and lectures at the military training schools. His position is that Kasher and Walzer 
are both wrong. Walzer is wrong to have us behave towards enemy civilians as if they were 
our own. Halbertal believes that this is too high a standard. On the other hand, by placing the 
value of protecting the lives of enemy civilians below the value of our soldiers' lives, Kasher 
relieves soldiers of the duty to take risks to protect enemy civilians. Halbertal believes that 
the correct position is somewhere between the two so that soldiers should be taking risks to 
prevent harm to enemy civilians89. 
Another view of the ethics of force protection is promoted by Thomas Hurka90, who accepts 
that a state is entitled to favour its own citizens over those of the enemy but finds that he 
cannot justify the same for soldiers. While there is a quasi-familial relationship, soldiers are 
`legitimate targets of military force and their deaths are an expected consequence of war as 
civilians' deaths are not'91. Hurka argues in favour of placing an equal value on the lives of 
soldiers and enemy civilians. Written before Gaza, Hurka's position seems prescient: `This is 
not to say that an act that kills 101 civilians as a side effect of saving 100 soldiers is 
necessarily disproportionate; the comparisons cannot be precise. But it does imply that any 
act that kills significantly more civilians than it saves soldiers is morally impermissible'. 
While apparently supporting a view that the Israeli tactics seemed `morally impermissible', it 
should be remembered that neither Goldstone nor anybody else has asked how many soldiers' 
88 Professor of Jewish Thought and Philosophy at the Hebrew University. 89 Author's interview with Halbertal in Jerusalem on 5 Febuary 2009. See also, Moshe Halbertal, 'The 
Goldstone Illusion: What the UN Gets Wrong about Gaza- and War', New Republic, November 6,2009. 
90 Thomas Hurka, 'Proportionality in the Morality of War', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33,2005, pp. 34-66. 
See also Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace, An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues, (New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994), for an argument that a state is not entitled to prefer its own civilians lives whether 
or not in the military above those of the enemy. 
91 Hurka, 'Proportionality', p63. 
130 
lives were saved by the Israeli tactics. Of course, it is much easier to measure lives lost than 
lives saved. 
To be sure, the debate goes further than the ranking of soldiers and civilians. In Walzer's 
terms, if there is a duty to protect civilians, then it extends to not placing them in danger in 
the first place. In Gaza, Hamas strategically eliminated the distinction between its own forces 
and its civilians and conducted military operations from among them. It is easy enough to 
justify the position that each side bears a responsibility for harm to civilians, but the more 
difficult question is whether and to what extent the conduct of one side can be excused by the 
immoral acts of the other. Should the unjust conduct of the war by one side reduce the 
standards to be applied to the other? The attacking forces will be quick to argue that the 
defenders should not be allowed to profit from their misdeeds? 
For Walzer, Hamas is responsible for mixing combatants with civilians but this does not 
reduce the moral obligations of the IDF: `It is not that responsibility for the mix is irrelevant, 
but that the side that creates the mix does not thereby free the other side from its own moral 
obligations' 92. Hence, for Walzer it is right that there should be an ethical enquiry into the 
endangering of civilians and that responsibility for harm should be parcelled out among those 
involved in the military conflict, but findings of responsibility should not undermine the 
universal nature of standards of behaviour in war. For Walzer, the same argument holds true 
when considering whether combatants fighting for unjust and just causes should be held to 
the same standards; the traditional strict separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
must be maintained. 
As we have seen, traditional Just War theory is constructed on the strict separation of jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello and that, despite proposing radical change to the Doctrine of Double 
Effect, Walzer retains the duality. Traditionalists maintain the view that, since all parties to 
92 Walzer, 'Responsibility and Proportionality', p5. 
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wars claim to be justly entitled to go to war and regard their enemies as unjust, applying 
different standards would be dangerously unworkable; the ethics of going to war are relevant 
to a judgment of the acts of the sovereign and that the actions of soldiers in war are to be 
judged in relation to discrete military actions. This dichotomy is also strongly upheld in the 
formation of IHL, which requires the same standard of conduct from both the aggressor and 
defender alike. Nevertheless, there are emerging views among contemporary Just War 
theorists that the separation is artificial. Jeff McMahan's Killing in War is a persuasive 
argument challenging the traditional position and his ideas are worthy of detailed 
examination 93 
McMahan collapses the duality to arrive at the idea of just and unjust combatants to argue 
that combatants fighting in support of an unjust cause fight immorally irrespective of their 
methods so that there can be no proportionality in service of an unjust cause. Conversely, just 
combatants should in some circumstances be released from the present constraints on their 
behaviour. This position is worthy of detailed consideration because of the parallel position in 
modern international law scholarship that observes the collapse in legal practice of the 
theoretically separate jus ad bellum and jus in bello judgments, whereby parties whose cause 
we approve of are subject to less rigorous legal standards over their conduct of their 
hostilities than those whose cause we find less attractive94. 
McMahan's critique of traditional just war theory and, indeed, of Walzer's position, rests on 
a return to a value-laden concept of innocence. This challenges the principle of the moral 
equality of combatants and places the whole edifice of distinction on a moral basis. Non- 
combatants have a moral, not instrumental, status that protects them from attack and 
combatants lose the right to fight, whether defensively or aggressively, in the absence of just 
cause. The consequences for proportionality are clear. Proportionality works to allow harm in 
93 Jeff McMahan, Killing in War, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), 
94 This is an important insight, which is considered in detail in the next chapter. 
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furtherance of a valuable goal; if the good effect of military advantage is lost in pursuit of an 
unjust cause, it follows that civilian harm can never be proportionate in an unjust war. This 
leads McMahan to extend the discussion of proportionality from its preoccupation with harm 
to civilians ('wide proportionality') to consider attacks on combatants ('narrow 
proportionality') whose moral status affects the degree of violence that can be done to them. 
This is to argue that attacks on just combatants can never be proportionate in either the wide 
or narrow sense, and means that only the just can claim the moral authority to fight at all. 
While McMahan constructs a logically attractive argument that appears to deny unjust 
combatants the rights of just combatants, he is runs into difficulties when considering the 
practical implications his position. 
Traditional Just War theorists have long recognised that all sides to a military conflict claim 
just cause. Acknowledging this, McMahan has to accept that any differentiation of the 
restraints of just and unjust combatants involves the very real risk of unjust combatants 
simply claiming to be acting justly or failing to recognise the legitimacy of a code of restraint 
that discriminates against them. If all attacks by unjust combatants are disproportionate, 
where is the incentive for restraint? In the context of Gaza, if Israel is judged fighting to 
prolong an illegal occupation (a jus ad bellum position) and any attack is disproportionate, 
why exercise restraint in accordance with jus in Bello principles of distinction and 
proportionality? This suggests that by importing jus ad bellum considerations into jus in bello 
assessments, there is the potential for all sides to abandon restraint- the good because they are 
not required to and the bad because they get no benefit from it. Struggling for a practical 
solution, McMahan explores the idea that the good of the proportionality matrix be restricted 
to the welfare of the attacking combatants, thereby removing the objective of a potentially 
unjust victory from the mix. Again, practical considerations stand in McMahan's way since 
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proportionality must recognise strategic advantage, which may have no real relevance to the 
immediate saving of military lives. 
McMahan convincingly refutes the moral arguments in favour of the moral equality of 
soldiers and is, indeed, arguing for a position that is intuitively correct- that people fighting 
for an unjust cause are morally in the wrong and should be less free to attack their opponents. 
But by failing to formulate moral norms of conduct in war that give practical effect to this 
propositions, McMahan comes dangerously near to validating the realist conviction that there 
is no place for morality in war- a danger that McMahan himself recognises95. McMahan is 
left promoting his moral position of differentiation between just and unjust combatants while 
at the same time recognising the need for a legal enforcement of restraint. While promoting 
his moral position, McMahan is reduced to defending the diametrically opposite legal regime 
of IHL. This denies Just War theory one of its main claims to contemporary relevance, its 
connection with IHL. McMahan places the blame for this on weak jus ad bellum 
requirements and, more convincingly, the lack of a recognised authoritative legal body, so 
that combatants do not have any alternative to reliance on the views of their own 
government96. 
Having explored McMahan's influential views in some detail, it appears that his challenge to 
the traditional duality of Just War theory produces morally attractive positions but ultimately 
leads to a legal dead end. However, consideration of IHL in the next chapter shows that 
modern Just War thinking is permeating the application, if not the theory, of the legal 
regulation of warfare. 
Before concluding this discussion of Just War theory it is necessary to recognise the 
relevance of Jus Post Bellum or the just ending of wars. This was long neglected by Just War 
scholars, being seen as no more than a process of reinstating the status quo ante bellum. As 
95 McMahan, Killing in War, p36. 
96 Ibid p. 108 
134 
Coates points out, this is in stark contrast with utopian ideas of creating a just state from the 
ashes of the defeated aggressor but it does extend to the idea that a Just War should result in a 
just peace. For modern just war thinkers a just peace includes putting in place structures that 
prevent further aggression97. Walzer calls this `restoration plus'98. Building on Walzer's 
sparse treatment of the subject, Michael Orend employs traditional just war principles to 
provide a framework for a just peace that uses ideas of discrimination, proportionality, right 
intention, just cause and proper authority to give moral guidance to the restoration of peace" 
Trudy Govier puts forward a powerful argument for the development of Just War theory to 
recognise the duties of the victors to deal justly with the victims and perpetrators within the 
defeated society1°°. Building social trust through reconciliation processes is for her more 
important than the treaties and conventions that bring wars to an end. Clearly, there are 
important developments in jus post bellum scholarship that merit greater attention than is 
possible in this thesis. Indeed, the failure to plan for the post bellum in Iraq stands as 
powerful testimony to the practical contemporary relevance of jus post bellum thinking. 
The foregoing review of contemporary just war theory is necessarily brief and cannot do 
justice to the breadth of just war scholarship. It is nonetheless sufficient to show that Just War 
scholarship is engaging with the difficult questions currently generated by modern 
asymmetric warfare. How to react to an Afghan that may be a disinterested farmer or a 
Taliban fighter, how many civilians can be put at risk in an attack on a rocket launcher 
located in a village, whether a power station can be attacked and whether rules of engagement 
should be relaxed when fighting against combatants who conceal themselves among civilians 
are the meat and drink of Just War debate. Just War Theory claims ownership of the language 
97 Coates, The Ethics of War, p 273-291. 
98 Walzer, Just and Unjust wars, p 119-124. 
99 Brian Orend, Michael Walzer on War and Justice, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000), p135-152. 
10° Trudy Glovier, 'The Challenges of Reconciliation', in Larry May (Ed. ) War; Essays in Political Philosophy, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p 229-248. 
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and the ethical principles to discuss the moral questions posed by war and its major positions 
form an important element of the regime of legal regulation of war. However, there are other 
ways of thinking about the choices made in war that have always challenged threaten the 
primacy of Just War theory. 
4) Battles with Realism, Consequentialism and Militarism 
This thesis does not attempt to locate Just War theory within the wide tradition of political 
philosophy or international relations theory101; the focus of the inquiry is on the place of 
morality in military decision-making and its impact on the construction of operational legal 
advice. 
That said, it is instructive to briefly consider the Just War critique of realism, 
consequentialism and militarism in order to gauge the robustness of Just War thinking and the 
relevance of other ways of understanding the decisions that are taken in war'°2. 
101 Placing Just War theory within a context of political theory is a far more demanding task than examining Just 
War theory's critiques of realism, consequentialism and militarism. The key debates is the extent to which Just 
War moral positions are recognised as universal moral norms that apply to behaviour both within the state and 
externally. Apparent universal norms take on particular forms in different societies. Walzer in, Spheres of 
Justice: a Defense of Pluralism and Equality, (New York: Basic Books, 1983) thinks in terms of 'thick' state 
morality and 'thin' international and cosmopolitan morality. Walzer's thin universalism is a product of `thick' 
particularism. The incorporation of particularistic communities in theories of cosmopolitanism allows for the 
influence of particular constructions of identity on morality. The challenge is to account for moral diversity 
without abandoning ideas of universal morality; for a useful starting point see, David Boucher, Political 
Theories of International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
102 Just war thinkers locate their scholarship as the alternative to realism and pacifism as a body of thought on 
war. Kantian philosophy is usually regarded as pacifist, although Brian Orend challenges the conventional view 
to claim that Kant has a form of just war theory that shares much of Just War theory's `moral logic', particularly 
in the area of jus post bellum: See, Brian Orend, 'Kant's Ethics of War and Peace', Journal of Military Ethics, 
(2004) 3(2): 161-167. Although Orend is able to show some commonality of principles by using the Doctrine of 
Right to re-interpret Perpetual Peace to argue that Kant's ethical position on defensive wars amount to a just 
war theory, Kant's refusal to distinguish between the rights of combatants and non-combatants in war is difficult 
for just war theorists to accommodate. Indeed, Kant's evident contempt for Vittel's talk of just and unjust wars 
suggests that Kant's recognition of the place of morality in state behaviour does not of itself enable just war 
theorists to claim Kant as part of their tradition. For a concise discussion, see David Boucher, Political Theories 
of International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 270-284. For a realist argument that Kant 
saw the inevitability, if not the morality, of war see, Kenneth N. Waltz, `Kant, Liberalism, and War', The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Jun., 1962), pp. 331-340 and Eyal Benvenisti, `Human 
Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians', Israel Law Review, V. 39,2006, at p. 83 has a nice 
reference to Kant in the judgment of ICTY in Prosecutor v Kupresckic, 14 January 2000, at paragraph 518, 
136 
4.1) Realism 
Realism is not something that just war theory can easily ignore when promoting its discourse 
on war 103 In fact Walzer begins Just and Unjust Wars by describing his task as that of 
presenting an answer to Realism. While this is not the place for a textured investigation of 
Realism, it is important to understand the Just War critique of Realism. Just War theorists 
identify in realism the antithesis of their world view and almost all modern Just War writing 
begins with an attack on Realism. In so doing, Just War critiques can be accused of setting up 
a straw man by playing down the Realist recognition of the instrumental role of moral 
argument or the benefits that may flow from policies that meet moral criteria. Rather, Just 
War theorists tackle the Realism that denies the relevance of morality to the conduct of 
affairs of state and, indeed, regards moral influences on state action as downright harmful; 
moral influences are there to be excluded from the decision-making process and this holds for 
war as it does in all international relations since war is, after all, international relations in 
extremis. For Realists evil can be used to maximise the interests of the state and thus ceases 
to be really evil; morally duplicitous methods, used to bring some semblance of an 
advantageous balance of forces, are a price worth paying104. The fact that the difference 
between Just War and realist approaches to war is so fundamental, enables Just War theorists 
to attack realism without distinguishing between the various strands of realist thinking. 
Indeed, in the context of this polarisation of the debate between Just War theory and realism 
the multiplicity of positions within Just War theory also lose their significance. 
where the humanitarian rules are described as the result of '[T]he transition into legal norms of the "categorical 
imperative" formulated by Kant in the field of morals: one ought to fulfil an obligation regardless of whether 
others comply with it or disregard it'. 
103 While there is an extensive realist literature, reference is usually made to Edward Carr, The Twenty Years' 
Crisis 1919-1939, (London: Macmillan, 1939), Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among the Nations, (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1978) and Robert Keohane (ed. ), Neorealism and its Critics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 
104For a realist account of foreign policy, see Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, (London: Weidenfeld 
& Nicholson, 1969). 
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The Realist view is that war is justified by the self-interest of states, takes place in an 
anarchical international environment and a state should do whatever is necessary to win. This 
is a discourse of power, security and self-interest that denies a place for justice otherwise than 
in purely instrumental terms. In so far as moral considerations are recognised by realists, it is 
a matter of assessing the consequences of compliance and non-compliance in a cost-benefit 
analysis. This is an approach that recognises the moral norms as part of the decision-making 
environment but such moral standards are to be subordinated to the standards of politicslos 
Appeals to justice for the sake of justice are to be disregarded. As Coates puts it, `From a 
realist perspective, however, it is the political utility of morality which is paramount: morality 
plays, or ought to play, an important instrumental but always subordinate role' 106 Realists 
argue that their approach to war is less likely, in practice, to lead to war and, once begun, less 
likely to lead to excess than the pursuit of justice by Just War theorists. For Realists, war is 
always instrumental and subordinate to a political cause- to paraphrase Clausewitz, a 
continuation of political relations107. Coates neatly expresses the realist argument that, `In the 
end morality is better served by those who seem to disavow it than by those who trumpet it 
and who seek to carry all before it' 108. 
To be sure, the relationship between realism and morality is troubling. Realists do not deny 
the utility of morality as a means to an end; rather they deny the elevation of moral standards 
above other political strategies. However, since realists cannot ignore the consequences of 
immoral behaviour in personal affairs, Realist thinkers recognise a duality of personal and 
political morality. Personal morality, such as decisions taken by a soldier in battle, submits to 
103 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 13. 
106 Coates, The Ethics of War and Peace, p. 21. 
107 C. Von Clausewitz, On War, (London: Penguin, 1982), p 402, quoted by Coates, The Ethics of War, at p. 28, 
`We maintain, on the contrary, that war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of 
other things. ' 
10B Coates, The Ethics of War and Peace, p. 26. 
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political morality where political morality is in service of the state, such as rules of 
engagement, to maximise its gains. Whether political morality and personal morality are 
separated in context or function, the Realist ultimately makes a virtue of subjugating the 
moral to the political. This confirms the Realist view that war and the conduct of war are 
matters of state and not subjected to moral restraints. How this works in practice depends on 
whether the soldier in the heat of battle can separate personal morality from the public 
morality expressed in his rules of engagement. 
Coates reminds us of another form of war realism, `a grassroots variety' of `combat 
realism"09, that is not the concern of theorists but rather the experience of soldiers in war 
who find that it is impossible to fight morally when fighting for personal survival. This 
tendency is reinforced by military training that may be designed to turn the soldier into a 
disinterested killing machine. Indeed, the group dynamics, organisation and training of 
soldiers militate towards realist behaviour. The group identity engenders loyalty to comrades 
that can militate against moral conduct in war. The time for reflection can be seen as after the 
conflict and moral reflection on the battlefield may be perceived as a dangerous indulgence. 
Soldiers may not be enthusiastic followers of Walzer's injunction to take personal risks to 
reduce the risk to enemy combatants, and, indeed, the commanders may be equally unhappy 
to see them do so. The experience of the soldier, who eschews heroic warfare, endorses the 
realist view that war is hell beyond the realm of morality. To be sure, Realism in its various 
forms is a powerful opponent of Just War theory. 
In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer derides the language of realism. Realist language is the 
language of self-interest and cost-benefit analysis. Walzer's point is that this hard talk is 
incapable of addressing the moral complexities of war, but this is hardly surprising since 
Realists are not interested in moral complexities. While Walzer's response is that most people 
109 Coates, The Ethics of War and pPeace, p. 28-31. 
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are interested in the morality of war, Just War theory has to show that this is for good reason. 
Just War theorists argue that people ought to be interested in the morality of war and also 
need to be so interested, because Just War theory must has a practical utility to compete with 
realism in the hard places of military decision-making. To be persuasive, Just War theory 
must address the realist position not only in terms of the importance of morality but also to 
show convincingly that a moral ordering of war works better in practice. 
Walzer's objection to Realism is organised around the argument that there is room for moral 
content in the choices that states make in the conduct of their affairs, whether domestically or 
internationally, and that the moral content of decision-making both satisfies a human need 
and advances their interests. Walzer does not ignore the malign intentions of states, but 
denies them the role of organising principle. Instead, shared moral beliefs form the basis of 
collective association and a shared moral discourse on war. It is the value of human life and 
the right to it that underpins common values in war that demand a standard of conduct, rather 
than the realist limits of what the state can get away with. In short, Just War theory lays claim 
to universal moral norms that inform a shared approach to war. 
Resisting the Realist charge that justice is an elusive and dangerously vague term that leads 
to excess in war, Just War theorists distinguish between realistic expectations of justice and 
realism. This is the openly consequentialist aspect of Just War theory that recognises limits to 
the pursuit of justice in war. While moral means are to be used to moral ends, Just War theory 
puts a break on its prescriptive aspect to recognise that both ends and means are limited by 
what is possible. To be sure, human suffering is to be minimised, but it cannot be avoided. 
Brian Orend counters the Realist position with the argument that prescriptive Realism, which 
claims that a state ought to behave amorally in the international arena, undermines co- 
operation between states producing sub-optimal results' 10. In practice, avoiding this outcome 
10 Orend, Michael Walzer on War and Justice, p68. 
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leads to a possible behavioural congruency between the realist and the Just War theorist; 
recognising the benefits of cooperative action, the realists will, in some circumstances, accept 
the prudence of observing rules such as the limitation of war to situations of self-defence. In 
these circumstances the outcome of rule compliance might be the same for the Just War 
theorist and the realist, though the behaviour justification would be in the different discourses 
of morality and self-interest. 
Just War theorists attach great importance to the role of the tradition in the creation of the 
moral principles of war that have been given legal force in the codification of international 
law. Nevertheless, the relationship between just war theory and IHL is strained. Just War 
theorists debate behaviour in war as though IHL does not regulate the activity, while, at the 
same time, maintaining that IHL can only be properly understood from a Just War 
perspective and the law should be developed to accommodate changes in just war positions. 
Meanwhile, realists deny IHL its moral code and the moral justification for its development. 
As Orend observes, realists might argue that the process whereby Just War rules have been 
codified into international law has been one of rational choice bargaining between self- 
interested parties rather than recognition of shared moral values. Indeed, from a realist 
perspective it is the process of self-interested rational choice bargaining that drives the 
development of IHL rather than the evolution of universal moral norms. Nevertheless, 
whether or not the result of self-interested bargaining, it is a mark of the strength of Just War 
theory that it is the rules constructed within the discipline have been codified into 
international law. 
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4.2) Consequentialism 
Just War Theory is often criticised from a philosophical perspective for its concern with the 
consequence of behaviour in war. Those who challenge the moral strength of DDE see 
proportionality as surrendering the moral content of behaviour in war to the end of military 
advantage- bad means justified by good ends. Just war theorists tend to deflect this criticism 
by its own attacks on utilitarianism- the biggest target among the array of consequentialist 
targets. In doing so just war theorists, who cannot deny a consequentialist aspect to their 
theory, emphasise its moral content. 
Walzer distinguishes his rights based conception of justice in war from utilitarian justice. 
While he acknowledges that utility plays a part in his theory, it is at all stages limited by 
rights. Orend observes that Walzer's framework of `something like absolute' human rights to 
life and liberty in war operates to bar utilitarian calculations that would deny those rights" 
Clearly, the fact that the right to life and liberty in war is not absolute allows a 
consequentialist element to the theory. The point, then, is not whether Just War theory is 
consequentialist, but rather that most consequentialist theories treat as negotiable the moral 
principles regarded by Just War theorists as universal. 
Just War criticism of consequentialism usually focuses on classical Benthamism with its 
distain of human rights and promotion of a conception of justice based on the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number. The essence of the Just War critiques of utilitarianism is 
the obvious potential for the happiness of the many to cause injustice to the few. While 
variants of utilitarianism, such as rule utilitarianism, can recognise the value to the majority 
of rules that protect the minority, Just War theorists powerfully argue that, for utilitarians, 
rules and rights will always be threatened by cost-benefit analysis that may fail to recognise 
"' Orend, Michael Walzer on War and Justice, p. 77-78. 
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this value above others. Indeed, utilitarians who fail to see the value of a rule would be 
inclined to break it or at least stretch its meaning to suit their purpose. 
For all the theorising about rule compliance, and irrespective of their relative respect for 
rights, the fundamental difference between Just War theorists and utilitarians lies in their 
conception of justice. The maximisation of pleasure for the greatest number where `pleasure' 
is a moveable feast is not how Just War theorists see justice in war, or indeed anywhere else. 
4.3) Militarism 
Militarism is deserving of separate consideration since it is better understood as an ideology 
than a philosophical theory or a particular genus of political organisation. The strength of 
militarism within a culture, whether at the societal, institutional, group or individual level 
inhibits the acceptance of Just War theory and the subjection of military advantage to 
humanitarian need. As Coates puts it, `Militarism is rife in the modern world, where its 
. pervasive and multiform presence constantly threatens the moral regulation of war't12 
Militarism has been seen as the product of fascist particularism, socialist revolutionary 
ideology, prescriptive democracy and religion in conflict with secularism or rival creeds. In 
fact militarism is better understood as a product of, and response to, social constructions of 
security that can arise in any society whatever its political organisation. Understood in this 
way, the old debates about the extent to which militarism is confined to the extremes of 
fascism or socialism are unhelpful. 
From a Just War perspective, militarism presents a real challenge to Just War practice since 
militarism disregards the just war constraints on the resort to war and the conduct of war. It 
has this in common with realism but with an added element; while realism adopts an amoral 
cost-benefit analysis that may or may not result in war, militarism tilts the balance in favour 
of war. It is easy to characterise militarism as blood lust for combat, but this is to 
112 Coates, The Ethics of War, p. 40. 
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underestimate the power of the ideology. Militarism is better understood as the propensity to 
see military solutions to political problems. While for Just War theorists, war is a matter of 
last resort, for the militarist it is the first option on the agenda. As was seen in chapter one, 
Israeli civil-military relations scholarship has produced a compelling analysis of Israeli 
militarism as a cultural phenomenon. 
Influential Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling terms this `cognitive militarism' or 
`military-mindedness', which he applies to his own society: 
Despite its centrality and the high esteem accorded to it, the Israeli military is mainly 
professional and does not seek to intervene in social or political issues or processes. From this 
point of view, the military is not much more "militaristic" than any military in any democratic 
country; rather, considerable portions of Israeli civilian society have become highly 
militarised. The militarisation of Israeli culture is expressed mainly by the use of excessive 
power in solving social and political problems, by the "military-mindedness" of large parts of 
the civilian population and political leadership, and by the high expectation that the military 
will solve non-military problems 113. 
In Israel, resources are allocated in anticipation of war and the country is in a state of constant 
readiness. Whether this is in response to real or perceived military threats is irrelevant, since 
the Israeli construction of national security recognises a multitude of threats as social facts 
that can, and are, addressed in military terms. It is not that Israel's decisions to go to war 
evidence militarism, rather the alternative policy options are undermined by a belief in the 
inevitability of war. In these circumstances a militarised society is resistant to Just War 
principles designed to limit the recourse to war to a strict interpretation of self-defence and 
there is a stretching, if not disregard, for the letter of IHL114. 
113 Baruch Kimmerling, The Invention and Decline of Israeliness: State, Society and the Military, (Berkley: 
University of California Press: 2001), p. 226. 
114 For useful review of militarism from an Israeli perspective, see Yoram Peri, 'The Radical Social Scientists 
and Israeli Militarism', Israel Studies, fall 1996, Vol. 1, No. 2, Pages 230-266. Peri distinguishes between 'the 
national policy and its implementation, the institutional-organizational aspect, and the value or ideological 
aspect'. Policy and implementation is characterised by military excess, the institutions are influenced by the 
military and the ideological aspect. Peri strongly disputes Kimmerling's position and claims that there are 
counter-balancing ant-militaristic trends in Israeli society that condemn wars of choice. 
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While it is easy to understand that cognitive militarism challenges Just War principles of jus 
ad bellum, the effect of militarism on the processes of terminating hostilities is equally 
pronounced. The Just War message is one of restraint in negotiating the ending of war, but 
militarism encourages victory in arms rather than compromise. Clearly, there are 
opportunities for peace in the course of war that militarists spurn in favour of one more push. 
A military state of mind is not well versed in processes of reconciliation. 
Militarism has in common with Realism a world view that sees anarchy in the international 
relations of states and war as its natural product. The militaristic assessment of neighbouring 
states and their populations is a constant preparation for war. Unlike Realism, militarism does 
not necessarily deny the place of morality in the conduct of war but this will depend on the 
strength of militaristic ideology. Where militarism is closely linked to nationalism there will 
be a tendency towards privileging citizens whether civilian or soldier above enemy civilians. 
Thus, Kimmerling would not have been surprised by the Kasher position. To the extent that 
Just War theory is accepted by militaristic societies, it will be adapted to emphasise the 
reciprocal nature of restraint in war and in conflicts such as Gaza, where Hamas sought to 
collapse the principle of distinction, there would be a tendency to relax the ethical constraints. 
In these circumstances Just War theory will be seen as relevant in a form that meets the 
perceived security needs of the state as filtered through a cultural militarism. That said, the 
breadth of debate within Just War scholarship allows the tradition to accommodate moral 
positions within a practical framework designed to enable wars to be fought and militarists 
are slow to deny the utility of rules of combat whatever their moral content. 
5) Conclusion: The Place of Just War Theory 
Just War theory is located within the field of applied ethics and has a narrow focus; it 
engages with law, philosophy and political thought only where they speak about the resort to 
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war and the conduct of war. Nevertheless, it seeks to influence behaviour. Publishing in 
newspapers and magazines and meeting with the military, the theorists working in this area 
are devoted to making their knowledge more accessible and comprehensible. To be sure, 
some discussions can become complex but writers in the field constantly return to battlefield 
situations to test the application of their theory. The relevance of Just War theory lies in its 
narrow philosophical focus on the difficult decisions in war and its prescriptive claims to 
guide both conduct and the correct understanding of international humanitarian law. This 
enables Just War theorists to claim ownership of the moral analysis of war and the ethical 
training of its practitioners. If, as was argued in the previous chapter, the choice of legal 
interpretation of IHL involves an ethical assessment, Just War theory certainly claims to 
inform the ethical content of the decision making process. As such, it overlaps the boundaries 
between the ethics of war and the philosophy of law as it applies to war. This puts Just War 
doctrine firmly within an international institutional regime of legal regulation of war. 
A brief survey of modern just war theory has shown that traditional Just War theory is 
undergoing a period of renaissance with a confusing array of moral positions on the key 
principles of discrimination, proportionality and the moral equality of combatants. 
Underlying the debate is a disagreement about the balance to be struck between the utility of 
war and the protection of civilians. If it is accepted that, as Walzer puts it, `Often, it is 
morally necessary to fight; and then it may also be necessary, this time in the sense of 
"inevitable", that civilians will die, and those who are fighting on the side of right will do 
some of the killing'' 15, then a balance has to be struck between protecting civilians and 
allowing the military to do its job. As we have seen, Walzer wants only careful killing of 
civilians while Kasher emphises the morality of force protection. At the other end of the Just 
War spectrum there are Just War practitioners whose aversion to militarism turns just war 
115 Michael Walzer, 'Responsibility and Proportionality in State and Nonstate Wars', Parameters, Spring 2009, 
p42. 
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theory into `pacifism's functional equivalent- a kind of cover for people who are not prepared 
to admit that there are no wars they will supporti116 The practical effect of these diverse 
positions is that Just War theorists do not speak with one voice except in so far as their 
opinions are always expressed in moral terms. In fact, the key to understanding Just War 
theory is to recognise that whether or not jus ad bellum and jus in bello are kept apart, the 
discipline demands that both the means and the ends must meet stringent moral criteria; the 
resort to war and the conduct of war, whether linked or separate, must be just. This is what 
distinguishes Just War theory from other discourses on war. 
However, Just War theory claims practical application and it is the theoretical concessions to 
utility that leave it open to criticism- particularly from the political left. How can soldiers 
fighting for an unjust cause be justified in killing civilians by reference to the `good' of their 
military objects? Even if this is accepted, why should unintended killing be acceptable when 
it is the obvious consequence of the intended act? While Just War theory jumps through 
hoops to provide a moral answer, its task is made urgent by the moral outrage of armchair 
observers of real-time media images of civilian suffering in war. The intense media coverage 
of war drives the hardening of the norm against civilian harm and strains the Just War 
positions that aim to protect civilians while permitting some degree of efficient warfare. Just 
War theorists seek to influence moral culture and offer prescriptive advice to the military, 
claiming to identify and interpret universal moral norms. The problem arises when trying to 
balance the moral norms against the needs of the military. The practical consequences, 
despite referencing universal morality, will not be universally popular- indeed Just War 
theorists may find themselves detached from popular morality. In these cases the unspoken 
pact between the military and Just War practitioners that Just War doctrine is an accurate 
guide to what is generally acceptable, fails to deliver. Proportionality goes out the window 
116 Walzer locates these thinkers as being primarily among the European left. 
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when the cameras broadcast images of dead children and their distraught families. The Israeli 
efforts to keep reporters out of Gaza were not so much an admission of war crimes as 
recognition that even legal and Just War compliant operations can offend moral sensibilities 
with severe political consequences. 
In these circumstances, McMahan may be right to accept a decoupling of Just War theory and 
international law in order to locate just war theory closer to popular morality and to push 
practice closer to public expectations rather than to the limits of international law. In practice, 
our judgment of the rightness of the resort to war does influence our judgment of military 
behaviour in war. If this leads to differing judgments of behaviour in war, then those 
militaries fighting for a cause that is popularly perceived to be unjust can expect a rough ride. 
The Israelis are well aware of this, with several commentators bitterly noting that the 
American operation in Fallujah was far more destructive than their operation in Gaza but the 
criticism of the US was mild by comparison. The same can be said of NATO actions in 
Kosovo. Whether Just War theory can provide a guide to the nature and strengths of universal 
moral norms in war is itself open to question. Communitarians, for instance, would argue 
moral values are mediated by states and the very concept of universal norms or values 
implies a world community that does not yet exist. In the meantime claims of universal moral 
norms may be no more than the imposition of the moral values of the dominant states. 
Cultural relativism would suggest the partial application of moral values, which may or may 
not extend rights to non-citizens- a position reminiscent of Kasher's ordering of the state's 
duties towards its own citizens and those of the enemy. 
Whether or not the Just War tradition's claim to universal moral standards is well founded, it 
remains open to the criticism that it is too responsive to the needs of the military. Those who 
care less for military efficiency than they do for the protection of civilians see Just War 
theory as ethics in service of the military and failing to properly protect civilians in war. This 
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charge was forcibly made against Kasher and Yadlin by Zeev Sternhall, participating in the 
Kasher/Walzer New York Review of Books exchanges: 
The framework of Israel's recent operation in Gaza was shaped by the main lesson that was 
drawn from the warfare in Lebanon in the summer of 2006: that Israeli society would not 
stand for another offensive war that would claim heavy casualties. This was, beyond all 
sophistry and mental gymnastics, the true goal of the ideological cover, which Yadlin and 
117 Kasher provided the government and the army: "Zero casualties for our troopsi 
This critique goes to the heart of the matter. If Israel adopted a policy of force protection in 
Gaza it did so with the moral force of Kasher's Just War ethical position. Indeed, Kasher's 
analysis pre-dates Gaza and was generated in support of Israel's policy of targeted killing 
during the Second Intifada. Both policies received widespread popular support within Israel 
demonstrating a congruency between Kasher's scholarship and popular morality when faced 
with perceived existential threats from non-state actors. If this is Kasher providing 
`ideological cover', it is also an engagement in the contestation of ethics, identified by Clarke 
as a key input of international legitimacy. 
From a theoretical perspective, the point to be emphasised here is that in the absence of 
universalist moral positions on the right way to fight, Just War theory provides the 
intellectual framework to inform military ethics in practice but, within the boundaries of Just 
War doctrine, allows for differing ethical outcomes. Consensus positions are reached at the 
domestic level through political engagement. In Israel, the Kasher position appears to be 
widely accepted and to inform the conduct of recent Israeli military action in Gaza. However, 
it has been argued throughout this thesis that the international level of analysis, where 
legitimacy is contested, influences domestic military behaviour and the practical application 
of military ethics- despite the absence of moral universalism. Here, Adler's communities of 
purpose allow an understanding of groups of elite actors reaching consensus positions on the 
117 Zeev Sternhall, Leo Blum Professor Emeritus of Political science at the Hebrew University, letter to the 
editor, New York Review of Books, Vol. 56, No. 13, August 13 2009. 
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right way to fight. This suggests a fruitful avenue of research into where Israel's ethical 
positions are located in terms of like minded communities. 
However, ethical ideological cover is not enough to meet the needs of the military. There is 
also the need for legal cover, which has been provided by the IDF military lawyers who 
approved the targeted killings and the major targeting decisions during Cast Lead. As was 
shown in the last chapter, the grey areas of IHL invite ethical decision-making in the process 
of legal decision-making. It will be recalled that the Martins clause has formed a part of the 
laws of armed conflict since its first appearance in the preamble to the 1899 Hague 
Convention (II) with respect to the laws and customs of war on land: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it 
right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and 
belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as 
they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity 
and the requirements of the public conscience! 18 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the clause can be seen as an embedded moral code 
within IHL. In legal terms, this is recourse to natural law principles. Since Just War theory 
has informed and constructed the principles that became recognised as natural law, the clause 
can operate to enable Just War Theory to influence the construction of legal advice to the 
military. This is a very direct route to influencing the behaviour of militaries, but as we have 
seen the `requirements of public conscience' are contested. Indeed, Just War scholarship can 
be seen as framing the political contestation that precedes and challenges consensus positions 
on the morality of military operations. If Kasher's views are a measure of the Israeli `public 
conscience', it is to be expected that the IDF military lawyers will adopt a permissive 
118 For a brief discussion of the legal interpretations of the clause, see Rupert Ticehurst, 'The Martens Clause 
and the Laws of Armed Conflict', The International Review of the Red Cross, 30 April 1997, no 317, p. 125- 
134. Eyal Benvenisti, 'Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians', Israel Law Review, 
v. 39,2006, p. 83 quotes the Kupresckic judgment at p. 518 and discusses the developments in IHL post-WW1 as 
a move away from treaty principles of reciprocity and `marks the transition into legal norms of the "categorical 
imperative" formulated by Kant in the field of morals'. But armies are unlikely to give an advantage to the 
enemy who does not recognise the same restrictions on its behaviour. 
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approach to force protection when they construct their legal advice in the grey areas of the 
legality of targeting. This theme will be explored in the course of the case studies. On the 
other hand, other views of what is legal may be generated by differing moral positions on the 
obligations of militaries to avoid harming 'their' civilians. 
It follows that, before beginning the case studies, it is necessary to have a clearer 
understanding of what constitutes authoritative international humanitarian law. In the absence 
of a powerful international court where pluralistic interpretations abound, whose law is law? 
As Asa Kasher recently formulated the question, 
How then can international law meant for classical warfare apply to non-traditional wars? 
One way is by means of creative interpretations of international law. The problems with such 
an approach, however, are immediately apparent. Whose interpretation prevails? The 
interpretation of the Supreme Court of Israel? The US Supreme Court? The Marine Corps' 
Judge Advocate Division? Somebody within the United Nations? 119 
These questions recognise the problem of identifying law and legal authority beyond the 
sovereign state in the absence of a powerful international court. This uncertainty requires an 
enquiry into what international humanitarian law is and, if the law is pluralistic, whose 
opinion counts? To frame the same question differently, whose opinion confers legal 
legitimacy? These issues will be addressed in the next chapter. 
119 Asa Kasher, 'A Moral Evaluation of the Gaza War- Operation cast Lead', Jerusalem Centre for Public 
Affairs, Jerusalem Issue Brief, vol. 9, no. 18,4 February 2010. 
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Chapter 5: Understanding the plurality of IHL 
1) Introduction 
This chapter presents a methodological analysis of IHL's legal pluralism that links the legal 
to the political and locates the construction of legal advice by military lawyers within a larger 
political calculation of the consequences of military actions in war. It will be recalled that 
chapter two examined the increasing use of law as a medium of political judgment of war. 
Chapter three looked at the detail of IHL and saw that there are large grey areas where the 
law is imprecise and open to multiple interpretations. In chapter four we considered 
philosophical positions on war and the connection between Just War theory and IHL. 
In this chapter, we acknowledge the continuing close association of Just war theory and IHL 
but argue that the dynamic cannot be understood without recognising that the application of 
ethics to the construction of law is more than giving weight to ethical principles embedded in 
IHL; the application of ethics to law involves political choice. Equally, the choosing between 
laws is a political act. The challenge is to adopt a methodology that accounts for the plurality 
of international law in terms of the exercise of political power and furthers an understanding 
of the role of military lawyers. 
Rather than adopt the classical positions of legal philosophy, which explain the juridical 
process as a disinterested application of legal rules and principles whereby the one law is 
revealed within a closed logical system, the approach here is to see law in political and 
sociological terms, so that the political nature of the `legal' function of the military lawyer 
can be better understood. The argument is informed by American Legal Realism and Michael 
Reisner's work on the `incident' as a decisional unit in International law. This approach 
acknowledges the weakness of the letter of the law in international conventions, and in the 
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absence of a strong international court capable of establishing and enforcing a detailed body 
of law that is case specific, looks to elite responses to international incidents as indicators of 
international law in practice. The multiplicity of responses of elites reveals the existence of 
choice in identifying law. This is not to suggest that IHL is epiphenomenal. Rather, 
competing constructions of IHL and their promoters are elements of a legal regime that 
includes the international and the domestic. Recognising the plurality of international law as a 
diverse structure allows for the agency of the legal advisor, whose choice is not between law 
and non-law but between competing constructions of law. The approach opens the way for 
consideration of the question posed by Asa Kasher in the concluding section of the last 
chapter: whose law is to be preferred? 
Emanuel Adler thinks in terms of several, often overlapping, transnational or international 
communities where, `members have collective understandings of what they are doing". 
These `communities of practice' are not just based on shared values but also on norms that 
shape practice and expectations of consequences. The approach adopted in this thesis does 
not deny the relevance of universal values but recognises diversity of expectations and rules 
of behaviour. Seen from this perspective, the choice of law becomes a function of which 
community of practice is preferred. 
As Brunnee and Troope put it in their promotion of their interactive law model of 
international law, `International law today is largely a set of interlocking communities of 
practice that uphold relatively weak norms, but there are some sites of richer normality'2. 
This thesis adopts Reisman's analysis for the identification of pluralistic statements of IHL 
but retains a communitarian view of `interlocking communities of practice'. Using elite 
t Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International 
Relations, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). 
2 Jutta Brunnee and Stephen J. Troope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
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behaviour and political reactions to military behaviour as statements of IHL means that, in 
the absence of a powerful international court, predicting the legal consequences of military 
action amounts to a political analysis expressed in legal language. Viewed from this 
perspective, the role of the military lawyer can be understood as that of a specialist political 
advisor speaking the language of law with the authority of the international lawyer. 
2) The intersection of the legal, the ethical and the political 
As has been discussed in previous chapters, IHL mandates an ethical balancing of 
humanitarian and military values to determine the boundaries of legality but the relevance of 
Just War doctrine is seldom recognised in the legal literature. Indeed, while Just War theory 
has been remarkably influential in giving form to IHL and continues to provide a framework 
for moral discussion of law, it is tempting to see the relationship as having irretrievably 
broken down, with Just War thinking and IHL going their separate ways. After all, Walzer's 
revision of the Doctrine of Double Effect that requires militaries to make sacrifices to reduce 
harm to civilians suggests a different view of proportionality to that of the international 
lawyer. Equally, McMahan's arguments for collapsing the distinction between jus ad bellum 
and jus in Bello to distinguish between just and unjust combatants runs counter to the 
fundamental architecture of IHL3. The language is the same, but its usage has changed. If 
international lawyers talk of justice at all, it is in relation to procedure rather than substance. 
The triumph of positive law has been to replace nature with formalism and throw out abstract 
principles that are not clear legal principles of interpretation. Nevertheless, it will be argued 
here that, it is precisely because IHL compels consideration of humanitarian values that Just 
War theory and IHL have more in common than their vocabulary; a commonality of thought 
and purpose arises from IHL's balancing of its humanitarian aims against the requirements of 
3 For a detailed discussion of Walzer's and McMahon's positions see chapter 4. 
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military necessity- a process that invites both legal and ethical investigation. In fact, Just War 
theorists have important insights that are informing the development of IHL. 
The Just War analyses of the ethical requirements of warfare are addressing the very issues 
that currently concern legal commentators: the extent to which the balance between civilian 
protection and military necessity requires adjustment to meet the challenges of modern 
asymmetric warfare. In fact, the two disciplines most profitably intersect in discussion of 
force protection and whether the jus in bello requirements should be relaxed in respect of 
militaries fighting non-state actors that fight among their civilians and wear no uniforms. At 
first sight, Just War theorists and legal commentators appear as ships that pass in the night, so 
that Just War revisions to the traditional theory appear removed from IHL and lacking the 
traction to achieve legal change. In fact, there is a much closer relationship than at first 
appears. While not interdependent, the two disciplines have overlapping agendas so that 
MacMahon chose to debate his ideas with Israeli academic international lawyers before 
publishing The Ethics of War and their responses appear as articles in a special issue of the 
Israeli Law Review4. This congruency of interest is evident in influential Israeli professor of 
law Ayel Benvenisti's5 essay, `Rethinking the Divide Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in 
Bello in Warfare Against Nonstate Actors'6, where he marshals both the ethical and the legal 
arguments in support of a thesis advocating the partial collapse of the separation of jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello. There is a similar ethical and legal discussion in Benvenisti's 
treatment of the tension arising from the expectations among militaries of the reciprocal 
nature of IHL obligations- an expectation that runs counter to the structure of IHL7. Legal 
scholars addressing the pressing legal issues arising from contemporary warfare very soon 
4lsrael Law Review, Winter 2007. 
s Professor of Law at Tel Aviv University. 
6 Eyal Benvenisti, 'Rethinking the Divide between Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in Warfare Against Nonstate 
Actors', Yale Journal of International Law, 13 May 2009. Available at SSRN: 
httn: //ssrn. com/abstract=1403882. (Last accessed 12/1/09) 
7 Eyal Benvenisti, `Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians', Israel Law Review, V. 39, 
2006, pp. 81-109. 
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find themselves grappling with the consequences of either reinforcing or collapsing the ad 
bellum/in bello duality and are increasingly recognising the analytical value of current just 
war scholarship. The employment of Just War ethical thinking by international lawyers is 
particularly evident in the proliferating legal scholarship on the conduct of asymmetric 
warfare, where Just War arguments are deployed to question the balance between 
humanitarian and military objects. 
The tension between the humanitarian protection of civilians and the needs of the military is 
at the heart of many of the difficult judgment calls in IHL. However, it would be a mistake to 
assume that balancing conflicting rights, duties and benefits is a special feature of IHL. In 
fact, balancing is not at all unusual and is a common feature of legal codes, especially when 
the rights of individuals are to be constrained by the needs of the state. Indeed, the legal 
framework of the welfare state rests on a balance of the rights of the individual to social 
goods against the needs of the state to ration those goods8. However, in IHL the process is 
complicated by the requirement to balance the wellbeing of individuals with the needs of 
states of which they are not citizens. Critical Legal Theory9 would have us recognise that this 
is not just balancing the rights of the individual, but rather the rights of the `other'- a much 
more troubling category of person. 
As was argued in chapter three, the balancing of civilian protection against military objects 
results in legal grey areas where a plurality of legal positions are possible and where human 
rights lawyers and military lawyers can be expected to disagree about what the law is and 
what it requires. This disagreement can be framed in legal terms that are informed by the 
8 Both just war theory and IHL scholarship look to the domestic legal analogy of the criminal law of self- 
defence but find that the analogy breaks down because the law of self-defence is designed to measure individual 
responsibility and because it has an expectation of enforcement that is largely lacking in IHL. In fact domestic 
legal regimes that regulate the allocation of resources are a much more fruitful guide, particularly the provision 
of expensive drugs where there is an interaction between law and medical ethics. 
9 See, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical legal Studies Movement, (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University 
Press, 1986). 
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differing ethical positions discussed in Just War theory. The Just War discussion of the 
protection of innocent civilians, and the need to sacrifice a degree of military efficiency in the 
process, translates into the fundamental legal tension that is found throughout the law: the 
conflicting demands of the individual and the state. As legal scholar Amichai Cohen puts it 
with regard to proportionality, `In practice there exist two very different approaches to the 
interpretation of the principle of proportionality: the human rights model, which gives 
preference to the interests of civilians who might be harmed by military action, and the 
contractual model which gives precedence to state interests. ' 10 In IHL this tension can be 
represented as an axis that runs from the interest of the individual (human rights) to those of 
the military (the state) with the human rights lawyer located at one extreme and the military 
lawyer at the other. 
The relative positions of Just War theorists can be similarly represented, with the axis 
running between the near-pacifist and the near-militarist. Superimposing the ethical onto the 
legal, it can be seen that Kasher" (whose position on force protection can be seen as near 
maximalist) would be closer to the military lawyer and Walzer12 (who believes that soldiers 
should risk their lives to protect enemy civilians) to the human rights lawyer. While this 
treatment of the respective positions of lawyers and Just War theorists lacks sophistication, it 
does show that the disciplines are more complementary than either is usually prepared to 
acknowledge. The practical consequence of this is that the moral arguments of the Just War 
theorists add weight to the corresponding legal positions. Hence, lawyers and ethicists who 
share the same position on the axis would have similar assessments of the right balance to be 
achieved on issues such as force protection. While Kasher defends force protection on ethical 
grounds, Benvenisti uses IHL to argue that proportionality does not require soldiers to be put 
10 Amichai Cohen, Proportionality in Modern Asymmetrical Wars, Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, 2010, 
available at, httl2: //www. icpa. org/text/prol2ortionality. pdf. (Last accessed 06/03/2011) 
11 See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion. 
12 See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion. 
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at risk to protect enemy civilians 13. In short, both law and ethics can be read together in 
support of a range of positions from civilian to force protection. In these circumstances law 
and ethics need not be oppositional and can be mutually supportive. This is more than a 
coincidence of views between ethical and legal commentators, but rather an ongoing debate 
within the two disciplines as to how wars and warfare should be regulated that is informed by 
both legal and ethical enquiry. In so far as there is an engagement of ideas, the legal 
commentators are more inclined to engage with Just War theory than the Just War theorists 
are to grapple with IHL. 
We saw in the last chapter that most modern Just War Theorists such as McMahan are 
uncomfortable with the separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello on the grounds that just 
and unjust combatants should be held to differing standards of behaviour, but are struggling 
to see how the separation can be collapsed without an unwelcome relaxation of in bello 
protection of civilians. We have observed that this concern is shared by some legal scholars 
analysing the application of IHL to asymmetric warfare. In fact, there is a greater symmetry 
to be found by examination of the practical application of IHL, where there are grounds for 
concluding that the separation of the two legal codes is something of a legal fiction. 
Returning to McMahan's position on collapsing the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus 
in Bello, it will be recalled that McMahan argues that it offends moral expectations to fail to 
distinguish between the morality of the military actions of the unjust combatant and the just 
combatant. Put simply, there can be no strong moral argument in support of the right to kill to 
further the objects of an unjust war nor is it clear that those fighting a just war should be 
subject to the same constraints as the unjust. On the face of it, IHL's insistence on the 
separation of the two codes has no place for an analysis based on the relative moral status of 
the combatants, so that IHL and McMahan's version of Just War theory appear to be 
13 Benvenisti, `Human Dignity in Combat', discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
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completely at odds. To be sure, traditional `black letter' IHL is clear that the constraints on 
the conduct of warfare should apply equally to the parties whatever the legality of the initial 
recourse to war. 
Generally speaking, although modern Just War scholarship tends towards collapsing the 
duality with reservations about how this would work in practice, the balance of legal 
scholarship seeks to reinforce the separation14. Lawyers are well aware that the regime under 
the UN Charter that allows armed conflict only in self-defence (Article 51) or by Security 
Council authority (Article 42) is a defective regime when it comes to determining which 
party is the aggressor and which the defender. In these circumstances, it is generally argued 
that all ad bellum judgments are overly politicised and to link them to in Bello assessments of 
legality would be to expose combatant rights and responsibilities to political calculation. 
However, ethical considerations may already have held sway since it is increasingly 
becoming accepted among legal commentators that the strict separation between ad bellum 
and in bello judgments is something of a legal fiction that does not accurately describe the 
operation of IHL in practice. 
As Michael Schmitt puts it, "conflicts continue to be viewed in terms of `good' and `evil'... 
[and] the reality is that such differences, real or perceived, matter. "15 Any assembly of the 
differing legal positions on jus in Bello incidents leads to the conclusion that this is right. 
Judith Gardam, analysing legal responses to the first Gulf War of 1991, observes that, "in the 
assessment of proportionality, civilians, and to a lesser extent combatants, of the aggressor 
s16 state were afforded less weight in the balancing process than combatants of the `just side'. 
14 See for instance, Robert D. Sloane, 'The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus 
in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War', The Yale journal of International Law, Vol. 34,2009, p47-112. 
15 Michael N. Schmitt, `Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law', 62 Air Force 
Law Review, 1/ 41 (2008), quoted by Benvenisti, Rethinking, at p. 544. 
16 Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 American Journal of International 
Law. 
391,412 (1993), quoted by Benvenisti, Rethinking, at p. 544. 
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Robert Sloane, sees the ad bellum judgments in terms of an aggressor-defender model 
operating within a normative system made defective by institutional paralysis at the 
international level. Without effective U. N. sanction against aggression, redress is sought at 
the in Bello level so that judgments of in Bello acts are informed by ad bellum considerations 
of whether the actor is the aggressor or the defender. 
Sloan's thesis is that this is more than a legal judgment, although it is expressed as such. 
Military operations resulting in collateral civilian damage get an easier ride where the reason 
for war is: 
either (1) widely perceived as legal (for example a clear unassailable case of self-defense) or 
(2) formally illegal but still perceived at legitimate, meaning that it furthers broadly shared 
international values: preserving minimum order, halting human rights atrocities, and so 
17 forth. 
This amounts to a complex relationship whereby legitimacy is disconnected from legality at 
the ad bellum level to form a structure that influences the application of legal judgment at the 
in Bello level. Sloane uses the oft quoted example of NATO's actions against Serbia in aid of 
the Kosovans in support of the second proposition. In fact, the converse is also true: ad 
bellum judgments that regard acts as formally legal can be seen as illegitimate if they offend 
the values of the observer, leading to greater condemnation of in bello collateral damage than 
would otherwise have been the case- a charge frequently made by the Israelis. Indeed it is the 
politicised nature of the ad bellum judgment that is seen to import political positions to the in 
bello judgment. 
Certainly, Jerusalem was quick to point out that the Goldstone Mission prefaced its 
assessments of Israeli military operations with a strong condemnation of Israel's culpability 
17 Sloane, 'The Cost of Conflation', p. 55. 
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for launching the attack on Gaza in the first place 18. The Mission found that that Israel was 
not fighting a defensive war19 in response to Harnas missile attacks but rather the object of 
the operation was to punish the people of Gaza for their support for Hamas: 
While the Israeli Government has sought to portray its operations as essentially a response to 
rocket attacks in the exercise of its right to self-defence, the Mission considers the plan to 
have been directed, at least in part, at a different target: the people of Gaza as a whole20. 
In this respect, the operations were in furtherance of an overall policy aimed at punishing the 
Gaza population for its resilience and for its apparent support for Hamas, and possibly with 
the intent of forcing a change in such support21. 
Critics of the report see the ad bellum finding as the real force behind the severe criticism in 
Bello criticism of Israel's conduct of the campaign. Hence even Israel's unprecedented use of 
warnings to the civilian population of planned attacks is viewed by the Mission as a device to 
terrorise civilians rather than reduce civilian harm22. Equally, Israel's conceptualisation of 
Hamas in Gaza as a terrorist near state can be seen as leading to an assumption of ad bellum 
legality and an Israeli claim to favourable in Bello treatment for operations such as the 
targeting of the Gaza police force. Since there appears to be some truth in both perspectives, 
Cast Lead neatly illustrates the politicisation of in Bello judgments through conflation of the 
two codes. 
In fact the Goldstone Report does more than demonstrate the strength of the 
aggressor/defender model as a conduit for the politicisation of IHL; it demonstrates the 
importance of another level of analysis- the increasing power of NGOs as promoters of 
humanitarian values in international law. Among the non-state actors NGOs predominantly 
promote a humanitarian version of IHL that privileges the human rights of the individual 
'B Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, available at: 
<http: //www2. ohchr. org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48. pdf (18 December 2009)>. 
(Last accessed 10/12/2010). 
19 Article 51 of the UN Charter allows war in self-defence without UN authorisation. 
20 Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, paragraph 1883. 
21 Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, paragraph 1884. 
22 Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, paragraph 1920. 
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above the rights of the state, with state military action almost always seen as disproportionate 
to the harm caused to civilians. 
How then should we understand the divergence between the clear letter of the law as 
expressed in the Conventions and state and elite practice? Is this a breach of the law or a 
recognition that the law differs from its formal written form? The point to be emphasised here 
is that this is not hypocrisy or a breach of the principle of equality before the law, but rather a 
political reality of the application of law in practice that suggests that IHL is more than, and 
different from, the codified words of the principle treaties. Clearly, an analysis of IHL that 
ignores the political cannot explain this apparent disconnection between the letter of the law 
that requires a strict ad bellumlin bello separation and its practical application. To be sure, the 
custom and practice of states has always been recognised as an important source of 
international law that allows for dynamism and change in response to perceived need 23, but a 
deeper understanding of this dynamic requires a conception of law that recognises, rather 
than obscures, its political function and content and can account for the plurality of legal 
opinion in key areas of IHL. Before there can be any attempt to understand the role of 
military lawyers advising on the conduct of war, there needs to be in place a legal 
methodology that can account for the fact that, despite the letter of the law that requires a 
disinterested application of jus in Bello, when it comes to the actual application of IHL, 
militaries whose wars we approve of are more likely to be judged to be acting lawfully than 
those fighting in pursuit of an unpopular cause. 
While legal philosophy has traditionally sought to downplay the political aspects of the 
juridical process in favour of various representations of the disinterested application of legal 
rules and principles, American Legal Realism is a fertile ground for those seeking to uncover 
23 See, Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 5: 'Customary international law crystallises when there is "evidence of a 
general practice accepted at law". ' This is a process that takes decades according to Dinstein. 
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political influences on legal decision making. Legal realists look beyond the statutes to 
recognise the role of the judges as lawmakers that operate as part of, rather than separate 
from, society24. The American Legal Realists have traditionally distilled their wisdom from 
observation of the US Supreme Court where conflicting constitutional principles are often 
used to balance the interests of the community and the individual. The degree of judicial 
choice arises from the practical application of often vague and conflicting constitutional 
principles to hard cases. Anyone who doubts the political nature of the legal institution and its 
practices has only to examine the Presidential appointment process where the choice between 
apparently liberal and conservative judges is accorded great political and constitutional 
importance. At the time of writing25, consideration of President Obama's nomination of Elena 
Kagan to replace retiring Justice John Paul Stevens centres on her known political positions 
that include moral acquiescence to capital punishment, support of gay rights in the military 
and apparent opposition to terror detainee trials in civilian courts26. 
While there are many strands of American Legal Realism, their common positions include 
the central importance of the judges, particularly the appellate judges of the US Supreme 
Court, as creators of law and the role of legal advisors as predictors of judicial decisions. As 
the leading American Legal Realism theorist Oliver Wendell Holmes put it, `The prophesies 
of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the 
law'27. This legal scholarship attaches greater importance to records of judicial decisions, or 
`case law', than the legislative codifications of law that are frequently no more than 
statements of principle. 
24 Leading figures in the movement are Oliver Wendell Holmes, Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank. Their 
hallmark is empiricism and pragmatism. For a useful survey of Legal Realism see, William Twining, Karl 
Llewellyn and the Realist Movement, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1973). 
25 May 2010. 
26 'Obama nominates the youngest judge', The Times, 11 May 2010, p. 33. 
27 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167,173 (1921), quoted by W. 
Michael Reisman, 'The Incident as a Decisional Unit in International Law', The Yale journal of International 
Law, Vol. 10, No. 1, Fall 1984, p7. 
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This analysis certainly fits with our observation of the principled but vague treaty 
codification of IHL, but the problem with adopting the `legal science' of the American Legal 
Realists is that the focus of their analysis is on the powerful appellate court of the US 
constitutional system as the creators of law and there is not yet an institutional equivalent in 
IHL. While it may the case that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) will one day acquire such status and create a comprehensive case law 
that gives clear case by case guidelines thereby shrinking the grey areas, this is clearly not an 
option at present. If the construction of IHL is a politicised juridical process that is not yet 
being carried out by a powerful international court, the question then surely is one of who is 
exercising the power of the identification and creation of IHL. Traditionally the answer has 
been in the conduct and practice of nations, but what does this mean in practice? Who 
decides what the law requires of the military and whose legal opinions influence the 
behaviour of the military and its lawyers, especially if there is no consensus on what is the 
general practice of nations let alone whether it has yet coalesced into the rules of IHL? Any 
meaningful analysis must take account of the dynamic relationship between the international 
and the municipal. 
2) The municipal or the international? Whose law? Whose condemnation? 
It is well established in international law that a state cannot escape its obligations under 
international law by relying on its own municipal law even including its own constitution 28. 
Further, there is a general duty to bring internal law into conformity with international law29. 
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg did not admit pleas that the accused person 
had complied with German law. The extent to which international law, particularly customary 
28 See, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Art. 27. 
29 For a discussion of the import of IHL into Israeli law and the influence of military attitudes on this process, 
see Amichai Cohen, `Administering The Territories: An Inquiry into the Application of International 
Humanitarian Law by the IDF in the Occupied Territories', Israel Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 3, (2005), pp. 24- 
79. 
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international law, is incorporated into municipal law and the constitutional process whereby 
this is achieved vary from state to state30. The position is further complicated by the particular 
relationships between courts and legislature that make some issues in some jurisdictions non- 
justiciable. This is the legal principle that some areas of life are beyond the reach of the 
courts and reflects the particular power relationships between the elected and non-elected 
judicial organs of the state. In practice, if not in theory, this has been the approach of the 
Israeli courts in respect of the legality of Israel's settlement policy; less controversially, 
courts will rely on the principle of non justifiability to avoid being drawn into political debate 
or strategic and operational military decision-making. Consequently, municipal courts rarely 
rule on matters of IHL. 
However, as we saw in chapter two, since the 1980s the Israeli Supreme Court has shown an 
increasing willingness to use IHL to decide petitions involving the IDF to regulate targeted 
assassination, house destruction, deportation, suspension of military operations to allow 
humanitarian aid and, most recently, military exclusion of media reporters from Gaza. The 
process is enhanced by the right of Palestinian citizens of the Occupied Territories to directly 
petition the Israeli Supreme Court- thereby creating a channel of IHL issues from the 
Territories directly to Israel's most senior judges. It follows that the IDF's military lawyers 
will be predicting the likely reactions of the Israeli Supreme Court to military decisions, but 
given the lack of precision of IHL, and the extent to which municipal interpretation of 
international law is a product of the particular society, Israeli judicial decisions on the 
conduct of the IDF are but one of many possible constructions of IHL. 
The Universal Jurisdiction also functions at the municipal level in an international context 
with a political profile far above its legal profile. As discussed in chapter two, the Universal 
30 For a discussion of this process of internalisation see, Harold Koh, 'Why do Nations Obey International 
Law? ' Yale Law Journal, 106,2599,1997. 
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Jurisdiction relies on state enactment of domestic legislation to enable criminal prosecution in 
their own municipal courts of war crimes committed anywhere in the world. This growing 
jurisdiction has the potential to bring some clarity to some aspects of IHL but the paucity of 
cases suggests that any significant benchmarking is unlikely. The jurisdiction seems set to be 
a highly politicised threat to the travelling military elites rather than a process of judicial law 
making 31 
Clearly, the municipal is but one level of analysis. Consideration of whose law influences the 
behaviour of the IDF and its lawyers, and to what extent, suggests a political calculation of 
the consequences of compliance and non-compliance with a variety of `legal' opinions that 
are held by the elite actors in a global arena. Some account must also be taken of the dynamic 
nature of norm formulation and the changing perceptions and power of IHL; what is 
acceptable today may lead to an arrest warrant tomorrow. Israeli generals who acted beyond 
the reach of IHL in the 1980s have found themselves liable to prosecution under the 
Universal Jurisdiction in the twenty-first century. This means that the calculation of possible 
reactions to military operations require not only consideration of the immediate behaviour of 
domestic and international actors but also their possible positions in future. 
Michael Reisman, the distinguished Yale professor of law, argues that, given the weakness 
of international legal institutions, international law is identified from the responses of elite 
international actors to incidents; he calls this an Incident Analysis Approach that charts 
normative positions of key actors by observation of reactions to incremental incidents32. This 
methodology is derived from the legal realist identification of law as the product of appellate 
court rulings in hard cases. In the sphere of IHL, where there is no strong appellate court with 
31 For a more detailed discussion of the politicisation of the jurisdiction see chapter 2. 
32 Reisman is the Myres S. McDougal Professor of Law at Yale. See in particular, W. Michael Reisman, `The 
Incident as a Decisional Unit in International Law', The Yale journal of International Law, Vol. 10, No. 1, Fall 
1984. 
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a succession of hard cases to decide, Reisman looks to behaviour as descriptors of 
international law. His analysis treats the incident as the hard case and the elites as the judges. 
Instead of the law being what the judge says it is, the law is what we can take from how the 
elites behave in response to the incident33. Reisman defines the incident as follows: 
`I define an "incident" as an overt conflict between two or more actors in the international 
system. It must be perceived as such by other key actors and resolved in some non judicial 
fashion. Finally, and this is of crucial importance, its resolution must provide some indication 
of what elites in a variety of effective processes consider to be acceptable behaviour. Though 
the incident is "resolved" in a factual if not authoritative sense, without judicial imprimatur 
which routinely indicates law in domestic settings, the incident may often be a more reliable 
indicator of international law than are codes or case law. '34 
If we are considering IHL in respect of military operations, the operation is the incident and 
the reaction of the elites is the law. Simply put, IHL is described by what the elites say and do 
in response to military action. Such responses may well be contradictory and lacking in 
coherence but they are capable of empirical study and fit the legal realist pretentious towards 
legal science. It is not necessary to consider the merits of the theory in its entirety; the 
attraction for our purposes is the clear link that Reisman makes between elite political 
responses to military action and the predictive function of the legal advisor as descriptors of 
IHL. 
As was discussed in detail in chapter three, in the absence of an overriding powerful 
international legal institution, there is no right or wrong understanding of the law in relation 
to whole swathes of imprecise written legal regulation; rather, it is the behaviour of the actors 
themselves that describes the law and if behaviour lacks unanimity the law is pluralistic with 
contradictory norms of varying coercive value- at least until behaviour coalesces and thereby 
acquires greater normative value. This is to radically depart from the Pure Theory of Law that 
limits its focus to a structural analysis of rules and principles emanating from legal 
institutions narrowly understood and demands that each norm be validated by a preceding 
33 American Legal Realism is influenced by behaviourist thinking in the identification of norms. 
34 Reisman, 'The Incident', p. 12. 
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power-conferring rule35. While Reisman's approach shares with Legal Positivism the 
understanding that there is no compelling universal moral content to law, it rejects the Legal 
Positivism's inward perspective by recognising the legal dynamic of norm aggrandisement 
through conclusions drawn from observation of social reality. Nevertheless, by applying 
Legal Realism to IHL and shifting the focus from the appellate court to elite behaviour, 
Reisman is losing a significant analytical tool that Legal Realism offers to the discussion of 
how law changes. One of the great strengths of Legal Realism is its simple answer to this 
question: forget grand theories of norm validation and rely on the behaviour of the judges in 
creating law. If law is the outcome of legal judgment, there is simplicity and certainty. The 
problem, of course, is that if law is the outcome elite behaviour there is complexity and 
confusion. 
Reisman accepts that his approach can be disturbing: `Some who endorse this concept of law 
[the conventional understanding of a rational process of organised public deliberation] are apt 
to find disturbing the fact that the incidents approach draws its normative inferences from no 
more than the apparent expectation of elites. ' 36 Reisman's analysis is indeed disturbingly 
empirical, and the approach fails to produce an ordered normative structure capable of 
identifying clear normative positions that can resolve the hard cases of IHL and shrink the 
grey areas of legal imprecision. However, important areas of IHL are vague and undecided 
and the methodology captures very well the confused nature of IHL where there is little 
agreement in practice on how to balance civilian protection against military efficiency. The 
strength of the method is that it allows for the conclusion that there may be multiple norms in 
play at any one time and it is capable of identifying them. 
35 This approach is best exemplified by Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, transl. Max Knight (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957). 
36 Reisman, 'The Incident', p. 18. 
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It must be remembered that the reason for adopting this approach is the weakness of 
international legal institutions. Reisman's approach is not to replace case law but to 
supplement it so that, `[I]ncidents may serve as a type of "meta-law" providing normative 
guidelines for decision makers in the international system in those vast deserts in which case 
law is sparce'37. If and when the ICJ and the ICC eventually become powerful international 
legal institutions capable of providing authoritative statements of IHL that are accepted by 
elite actors, IHL will undergo a process of clarification and its provisions will be identifiable 
from the treaties and the court decisions. Until then Reisman offers his realist approach to 
norm identification. 
To be sure, there are many theories of law but the significance of Reisman's Incident 
Analysis Approach lies in the explicit understanding that the written legal code of IHL cannot 
alone account for the diverse normative reactions of elite actors to `incidents' of military 
behaviour in war. This does not deny the existence of legal norms and their application- 
rather it accounts for the diversity by recognising the political instrumentality of normative 
judgments and directs the concerned actor to the behaviour of elites as indicators of what is, 
and what is not normatively acceptable. It follows that Reisman's advice to the military 
lawyer would be that to perform a useful function it is necessary to be able to identify the 
normative positions of the key national and international actors. Without this knowledge it 
would not be possible to provide the military planners with the necessary breadth of IHL 
advice. 
American Legal Realists stress the connection between law and politics. If law is created by 
judges who exercise a political role in creating law and that role is constrained by the 
constitution, what are the political constraints on law created by the behaviour of 
international elite actors? This is a discussion of state power that is beyond the scope of this 
37 Reisman, `The Incident', p. 19. 
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thesis which does not purport to advance a new theory of state and domestic behaviour. It is 
perhaps sufficient to observe that for Reisman, in the absence of an authoritative court 
decision or unambiguous codification, the visible exercise of power is a statement of the law. 
This circular justificatory relationship between power and international law denies any 
distinction between `right' and `wrong' understandings of the law other than as instruments 
of power and acknowledges the normative content of the key IHL treaties only in so far as 
they constrain the behaviour of elite actors. Indeed, the behaviour of Reisman's elite actors 
may or may not describe an IHL that accords with the ethical principles that Just War 
theorists regard as universal normative principles of jus in bello. However, power is not 
exercised in a vacuum and if these really are universal moral norms based on widely shared 
values, they will inform the political behaviour of the elite actors and the political, ethical and 
legal will form a coherent mutually reinforcing statement of IHL. Implicit in Reisman's 
approach is an understanding that ethical positions are specific to societies and cultures and 
inform and are informed by those societies and cultures and the internal and external 
pressures to which they are subjected. Indeed ethics and law are part of society and shape, 
and are therefore evidenced by, behaviour. Consequently, using behaviour as a statement of 
law does not deny the relevance of Just War theory to law, or the relevance of Just War 
thinking to our attitudes to war and how war ought to be fought, rather it recognises that 
ethical thinking both precedes and follows the legal statement. Whether or not Just War 
thinking influences the behaviour of Reisman's elite actors must therefore depend on the 
extent that the societies of which the actors are a part share the moral positions of the Just 
War theorists. Viewed in this way, Reisman's observation of the incident as the decisional 
unit in international law is an observation of law, ethics and politics in practice. 
Whether or not the observer understands behaviour in ethical, political or normative terms is 
a matter of analytical choice. Either way, the same behaviour serves to inform the predictive 
170 
calculations of the advisor, whether they are political analysts or military lawyers. It follows 
that when considering the big issues of IHL, whether the discourse is the politics of which 
side to support, the ethics of civilian suffering or the legality of military operations, the real 
calculation is one of locating the limits of acceptable military action in the particular context 
of the armed conflict. Is this a legal, ethical or political calculation? From the perspective of 
the international lawyer, the question simply does not arise since if law is elite behaviour it 
encapsulates all three. The fact that so much of political and ethical judgment is expressed in 
legal terms only goes to prove the point. 
This approach to identifying the norms of IHL helps us to understand the disconnection 
between the strict treaty separation of ad bellum and in Bello judgments and the collapse of 
the two codes in practice. The elite behaviour of judging the conduct of warfare by actors by 
an application of the defender/aggressor model is a clear statement that for many actors the 
law does allow ad bellum judgments to inform considerations of the legality of in Bello 
actions. The fact that this behaviour may not yet be at the level of the custom and practice of 
states does not prevent us from concluding that for many actors the law has changed from its 
formal written form. 
Since everyone is capable of expressing a view of the legality of military action, the political 
question is whose views matter to whom. Who are the key actors whose behaviour is so 
influential? Reisman does not offer a clear definition of his elite actors. Looking at law in 
terms of the power and product of legal institutions, suggests that the actors are the municipal 
courts, courts of foreign countries that use the universal jurisdiction as a coercive tool, and 
the International Criminal Court. Reisman has a wider focus than this and clearly includes the 
behaviour of states, influential organisations such as the International Commission of the Red 
Cross and elite jurists, academics and members of the military such as those who made up the 
Goldstone mission. The apparent breadth of enquiry can be understood in terms of New 
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Institutional thinking that can incorporate differing laws, legal ethics and actors within a 
regime of international humanitarian law38. 
To be sure, legal theorists seeking to identify norms in the social processes evident in the 
behaviour of institutions beyond courts and legislatures have adopted the New Institutional 
expansive understanding of institutions. The pioneering work of legal philosophers Ota 
Weinberger and Neil MacCormick applies New Institutional thinking to Legal Positivism to 
create Institutional Legal Positivism, which recognises the value of positivist logic while 
treating norms as social facts39. Norms gain their validity through the social processes of 
institutions rather than as a result of vague moral criteria. Their rejection of Legal Realism as 
being too narrowly associated with a narrow view of legal institutions 40suggests that 
Reisman's analysis could very well be viewed with favour. Perhaps the doctrinal 
disagreement would arise over the primacy of international appellate courts as their 
jurisprudence expands. The value of Institutional Legal Positivism to this thesis is its import 
of sociological theories of the institution into legal scholarship without losing sight of the 
importance of normative behaviour. The concept of the institution is intended to lift the level 
of analysis above the isolated individual in order to identify the normative behaviour of the 
individual as an element of a larger social structure. Drawing lines round structures to 
identify institutions is strongly resisted by Weinberger41; the complications arise from the 
38 See the discussion of New Institutionalism in chapter 1. 
39 See, Ota Weinberger, Law, Institution and Legal Politics, Fundamental Problems of Legal Theory and Social 
Philosophy, (The Netherlands; Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991) and Neil McCormack and Ota Weinberger, 
An Institutional Theory of Law: New Approaches to Legal Positivism, (Dordrecht, Holland; D. Reidel 
Publishing Company, 1986), available at: 
http: //books. google. co. uk/books? id=evOn9D6d mkcC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Neil+McCormack+and+Ota+ 
Weinberger, +An+Institutional+Theory+of+Law: +New+Approaches+to+Legal+Positivism, &source=bl&ots=aj- 
HkdkXmO&sig=IpQbupJHcXh3= PUf2KvG514sgc&hl=en&ei=kx_pS7HzLYz- 
OgSsp9TRDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=l &ved=OCBUQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false 
(Last accessed 10 May 2010). 
40 Weinberger, Law, Institution, pp. 210-211. 
41 Weinberger, Law, Institution, p. 24. 
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constant shifting of focus between the individual as an signifier of institutional norms and the 
institution as a larger social grouping that exerts a normative influence on the individual. 
Institutions can be social organisations or normative structures- a chess club but also the rules 
of chess. Hence institutions are a form of communal action and the social arrangements that 
make those actions possible. Institutions are the place of action and the result of interaction. 
As Weinberger puts it: 
The term "institution" denotes a family concept of a particular kind: wherever we refer to 
institutions, the reference infers something that contains the same essential ingredients: 
namely, relations between individuals and a community, relations with a certain tendency to 
permanence, relative regularity and narrative order. Nevertheless, the institutions are so 
varied that it is impossible to set down a unified class of attributes to define all of them. 
Clearly, analysis of this sort is open to the criticism that the basic concept is so imprecise that 
it undermines any useful insights it might throw up. While there is an apparent similarity in 
Reisman's and Weinberger's focus of regard, Wienberger is looking to institutions to 
account for the creation of normative behaviour as well as evidence of the existence of the 
norm, Reisman is simply attempting to identify the norms. Nevertheless, consideration of 
Institutional Legal Positivism does suggest that there is good reason to adopt a wide focus 
when following Reisman's prescription to examine the behaviour of elite actors as signifiers 
of IHL. 
Taking a broad view of legal institutions brings into consideration practicing lawyers of 
international repute such as Judge Goldstone, academic lawyers of international repute, 
international NGOs such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch, and domestic NGOs such as 
the respected Israeli NGO B't Selem. In addition there are the judgments of actors such as 
international institutions, international allies and enemies. The political calculation must be 
one of who the key international and national actors are and the limits of their toleration or 
condemnation. Adopting a purely instrumental approach, the question that the military is 
really asking its military lawyer is whether a proposed action is likely to sufficiently offend 
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IHL that a key actor is going to condemn the behaviour in legal terms not- whether or not 
those terms are legally correct42. Additionally, the commander may well ask whether a 
proposed action is going to result in personal legal liability with the possibility of real 
personal consequences. This is an entirely different question since it requires an assessment 
of likely court action at the domestic, foreign (under the universal jurisdiction) and 
international levels (ICC). Ultimately, the choice of law is a matter of political contestation 
that is best understood as expressing a preference for one or more of Adler's `communities of 
practice'. 
3) Military lawyers as legal advisors. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the military lawyer's knowledge of the law will need to 
be drawn from a variety of possible sources and that the choice of whose law to consult will 
be an overtly political process. One would expect that deciding whose law to apply to 
military operations would be an institutional position determined at government level. 
Certainly, the Israeli Foreign Ministry monitors the legal positions of various actors43. Their 
International Law Department monitors legal responses to Israeli military actions. In 
addition, there are institutional links between Israeli diplomats, military and legal personnel 
that evaluate understandings of IHL among key actors. Israeli military and Foreign Ministry 
lawyers regularly meet their opposite numbers in NATO and the US and are aware of each 
other's positions on key issues in IHL. As Mandelblit testified to the Winograd Commission, 
there are regular meetings between Israeli military lawyers and their opposite numbers in the 
42 Holmes used the concept of the `bad man' to illuminate his view of law in purely instrumental terms: 'If you 
want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material 
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict'. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Legal Papers, 
(London: Constable & Co., 1920), p. 171. However, this surely over states the relevance of coercion to 
obedience of the law. We can add the concept of the `good citizen' to acknowledge the organisational power of 
identity, which allows recognition of the importance of respect for the institution of the law and the good 
opinion of others as drivers of behaviour. 
4 See, author's interview with Daniel Taub, Deputy Head of the International Law Department of the Israeli 
Foreign Ministry, at Jerusalem on 18 May 2009 
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US military as well as with military lawyers from other countries with whom Israel maintains 
friendly relations. This is not just a matter of keeping track of attitudes. It is part of the 
process of observing the behaviour of key elites in response to Israeli military actions 
(Riesman's `incidents') and the normative positions of `communities of practice' whereby 
Israel and its military lawyers identify the IHL that matters. 
This monitoring of the behaviour of elites can be seen as part of the process that creates the 
legal knowledge that is made available to the military lawyer. If this is correct, one would 
expect to find that the Israeli Foreign Ministry and Israeli actors with knowledge of the 
behaviour of key international elites have channels of communication with Israeli military 
lawyers. This can be seen as part of Bark and Sheffer's security network and it should be no 
surprise that the International Committee of the Red Cross organises regular symposiums on 
IHL with Israeli academic lawyers and Israeli military lawyers with guest experts from 
abroad" or that the senior lawyers in the Israeli military international law department (IDL) 
have regular meetings with their allied opposite numbers, frequently attend international 
symposia and work closely with the legal department of the Israeli Foreign Ministryas 
However, ultimately the military lawyers are serving military officers tasked to assist the 
military in the achievement of its military aims and these institutional interests may conflict 
with government policy. This suggests that the choice of IHL is a matter of political 
contestation with institutional constraints. 
Assuming that the lawyers' legal veto stands, knowledge of contradictory understandings of 
IHL and the details of operations that the IDL has approved enables the outside observer to 
identify the particular construction that the legal advisor will have used when advising in the 
grey area. Why the choice was made in this way will be a product of the military, 
44 Author's interview with Eitan Diamond, legal director of the Israeli ICRC at Tel Aviv on 25 May 2009. 
45 Author's interview with Pnena Shavit-Baruch, former head of the IDL, at Tel Aviv on 21 May 2009. 
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governmental and legal institutional regimes that constrain the actions of the lawyers. In the 
following chapters case studies of controversial Israeli military operations that have been the 
subject of widespread legal comment will allow conclusions to be drawn about the legal 
choices made by the IDL and the extent to which they have been used constrain the Israeli 
military. 
4) Conclusion 
This chapter has drawn on legal, ethical and IR scholarship to understand the plurality of IHL 
and the exercise of choice by the military lawyers. Previous chapters have examined the 
political utility of IHL and its formal judicial processes in the context of the international 
system, where law is used by political actors to challenge or endorse the legitimacy of 
military operations. The regulations that make up IHL have been analysed and shown to be 
imprecise; the legal balancing of humanitarian aims and military objectives produce grey 
areas of law and inconsistent legal positions. These opposing legal positions are evidenced by 
the diametrically opposing positions of NGO lawyers and military lawyers when applying the 
same legal regulations to the same facts of military behaviour. Consideration of Just War 
Theory revealed similar polarities within Just War thinking that fail to agree on a `right' 
understanding of the grey areas of IHL, instead providing ethical support for, and generation 
of, the various legal interpretations. In these circumstances how should a military lawyer 
correctly identify the law to apply to the facts of a proposed military action? 
In this chapter we have arrived at the position that there may be no `right' answer in strictly 
legal terms. Rather, in the absence of a powerful international court, key areas of IHL are 
pluralistic. Adopting an American Legal Realist approach, and in particular Michael 
Reisman's Incident Analysis as an identifier of international laws, coupled with a 
communitarian view of communities of practice, allows the confused state of IHL to be 
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accepted and identified in the diverse political behaviour of international elites . Viewed 
from this perspective, the plurality of IHL is neither a surprise nor a problem. The objection 
to uncertain law is that it is unpredictable and arbitrary, but law is a product of the society 
that it is designed to serve and, in the absence of a cohesive global society, international law 
is both constructed by, and at the service of, the various international elites that employ law 
in the furtherance of their own interests and those of the communities they represent. Ad 
bellum legal judgments are politicised and vary according to the perceived status of the actor 
as either aggressor or defender and this judgment influences in bello legal assessments 
despite the formal legal separation of the two codes. It follows that actors with different 
views of the `rightness' of the resort war will apply different standards of in bello judgment 
or `law' to the actions of the parties to the conflict. 
Applying Reisman's analysis to the role of military lawyers is to recognise the behaviour of 
elite actors in response to Israeli military operations as an expression of IHL and an 
indication of how those actors are likely to view the legality of future Israeli military 
operations. This means that, rather than rail against the uncertainty of IHL, the legal advisor 
should accept the troubling notion, rejected by mainstream legal philosophy, that there is not 
IHL but IHLs and advise the military accordingly. In so doing the lawyer is exercising 
choice among competing constructions of IHL that reflect the understandings of differing 
domestic and international actors- whether elites or communities. It is tempting to suggest 
that when taking stock of IHL in planning its operations, Israel may have particular regard to 
the IHL promoted by the White House. After all, Israel and the US can be seen as members 
of a security community that requires a degree of shared values and shared expectations of 
behaviour that includes military behaviour. However, the fury expressed by Jerusalem at the 
`bias' of the Goldstone Report, and the allegations against the Israeli elite perused through 
the Universal Jurisdiction, indicate the need for a more nuanced appreciation of the plurality 
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of IHL and the likely future reactions of elite actors whose opinion may also count. This 
methodology recognises that the IDL is exercising choice in its construction of the law that it 
applies to the IDF military operations and asks the question, not whether their legal 
constructions are right, but rather which version of IHL they have chosen to apply and whose 
interests does it serve? These issues will be explored in the following chapters by reference to 
case studies of controversial Israeli military operations that received the prior approval of the 
IDL. 
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Introduction to the Case Studies 
This section of the thesis is arranged as follows: 
Case Study 1. The Second Intifada: the targeted killing of Salah Shehadeh 
Case Study 2. The 2006 Lebanon War 
Case Study 3. Operation Cast Lead 
Case Study 4. The 2010 Turkish Flotilla- the Mavi Marmara Affair 
The case studies have been selected to enable the examination of the role of the IDF lawyers 
(IDL) in some of the more controversial IDF military operations that occurred between 2000 and 
2010. The time frame coincides with the increased involvement of the IDL in operational 
decision making that began in the Second Intifada and has been increasing ever since. The 
analysis is informed by the author's interviews with IDL officers, including Colonel (Rtd. ) 
Daniel Reisner and Colonel (Rtd. ) Pnina Sharvit-Baruch, the two IDL senior officers whose 
periods of service in command of the IDL span the period under examination. As such, these 
case studies present original research material in an area that has thus far received little 
attention. 
Each of the case studies reveals how the IDL was used by the IDF to address new operational 
military challenges that tested the boundaries of International Humanitarian Law. The first case 
study concerns the IDF use of military force against a Palestinian rebellion against Israeli rule. 
The IDL was required to provide a legal analysis that allowed the IDF to employ the full force 
of its military might to crush an insurgency increasingly defined by the use of a campaign of 
suicide bombing. The case study examines the Israeli policy of targeted killing and the IDL's 
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construction of legal guidelines for the institutionalisation of the process. The second case study 
sees the IDF conduct a war against Hezbollah, which required a legal framework that set the 
limits of military conflict against a non-state actor conducting operations from a sovereign state. 
The case study focuses on the targeting decisions against an enemy concealing itself and its 
military operations among its own civilians. The legal question here was the extent to which the 
humanitarian provisions of IHL could be relaxed to meet the needs of the military in such 
situations. The third case study looks at the Israeli military conflict against Hamas in Gaza 
during Operation Cast Lead. Here, the IDL developed their Lebanon legal analysis to address 
the further problem of a terrorist organisation that has governing functions within a distinct 
territory that has not acquired the status of a state. The final case study looks at the role of the 
lawyers in Israel's strategy of blockading Gaza and, in particular, the Mavi Marmara affair. This 
case study exposes the role of the IDF lawyers in the construction of a legal regime that enabled 
the use of force against apparently humanitarian convoys, with the suffering of the citizens of 
Gaza as a proportionate price for the improved security of Israeli citizens living in the south of 
the country. 
Previous chapters have identified IHL in practice as an uneasy balancing of humanitarian and 
military concerns that complicate targeting decisions. The key principles of distinction that 
separates what can be targeted from what cannot, proportionality that puts a limit on collateral 
damage and military necessity that seeks to exclude unnecessary harm are all imprecise 
constraints on military targeting. In the absence of a robust structure of international courts, the 
targeting law in practice remains pluralistic and subject to the pushes and pulls of political 
contestation. To be sure, ethical principles inform legal judgment and structure the legal and 
political debate so that each case study considers the legal decision making in its ethical context. 
Indeed, it is useful to recognise the conflicting legal and ethical positions as part of a regime of 
international humanitarian law than right of wrong legal and ethical positions. Discussion of the 
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case studies frequently returns to the key issue about which the considerations of law, politics 
and ethics coalesce: the extent to which Israel is prepared to risk the loss of life of its soldiers to 
spare hardship to `their' civilians- force protection when fighting non-state actors. 
Research has revealed the extent to which the IDL has become involved in IDF target selection. 
This allows each case study to examine specific military operations that the IDL reviewed in 
advance. Military security has not allowed the interviewees to reveal the details of their legal 
advice, although they do say that their advice was followed. This means that by only looking at 
the military operations that took place and that the IDL would have been involved in, the 
discussion focuses on what they must have approved. Further limiting the focus to the 
operations that have come under heavy international legal criticism puts the hard decisions 
under the spotlight. Where possible international fact finding reports prepared by UN missions 
and NGOs have been examined to present the critical IHL positions and the Israeli legal 
defences have been used to imply the legal arguments that the IDL will have used to approve the 
operations. This has enabled judgments to be made on the role played by the IDL in 
controversial targeting decisions including targeted killings, bombing villages in southern 
Lebanon, Shiite districts of Beirut, the Hamas government infrastructure and police force, the 
imposition of the Gaza naval blockade and the seizure of the Turkish flotilla. 
Each case study addresses the question of the extent to which the IDL adopted a permissive 
construction of IHL that met the needs of the IDF and meets the less exacting standards of 
communities of practice comprising those states whose militaries are engaged in fighting 
terrorism and insurgencies. Such a legal advice would, of course, enable the Israeli military to 
condition the battlefield by putting in place a construction of IHL that best meet its operational 
needs. The case studies are also used to test the three hypotheses that were posed in chapter 1 to 
account for the increased involvement of military lawyers in IDF operational decision-making: 
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1) The application of international law by the Israeli Supreme Court, 
2) The threat of foreign prosecutions of Israeli decision-makers for war crimes and 
3) The increased use of International Humanitarian Law as a measure of the legitimacy of 
military action. 
Finally, the case studies reveal a more general observation that will be explored in the 
concluding chapter: the importance of IHL to the military as a civil institutional regime that 
must be engaged with both domestically and internationally in order for the IDF to achieve its 
military objectives and for a more robust civil control of the military. 
Before, considering the case studies, a further note on methodology is appropriate. This research 
is heavily reliant on interviews with former officers of the IDL. The interview method was one 
of unstructured interviews designed to allow consideration of the lawyers' understanding of their 
role in military, legal, ethical and political terms. Open source material including government 
reports, NGO reports and newspapers were used to authenticate information given in interview. 
Assistance was also derived from the International Committee of the Red Cross. The main 
constraint was that the IDL had only become routinely involved in operational decision-making 
since 2000 and the military interviewees could not discuss the specifics of recent operations. 
Nevertheless, sufficient original information was obtained to allow useful observations to be 
made and conclusions to be drawn that make a real contribution to a scholarly understanding of 
the role played by Israeli military lawyers in operational decision-making. 
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Chapter 6: Case Study 1: The Second Intifada: the targeted killing of Salah Shehadeh 
1. Introduction 
The Second Intifada' began on 28 September 2000 when violence erupted following Ariel 
Sharon's visit to the temple mount in Jerusalem. This marked the end of the optimism of the 
Oslo years when peace had seemed possible. There is no firm date for the ending of the 
intifada but the assumption of power by Mahmoud Abbas in 2004 and the negotiations that 
led to the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, are generally taken as indicators of an end to the 
uprising. 
The Second Intifada was qualitatively and quantitatively different from the Palestinian 
resistance that had gone before. Past terrorist violence had largely been instigated from across 
Israel's borders and the civil unrest of the First Intifada had been associated more with stone 
1 Also called the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Second Palestinian Uprising. 
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throwing than bombings. Suicide bombing was the signature attack of the Second Intifada; 
terrorist attacks took the struggle for Palestinian nationalism to Israeli cities with 
unprecedented Israeli civilian loss of life2. Once the Israeli government characterised the 
Palestinian violence as an existential threat, the stage was set for the use of unprecedented 
military force to quash the uprising. The adoption by the IDF of new and harsher tactics to 
suppress the Second Intifada took place in an uncertain legal environment and came at a time 
of increased legal activism at home and abroad. It will be argued in this case study that this 
legal and military context generated a demand from the military that its operations would not 
be disrupted by legal challenges, or its commanders prosecuted for war crimes- a demand that 
led to a new institutional role for the IDF International Law Department and a much 
increased involvement in operational decision-making. The Salah Shehadeh affair is used to 
illustrate how this worked in practice. 
2. A new paradigm 
From the beginning, the Israeli response to the Second Intifada was to meet violence with 
violence. However, it was the election of Ariel Sharon's right wing Likud government in 
2001 and widespread disillusion with the peace process that led to the adoption of severe 
measures to crush the uprising. On 4 `h December 2001, after a weekend when 26 Israelis were 
killed and 230 injured, Sharon abandoned the discourse of policing the occupied territories in 
concert with Arafat's security forces and declared to an angry public that Israel was at war 
2 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of 
Principles (Sept 1993), available at, http, //www. mfa. gov. il/MFA/Terrorism- 
%200bstacle%20to%20Peace/Palestinian%20terror%20since%202000/Suicide%20and%200ther%2OB ombing 
%20Attacks%20in%201srael%2OSince. [Last accessed 11 March 2011]. 
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with the terrorists3. His choice of words, clearly echoing Bush's War on Terror, avoided any 
reference to war with the Palestinian Authority (PA) since this would imply some recognition 
of statehood. The intifada was characterised by the Sharon government as an existential threat 
to the Israeli state and the response was not to be one of law enforcement, diplomacy or a 
more restrictive occupation; the response was to be warfare whereby the enemy was to be 
killed or captured and control regained within the limited restraints of the laws of war. This 
was to involve re-occupation of areas that had been put under limited PA control following 
the Oslo Accords, destruction of Arafat's administrative infrastructure, mass detentions and a 
stepping up the policy of targeted assassination. In the absence of a clear legal regime that 
fitted the new strategy, Sharon adopted the Talmudic formulation, `He who is going to kill us, 
his blood will be shed by us'4. As the ancient legal authority for pre-emptive killing, this 
signalled the importance attached to targeted killing both in terms of counter-terrorism 
strategy and as a statement to the Israeli public that the state would reach out to the suicide 
bombers and kill them. To an Israeli public that had seen clubs, restaurants, buses and 
celebrations blown apart this policy received and continues to receive popular approval. This 
was a very different agenda from the Oslo years when policy was influenced by a gradual 
recognition of Arafat's' police force as a partner if not for peace, then at least for increased 
security. The Palestinian administrative infrastructure was now to be a target in the 
resumption of absolute Israeli controls. This policy had been an election winner. Sharon's 
very public presentation of targeted killing as the answer to suicide bombing indicates that it 
was to play a key role in combating the intifada. 
3 'Full Text Sharon's Address', BBC News, 4 December 2001, available at, 
http: //news. hbc. co. uk/l/hi/not in_webs ite/syndication/monitoring/media_reports/ 1690673. stm. (Last accessed 
3/11/2010). 
4 Sanhedrin 72a 
S Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's Political Address to the Knesset 8 April 2002, IMRA ,8 April 2002, available at, 
http: //www. imra. or . 
ilk /story. php3? id=11188. (Last accessed 3/11/2010). 
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Operation Defensive Shield began on 29 March with incursions into areas previously placed 
under Palestinian control, including Ramallah, Tulkarm, Jenin, Nablus, Nazareth, and 
Qalqilya. In a very high profile operation Arafat was effectively confined to his 
administrative offices while the administration of the Palestinian Authority was destroyed 
around him. Moshe Yaalon, former IDF Chief of Staff sees an increase in targeted killing as 
integral to the policy, 
Effective counterterrorism should be based on two guiding principles. The first of these is that 
the best defence is a good offence... Israel has further exemplified this principle since the 
April 2002 Operation Defensive Shield, when the IDF moved from the defensive to the 
offensive, including the use of targeted killing as a defensive tool. It should be emphasised 
that the targeted killings in the aftermath of Munich and those since April 2002 serve different 
purposes: while both deterred future attacks, the former were additionally intended to punish, 
while the latter were intended to pre-empt, terrorist attacks. ' 6 
This new paradigm raised awkward legal questions at a time when the Israeli Supreme Court 
had evidenced an increased interest in the legal regulation of the IDF's activities in the 
Occupied Territories. As was noted in chapter two, studies of the Supreme Court agree that in 
the 1990s the Court had begun to make significant judgments involving the conduct of the 
military in security matters. While there is some disagreement about the extent to which the 
Court was prepared to find against the military, there is a consensus that the Supreme Court 
under Chief Justice Barak was promoting the institution of the court as a mechanism of 
democratic oversight of the military, particularly the military in the Territories. As Mandelblit 
put it in his testimony to the Winograd Commission, `This simply put us in a position where 
we had to give many answers to petitions'. 
Some aspects of declaring war on terrorists in the occupied territories were to raise complex 
legal issues. How exactly was war to be conducted against a population under occupation that 
6 The Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, Lessons from the Fight against Terrorism; a forum 
following a screening of the film Munich, Peace Watch# 533, special forum report. 29 December 2005, available 
at, http: //www. washingtoninstitute. org/templateCO5. php? CID=2427. 
[Last accessed 11 March 2011]. 
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had legal rights both under international humanitarian law and under international human 
rights law? In what circumstances, if any, could civilians be targeted for assassination? 
As has already been noted, international humanitarian law is largely but not exclusively 
codified within the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The Fourth Geneva Convention provides 
a framework for the military administration of occupied territory and the protection of 
civilians during military conflict7 within a regime that balances civilian protection with 
military necessity. International human rights law (IHR), on the other hand, recognises the 
right to life and confers human rights by way of international treaty and declaration. 
International law recognises an uneasy relationship between the two codes whereby they are 
considered to apply in tandem, although in circumstances of armed conflict and occupation 
IHL is understood to take preference8. Put very simply, if IHL does not allow a military act, it 
will usually fall foul of IHR. Israel's administration of a semi-permanent occupation had 
developed a legal character all of its own; however, in 2000 the position was less clear. 
By 2000, Israel's maintenance of a near forty-year occupation without formal annexation had 
been facilitated by a multi-layered legal system designed to privilege Israeli residents of 
Israel and Israeli settlers, while the rights of the Palestinian population were shrouded in 
ambiguity. The legal regime of the Geneva Conventions is designed to maintain the pre- 
existing structures pending termination of occupation and is not designed as a long term 
replacement for the laws and legal institutions of the occupied population. This meant that in 
the absence of formal annexation a legal melange had developed to allow limited Palestinian 
institution building while maintaining Israeli control and settlement9. Although Israel was 
clear that Israeli sovereign law applied to the residents of the settlements and Israeli military 
law applied to the Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories, there was a genuine 
7 See Chapter 3. 
8 The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in The Occupied Palestinian Territory, [20041 ICJ. 
9 See Chapter 1, The application of international law by the Israeli Supreme Court. 
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uncertainty about the relationship in practice of IHR and IHL and the nature of Palestinian 
human rights. The Oslo accords themselves raised another layer of complexity by changing 
the status of some parts of the occupied territories by allocating security and civil control 
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority depending on whether they were in areas A, B or 
C10. 
With Arafat now firmly identified as part of the problem rather than part of the solution, the 
complex, area-specific arrangements for Palestinian security responsibility did not sit well 
with a military strategy that was to include action against the Palestinian administration's 
civil and security infrastructure. - Furthermore, Israel's use of creative legal analysis to 
challenge the legitimacy of treaty monitoring bodies and resist judicial interference in matters 
of security made the analysis even less clear. 
To be sure, the IDF had been operating within this uncertain legal environment for many 
years and targeted killing had been frequently employed. However, as has been noted 
earlier", during the relative quiet and optimism of the Oslo years the Israeli Supreme Court, 
under the direction of Chief Justice Aaron Barak, had involved itself in the legal 
determination of security issues that had previously been left to the unchallenged discretion 
of the IDF. Thus by the start of the Second Intifada the Court had already demonstrated its 
power to review and to a limited extent control military operations in the territories. 
At the international level, June 2001 had seen Ariel Sharon and Amos Yaron indicted in 
Belgium for war crimes arising out of the Sabra and Shatillah massacres of 1982, sparking a 
10 Under these agreements, the West Bank was divided into three different zones: 'A' areas in which both civil 
and security matters were in the hands of the Palestinian Authority established under the agreements; `B' areas, 
in which security control remained the responsibility of Israel, while civil matters were the responsibility of the 
Palestinian Authority; and `C' areas in which Israel retained responsibility for security matters while 
responsibility for civil matters was divided between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In Gaza there was a 
similar, although not identical, arrangement. 
11 The increasing involvement of the Israeli judiciary in security matters is discussed in chapter 1. 
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sudden interest by Palestinian NGOs in the universal jurisdiction as a tool to bring Israeli 
political and military elites to justice. The point to be emphasised here is that when the 
second Intifada erupted, and particularly after Sharon took office, the IDF found itself using 
military power against an occupied civilian population where the law was uncertain and 
where the Courts at home and abroad could intervene at any time. It was within this military 
and legal context that legal knowledge assumed a greater value and the previously neglected 
IDF International Law Department found its services in demand- particularly when it came to 
targeted killing. 
3. The involvement of the lawyers 
The Israeli military lawyers that deal with international matters such as military obligations 
under treaties, maritime law and the laws of war work in the IDF International Law 
Department (IDL). They are under the command of the Military Advocate General (MAG) 
who is subordinate to the Chief of Staff but is answerable to the Attorney General in legal 
matters. In 1989 there were five lawyers and by 2009 the department had grown to twenty. In 
time of war their number is further increased by drafting in reserve officers. However, it is 
not the increasing size of the department so much as its expanding scope that is of interest to 
this study. Col. (Res. ) Daniel Reisner served as Head of the department from 1995 until 2004, 
having joined as a legal adviser in 1985. As such, he has been best placed to observe the 
department's changing role. 
In fact, within weeks of the outbreak of the intifada Reisner was used by the IDF to explain to 
the press the methods that the IDF were employing and why they were a legal response 12. 
12 
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Briefing by Colonel Daniel Reisner- Head of the International Law 
Branch of the IDF Legal Division, 15 November 2000, available at, 
http: //www. mfa. jzov. il/MFAIMFAArchive/2000 2009/2000/11/Press%20Briefing%20by%20Colonel%20Danie 
l%20Reisner-%2OHead%20of. [Last accessed 11 March 2011]. 
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While keen to make the point that the IDF was exercising restraint, Reisner was at pains to 
establish a new paradigm, 
These differences between '87 and today are some of the reasons why we no longer view the 
legal situation as being the same. From a legal perspective, international law, classical 
international law, actually only recognizes two situations: peace or war. But life isn't as 
simple as that, and there are lots of terms running around the concerning the in-between. 
"Lower intensity conflict", "limited war", etc. Be the term what it may, the current situation, 
the fact that now a large percentage of the attacks involve live weapons, that we are facing a 
Palestinian authority, that we are facing a Palestinian security service which in part is taking 
active participation in hostilities, has brought us to the conclusion that we are no longer in the 
realm of peace. So where are we? While we are not at the end of the spectrum, which is war, 
because war is a conflict between two armies or two states, we are definitely in the area of 
armed conflict. Call it what you wish, some call it "un-conflict", some call it "active 
hostilities" - whatever the term you wish to use that's fine with us, but please understand that 
for us, we have reached the decision, and I think I would be quoting the Attorney General, 
who I saw yesterday on television, saying that the current situation has more of a semblance 
of war than of peace. As a result, we are also applying the principles applicable to warfare to 
the current situation, and no longer the principles applied in a time of peace. 
Reisner made it clear that the rules of engagement had changed in accordance with his 
department's legal advice, 
Up to the current events, the rules of engagement of the Israel Defense Forces in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip were police rules of engagement. Use of live weapons only in self- 
defense, or after a warning shot to carry out an arrest, which is not relevant right now because 
we are not involved in arresting people at this point in time - that's historical from our 
perspective. In all other cases when you're not in a life-threatening situation, you are allowed 
to use non-lethal weapons systems which I'll deal with in a few minutes. When this new 
situation came about, and we came to the legal decision that we have crossed the line between 
the area of peace and the area of let's say active hostility, I came to the Israeli military and 
said, "We can, at this juncture, look again at our rules of engagement, and they can move 
down that scale a bit more. " Because the facts have changed... Up to the current events, the 
rules of engagement of the Israel Defense Forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were 
police rules of engagement. Use of live weapons only in self-defense, or after a warning shot 
to carry out an arrest, which is not relevant right now because we are not involved in arresting 
people at this point in time - that's historical from our perspective. 
This statement to the press, which was followed by a question and answer session, is 
indicative of the advisory role that Reisner's department was playing at the time and of the 
nature of the legal advice. Placing the conflict somewhere between policing and warfare 
appeared to rely on complexity to enable military tactics against civilians. The fact that 
Reisner is giving the statement in the first place has the head of the International Law 
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department describing the new security tactics within a mixed security and legal discourse 
that is characteristic of what Clarke calls processes of legitimisation. Reisner's department 
was to do more than advise and explain- it was to become routinely involved in operational 
matters. 
Reisner recalls that when he joined the department, they were giving advice on issues 
involving the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but were not directly involved in operational 
matters 13. Reisner would be involved in drafting rules of engagement that reflected a policing 
role in the West Bank. He recalls that his department was using rules of engagement that 
were similar to those used by the British army in Northern Ireland. The work of the 
department changed as the army engaged in operations that went beyond a policing role and 
asked about the legality of their operations in the West Bank and Lebanon. This resulted in 
the department becoming writing legal annexes to operational orders covering issues such as 
POW detention and the protection of civilian objects. Involvement was within the operational 
world but always pre-operational. 
In fact, Reisner already had experience of the department playing an operational role, albeit 
an unusual one. This had been in 1988 when he was sent to sea to accompany the Israeli 
Navy Flotilla Commander tasked to intercept the Palestinian refugee ship Exodus. His task 
was described to him by the Flotilla Commander as, `if we come close to that ship and they 
start shooting at us I want you to tell me if I can shoot back'. Reisner remembers saying to 
himself `this is a different type of law they are asking me to practise, unlike the law which I 
previously had been practicing in my office'. In fact there was no confrontation at sea as the 
vessel was sabotaged in Limassol harbour before it had time to set sail, probably by Israel's 
13 Author's interview with Reisner, Jerusalem, 24 May 2009. 
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elite naval commando unit Flotilla 1314. Reisner maintains that after he became Deputy Head 
of the Department he began, in the early 1990s, to push the IDF to accept operational legal 
advice as a `product we can offer the army'. 
Reisner is clear that the Second Intifada led to a sharp increase in the involvement of his 
department in military operations. Reisner's views are confirmed by Colonel (Rtd. ) Pnina 
Sharvit Baruch, who joined the IDL in 1989 and later replaced Reisner as head of the IDL, 
retiring after Cast lead in 200915. She recalls that the military lawyers had not been involved 
in operational matters during Israel's conflict with Lebanon between 1982 and 2000 and 
agrees with Reisner that the changed role evolved during the Second Intifada. Her 
recollection is that the military found that the regulations governing the Occupation did not 
reflect a reality that Israel had characterised as war. In these circumstances, there was a 
demand for access to legal knowledge to understand the level of military violence that could 
legally be used to put down the intifada. Reisner believes that the catalyst was the issue of 
targeted killing, 
The major change happened during the Second Intifada because Israel moved from a law 
enforcement model to an armed conflict model. This raised the question of whether military 
hardware could be used in a military fashion- when tanks could be used for instance. This 
came to a head when discussing the issue of targeted killing when we were asked point blank 
whether we could lawfully deliberately go and kill someone. 
The problem, of course, arose from wanting to use the power recognised under international 
law as pertaining to an armed conflict between states, in circumstances where Israel was very 
keen to avoid any suggestion that the institutions of the Palestinian Authority amounted to 
anything of the sort. On the other hand, tactics of targeted assassination were inappropriate to 
a law enforcement situation, even one that was taking place in occupied territory. Reisner's 
14 Serge Schmemann, `Raiding Party in Lebanon belonged to Elite Unit', New York Times, 6 September 1997, 
available at htp"//www nytimes com/l997/09/06/world/raidina-party-in-lebanon-belonged-to-elite-unit. html 
(last visited 20 May 2010). 
15 See, author's interview with Pnina Sharvit Baruch at Tel Aviv, 21 May 2009. 
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legal department constructed their advice to meet the Israeli understanding of the operations 
as `anticipatory self-defence'. If the targets were to be terrorists bent on Israel's destruction, 
their elimination became a matter of self defence and therefore permissible whether or not a 
state of war was in existence. In the opinion of the IDF International Law Department, this 
legal formulation gave the military the right to carry out its liquidation policy in the occupied 
territories. This was consistent with the official Israeli discourse of preventative strikes and 
targeted frustration. The opinion, written in early 2001, remains classified and according to 
Reisner set out the following criteria for a legal kill: 
i) Only target actual terrorists or their command level. No political or religious leaders or 
philosophers or support structure. 
ii) You can only target if there is no viable arrest opportunity. 
iii) Any attack must be proportionate in the law of war context. 
iv) You can only launch an attack in areas where Israel does not have security responsibilities. 
You cannot do this in a place where you must be able to arrest someone. 
v) This must be a Ministerial level decision (since we did not want this to be an operation that 
16 could be signed off by the Chief of staff or someone) 
The legal guidance reflects an eclectic mixture of concerns: there is the IHL requirement of 
proportionality to provide some measure of protection for bystanders; the requirement for 
arrest rather than capture suggests that law enforcement is to be preferred where possible. 
Limiting the operations to where Israel did not have security responsibilities implies 
recognition of the Oslo framework of divided responsibility for security. The IHL principle of 
distinction is imported in a strict but imprecise form to limit the operations to `actual 
terrorists or their command level'. Finally, to preserve direct political control, these 
operations were to be under direct ministerial supervision. 
16 Author's interview with Reisner. 
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A brief analysis of Reisner's opinion to the military reveals the complexity of the legal 
position. If this is a military operation regulated by IHL, the principle of distinction allows 
the targeting of only enemy combatants or enemy civilians that have lost their privileged 
status by engaging in armed conflict. Why then is there an obligation to apprehend where it is 
practical to do so when there is no such requirement when conducting military operations? If 
this is a police operation to foil an attack, the normal strict rules of self-defence and 
proximity of attack apply. Added to that, there is the familiar problem of proportionality. 
The very formulation of the guidelines by the legal department is an exercise of institutional 
power. Moreover, the fact that Reisner's legal prescription asks as many questions as it 
answers increases, rather than dispenses with, the need for real time legal advice. As Reisner 
puts it, `After receiving this opinion the army said that these conditions are a little difficult to 
implement'. According to Reisner the military had difficulty in understanding how to decide 
who is in which circle of terrorism, how reliable the intelligence must be, when an arrest is 
viable and the limits of proportionality. Consequently, having got their legal advice, the IDF 
decided that they needed a lawyer from IDL in the room during the operational discussions of 
whether to kill someone, when, where and how to do it. The IDF had put together a legal 
justification for the use of lethal force where there existed no war and no possibility of 
effective policing. In so doing they had created a legal framework for an administrative 
process for the liquidation of Israel's enemies that preserved the political echelon's power of 
veto. The process of targeted killing had been institutionalised by the lawyers five years 
before the Israeli High Court ruled on the issue 17. 
17 The Palestinian Committee against Torture in Israel and Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human 
Rights and the Environment v The Government of Israel and others. Ref HCJ769/02, available at, 
http: //74.6.146.127/search/cache? e i=UTF- 
8&p=http%2F%2Felyonl. court. nov. il%2F&fr=mcafee&u=elvon1 . court. gov. 
ilffiles eng/02/690/007/A34/02007 
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However, it was not only the politicians that had a veto. Both political and legal sources 
confirm that if the lawyers say that an operation is unlawful it does not go ahead. Reisner is 
clear that he has vetoed operations that the military were very keen to carry out and although 
there had been efforts to have his decision reversed, his view prevailed. Given the nature of 
the operation, where the legality of the killing depends on what is known at the time of the 
attack, decisions on the lawfulness of the operation demand close contact with the IDL legal 
team including involvement of the lawyers in real-time operational decision-making. Reisner 
gives a chilling example of his involvement, and it is worth quoting at length, 
One case stays in my mind, which was where there was a huge proportionality problem. I was 
called unexpectedly to a targeted killing meeting. The meeting was in mid-session and they 
had not called me before, which meant that they had encountered a problem that they had 
been unable to resolve without a lawyer. These people had received our advice in the past and 
usually knew what to do without involving us. The problem was that a three man terrorist 
squad had kidnapped an Israeli agent who was a Palestinian. They were currently holding him 
in an apartment and interrogating him somewhat unpleasantly. They were going to finish 
interrogating him and then kill him. I asked whether their question of me was whether they 
could launch a missile right now and kill all of them including the suspected agent. My 
opinion was that this did not look like a proportionality problem. They said that they knew 
that already. Their concern was that the mathematical assessment of the missile strike gave an 
80% probability that the next door apartment, about which they knew nothing, would be 
destroyed or at least suffer serious damage. Their question was whether they were allowed to 
launch the attack. I said that, on that information I had no idea. I then spent 15mins giving 
orders for more information. We had a drone in the air and an agent on the ground. I asked 
questions like whether there was washing hanging outside etc. I served in the Territories for 
20yrs so I had some idea what to ask. At the end of the day the next door apartment looked 
closed and I said to them `Look if it's an orphanage we are screwed and if it's the local 
Hamas headquarters we are fine'. They said 'OK but can we? ' I told them that it looks more 
probable that it is an empty apartment because there are no signs of life but that this was one 
of those cases where there was no clear rule. I told them that it did not look to me as if it was 
an automatic war crime if they decided to launch the attack because they could legitimately 
claim that they had made a determination that there was a good chance that it was an empty 
apartment. However, I told them that they were taking a risk because although the law says 
that you are not supposed to be judged on the basis of hindsight, if something bad were to 
happen you would have to argue that you made a reasonable determination on the basis of the 
information you had at the time, and that is a tough sell if something bad happens. I told them 
it was not an obvious no. In fact they did not launch the attack. This was not because of me. 
They took my answer as a yes. It was because they could not get the ministerial level 
approval in time. 
690. a34. pdf&d=D1uCNe_ ZVckS&icp=I&. inti=uk&sig=VnDLaxD3AML4XWHx. ZtMHw--. (Last accessed 
12/12/09). 
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Former Deputy Defence Minister Ephriam Sneh confirms that the decision to carry out a 
targeted assassination needs political approval from the top18. The recommendation is from 
the Shabbak and although the lawyers are not usually present, their written opinion is 
considered at the meeting. Sneh confirms that the lawyers have an effective veto so that if 
they say no the operation does not proceed. Nevertheless, whether the procedure is always 
followed in practice is open to doubt. At the time of writing, the current police investigation 
of Anat Khan concerns her theft of documents while working at the office of the Head of 
Central Command. The documents that Khan has revealed to Israeli journalists apparently 
show that in 2007 the IDF Central Command was planning assassinations where arrest would 
have been possible19. It remains to be seen whether the lawyers were a party to this. On the 
other hand, Anat Khan affair is controversial because of the suggestion that the standard 
operational procedures were being circumvented and this suggests that the formal 
arrangements are regarded as important. While the exception does not prove the rule, it does 
not disprove it either. 
Consideration of the formal institutional arrangements for Israeli targeted assassinations 
shows that the IDL was instrumental in creating a decision making process that required their 
input and which give the IDL veto powers. While Reisner mentions the difficulty in applying 
his department's legal criteria as requiring the lawyer to be in the room, their enthusiasm for 
legal involvement may be related to the fact that the Supreme Court had taken an interest in 
the targeted killing policy. On 24 January 2002, two NGOs, The Public Committee Against 
Torture in Israel and the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and The 
Environment, had submitted a petition to the Supreme Court for an order that the targeted 
killing policy be declared illegal. The case was not ultimately decided until December 2005, 
18 See, author's interview with Ephraim Sneh at Herzliya, 7 September 2007. 
19 Yossi Melman, `The Source', Tablet Magazine, 8 April 2010 available at, http: //www. tabletmag. com/news- 
and_politics/30174/the-source/ (Last accessed 20 May 2010). 
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after the Intifada had come to an end, but the point to be emphasised is that from January 
2002 until the end of the intifada the military was operating a policy of targeted killing while 
the state was defending the policy in the Supreme Court. With the Attorney General 
defending the military at the Supreme Court, it is no wonder that the military was turning to 
the IDL. 
When finally giving their judgment, the Supreme Court substantially agreed with the IDL's 
formula. According to Michael Sfard, who acted as attorney for one of the petitioners, Barak 
`koshered targeted assassination' 20. In fact Barak did not just Kosher the policy in 
substantially the same terms as Reisner's advice, he put in place a further layer of legal 
bureaucratic procedure. In giving his judgment Chief Justice Aaron Barak stipulated that the 
operation receive legal approval before hand and, after the killing, there was to be an 
examination of the operation by internal inquiry with legal involvement, 
Third, after an attack on a civilian suspected of taking an active part, at such time, in hostilities, a 
thorough investigation regarding the precision of the identification of the target and the circumstances 
of the attack upon him is to be performed (retrospectively). That investigation must be independent. 
This amounts to institutionalising targeted killing in the IDF in terms of both military and 
legal institutions that led to the involvement of lawyers both before and after the event. 
4. The killing of Salah Shehadeh and its legal aftermath 
While Reisner's narrative of the unfortunate informer shows the exercise of covert power, the 
killing of Salah Shehadeh was a very public demonstration of the complexity of the issues 
and immediately became the cause celebre of those who challenge the legality of the policy. 
2020 Michael Sfard, joint attorney for the petitioners, is very critical of the judgment. It was deliberately delayed 
by the court from 2003 till 2005 and then , `Barak Koshered the idea of waging a war on terrorism by 
assassination'. Author's telephone interview with Sfard 6, September 2007. See also, Avigor Feldman. 
'Croaking Swan Song', Haaretz, 28/06/07. 
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Salah Shehadeh was commander and founder of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the 
military wing of Hamas, and his responsibility for ruthless attacks on Israeli civilian targets is 
not disputed. On 22 July 2002 an Israeli F16 fighter plane dropped a one ton bomb on 
Shehadeh's house in the crowded Al Daraj neighbourhood of Gaza city. The strike was a 
direct hit in an extremely densely populated area that was well known to the Israelis. It was 
inconceivable that the operation could be carried out without causing death and injury to 
other residents of the apartment block and the surrounding buildings. Eight houses in the 
vicinity of the bombing were severely damaged with walls blown out by the blast21. Fifteen 
people died, including nine children, and many were injured. This operation was 
controversial not because there was any significant body of opinion in Israel that believed 
that Shehadeh did not deserve to die or that he could have been arrested without Israeli loss 
of life, but rather it was the inevitability of death and injury to neighbours and bystanders that 
caused questions to be asked. Viewed from this perspective, it is a classic legal question of 
proportionality22. However, as has previously been noted, the legal judgment of 
proportionality and its moral component are tightly intertwined. 
The moral perspective that accepts state killing of terrorists that are beyond the territorial 
reach of its law invites further consideration of what constitutes beyond reach. To what extent 
should the state risk the lives of its military to apprehend rather than kill the target? This, of 
course, is another aspect of the familiar issue of force protection that was addressed in some 
detail in chapter four. In Israel the dominant moral position is in favour of targeted killing of 
those, such as Shehadeh, who organise suicide attacks on Israeli civilians. Equally, there is a 
21 Author's interview with Mathew Kalman in Jerusalem 10, June 2007, who examined the scene the following 
morning. 
22 See discussion of the grey area of proportionality at chapter 3. 
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strong consensus that Israeli soldiers should not be required to risk their lives to capture 
rather than kill such people. 
This ethical position is widely promoted by the influential Israeli moral philosopher Asa 
Kasher. It will be recalled that Kasher, who regularly lectures to the IDF, bases his analysis 
on the duty that the state owes to its citizens to provide security. The citizens of the state rank 
above non-citizens in a scale of duty and obligation and, unlike Walzer's position on 
collateral damage, there is no moral requirement to risk the lives of soldiers to protect non- 
citizens. Killing terrorists who cannot be captured without risk to soldiers is an ethical 
exercise of self-defence, even where civilians are going to die in the process. Furthermore, 
where the terrorists operate from among civilians, it is their use of civilians as human shields 
that is morally objectionable rather than the decision to target them in this environment. 
Having established the moral position for targeted killing of terrorists, Kasher's position on 
proportionality is particularly pertinent to the Shehadeh case, 
Hence, when only a single act of targeted prevention of terror by killing the terrorist is 
considered, the possibility exists that the number of casualties of the collateral damage is 
much higher than the number of saved citizens who are jeopardized by that single act of 
terror. However, consideration of a single act rather than the whole mode of activity is 
morally wrong. It is not the benefit gained by preventing a single act of terror that should be 
considered but the cumulative benefits gained by preventing a series of acts of terror to be 
committed if the terrorist enjoys immunity from military attack. Consideration of 
accumulative benefits will obviate the difficulty raised by the apparent disproportionality. 
23 
Nevertheless, even `apparent disproportionality' is morally disturbing and while there is no 
consensus on what constitutes acceptable collateral damage in such operations, there was 
considerable moral criticism within Israel of the Shehadeh operation24. International criticism 
was immediate and the Israeli Minister of Defence who was in the UK at the time raced from 
one TV studio to another in an attempt to justify the operation. 
23 Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin, 'Assassination and Preventive Killing', SAIS Review, Winter-Spring 2005, 
P. 53, 
24 See for instance, Ze'ev Schiff, 'In a Fit of Rage', Haaretz, 29/07/02 
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From a legal perspective, the operation appears difficult to defend. As discussed in chapter 
Additional Protocol I, Article 51(5) (b) prohibits, `an attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated. ' This provision codifies customary international law that is generally understood 
to apply to both international and non-international armed conflict. Indeed, when Barak 
discussed proportionality his example of a disproportionate attack, at paragraph 46 of his 
targeted killing judgment, is a thinly veiled reference to the Shehadeh operation, 
The proportionality rule applies in regards to harm to those innocent civilians The rule is that 
combatants and terrorists are not to be harmed if the damage expected to be caused to nearby 
innocent civilians is not proportionate to the military advantage in harming the combatants 
and terrorists. Performing that balance is difficult. Here as well, one must proceed case by 
case, while narrowing the area of disagreement. Take the usual case of a combatant, or of a 
terrorist sniper shooting at soldiers or civilians from his porch. Shooting at him is 
proportionate even if as a result, an innocent civilian neighbor or passerby is harmed. That is 
not the case if the building is bombed from the air and scores of its residents and passersby 
are harmed. (Emphasis added) 
The political value to the Sharon government of killing Shehadeh together with the fact that 
previous attempts using smaller munitions had failed would have led to substantial 
institutional pressure to proceed with the operation as planned. Those involved have argued 
that the intelligence suggested that the timing of the attack was designed to reduce the 
likelihood of civilian casualties and that Shehadeh, who had already been unsuccessfully 
targeted, was using his family and neighbours as human shields. This attempt to pass the 
responsibility for the civilian deaths and injuries mixes the moral and legal arguments. The 
only basis for arguing in law that the operation was legal is to present a case that the 
operation was both necessary and proportionate because of the massive importance of 
Shehadeh to the continuation of the campaign of suicide terrorism- in other words, Kasher's 
long view. This amounts to an application of the proportionality test that is tailored to attacks 
on terrorists. As Israeli professor of law David Kretzmer puts it, 
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Use of lethal force must always conform to the proportionality test. In this context this test 
should be based on balancing three factors: 1. the danger to life posed by the continued 
activities of the terrorists; 2. the chance of the danger to human life being realized if the 
activities of the suspected terrorist are not halted immediately; and 3. the danger that civilians 
will be killed or wounded in the attack on the suspected terrorist. As mentioned in the 
discussion above of the proportionality test, a heavy burden rests on the state to justify killing 
or wounding of civilians during an attack on suspected terrorists. The presumption should be 
that suspected terrorists may not be targeted when there is a real danger that civilians will be 
killed or wounded too. 5 
Avi Dichter, former head of Shin Bet has defended the action on the basis that Shehadeh was 
an important target whose elimination would seriously disrupt lethal terror attacks in Israel 
and that there was a danger that he would not be found again if the attack were not to 
proceed; he defended the decision to use such a large bomb on the grounds that a previous 
attack had been unsuccessful because concern for civilian casualties had led to the use a 
smaller bomb that had caused structural damage without killing Shehadeh. Nevertheless, the 
need for a larger bomb does not make its use proportionate. Furthermore, the argument that 
lives will be saved by the disruption of future attacks demands more than mere assumption if 
it is to be used in the balance against immediate extensive civilian deaths. In fact there have 
been legal challenges both domestically and internationally. 
It is well established that proportionality is judged by the information available at the time 
that the operation is carried out and Dichter claims that there was an intelligence failure so 
that the IDF wrongly believed that the neighbouring dwelling was empty. Even so, it is 
difficult to believe that widespread loss of life was not inevitable. Dichter's insistence on the 
importance of Shehadeh to the ongoing terrorist campaign is more convincing26. 
25 David Krezmer, `Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or legitimate Means of 
Defence? 'European Journal of International Law, Vol16, no. 2, p. 203-204. 
26 Avi Dichter and Daniel Byman, `Israel's Lessons for Fighting Terrorists and their Implications for the United 
States', The Saban Centre, analysis Paper, No. 8, March 2006. 
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Legal proceedings have been brought on behalf of the injured civilian bystanders against the 
IDF in the Israeli Supreme Court and internationally under the Universal Jurisdiction. On the 
domestic front the case has been stalled by virtue of the fact that, following Barak's ruling 
that there must be post-facto investigations of operations involving the death of civilian 
bystanders, there is a long standing ongoing IDF investigation and the Court has refused to 
rule on the matter until the investigation comes to an end27. 
Internationally, the legal repercussions have been most evident in Spain. The Spanish case 
began in January 2009 when Judge Fernando Andreu, an investigating magistrate at the 
national court in Madrid, began an investigation at the request of the Gaza-based Palestinian 
Centre for Human Rights. The intention was to pursue war crimes allegations under the 
universal jurisdiction. In view of the involvment of the Israeli political and military elite in 
the operation, the prosecution involved very high profile Israelis including, Binyamin Ben- 
Eliezer (former Defence Minister), Dan Halutz (former Chief of the Air Force and 
subsequently Chief of Staff), Avi Dichter (former head of Shin Bet and subsequently Internal 
security Minister), Moshe Yaalon (former GOC Southern Command and Chief of Staff), 
Doron Almog (former head of Southern Command) and General (Res. ) Mike Herzog. The 
investigation was eventually quashed by the Spanish Supreme Court in April 2010 after 
intense legal and political manoeuvring. Nevertheless, lawyers active in support of the 
Palestinian cause are known to have lodged files of evidence on the Shehadeh operation with 
prosecuting authorities around the world so that proceedings can be started should Israeli 
political and military elites come within their national jurisdiction 28. 
27 HCJ 8794/03 Yoav Hess et at. v Judge Advocate General et at. 
28 Author's interview with Daniel Machover (London solicitor representing Palestinian NGOs), London, 20 
September 2007, 
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The threat of prosecution abroad is a very real concern among the Israeli political and 
military elites involved in the Shehadeh operation. This is apparent from the steps taken by 
successive governments to counter the threat of prosecution. In addition to legal challenges to 
the prosecution there are high level diplomatic efforts designed to achieve changes in foreign 
domestic law. Successive UK governments have refused to change UK law despite a series 
of attempted prosecutions of visiting Israeli politicians and senior IDF officers. This is not to 
suggest that it is only the Shehadeh operation that raises the threat of prosecution given the 
former military careers of many of Israel top political figures. However, the operation 
continues to head the list of threatened prosecutions with former IDF Chief of Staff Moshe 
Yaalon narrowly escaping prosecution while on holiday in New Zealand in November 
200629. 
Besides the predictable involvement of government and IDL lawyers in the defence of the 
court cases themselves, there has been a government institutional response that directly 
involves the military lawyers in the legal and political strategies designed to counter the 
prosecutions. Central to the Government response is the establishment of a new legal 
department within the Ministry of Justice to act as a task force to co-ordinate a response to 
international legal proceedings involving the state and those who act on its behalf to counter 
terrorism. The department works in conjunction with a permanent steering committee 
composed of experts in relevant fields from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the IDF, and the Office of the Prime Minister30. These 
institutional arrangements bring together the MAG, state and academic lawyers to co-ordinate 
the defence of the civil and military elites against legal proceedings initiated overseas arising 
from the Shehadeh and similar operations. 
29 Ronny Sofer, `Yaalon Escapes arrest in New Zealand', Ynet News, 30 November 2006, available at, 
http: //www. ynetnews. com/articles/0,7340, L-3334597.00. html. (Last accessed 12/12/10 
30 Ido Rosesweig and Uval Sheny, 'Establishment of a Legal Department by the Israeli Security Cabinet to Deal 
with Issues of International Jurisdiction', Terrorism Newsletter, Issue 12. 
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The successful strategy in Spain operated on at least two levels. On the diplomatic level 
Israeli diplomacy was coordinated with that of the US to successfully persuade the Spanish 
government to change its domestic law so that war crimes prosecutions could only be brought 
where there is a direct Spanish involvement31. This change was not retrospective, so that the 
merits of the case against the Israelis had to be challenged before the Spanish Court of 
Appeal and the Spanish Supreme Court. At the legal level, the Spanish Supreme Court was 
persuaded to order that the investigation was inappropriate on the grounds that there was a 
credible ongoing Israeli investigation into the Shehadeh affair. This last point reveals the 
legal institutional connection between foreign and domestic legal institutions. It will be 
recalled that Chief Justice Barak had ordered an independent inquiry within the IDF into the 
Shehadeh killing and it was the existence of this enquiry that was used to persuade the 
Spanish Supreme Court that the Spanish proceedings were inappropriate. Ironically the same 
argument was successfully made by the state before the Israeli Supreme Court when the 
Israeli Court was petitioned to rule on the legality of the killing32. Thus at the time of writing 
the issue of the legality of the Shehadeh operation is being investigated within the IDF very 
slowly and the Spanish and Israeli courts are giving the investigation a wide berth. 
Nevertheless, the threat of prosecution at home and abroad continues to hang over those 
involved in the operation. 
5. Conclusion 
It will be recalled that the discussion in chapter one raised the following hypotheses: 
1) The IDF military lawyers exercise choice in the construction of their advice and apply a 
permissive construction of international humanitarian law to IDF targeting decision making. 
31 This is similar to the changes made by the Belgians' to their criminal code following US pressure. 
32 HCJ 8794/03 Yoav Hess et al. V. Judge Advocate General et al. 
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2) Their choice of IHL accords with a consensus among states conducting military actions 
against non-state actors and conflicts with legal positions adopted by communities of NGOs 
and UN commissions of enquiry. 
3) The increased involvement of lawyers in Israeli military decision-making is an institutional 
reaction by the IDF to the following changes in its external environment: 
a) The application of international law by the Israeli Supreme Court. 
b) The threat of foreign prosecutions of Israeli decision-makers for war crimes. 
c) The increased use of humanitarian law as a measure of the legitimacy of military 
actions. 
Second Intifada was a sea change in the Palestinian style of resistance that produced in Israel 
a political determination to crush the intifada by the employment of Israel's military might. 
The IDF lawyers played a crucial role in constructing an understanding of international 
humanitarian law, which used law that had traditionally been applied to inter-state conflict 
and adapted it to a war against terrorists. Reisner and his team produced a hybrid version of a 
law enforcement and international law model. Under Reisner's formulation the IDF was only 
able to kill the target if capture would endanger Israeli forces. In war there is no obligation to 
capture rather than kill enemy combatants. Furthermore, the definition of combatant to 
include people who were not at the time actively engaged in a mission was particularly wide. 
This represented a choice of law that met the needs of the military and supports the 
hypothesis that the lawyers had exercised choice in their selection of law and that the choice 
amounted to a permissive construction of international humanitarian law- the particular 
circumstances of the Shehadeh killing show just how permissive. 
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If it is accepted that the operation should have been vetoed by the lawyers, this raises the 
question of why it was allowed to proceed. It is possible to draw some tentative conclusions 
about the legal input of the IDL lawyers. The military lawyers are operating at the 
intersection of legal and military institutions and their legal advice will be subject to both sets 
of institutional constraints. On the one hand, professional standards and peer pressures will 
militate against self-serving legal positions that cannot be defended in good faith and on the 
other there will be the pressure of a military culture that demands that the IDF be allowed to 
win. However, the analysis is made more complex by the militarised nature of Israeli society, 
which is itself influenced by the ethical positions promoted by opinion formers such as Asa 
Kasher. 
In these circumstances the legal institutions of a militarised society will bend to pressure 
from the military and tend towards advice that lets the IDF win. The literature recognises 
these pressures on institutional lawyers, and it will be recalled that MAG Mandelblit told the 
Winograd Commission in no uncertain terms that his loyalty is to the military, `Now I need to 
help the IDF win, like any army officer. I want the IDF to win the war, and that's why I want 
to help the operational body to succeed as much as possible'. As a statement of the 
institutional culture of his corps, this may go some way towards explaining the IDL advice in 
the Shehadeh affair. This analysis suggests that the legal institutional culture was 
overwhelmed by the offensive spirit of the IDF with the result that the lawyers became the 
instrument of the military. 
The second hypothesis is that the choice of IHL accords with a consensus among states 
conducting military actions against non-state actors and conflicts with legal positions adopted 
by communities of NGOs and UN commissions of enquiry. Adler's concept of communities 
of purpose allows further insight into the choice that the IDF lawyers made. Such 
communities have consensus positions on what is required of militaries by international 
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humanitarian law. This is best understood in the wider legal context of a choice between a 
law enforcement paradigm and a war paradigm. Reisner is very clear that this was the choice 
that was in the minds of the military and political planners when deciding how to respond to 
Palestinian terrorism. Sharon's December 2001 declaration of war on Palestinian terrorism 
echoed the US response to 9/11, which had taken place less than three months earlier and was 
made shortly after the October 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. By adopting the war paradigm, 
the Israeli government was consciously adopting the legal and ethical norms of the US and its 
allies fighting a war on terror. Thus Israeli legal advice that brought targeted killing within a 
legal institutional framework can be understood as being within a legal consensus of 
communities of states whose common purpose is fighting terror. Such communities bestow 
legitimacy on the targeted killing policy grounded in this legal and ethical consensus. The 
particular circumstances of the Shehadeh case shows the importance of properly gauging the 
consensus, since it is probably the case that that particular operation breached the consensus 
and has been difficult for Israel to defend even among its friends. This does not detract from 
the main point to be emphasised, which is that the Israeli military lawyers chose their legal 
advice to enable the Israeli military to fight a war against a Palestinian insurgency that was, 
with some exceptions, consistent with a new legal and ethical paradigm that had been 
adopted by states fighting a post 9/11 war on terror. In so doing they correctly judged that a 
policy of targeted killing would be seen as both legal and legitimate in the eyes of Israel's 
allies. Indeed, not only was the targeted killing of insurgents seen as legitimate it has since 
become the weapon of choice in the drone operations in US and UK operations against the 
Taleban and Al Qaeda. The fact that this policy is not universally accepted as legitimate by 
states and NGOs is illustrated by the efforts, discussed in chapter three, of the International 
Red Cross, other NGOs and their state supporters to promote a narrower legal definition of 
combatants. Reisner makes the distinction between states fighting terror and those that are 
207 
not. In his view Israel is fighting in accordance with the consensus position of the US, UK, 
Germany, Russian and China33. While this approach suggests a research agenda that includes 
mapping attitudes towards the legality of targeted killing, it can be said at this stage that the 
case study supports the second hypothesis. 
The third hypothesis, is that the increased involvement of lawyers in Israeli military decision- 
making is an institutional reaction by the IDF to the following changes in its external 
environment: 
a) The application of international law by the Israeli Supreme Court. 
b) The threat of foreign prosecutions of Israeli decision-makers for war crimes. 
c) The increased use of humanitarian law as a measure of the legitimacy of military 
actions. 
Reisner and Sharvit-Baruch, who are both former heads of the IDL confirm MAG 
Mandelblit's evidence to Winograd that the department become involved in IDF operations 
during the Second Intifada. The department had previously been concerned with operational 
matters at the planning stages and in drafting rules of engagement. Now they drafted new 
rules of engagement and Reisner was used by the IDF to promote their legal legitimacy. 
Added to this, there was a new involvement in real-time targeted killing decisions that 
brought the lawyers into the operations room. Both legal and political sources are clear that 
the IDL has a veto if they decide that an operation is not legal. The point has already been 
made that the state was putting the fight against Palestinian terrorism onto a war footing and 
that the lawyers were needed to advise on the legal limits, but this could have been done 
without their being allowed a new role in operational decision-making. The third hypothesis 
33Author's interview with Reisner on 24`h May 2009 at the Kind David Hotel Jerusalem. 
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suggests that the increased legal involvement in operational matters was not just the result of 
a more challenging operational environment, but also a response to a more rigorous legal 
environment. The Israeli Supreme Court had already demonstrated an increasing willingness 
to regulate the actions of the military in the occupied Territories and the government and the 
military must have anticipated that an unprecedented use of military force would lead to 
further legal challenge- not least to the policy of targeted killing. The fact that the case 
against the policy was before the court for years can only have served as a spur to further 
legal involvement. The danger of legal proceedings outside the country would have been 
readily apparent following the Sharon case in Belgium but in 2000 the threat of the universal 
jurisdiction had not yet become a major concern. To be sure, it was to grow during the 
intifada and has been a powerful response to the Shehadeh case. As such it can be argued that 
the permissive approach adopted by the lawyers failed to protect the military and political 
elites from the risk of personal legal proceedings for war crimes, ironically thereby producing 
a demand for greater rather than lesser legal involvement. As far as the greater use of 
international humanitarian law as a measure of the legitimacy of military operations is 
concerned, the evidence presented in this case study does not advance the argument, possibly 
because in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the constraints of a legal humanitarian discourse 
were, for a time, displaced by the perceived need to strike back at terror and a discourse of 
American frontier justice. 
In summary, the greater legal involvement in operational matters coincided with a major shift 
in the legal paradigm applied by Israel to combat a Palestinian insurgency. This took place in 
challenging operational and legal environments. The case study presents strong evidence in 
support of the hypotheses that the lawyers chose legal advice that was permissive and that 
reflected a post 9/11 consensus position among states fighting a war on terror. Their initial 
involvement in operational matters reflected a belief that law mattered, if only because of the 
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expected rush of domestic legal challenges to Israeli military operations. It seems likely that 
the threat of prosecutions abroad under the universal jurisdiction played some part but there is 
no evidence that this was a major concern at the beginning of the intifada. However, it is 
likely that it became so in the aftermath of the Shehadeh operation, which drew fierce 
international condemnation. The analysis has not revealed that the increasing use of 
humanitarian law as a measure of the legitimacy of military action was a major factor. 
210 
Chapter 7: Case Study 2: The 2006 Lebanon War 
1) Introduction 
This case study examines the role of the IDF lawyers in the Second Lebanon War, which lasted 
from 12 July 2006 until 14 August 2006. The significance of the study lies in the fact that this 
was the first time that the military lawyers have been involved in wartime operational decision- 
making. This involvement coincided with a change in strategic thinking that saw Israel attempt 
to win a war without the major deployment of ground troops. Instead, there was a sustained 
aerial campaign against Hezbollah targets and Lebanese infrastructure'. In these circumstances 
the military lawyers were, for the first time, routinely involved in significant categories of target 
selection and had the opportunity to veto operations that contravened international humanitarian 
law. 
The argument will be made that, an examination of the targeting of the Lebanese infrastructure, 
the Shiite Dahiyeh section of southern Beirut and villages in Southern Lebanon shows that the 
IDL lawyers adopted a permissive view of the law that enabled Israel to target Hezbollah 
fighters and rocket launchers embedded among Lebanese civilians without risking the lives of 
its soldiers in potentially costly ground operations. This choice of a more permissive form of 
international humanitarian law, which was based on an optimistic view of the effectiveness of 
warnings, met the needs of the military by reducing the risk of IDF casualties. However, the 
consequent damage to Shiite villages, Shiite sections of Beirut and the Lebanese infrastructure 
became the focus of UN and international NGOs allegations of war crimes that challenged the 
legitimacy of the war itself. It will be argued that in the aftermath of the war the legal discourse 
1 See, Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon, (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) and Avi Kobar, `The Second Lebanon War', The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic 
Studies, Perspectives Paper No. 22,28 September 2006. 
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became central to Israel's defence of its campaign and the lawyers now played an unprecedented 
international role in defending the legitimacy of the war. 
2) The Israeli conduct of the war. 
The war was precipitated on 12 July by Hezbollah, whose fighters crossed the border into Israel, 
killing three IDF soldiers and taking two captured IDF soldiers back into Lebanon. The attack 
also featured rocket fire into Northern Israel. The immediate Israeli attempt to recover its 
soldiers resulted in humiliation, with the loss of a tank to a landmine, killing three of its crew 
and injuring a forth. The IDF lost a further soldier in a follow up operation to recover the 
casualties. In the aftermath of the failed attempt to recover the kidnapped soldiers, Israel 
launched a full-scale military offensive apparently designed to restore Israel's deterrence 
capability. In fact, the Winograd Commission, which was established in the aftermath of the war 
to investigate Israel's military and intelligence failings, is highly critical of the Government's 
failure establish clear war aims2. It seems that the military campaign was designed to weaken 
Hezbollah, destroy its offensive capability in Southern Lebanon and encourage the Lebanese 
government to assume control. How this was to be achieved was a matter of constant debate 
with Chief of Staff Halutz calling most of the shots. Halutz's stated aim of relying on air 
superiority to destroy the Lebanese infrastructure as a means of pressurising Lebanon's 
government into acting against Hezbollah was constrained by opposition from Prime Minister 
Olmert who had been informed of Washington's veto3. Indeed, Israel denies that punishment 
was the intention; rather, this was an Israeli variant of the American effects-based operation 
2 The Winograd Commission official site including the report and testimony (in Hebrew) can be accessed at 
h ttp: //www. vaadatwino. ore. il/statements. htnil#null. (Last accessed 4 Febuary 2011). 
Uri Bar-Joseph, `The Hubris of Initial Victory: The IDF and the Second Lebanon war', in Clive Jones (ed. ) 
The Israel-Lebanese Conflict: an Interstate and Asymmetric War in Perspective, (Abingdon : Routledge, 2010), 
pp. 147-163. 
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(EBO) that sees the enemy as a system with vulnerable nodes and uses stand-off firepower to 
bring about cumulative effects that produce cognitive-strategic collapse4. 
Israel's initial response was Operation Specific Gravity, which had been planned well in 
advance and was the highly successful targeting of Hezbollah's Fajr missile facility in the early 
hours of 13 July. The attack destroyed a significant proportion of Hezbollah's Iranian-made 
s intermediate range rockets. The operation was the product of excellent intelligence and marks 
the high point of Israel's campaign. In the first three days the Israeli Air Force destroyed most of 
its pre-planned Hezbollah targets, including arms and rocket storage locations in Lebanese 
villages, Beirut international airport and Hezbollah's Beirut headquarters. The IDF responded to 
Hezbolla's multiple rocket launchings with air and artillery strikes, having issued warnings to 
the civilian population to leave the area south of the Litani River. Communications routes to the 
north were cut with bridges destroyed although Israel maintains that it kept open a safe route for 
refugees to escape the fighting. Israel repeatedly targeted the Shiite Dahiyeh section of Southern 
Beirut, which was the centre of Hezbollah activities in the city, and included its political offices, 
homes of its leaders and the Hezbollah's TV station (Al-Manar). However, Hezbollah's 
diversified command structure, the enormous number of short range rockets available to 
Hezbollah and the ease of movement of their launchers, meant that it was very difficult for the 
IDF to prevent Hezbollah from maintaining a steady rate of fire of short range rockets into 
Northern Israel. 
° For a comprehensive Israeli analysis see, Ron Tira, 'The Limitations of Standoff Firepower-Based 
Operations: On Standoff Warfare, Manoeuvre, and Decision', Institute for National security Studies, 
Memorandum 89, March 2007, available at, httl2: //www. inss. ora. il/upload/(FILE)1188302040. pd f (Last 
accessed 10/12/2010) 
5 The IAF are believed to have destroyed most of the 150- km-range Zelazal 1 launchers and rockets as well as 
about 500 Fajrs. 
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The war soon became defined in terms of Hezbollah's rocket campaign against Israel6. 
Operation Specific Gravity had apparently neutralised the threat from the Iranian long-range 
missiles that were capable of hitting nearly every major Israeli city7. The remainder of the 
conflict, with the exception of the long-postponed and largely ineffectual ground campaign, 
amounted to, `a slugging match between the Hezbollah's rocket teams and the IDF's airmen 
and soldiers. The IDF employed artillery, special forces, and manned and unmanned aircraft 
in an effort to suppress the rocket fire'8. There was extensive use of highly skilled special 
forces who were tasked to work closely with the air force9. The strategy was to use small 
specialist units acting independently to apply network-centric tactics designed to expose the 
rocket launchers to aerial attack. This was linked to the idea of controlling rather than 
capturing territory. 
Israel made extensive use of warnings to clear the battlefield of civilians10. Warnings were 
frequently given to villagers to evacuate before attacks and the whole population living south 
of the Litani River was directed to move north, while residents of Dahiyeh were advised to 
move out of the quarter. These warnings were given by fliers dropped from aircraft, radio 
broadcasts in Arabic from Israel and direct telephone calls to local civic leaders. 
Israel had invested heavily in launcher-hunting strategies, employing quick response 
technologies that destroyed a launcher within one minute of its detection. However, it appears 
that Israeli technology was countered successfully by the simple tactic of treating the 
6 For a comprehensive influential analysis of the campaign and Israel's strategic response see, Uzi Rubin, 'The 
Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War', The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic studies, 
Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 71. 
7 It is generally accepted that not all of the missiles were destroyed and there is no definitive explanation for 
their non-deployment (with the possible exception of one failed launch). For an argument that Hezbollah did not 
have the Iranian authorisation to use the undamaged remnants of the arsenal see, Rubin, `The Rocket 
Campaign', pp. 5-7. 
8 Rubin, `The Rocket Campaign', p. 19. 
9 See Avi Kober, `The Second Lebanon War', BESA Perspectives Papers on Current Affairs, Perspectives 22, 
28 September 2006 available at, http: //www. biu. ac. il/Besa/perspectives22. html. (Last accessed 7/311) 
10 As required by Protocol 1, article 57(2)(c). 
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launchers as disposable. Throughout the war Hezbollah demonstrated a capacity to maintain 
and even increase the rate of its rocket fire directed towards Israel's northern population 
centres; this single statistic is widely seen as the measure of the failure of Israeli strategy. 
The IDF did not deploy significant land forces until 23 July where their performance in 
Southern Lebanon has attracted much Israeli criticism 1. While there are several structural 
reasons for the poor performance of the IDF ground forces, it is the reluctance with which 
they were deployed that is particularly relevant to this case study. As has previously been 
noted in chapter one, Yagil Levy has charted the decline in the republican ideal and the 
emergence of aggressive liberalism in Israeli society that has resulted in a reluctance to make 
individual sacrifice for the benefit of the state. This means that, in Levy's contractual 
analysis, Israeli soldiers and their wider society expect more of the army in return for their 
service and that chief among these expectations is the protection of the lives of Israeli 
soldiers. These demands are given purchase within Israel's democratic political system by a 
clear understanding among the political and military elite that the Israeli public will not long 
countenance a military campaign that involves significant Israeli losses. This phenomenon is 
at first sight counter-intuitive to those who see Israeli society as heavily militarised, where as 
Kimmerling observed military solutions are habitually sought to non-military problems. 12 In 
fact it simply translates to a tendency to expect military solutions that do not cost the lives of 
Israeli soldiers. This produces, in Edward Lutwak's terms, a `post-heroic' style of conflict 
where force protection structures strategy. 13 
11 Israel deployed about 30,000 troops according to, `The War in Numbers', Jane's Defense weekly, 23 August 
2006. 
12 Kimmerling's scholarship was discussed at length in chapter one. 
13 Edward Luttwak, `Toward post-heroic warfare', Foreign Affairs, May 1995. Vol. 74, Iss. 3; pp. 109-133 and 
Clive Jones, `The Writing on the Wall: Israel, the Security Barrier and the Future of Zionism', Mediterranean 
Politics, Volume 14, Number 1, March 2009, pp. 3-20. 
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In Israel, this popular position is informed by competing ethical frameworks but is given 
particular support by the work of Kasher and Yadlin14. As has previously been noted, they 
contest the ethical space to promote an understanding of Just War military ethics that uses 
social contract theory to challenge the belief that `our' soldiers should be exposed to risk of 
death to reduce harm to `their' civilians. A second limb of this ethical approach is particularly 
capable of wider popular dissemination; this is the idea that combatants who hide among 
civilians and conduct their attacks from behind human shields should not be immune from 
attack. The contrary argument is seen as denying Israel the right of self-defence against 
terrorism. Furthermore, the increased civilian casualties are the responsibility of the terrorists 
not Israel. 
As was noted in chapters three and four, mainstream Just War doctrine and IHL agree that 
civilian protection does not depend on reciprocity. The fact that one party to a military 
conflict deliberately targets civilians does not entitle the other to do so. However, there is an 
emerging position that distinguishes the intentional targeting of civilians from shielding 
combatants behind their own civilians. It is not a matter of targeting Lebanese villages 
because Hezbollah targets Israeli villages, rather an acceptance of a mixed civilian and 
combatant battlefield. In such circumstances distinction and proportionality are not to be 
abandoned, but the mounting civilian body count is the responsibility of their own side. 
Adopting this ethical position conditioned the Israeli popular culture to expect high civilian 
casualties from its aerial response to Hezbollah rocket fire from or near to Lebanese villages 
or, indeed UN positions. 
14 Asa Kasher, `A Moral Evaluation of the Gaza War- Operation cast Lead', Jerusalem Centre for Public 
Affairs, Jerusalem Issue Brief, vol. 9, no. 18,4 February 2010. Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin, 'Assassination 
and Preventive Killing', SAIS Review, Volume 25, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2005, pp. 41-57. Asa Kasher and 
Amos Yadlin, 'Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective', Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 4, 
2005, pp. 3-32. Asa Kasher and Amos Yadin, `Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: Principles', Philosophia, Vol. 
34,2006, pp. 75-84. Asa Kasher, and Amos Yadin, 'Israel and the Rules of War: An Exchange', New York 
Review of Books, June 11,2009. Asa Kasher, The Gaza Campaign and the Ethics of Just War, Azure, autumn 
2009, no. 38, pp. 1-1 1. 
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As was observed in chapter three, the balancing of civilian harm and military efficiency that 
is at the heart of IHL, produces a flexibility of approach that is often seen as legal imprecision 
or grey areas that enable military practice to vary with the prevailing ethics and their political 
manifestations. It is clear that force protection is a military objective in itself. It will be 
recalled that the ICTY accepted the legality of NATO high level bombing designed to protect 
its own airmen even though this resulted in increased civilian casualties15. This enables 
Amichai Cohen to argue that proportionality should be a less stringent constraint where the 
enemy is hiding among its own civilians. 16 Whether this requires a different formulation of 
the proportionality principle or whether a commander is better placed to push it to the limits 
or is entitled to some sort of benefit of the doubt, are all legal strategies to accommodate an 
ethical position that seeks to share if not shift the blame. This legal approach to targeting 
decisions would certainly reinforce a tendency towards a post-heroic style of conflict that 
would accept collateral civilian deaths to immediate artillery and IDA response to rockets 
launched from the vicinity of Lebanese villages, rather than risk the deployment of ground 
forces to clear the region. 
While much has been written about Israel's failure to destroy Hezbollah's capability to 
maintain its rocket attacks on Israel throughout the war, little attention has been given to the 
strategy of destroying the Lebanese infrastructure. If is accepted that Israel does not have a 
military answer to Hezbollah's rocketry other than politically unacceptable ground attacks, it 
seems likely that in the next war there will be an even greater concentration of fire on the 
Lebanese infrastructure. Indeed, this is exactly the thesis of influential Major General (ret. ) 
Giora Eiland who paints a chilling picture of the next Lebanon war, 
15 'Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 I. L. M. 1257 (2000). For an alternative view see, Amnesty International, 
'NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 'Collateral Damage' or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Law of War by 
NATO during Operation Allied Force', (6 June, 2000) (Available at http: //www. amnesty. org) 
16 Cohen, Amichai. 'Proportionality in Modern Asymmetrical Wars', Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, 2010, 
available at, http: //www. icpa. org/texyproportionality_pdf. (Last accessed 7/3/11). 
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Such a war will lead to the elimination of the Lebanese military, the destruction of the 
national infrastructure, and intense suffering among the population. There will be no 
recurrence of the situation where Beirut residents (not including the Dahiya quarter) go to the 
beach and cafes while Haifa residents sit in bomb shelters. Serious damage to the Republic of 
Lebanon, the destruction of homes and infrastructure, and the suffering of hundreds of 
thousands of people are consequences that can influence Hezbollah's behaviour more than 
anything else. ' 17 
This is not to say that Israel did not attack Lebanese infrastructure targets during the 2006 
war. There was substantial targeting of the Lebanese infrastructure including roads, bridges, 
Beirut airport, the fuel storage tanks of the Jiyyeh power station and numerous factories. In 
fact, the damage to the Lebanese infrastructure would have been far more extensive had the 
US not placed limitations on the extent of the damage to be inflicted on Lebanon's 
democratic government. 
The twin strategies of directly smashing Hezbollah's offensive capabilities and indirectly 
constraining Hezbollah by coercing the Lebanese people and their government meant that 
Israel characterised the war as a war against Lebanon rather than a war or military campaign 
against Hezbollah. Hezbollah's minority presence in the Lebanese government reinforced the 
conflation of Hezbollah and Lebanese responsibility for the attacks on Northern Israel and the 
understanding of the war as an interstate conflict, while at the same time allowing the enemy 
to be targeted both as a non-state actor and as a government that was failing to control its own 
population. 
This was the military and ethical context of operational decision-making during the Second 
Lebanon War. Hezbollah had made no secret of its intention to kidnap Israeli soldiers or its 
stockpiling of missiles. Israel's response comprised attacks that had been pre-planned. Given 
that this was to be the first war that the IDF lawyers were to play a major part in, there was 
17 Giora Eiland, `The Third Lebanon War: Target Lebanon', Strategic Assessment, 11/2, November 2008, p16. 
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the opportunity for an unprecedented application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to 
the targeting decision making process. 
3) The involvement of the lawyers 
As was discussed in Case Study one The Second Intifada, the IDF lawyers had become 
involved in operational decision-making during the Second Intifada. The development that 
now took place was the operational involvement of lawyers in the 2006 Lebanon War. 
According to Pnina Sharvit-Baruch, who in 2004 had taken over from Reisner as head of the 
IDL, during that war her department had legal advisors sitting in at headquarters forums and 
at Northern Command. On the outbreak of hostilities, a team from the IDL had reinforced the 
Northern Command lawyer. Operating at Headquarters and Command level, the IDL lawyers 
were directly involved in approval of target selection. This included advance target selection 
and sitting in the targeting cells (operational decision-making rooms) reviewing target and 
munitions selection. However, the lawyers were normally out of the loop when it came to 
artillery or air support, when it was called in response to enemy fire or targets of opportunity. 
According to IDL sources, this explains why the initial decision to fire cluster bombs was 
taken by artillery batteries without prior IDL consultation, although the department defends 
the legality of their use. 
The choice of targets, munitions and rules of engagement had all been worked out well before 
the start of hostilities. The lawyers had played their part in the selection of banks of targets in 
the military planning stage before the war. Once hostilities had begun decisions were made 
on a daily basis concerning which targets should be selected from the bank and when they 
should be attacked. Updated intelligence was used. This included targets that had become 
apparent during operations and had not yet been attacked. Sharvit-Baruch confirms that the 
219 
lawyers were reviewing the targets to confirm that the principles of distinction and 
proportionality are being observed: 
The lawyer will mainly be discussing the legal aspects of the target to be attacked; here we 
are considering the principal of distinction. In our operations we are frequently dealing with 
civilian areas that are being used for military operations. When operating against the 
Palestinians and also the Hezbollah it is rare to have purely military targets. We must see 
whether somewhere indeed has lost civilian status and become a lawful target. This involves 
the consideration of what use is being made of the target building or area. Then there is a 
further consideration. This is the question of proportionality. Here the whole analysis is made 
on the basis of the information you have available at the time of making the decision. The 
proportionality and the precautions will include questions of when to attack- in the night or in 
the day. There are questions of what size of bomb to use to cause the minimum collateral 
damage and then the decision as to who is to carry out the attack the next day. It is usually the 
air force. 
During the Lebanon War the lawyers operated at Headquarters and at the Northern 
Command centre but not at Divisional level. However, since this was mainly an air assault 
and the majority of the decisions were made in advance. However, Sharvit-Baruch 
acknowledges that lawyers were not involved in the short cycle targeting; these are situations 
where Hezbollah may be shelling IDF troops who have called in air or artillery support. 
Equally, it may be that a target has been spotted that is thought to be too good to miss. 
Sharvit-Baruch gives the example of a truck that was thought to be carrying rockets although 
it in fact turned out to be transporting gas cylinders. 
Lawyers were closely involved in drafting the rules of engagement, which remain classified. 
In addition, the IDL claims credit for the widespread use of warning leaflets that were used to 
clear the battlefield of civilians. Both Reisner and Sharvit-Baruch maintain that their advice is 
backed up by the Judge Advocate General and that commanders who have failed to observe 
the IDL's veto have been denied career advancement. While both claim to have on occasions 
prevented attacks and required changes in military plans, they are unable to divulge details. 
Consequently, in order to gain some insight into the IDL's legal role in the 2006 War it is 
necessary to look at those IDF military operations that would have been vetted in advance by 
the military lawyers and the legal controversies that they caused. 
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4) The legal controversies: Soares, Amnesty and the Israeli legal defence 
`Legal controversy' is used in the present discussion in its general rather than legal sense to 
mean a prolonged public dispute about the legality of Israeli operations. The purpose of the 
examination is not to establish whether or not the operations were lawful per se. Rather, the 
examination, which is limited to those operations that would have been reviewed in advance 
by the IDL, is designed to allow conclusions to be drawn about the advice that the lawyers 
must have given the military. The value of the conclusions relies on the research gathered in 
the course of this thesis, which states that the lawyers had a veto over operations that they 
regarded as being unlawful. 
The legal basis for states to use military force in response to attack relies on Article 51 of the 
UN Charter. This right was traditionally understood as the right of a state to self-defence in 
response to an attack by another state'8. The Articles on State Responsibility set out the 
circumstances in which a state is responsible for military action. This is not the place for a 
full consideration of the issues but Lebanon's responsibility for the attack can be located in 
the repeated Security Council demands for Lebanon to take control of its territory bordering 
with Israel. As far as Hezbollah is concerned, the right of self-defence against non-state 
actors has emerged through state practice following 9/11 and the Security Council resolutions 
authorising state action19. This legal framework is not controversial and allows the normal 
rules of IHL to be applied to the conflict20. 
18 It was not 25 March 2007 that Israel decided that there had been a `war' and called the conflict `The Second 
Lebanon War'. 
19 S/RES/1368(2001) and S/RES/1373(2001) 
20 For a detailed discussion see, Andreas Zimmermann, `The Second Lebanon War: Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello 
and the Issue of Proportionality, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 11,2007, p. 104-118. 
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At the jus ad bellum level of analysis, as was discussed in chapter three, the legal military 
response to aggression must be defensive and proportionate. It is accepted that the level of 
defensive violence is calibrated to stop the attack may be at the level of destroying the 
aggressor's capacity to continue the conflict. Nevertheless, the intent must not be one of 
punishment or reprisa121. It is clear that the Hezbollah attack was sufficiently serious to entitle 
Israel to mount a military response under Article 51. Since Hezbollah's command structure was 
located in Beirut and its resupply routes were through Syria in the north, proportionality did not 
require military operations to be confined to the Hezbollah heartland of the south. 
The findings of the Winograd Report into the conduct of the war confirm that PM Olmert and 
Defence Minister Peretz were heavily influenced by the military strategy promoted by Chief of 
Staff Halutz, which relied on the IAF to stop the rockets and coercion of Siniora's Lebanese 
government to bring about change in the strategic environment. On 4 August Halutz said in a 
discussion at the GHQ, `I think that we should destroy Lebanon, threaten with the destruction of 
Lebanon and bring it to the dark and stone age- with no water, no electricity, no oil, no roads, no 
government institutions, nothing'22. This is perhaps an unfortunate formulation of the American 
effects based strategy that had gained currency in the IAF in the decade preceding the war. 
Compliance with IHL requires that civilian harm is unintended. Put simply, the strategy calls for 
the targeting of military and dual use targets to produce a cumulative dysfunction of the 
opposing military rather than the capturing and holding of territory. The effect on civilian 
consciousness is represented as an unintended consequence23. 
21 For a detailed discussion see, Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States, 
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
22 Quoted in Bar-Joseph, 'The Hubris of Initial Victory'. 
23 This manifestation of the Doctrine of Double Effect was discussed in detail in chapter 3 and appears in this 
context as a particularly obvious hypocrisy. 
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The UN Human Rights Council Commission of Enquiry on Lebanon published its report on 
23 November 2006 24 (the Soares Report) amounts to a damning legal critique of Israel's 
conduct of the war. The Commission was headed by Joao Clemente Baena Soares a Brazilian 
diplomat, Stelios Perrakis a Greek professor of international law and Mohamed Chande 
Othman a Tanzanian judge. The mandate was to investigate Israeli actions alone and is 
expressed in terms that prejudge Israeli guilt including the `systematic targeting and killing of 
civilians by Israel in Lebanon'25. The Israeli response was to refuse to co-operate with the 
commission, providing only general legal justifications and refusing to make available 
intelligence reports that may or may not have justified its operational decision-making. The 
effort to block the enquiry through non-cooperation failed and, as was to be expected, the 
report is a savage indictment of the Israeli conduct of the war. It is instructive to look at the 
findings in some detail to gain a critical legal perspective of the operations approved by the 
IDL. 
The report expressed particular concern with the extent of the damage to the Lebanese 
infrastructure, 
(20) During the conflict, major damage was inflicted on civilian infrastructure, including 
critical infrastructure. According to the Government of Lebanon, 32 "vital points" were 
targeted by IDF, 109 bridges and 137 roads damaged. The destruction of the land 
transportation network had a huge impact on humanitarian assistance and on the free 
movement of displaced civilians. Housing, water facilities, schools, medical facilities, 
numerous mosques and churches, TV and radio transmission stations, historical, 
archaeological and cultural sites also suffered massive damage. The economic infrastructure 
was targeted by aerial bombardment and 127 factories were hit by IDF strikes. In addition, 
agriculture and tourism were particularly hit. The Commission considers that it will take years 
for Lebanon, with the help of the international community, to be able to rebuild all the 
damaged buildings and other facilities. In the meantime, solutions must be found for the 
civilian population to see their human rights, in particular their right to adequate housing and 
to the highest attainable standard of health, respected. 
24 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human 
Rights Council resolution S-2/1 *, A/HRC/3/2,23 November 2006, available at, 
www2. ohchr. org/english/bodies/hrcounciVdocs/... /A. HRC. 3.2. pdf. [Last accessed 11 March 2011]. 
75 HRC resolution S-2/1 
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(21) Israel justified its attacks on the civilian infrastructure by arguing its hypothetical use by 
Hezbollah. The Commission appreciates that some infrastructure may have had "dual use" but 
this argument cannot be put forward for each individual object directly hit during this conflict. 
By using this argument, IDF effectively changed the status of all civilian objects by alleging 
that they might be used by Hezbollah. Further, the Commission is convinced that damage 
inflicted on some infrastructure was done for the sake of destruction. 
The report can be criticized for adopting a broad brush approach since the legality of attacks 
needs to be examined on a case by case basis that considers whether the requirements of 
distinction necessity and proportionality have been met. The specific findings are, 
(320) All attacks on civilian infrastructure, including roads, bridges, airport and ports, water 
facilities, factories, farms and shops, in particular far from the confrontations in the South, 
even in cases of "dual use", cannot be justified in each instance under military necessity and 
was disproportionate to the military advantage they provided. They constitute a violation of 
Israel's obligations under international humanitarian law to distinguish between military 
targets and civilian objects. 
On specific issues, the commission found that the attacks on the airport and the TV and radio 
stations to be attacks on civilian objects. In doing so the commission rejected Israeli 
arguments that the TV station and the airport were dual use targets and that the attacks were 
necessary. 
The report was particularly critical of the bombing of the Jiyyeh power station, which took 
place on 13 July and again on 15 July. The facility is located on the coast some 30 km south 
of Beirut. The attack was on the storage tanks, which collapsed spilling between 
10000and15000 tons of oil into the Mediterranean causing a 10 km oil slick that polluted 
170km of coastline. 
(23) The Commission considered the devastating effect the oil spill from the bombing of the 
Jiyyeh power plant has had and will continue to have in the years to come. The Commission 
is convinced that this attack was premeditated. The spill affected two thirds of Lebanon's 
coastline. IDF's failure to take the necessary precautionary measures violated Israel's 
obligations to protect the natural environment and the right to health. In particular it caused 
significant damage to the Byblos archaeological site, included in the UNESCO World 
Heritage list. 
224 
The report finds that the attack was disproportionate and in breach of Article 35(3) of 
Additional Protocol 1 that prohibits attacks that can be expected to cause widespread, long- 
term and severe damage to the natural environment. 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) is also severely critical of Israel's broad definition of legitimate 
Hezbollah targets and provides another critical perspective on the legality of the Israeli 
operations. The September 2007 HRW report, Why They Died; Civilian Casualties in 
Lebanon during the 2006 War26, examines the Israeli conduct of the war, and finds that Israel 
breached the requirements of distinction by assuming that anyone associated with Hezbollah 
was a combatant, 
Israel's broad definition of legitimate Hezbollah targets is particularly evident in the pattern 
of attacks on the densely populated southern suburb of Beirut, Dahieh. In their attacks on this 
largely Shiite district of high-rise apartment buildings, Israeli forces attacked not only 
Hezbollah military targets but also the offices of Hezbollah's charitable organizations, the 
offices of its parliamentarians, its research center, and multi-story residential apartment 
buildings in areas considered supportive of Hezbollah. Human Rights Watch research did 
establish that Hezbollah maintained a weapon storage facility in at least one civilian 
apartment building in the Dahieh, and that armed Hezbollah fighters sheltered together with 
civilians in at least one civilian basement in the Dahieh, but did not find widespread evidence 
of such unlawful Hezbollah practices which would have justified the extent of Israeli 
bombardment of this civilian area . 
The report highlights the targeting of the Al-Manar TV station, arguing that the dissemination 
of Hezbollah propaganda did not make it a dual use target, and that the attack was unlawful. 
Adopting a similar perspective to that of the Soares Report, HRW criticizes the attacks on 
Southern Beirut: 
Statements by Israeli officials strongly suggest that the massive IDF attacks in southern Beirut 
were carried out not against Hezbollah military targets, as required by the laws of war, but 
rather against entire neighborhoods because they were seen as pro-Hezbollah. Some 
statements by Israeli officials, including Israel's Defense Minister Amir Peretz and the IDF 
chief of staff Dan Halutz, suggest that some of the attacks on southern Beirut may have been 
28 unlawful retaliation for Hezbollah attacks against Israel. 
26 Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, February 2000, Vol. 12, No. I (D). 
Available at http: //www. hrw. org/legacy/reports/2000/nato/. [Last accessed 11 March 2011]. 
27Ibid, p. 74. 
28 Why They Died, p. 10. 
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Another area of severe criticism is the intense use of cluster munitions in the final days of the 
conflict that left unexploded ordinance in the fields of southern Lebanon. 
The Human Rights Watch report focuses on specific instances of Israeli attacks that involved 
civilian casualties. The report links Israel's reliance on warnings to civilians, damage to the 
civilian infrastructure and attacks on village locations to account for loss of civilian life, 
Our research into more than 94 attacks shows that Israel often, even though not deliberately 
attacking civilians, did not distinguish between military objectives and civilians or civilian 
objects as required by humanitarian law. The chief cause of this wrongful and deadly 
selection of targets was Israel's assumption that Lebanese civilians had observed its warnings 
to evacuate all villages south of the Litani River, and thus that no civilians remained there. As 
a result, Israel targeted any person or vehicle south of the Litani River on the grounds that 
they were part of the Hezbollah military apparatus. Israel also engaged in widespread 
bombardment of civilian areas that was indiscriminate, which endangered many of the 
civilians who had remained behind. In addition, in the Dahieh section of southern Beirut, this 
danger of this presumption was compounded by the Israeli tendency to treat all people and 
buildings associated with Hezbollah, however vaguely, as legitimate military targets. 
The HRW findings paint a picture of ineffective warnings to civilians that led to Israel 
adopting a false presumption that there were no civilians in the area and that the IDF was 
operating in a free fire zone29. 
The official Israeli response to these allegations, promoted by the Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs30, can be summarised as: Israel was acting in self-defence, Hezbollah was using 
Lebanese civilians and their property as shields31, Israel targeted only military objects and 
any civilian damage was proportionate in terms of the intelligence available at the time. The 
29 Why They Died, pp. 63-66 
30 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Preserving Humanitarian Principles While Combating Terrorism: Israel's 
Struggle with Hizbullah in the Lebanon War, 1 April 2007, available at, 
http: //www. mfa. gov. il/NR/rdon lyres/74D04C9D-FA73-4A54-8CBA-BCB 11 52C82E/0/DiplomaticNotcsO l . pdf. 
[Last accessed 7/3/11]. 
31 See, Reuven Erlich, `Hezbollah's use of Lebanese civilians as human shields: the extensive military 
infrastructure positioned and hidden in populated areas', Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the 
Center for Special Studies, November 2006, available at, httn: //www. terrorism- 
info. org. il/malam_multimedia/En lish/eng_n/pdt7human shields. pdt. (Last accessed 7/3111). 
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crux of the Israeli defence of its targeting lies in its assertion of the right to attack Hezbollah 
operatives embedded in civilian towns and villages where civilians have been warned by the 
IDF to leave. 
The fundamental IHL principle of distinction limits lawful targeting to military objects. 
Article 52(2) Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, defines military objectives as, 
`those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution 
to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage'. As was noted in 
chapter three, the concept of `dual-use' objects highlights the breadth of the definition. 
Civilian structures, even hospitals and mosques become lawful military targets when 
munitions are stored or fired from there. Hence, Israel was anxious to explain civilian damage 
to Shiite villages of southern Lebanon in terms of rocket storage and launch, either in or close 
to civilian areas, with Hezbollah not Israel bearing the responsibility for civilian harm. 
Conscious that there is a fine line between blaming Hezbollah and admitting callous 
disregard for the consequences of targeting embedded combatants, Israel made clear its 
commitment to proportionality, 
However, it is the IDF's position that the callous disregard of those who hide behind civilians 
does not absolve the state seeking to respond to such attacks of the responsibility to avoid or 
at least minimize injury to civilians and their property in the course of its operations. In 
32 particular this raises the complex issue of proportionality. 
Israel maintains that, 
Notwithstanding the above, it should be noted that even when civilians were in the vicinity of 
military objectives, Israel made significant efforts to avoid, and in any event to minimize, 
civilian casualties. Every operation was considered on an individual basis to ensure that it met 
the requirements of international law, including the test of proportionality. Frequently, this 
meant the rejection of proposed military operations when the likelihood of collateral damage 
to civilians and their property was considered too high. On other occasions, it meant that 
operations were conducted in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of incidental damage, in 
terms of the timing or operational aspects of the attack. Finally, whenever possible without 
jeopardizing the operation, Israel issued advance notice to the local residents through various 
media, including dropping leaflets, radio broadcasts and contacts with local leaders, to 
32 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Preserving Humanitarian Principles, p. 5 
227 
distance themselves from areas in which Hizbullah was operating and from places in which 
33 its weaponry was being stored 
The Israeli Ministry of foreign affairs has released videos and photos of missile launches 
from Lebanese villages and the Israel based Terrorism Information Centre34 has released a 
raft of data showing Hezbollah operating from civilian areas. However, the stated precautions 
are difficult to reconcile with the well publicised fact that the Israeli response to a detected 
rocket launch was no more than one minute3s 
Jerusalem has also been keen to distance the legal analysis of the infrastructure targeting from 
any suggestion that Israel acted with the intention of punishing the civilian population of 
Lebanon for its government's failure to disarm Hezbollah. Inconvenient statements to the 
contrary by politicians and generals are to be regarded as posturing rather than statements of 
Israeli intent. Specifically, the allegations of indiscriminate destruction of Lebanon's 
industry, agriculture and essential services are denied. According to the Israeli Ministry of 
Foreign affairs, bridges and roads were only targeted to the extent that they contributed to 
Hezbollah's military operations. Since Hezbollah was understood to be transporting rockets 
and munitions throughout southern Lebanon and resupplying from Syria through the Beka'a 
valley, bridges and roads could be seen as of fundamental military importance and lawful 
targets, 
The guiding principle adopted by the IDF was to target only infrastructure that was making a 
significant contribution to the operational capabilities of the Hizbullah ter orists. This meant that, 
for the most part, Israeli attacks were limited to the transportation infrastructure. Most of the 
other infrastructure (medical, cultural, railroad, tunnels, ports, banking, manufacturing, farming, 
tourism, sewage, financial, electricity, drainage, water and the like) was left almost completely 
36 untouched. 
33lsrael Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Preserving Humanitarian Principles, p. 6. 
34 Erlich, `Hezbollah's use of Lebanese civilians'. 
35 Erlich, `Hezbollah's use of Lebanese civilians'. 
36lsrael Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Preserving Humanitarian Principles, p. 6 
228 
Israel's defends the allegation that Beirut international airport was a civilian target with the 
argument that Israel only destroyed the runways and not the facilities and that the attack was 
necessary to prevent the resupply of Hezbollah's arsenal. The attack on Al Manar TV station 
is seen as lawful because it was the Hezbollah television station and `was used to relay 
messages to terrorists and to incite acts of terrorism'. Fuel reserves were targeted because 
terrorists cannot operate without a regular supply of fuel. The attack on the power station is 
justified in terms of its production of electricity for military consumption and Israel eased its 
naval blockade to allow treatment of the oil spill. The use of cluster bombs in agricultural 
areas of southern Lebanon was a lawful and proportionate response to the rocket launching in 
open areas. 
The Israeli narrative of the war weaves together the war against Lebanon with the war against 
Hezbollah terrorists and blurs the distinction between Hezbollah and Lebanese civilians, 
particularly Shiite civilians. As a terrorist organisation rather than a military force in service 
of a civil administration, there is no distinction between the civil and military so that both 
become lawful military targets. This means that the targeting of Hezbollah's administrative 
infrastructure and personnel in Beirut becomes a lawful military operation facilitated by a 
belief that all civilian personnel have fled in response to Israeli warnings. This legal frame 
work enables the construction of a permissive legal view of what constitutes a military object 
and who is a civilian, let alone what is proportionate. This gives credence to the Human 
Rights Watch allegation that Israel's expansive view of Hezbollah led to a high incidence of 
civilian deaths. 
Analysis of the legal critiques that challenge and defend Israel's military operations show the 
debate framed in terms of rival understandings of what is required of a state military fighting 
non-state actors on foreign soil. The Israeli defence does not deny the application of the key 
provisions of IHL, rather there is a shifting of the balance between civilian protection and 
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military efficiency that is grounded in the use of warnings to the civilian population. In this 
context warnings are used to allow an assumption that people in the line of fire are 
combatants or voluntary human shields. To be sure the attacks on the infrastructure targets 
are controversial, but it is the assumption that civilians who have been warned and not moved 
away are combatants that is the real contribution of the Israeli military lawyers to targeting 
decisions and the subsequent defence of their legitimacy. 
5) Conclusion 
The Second Lebanon war was the first war in which the lawyers were closely involved in 
operational decision-making. The military strategy relied heavily on pre-selected banks of 
targets. This meant that many of the targeting decisions were made in advance and subject to 
a legal veto. It follows that the controversial decisions to attack the Dahiyeh quarter, of 
southern Beirut, Beirut airport, the Jiyyeh power station and the Lebanese infrastructure were 
approved by the lawyers. Likewise the strategic decision to respond to rocket activation with 
immediate fire and the targeting of suspected arms caches located in civilian buildings. An 
examination of these operations enables conclusions to be drawn about the legal position 
adopted by the IDL and whether the legal advisors functioned to constraining or enable the 
IDF. 
The political, ethical and military context for the construction of the IDF's legal advice 
demanded that the Israel be allowed to use sufficient military force to deter the Lebanese 
government by punishment and destroy Hezbollah's capacity to sustain a rocket barrage on 
Israel. These aims were to be achieved by post-heroic methods of warfare that did not cost 
the lives of Israeli soldiers. Crucially, Hezbollah was not to be allowed immunity from attack 
by strategies of concealment among civilians. If this resulted in civilian casualties, it was 
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Hezbollah's responsibility not Israel's. This was to be a war against terrorists in the context 
of a war against Lebanon. 
There is no dispute that the IHL principles of proportionality, distinction and military 
necessity apply to Israel's conduct of the war, whatever the target. The starting point of any 
analysis must be whether a target is a military object and it is only when this has been 
established that proportionality becomes relevant. The Soares and Human Rights Watch 
reports maintain that Israel deliberately attacked civilian targets. If they their legal analysis is 
accepted and not dismissed as the product of political bias, the IDF lawyers were either 
ignored or gave the wrong advice on what constituted a lawful attack. 
Assuming that Israel did not deliberately attack civilian Lebanese villagers, and given that 
civilian homes become military objects when used for military purposes, proportionality 
becomes the issue- specifically how it was applied when responding to a Hezbollah strategy of 
firing from among civilians. Once the war had begun, the Israeli political definition of success 
rapidly became the halting of rocket attacks without significant loss of Israeli lives. This 
demanded the destruction of Hezbollah's capabilities whether or not they were located in a 
civilian environment, even though immediate artillery response lacks accuracy. Could this be 
achieved by the proper application of the proportionality constraints of international 
humanitarian law? 
A balanced assessment of the legality of Israel's operations requires a close examination of each 
operation and access to detailed accounts of the events and the intelligence available at the time 
that the decision to attack was taken. In the absence of such information, conclusions are 
necessarily general and contingent. Nevertheless, it can be said that the legal imprecision, the 
grey area of legality in respect of both distinction and proportionality, allows conflicting legal 
conclusions to be drawn on the legality of particular operations. There were legal grounds that 
would have enabled the IDF lawyers to veto operations against the Lebanese infrastructure and 
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military targets located in civilian environs but the lawyers chose not to do so. Rather, they 
applied a permissive construction of international humanitarian law that relaxed the 
requirements of proportionality when dealing with `terrorists' fighting from among civilians, 
which enabled Israel to pursue post-heroic military strategies against a terrorist militia operating 
from a neighbouring state. This can be seen as a frame of legal analysis that had been developed 
by the IDF lawyers during the Second Intifada. It amounts to condoning operations against 
terrorists fighting from among their civilian host community that, in other circumstances, would 
be seen as a disproportionate use of force- a concept that has come to be popularly referred to in 
Israel as the `Dania doctrine'. The problem, of course, is that to get full deterrent value from the 
Dahia Doctrine, is to threaten a disproportionate military response to attack, or to quote Tzipi 
Livni, `going wild'37. This leaves the lawyers having to square the circle- explaining why a 
disproportionate response is not disproportionate and why they allowed it, which is exactly what 
the Israeli legal justifications are doing. The problem is more than semantics and amounts to a 
disconnection between the political and legal discourses. 
It follows that the IDF lawyers performed two functions during and after the war. Firstly, they 
constructed a permissive legal framework that allowed the military to conduct the war adopting 
a strategy that resulted in substantial civilian harm and secondly, they were deployed to 
legitimise the operations in legal terms by explaining why a disproportionate response to 
Hezbollah military provocation was proportionate. In so doing, they were continuing a process 
whereby, in Israel, law and morality combine to produce a powerful force for the legitimisation 
of the use of post-heroic military force against an opponent that conceals itself among its own 
civilians. 
37 Tzipi Livni's formulation has received much attention, `We have proven to Hamas that we have changed the 
equation. Israel is not a country upon which you fire missiles and it does not respond. It is a country that when 
you fire on its citizens it responds by going wild - and this is a good thing' and is quoted in the Goldstone 
Report at para. 1206. 
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In summary, the point to be emphasised is that the IDF lawyers appear to have given the military 
a free hand in the Second Lebanon war- not in terms of allowing the legally indefensible but 
rather by applying a construction of IHL that was designed to meet the needs of the military and 
provide a legal model for fighting Israel's modem wars. Perhaps it is instructive that the 
Winograd Commission, which was looking to criticise the legal involvement in the war, was 
unable to find any instance of the military complaining about legal interference in their plans38. 
Returning to the hypotheses, the case study provides support for the hypothesis that the IDF 
military lawyers exercise choice in the construction of their advice and apply a permissive 
construction of international humanitarian law to IDF targeting decision making. In the absence 
of general state condemnation of the war, it can be assumed that the legal constructions designed 
to allow military action against Hezbollah in Lebanon find favour with states fighting insurgents 
sheltering within sovereign territory. Research into state use of warnings after 2006 can be 
expected show that there is a developing consensus position among states fighting insurgencies 
that adopts a more permissive proportionality/distinction regime where non-state actors are 
concealing themselves among their host population. 
There are three hypotheses raised in this thesis to account for the increased involvement of 
military lawyers in IDF operational decision-making: 
1) The application of international law by the Israeli Supreme Court. 
2) The threat of foreign prosecutions of Israeli decision-makers for war crimes. 
3) The increased use of International Humanitarian Law as a measure of the legitimacy of 
military action. 
39 See chapter 1 
233 
Unlike during the Second Intifada, the IDF was not subjected to Israeli Supreme Court scrutiny 
and there has not been the clamour for Universal Jurisdiction prosecution. Internally, Israel has 
been concerned with the perceived military failures exposed during the war, and the focus of the 
Winograd Commission was on military and political strategy rather than the legality of the 
operations. In fact the Commission had to be persuaded that IHL matters and that it was not 
being taken too seriously by the military. Internationally, the political support for a war against 
Hezbollah as Iran's proxy tended to mute the criticism of Israel's operations. In these 
circumstances, the Soares report and NGO reports such as those of Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International, assume greater importance by employing the powerful legal, rather than 
political, discourse to delegitimize Israel's conduct of the war. As such, the case study illustrates 
the importance of the third hypothesis. 
The Israeli response makes great play of the IDF's compliance with IHL. More directly, the IDL 
lawyers were fielded to explain the legality of the operation. When Human Rights watch 
launched its report in Jerusalem in 2007, Daniel Reisner, former head of the IDF International 
Law Department responded on behalf of the Israeli government and defended the legality of the 
Israeli operations with the assertion that the lawyers from his department had reviewed the 
banks of targets selected in advance and vetoed any that failed to meet the requirements of 
international humanitarian law39. Consequently, only military targets were attacked and any 
civilian damage was proportionate. This illustrates the value to the IDF and Israel of having 
lawyers taking part in the operational decision-making process and subsequent defence of the 
military operations as, in Clarke's terms, a strategy of legitimisation. 
To summarise, the case study reveals the growth of IDL involvement in IDF operational decision making 
in times of war. Their involvement provided a permissive construction of IHL that enabled a style 
of warfare that engaged non-state actors concealed among their civilians. The intense NGO 
39 The author attended the presentation at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem on 6, September 2007. 
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criticism of Israel's conduct of the war framed political objections in a powerful legal discourse 
that required a legal response from Israel. The fact that the IDL lawyers had been demonstrably 
involved in operational decision making enabled Israel to mount a legal defence and to use IDF 
lawyers in the presentation of that defence. This amounted to deploying the IDF lawyers to 
promote the legitimacy of Israel's military strategy and provides powerful support to the 
hypothesis that he increased involvement of lawyers in Israeli military decision-making is an 
institutional reaction by the IDF to the increased use of humanitarian law as a measure of the 
legitimacy of military actions. 
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Chapter 8: Case Study 3: Operation Cast Lead 
1) Introduction 
Israel's Operation Cast Lead against Hamas in Gaza began on 27 December 2008 and continued 
until 18 January 2009. The operation employed military force with the express purpose of 
stopping Hamas rocket attacks on Israel, rockets having replaced suicide bombing as Hamas' 
weapon of choice. This was not to be a law enforcement operation within an occupied territory. 
Israel had withdrawn from Gaza in 2005 as part of Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan, allowing 
Israel to argue that it was relieved of the obligations of an occupier. The subsequent Hamas 
takeover of Gaza in June 2007, the campaign of rocket attacks on Southern Israeli towns and the 
ongoing captivity of Gilad Shalit, the IDF soldier who had been kidnapped in June 2006, had led 
Israel to label Gaza a `hostile entity' that could be held responsible for acts of aggression 
emanating from its territory without recognition of state sovereign rights40. Gaza was effectively 
placed in a legal no-man's land somewhere between occupation and self-determination with the 
obligations of a state without the benefits of sovereign rights. This novel legal construction 
helped Israel to abandon the duties of an occupier and impose a virtual siege, claim the right of 
Article 51 self-defence and accept only the limited constraints of International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL) when planning its strategy and tactics in response to Hamas rockets. 
Israel's conduct of the war came under intense legal criticism that was powerfully articulated in 
the UN Human Rights Council Goldstone Mission Report41 of September 2009, which found 
40 Former head of the IDF International Law Department, Col (Rtd. ) Daniel Reisner admitted in telephone 
conversation with the author on 20 September 2007 that this term had no legal significance and was used to 
avoid any suggestion that Hamas was in control of a state while allowing Israel to impose economic sanctions. 
41United Nations Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, 
Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, A/HRC/12/48,28 September 2009, 
[hereafter: the Goldstone Report] available at, 
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Israel to be guilty of breaches of IHL amounting to war crimes. Having chosen not to cooperate 
with the mission, Israel defended the legality of its operation in its own report, the Operation in 
Gaza 7 December 2008 - 18 January 2009 Factual and Legal Aspects (the Israeli Report)42. 
Comparison of the reports in respect of the key areas of legal controversy reveals the extent that 
Israel applied a particular construction of IHL to the conflict. 
The IDF International Law Department (IDL), which had become involved in operational 
matters during the Second Intifada and had been involved in targeting decisions during the 2006 
Second Lebanon War, played an unprecedented part in target selection during Cast Lead. It will 
be argued in this case study that this close legal involvement provided a legal framework for a 
permissive construction of the key IHL principles of distinction and proportionality in warfare 
against Hamas that had deliberately embedded its fighters and military assets among its own 
civilians. This can be understood as an application of law designed to meet the needs of Israel's 
offensive counter-terrorism strategy; in teleological terms, it was conceived during the Second 
Intifada, found clear expression in the Second Lebanon war and was taken to its logical 
conclusion during Cast Lead. It follows that the military lawyers adopted a permissive 
construction of IHL when advising on the legality of the IDF's military operations during Cast 
Lead. 
It will be further argued that the involvement of the Israeli Supreme Court in accepting petitions 
from NGO's while the fighting was still continuing, the calls for prosecutions under the 
http: //www2. ohchr. org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/a-hrc-12-48. pdf [last accessed 12 January 
20111. 
42 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Operation in Gaza Factual and Legal Aspects, 29 July 2009, 
[hereafter: the Israeli report], available at: http: //www. mfa. gov. il/MFA/Terrorism- 
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrori sm+and+Isl amic+Fundamental i sm-/Operation_in_Gaza- 
Factual_and_Legal_Aspects. htm. [Last accessed 11 March 2011]. 
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Universal Jurisdiction and the unprecedented prominence given to the Goldstone Report, give 
powerful support to three hypotheses raised in this thesis to account for the increased 
involvement of military lawyers in IDF operational decision-making: 
1) The application of international law by the Israeli Supreme Court, 
2) The threat of foreign prosecutions of Israeli decision-makers for war crimes and 
3) The increased use of International Humanitarian Law as a measure of the legitimacy of 
military action. 
2) The Israeli conduct of the war 
Since the 2006 Second Lebanon War Israel had concentrated resources on the training and 
restructuring of its land army. Cast Lead was not going to repeat the mistakes of 2006 by relying 
on air power alone to destroy Hamas' capability to launch rocket attacks on Israel. Instead, Cast 
Lead required the careful deployment of ground forces in conjunction with air and artillery 
firepower. Israel's total control of the digital environment and the deployment of precision 
guided attack systems allowed the maximum use of remote observation of the battlefield and the 
apparently accurate delivery of ordinance. Israel's communications and human intelligence 
acquired through long years of occupation and the barely disguised assistance of Fatah, allowed 
for a rich variety of pre-determined targets. Nevertheless, the density of civilian occupation 
meant that there was a high risk of civilian harm in terms of loss of life, injury, destruction of 
homes and damage to the infrastructure. Set against that was the understanding of Hamas as a 
terrorist organisation with no respect for the rules of war; Hamas was expected to rely on LED's 
and to conceal its fighters among the civilian population. This raised the familiar problem of the 
extent to which the lives of Israeli ground troops were to be put at risk in order to reduce the risk 
of civilian harm. 
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The initial phase of the war was a surprise air strike on 27 December 2008, which was followed 
on 3 January 2009 by the second stage of the operation with the deployment of ground forces 
supported by a heavy artillery barrage. The ground troops made an unprecedented use of 
technology to avoid booby traps and the risk of capture, deploying robot and precision 
technology43. Advances in co-ordination of communications linked ground forces, artillery, air 
support and intelligence that enabled the ground forces to operate in the densely populated areas 
of Gaza city during the third phase of the operation`. The use of white phosphorous is further 
controversial aspect of the operation which was condemned by the Goldstone Mission and 
defended by Israel on the grounds that it was used to create a smoke screen. 
Following the surprise attacks of the opening hours of the operation, Israel used a sophisticated 
system of warnings designed to clear targets of civilians. It will be recalled that warnings played 
a big part in the 2006 Lebanon War. The system was further refined in Gaza. In addition to 
leaflets and radio broadcasts, residents received recorded messages on their mobile phones 
warning them to leave specific locations. In an effort to learn from the mistakes of Lebanon, 
civilians were directed to specific locations. The Israeli's employed a `knock on the roof' 
procedure whereby non-explosive munitions were fired to alert residents of an impending 
attack45. Nevertheless, as was to be expected there were civilian casualties, including several 
high profile tragedies. 
43 See David Eshel, `New Tactics Yield Solid Victory in Gaza', Aviation Weekly, 11 March 2009, available at, 
http: //www. aviationweck. com/aw/generic/story channel. jsp? channel=defense&id=news/GAZA031109. xml ( 
last accessed 3 January 2011) and Barbara Opall-Rome, 'Adapting Artillery to Urban War', DefenceNews, 23 
March 2009, available at, httn: //www. defensenews. com/storv. nhp? i=4001228 (last accessed 3 January 2011). 
44 Eshel, `New Tactics', `Cast Lead was the first Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operation in which unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs), helicopters and fighter jets were allocated to ground forces directly without IAF central 
command authorizing sorties. This went even further, with air-support controller teams operating alongside 
brigade commanders at the front, passing along whatever surveillance data from UAVs and other assets they 
needed'. 
as The associated Press, 'IDF phones Gaza residents to warn them of imminent strikes', Haaretz, 2 January 
2009. 
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Hamas, like Hezbollah, knew the value of captured Israeli soldiers and IDF avoidance of capture 
was an important element of force protection. The Israelis relied on technological innovation 
and intelligence to minimise losses from suicide attack and TEDs; Israeli ground forces had 
embedded intelligence officers, demolition teams, and direct communications with air and 
artillery response using shared GPS and drone technology. Israel's rules of engagement remain 
classified but the memoirs of serving soldiers suggest that in practice the IDF commanders 
warned their troops against taking chances. Indeed, the soldiers' narratives published by the 
Israeli NGO Breaking the Silence, describe instructions to soldiers to take no chances with 
approaching civilians and suspect buildings46. As was discussed in chapter one, this is consistent 
with the decline in the Israeli republican ethos of sacrifice and the political demand for post- 
heroic styles of warfare, even where, as was the case with Cast Lead, there was overwhelming 
domestic support for the operation. The increased risk of harm to the civilian population was 
seen as a consequence of Hamas' style of combat not Israel's strategy of force protection. 
As Jeffrey White has observed, 
IDF measures to protect its soldiers undoubtedly translated into additional destruction or 
damage to civilian property. Tactics that included using bulldozers and other armored 
vehicles to clear axes of advance, breaking through exterior and interior walls of structures to 
avoid exposure to observation and fire, and clearing rooms for use by IDF personnel. These 
measures, though, were taken in response to Hamas's preparation of the battlefield with mines 
and improvised explosive devices intended to impede Israeli movement and inflict casualties, 
as well as to the group's tactical employment of snipers and antitank weapons. In effect, 
Hamas had already prepared the civilian environment for military purposes. IDF commanders 
felt it was an acceptable trade-off to open an approach through civilian houses or greenhouses 
rather than risk being ambushed and taking losses. 7 
46 Breaking the Silence, Soldiers' Testimonies from Operation Cast Lead, Gaza 2009, available at, 
http: //www. shovrimshtika. org/oferet/ENGLISH _oferct. pdf 
(last accessed 3 December 2010). 
See also, Donald Macintyre, `Israeli Commander: We Rewrote the rules of war for Gaza', The Independent, 3 
February 2010, available at, http: //www. independent. co. uk/news/world/middle-east/israeli-commander-we- 
rewrote-the-rules-of-war-for-gaza-1887627. html (last accessed 3 December 2010). 
47 Jeffrey White, `Examining the Conduct of IDF Operations in Gaza', The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, 27 March 2010, available at, http: //www. washingtoninstitute. org/print. php? template=C05&CID=3034 
(last accessed 3 December 2010). 
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This is not to say that the Israeli Supreme Court remained aloof. The Supreme Court reviewed 
the humanitarian position at the height of the operation and at one stage case managed in real 
time an Israeli cease fire to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid48. Amichai Cohen regards this 
as an impressive demonstration of judicial power with the judges effectively ran the 
humanitarian operation from the court demanding the presence in court of the officer in charge 
and made decisions in real time49. As a direct result of these petitions the IDF declared a cease 
fire to assist aid deliveries. As the President of the Supreme Court, Judge Beinish put it, 
[I]t is the role of the court, even in times of combat, to determine whether within the 
framework of the combat operations the obligation to act in accordance with legal guidelines 
- both within the context of Israeli law and within the context of international humanitarian 
law - is being upheldso 
This legal involvement of the Supreme Court in the IDF's conduct of operations can be seen as 
the continuation of a process that had developed during the Supreme Court Presidency of Judge 
Barak during the Second Intifada. 
Cast Lead came to an end when Jerusalem decided not to continue phase three of the war. Faced 
with the opportunity to expand the operation to destroy Hamas and regain control of Gaza, 
Prime Minister Olmert chose instead to declare a unilateral cease fire on 18 January 2009. The 
tight operational aims, early deployment of ground forces and low Israeli casualties represented 
an improvement on the IDF's performance in Lebanon. Nevertheless, Israel's claim to have 
acted in accordance with IHL remains controversial, despite or perhaps because of the 
involvement of the IDF lawyers. 
48 Physicians for Human Rights et al. v. The Prime Minister et. al., HCJ 201/09 and HCJ 248/09,19 January 
2009. 
49 Author's interview with Amichai Cohen, 20 May 2009 at Modi'in, Israel. 
50 Physicians for Human Rights et. al. v. The Prime Minister et. al., 
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3. The Involvement of the Lawyers 
Colonel (Rtd. ) Pnina Sharvit-Baruch commanded the IDL during Cast Lead. Sharvit-Baruch 
confirms that the involvement of the lawyers in operational matters increased following the 
2006 Lebanon war51. Although, the Winograd Commission that investigated Israel's conduct of 
the Lebanon war was unenthusiastic about the involvement of lawyers in operational matters, by 
2009 the IDF lawyers were present at headquarters, command and divisional levels 52. This 
relationship did not extend below divisional level to brigade level. During Cast Lead, the 
brigades such as the Givati and Golani brigades were operating with their commanders in the 
field and lawyers were not present at that level53. This means that when units responded to fire, 
such as that coming from the Imra school, it was a decision on the ground and lawyers were not 
involved. Consequently, when assessing the influence of the IDL on operational decision 
making, a distinction needs to be made between pre-planned attacks and rapid response fire. 
The Gaza legal involvement was far greater than during the 2006 Lebanon War when the 
lawyers were at Northern Command but not at divisional level. Prior to the Lebanon conflict, the 
legal advisor for the Northern Command had sat at Haifa with her main focus on disciplinary 
matters. The lawyers were mainly at headquarters meetings and the presence at Northern 
Command was less close. This was a relationship that was still finding its feet. By Cast Lead the 
lawyers had built up a much closer relationship at command level. According to Sharvit-Baruch 
the increased involvement was encouraged after the Lebanon war by the then Attorney General 
with the informal, but very influential, support of the former President of the Supreme Court 
Aaron Barak. 
51 Author's interview with Colonel (Rtd. ) Pnina Sharvit Baruch at Tel Aviv University on 21 May 2009. Unless 
otherwise indicated the factual information contained in this section is provided by Sharvit Baruch in interview. 
52 The IDF is split between Northern Command, Central Command, Southern Command and Homefront 
Command. 
53 Col (Rtd. ) Daniel Reisner former head of the IDL confirms this institutional arrangement. See, Author's 
interview with Reisner in Jerusalem 24 May 2009. 
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During Cast Lead the IDL consisted of 20 full time officers who were reinforced from other 
parts of the JAG unit and by reservists. This raised the numbers by six or seven, enabling the 
unit to have a round the clock presence at headquarters where the operational decisions were 
being made. The Military Advocate General was in meetings with the Chief of Staff at high 
level forums and there was a close legal connection with the air force and the navy. There was 
also a legal advisor at the co-ordinator's office where humanitarian aid was coordinated with 
NGOs and international bodies. Sharvit-Baruch and her deputy were constantly available to give 
advice. 
IDL lawyers were involved in the advance planning of Cast Lead at the Headquarters forums. 
This included targeting decisions that were taken after input from the intelligence, air force and 
planning officers and the legal advisors. Sharvit-Baruch makes a distinction between the 
decision to include a location in the banks of targets, the decision to attack a target from the 
bank and short-cycle targets, 
There are two different levels of targeting decision. The banks of targets are created in 
advance and here the lawyer plays a part. This is operational planning. But during an 
operation we have to decide whether to attack a target from a bank. So then there is another 
decision of whether to attack or not. This then is a target that has already been discussed and 
included in a bank and now we are at a second stage of a decision making on whether or not 
to actually carry out the attack at the time. This is a discussion of when to attack and how to 
attack. Also there are new targets that have been created in the course of the operations. But 
here there is time to plan the same attack for the next day. Here again lawyers are part of the 
process. The lawyer will mainly be discussing the legal aspects of the target to be attacked; 
here we are considering the principal of distinction. 
In our operations we are frequently dealing with civilian areas that are being used for military 
operations. When operating against the Palestinians and also the Hezbollah it is rare to have 
purely military targets. We must see whether somewhere indeed has lost civilian status and 
become a lawful target. This involves the consideration of what use is being made of the 
target building or area. Then there is a further consideration. This is the question of 
proportionality. Here the whole analysis is made on the basis of the information you have 
available at the time of making the decision. The proportionality and the precautions will 
include questions of when to attack- in the night or in the day. There are questions of what 
size of bomb to use to cause the minimum collateral damage and then the decision as to who 
is to carry out the attack the next day. It is usually the air force. 
There is another type of target. This is the short cycle targeting. These are situations requiring 
fast response. It may be that the enemy is shooting at our forces from a particular location and 
they ask the air force to come in and bomb that building. These decisions do not go past the 
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lawyers. Here there is no legal adviser in the loop. These are urgent decisions that have to be 
taken at the moment with less knowledge. This may be because the forces are being attacked 
or because they have discovered a target that seems to them to be a good target and the 
opportunity may pass very quickly. An example of this would be to call in air support to 
attack a certain truck because they think that the truck is carrying missiles. Then of course it 
could turn out that the truck is carrying oxygen or gas bottles- which in fact it happenedsa 
You have to make the decision on the information you have. 
Although Sharvit-Baruch is unable to discuss operational decisions, this description of her 
department's involvement indicates that the lawyers were certainly involved in the major 
targeting decisions that would have included the controversial strikes on the Hamas organs of 
government and the Gaza police. Sharvit-Baruch is adamant that her department had the full 
support of the Judge Advocate General and that their legal advice was accepted. 
The IDL had been closely involved in advising on warnings during the 2006 Second Lebanon 
war and was aware of the international criticism that the warnings had been ineffective and both 
confusing and threatening. The department was again involved in drafting the warnings during 
Cast lead when greater efforts were made to ensure clarity and direction to safe places. 
Sharvit-Baruch is adamant that her department's legal advice was followed and that where her 
lawyers expressed an opinion that an operation was not lawful it had not proceeded55. She 
disagrees with the suggestion that there was an excessive concern with force protection and 
expressly disagrees with Asa Kasher's view that soldiers should not be put at risk for the sake of 
enemy civilians. From her perspective, her department did not tailor their advice to help the IDF 
avoid its legal obligations, seeing herself as a state lawyer rather than on the side of the IDF, 
`I am not there to find a way for them to do anything they want and to justify everything they 
want to do. I am there to try to find legal ways to achieve the goals of the army. If there is a 
legal way I am there to show it to them or help them find it. I am not there only to say what 
they can't do. I am also there to say what they can do and how to do what they want to do in a 
legal way. This does not mean that I will tell them how to do something unlawful'. 
sa This is a reference to a well documented incident during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. 
ss Author's interview with Sharvit-Baruch, `I personally know of targets that were cancelled or changes were 
made in methods of how to attack them because of decisions of lawyers'. 
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Colonel (Rtd. ) David Benjamin, who spent most of his military career as a lawyer in Gaza and 
Southern Command, confirms Sharvit-Baruch's view of the IDL role during Cast Lead56, 
The legal advisor is posted to a division. When an operation is planned the planners present 
proposals in a multi-tiered process. Issues discussed are strategic, operational and technical. 
The sort of questions put to lawyers are what targets can be hit legally. This becomes very 
difficult when you are in an asymmetric mode. The lack of reciprocracy is not what the 
enemy is doing to your side but what they are doing to their own civilians. This presents grey 
areas where the answer is not clear..... Grey areas include proportionality and collateral 
damage. This is the tricky legal area and the number one issue that comes up. 
Benjamin maintains that his advice was always followed and that he knew of no instance during 
Cast Lead where any IDL advice was ignored. Nevertheless, there were clear institutional 
pressures where `the legal advisor eats, sleeps and runs with the army military. The military is 
about pleasing the commander. The atmosphere can get very ugly when soldiers start getting 
killed. ' Benjamin points to the crucial importance of intelligence in identifying targets as 
military, 
This makes it very difficult to defend advice because I cannot say what I knew. The military 
is often operating in a situation where everything looks civilian- the people and the buildings. 
In Gaza buildings and whole streets were wired up with explosives, not just in buildings but 
also under roads. This is the nature of asymmetric warfare. It is the tactics rather than 
state/non-state involvement. 
Benjamin is clearly sympathetic to the problems faced by the IDF. Each of the IDL lawyers 
interviewed was keen to emphasise that this institutional identification did not lead to their 
turning a blind eye to illegality. However, an examination of the legally controversial targeting 
decisions is required before any conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the IDL legal 
advice during Cast Lead. 
56 Author's interview with Colonel (Rtd. ) David Benjamin, Jerusalem, 18, May 2009. 
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4. The Legal Controversies: the Goldstone Report and the Israeli legal defence 
There is very little about the Israeli conduct of Cast Lead that has not provoked legal 
controversy. `Legal controversy' is used in the present discussion in its general rather than legal 
sense to mean a prolonged public dispute about the legality of Israeli operations. The opposing 
positions are clearly articulated in the Goldstone Report and the Israeli Report. A comparative 
analysis of the two reports sheds light on the breadth of legal opinion that has been applied to 
the Israeli targeting decisions and the advice that the IDF lawyers must have given to the 
military. However, any conclusions are dependent on: 
1) legal advice having been given on the operations in question, 
2) the advice having been followed and 
3) recognition that, in the absence of details of operations that did not proceed or the text of the 
rules of engagement, the method of analysis cannot identify legal advice that set the limits on 
what was legal. 
Since the vast majority of the operations were rapid response close air and artillery support, 
which would not necessarily have been considered by the lawyers, and since the IDF rules of 
engagement have not been disclosed, the best indicators of the stance of the legal advisors are 
the pre-planned attacks that took place in the first days of the operation and the sophisticated 
system of warnings that were delivered to the civilian population. Consequently, this case study 
will focus on the pre-planned attacks on the Legislative Council, the Ministry of Justice and the 
Gaza police and the use of warnings. The analysis is assisted by the detailed legal criticism in 
the Goldstone Report and by the legal defence in the Israeli report. This is not to suggest that 
comparison of two reports reveals the multiplicity of legal positions that can be taken with 
respect to the Israeli conduct, but they do serve to present in concise form the parameters of the 
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legal discussion among two sets of elite actors and the Israeli Report is an authoritative 
statement of the Israeli position. 
The Goldstone Mission, which was established by the UN Human Rights Council on 3 April 
2009, was headed by Justice Richard Goldstone, a former South Africa Constitutional Court 
Judge and former prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia. 
The balance of the mission was made up of LSE professor of international law Christine 
Chinkin, Hina Jilani Pakistan Supreme Court advocate and Colonel (Rtd. ) Desmond Travers of 
the Irish Defence Forces. The terms of reference were negotiated by Goldstone, `to investigate 
all violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law' in the context of the 
military operations in Gaza. The original mandate had been to investigate Israeli war crimes and 
the re-interpretation by Judge Goldstein had been an effort to demonstrate even-handed 
objectivity divorced from the politicised discussions that had preceded the resolution57. 
The mission interpreted its mandate as a direction to review the legality of the suffering endured 
by civilians during the conflict. Since there was little dispute about the illegality of Hamas 
rocket fire at Israeli population centres, the Mission mainly concerned itself with determining 
the legality of the death, injury and loss visited upon the citizens of Gaza by the Israeli military 
operations. Despite the best efforts of the Mission, the Israeli government reaction was one of 
non-cooperation. This was consistent with Israel's dealings with UN fact finding missions and, 
as will be recalled from case study two, the Soares mission to investigate Israel's conduct of the 
Second Lebanon war was also denied Israeli cooperation. Consequently, instead of assisting the 
mission, the Israeli government launched a pre-emptive legal defence in July 2009 with the 
publication of its own report, The Operation in Gaza 7 December 2008 - 18 January 2009 
57 UNHCR Resolution S-91 had called for, `an urgent, independent international fact-finding mission, to be 
appointed by the President of the Council, to investigate all violations of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law by the occupying Power, Israel, against the Palestinian people throughout the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, due to the current aggression'. 
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Factual and Legal Aspects, (the Israeli Report)58. The Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Gaza Conflict, (the Goldstone Report) was published in its final form on 25 
September 200959. The two reports come to very different legal conclusions about Israel's 
missile strikes on the Gaza police and the Hamas government infrastructure and on the legal 
consequences of issuing warnings to the civilian population. 
It is common ground between the two reports that the IHL principles of distinction, 
proportionality and military necessity apply to Cast Lead. It will be recalled that the principle of 
distinction, which is a requirement of customary law in both international and non-international 
armed conflicts, has been codified in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I in the following terms, 
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all 
objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2. 
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, 
military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use 
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage. 
3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such 
as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an 
effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used. 
Article 48 of the 1977 Additional Protocol Ito the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
provides that, 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the 
Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct 
their operations only against military objectives. 
Additional Protocol I specifically addresses civilians in Article 51.2 by providing that, `[t]he 
civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts 
or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
58 The Israeli report: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Operation in Gaza: Factual and Legal Aspects, 
available at http: //www. ml'a. gov. il/NR/rdonlyresIE89E699D-A435-491 B-B2DO- 
017675DAFEF7/0/GazaOperationwLinks. pdf (last accessed 12 January 2011) 
59 Supra note 2 the Goldstone report. 
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population are prohibited. ' These provisions undoubtedly replicate customary law and thus bind 
even states that are not party to the treaty, such as Israel and the United States. Analogous 
prohibitions, also customary in nature, exist for non-international armed conflict. 
The provisions are intended to prevent the deliberate destruction in war of the civilian 
infrastructure. However, as was discussed in chapter three, the concept of dual-purpose targets 
muddies the waters by allowing targeting of objects that have both civil and military uses. In 
simple terms, dual use targets are those that are used by the military in addition to heir civilian 
use. As was seen in Case Study 2 The 2006 Lebanon War, this enabled the Israeli government to 
justify its targeting during the 2006 Second Lebanon war of Lebanese roads, bridges, power 
supplies and TV stations. 
On 31 December 2008 the Palestinian Legislative Council Building and the Ministry of Justice 
in the centre of Gaza city were attacked by air and hit by missiles. At first sight, this argument 
that these were dual-use targets does not seem to apply to the attack on the Legislative Council 
Building and the Ministry of Justice. They are part of the Tel El-Hawwa government complex 
and there has been no suggestion that the buildings were used by fighters or for the storage of 
weapons. The Goldstone Mission, which investigated the attacks, was satisfied that this was an 
unlawful deliberate attack on civilian targets, finding, 
389. There is an absence of evidence or, indeed, any allegation from the Israeli Government 
and armed forces that the Legislative Council building, the Ministry of Justice or the Gaza 
main prison "made an effective contribution to military action. " On the information available 
to it, the Mission finds that the attacks on these buildings constituted deliberate attacks on 
civilian objects in violation of the rule of customary international humanitarian law whereby 
attacks must be strictly limited to military objectives. (Emphasis added) 
390. In the Mission's view these facts further indicate the commission of the grave breach of 
extensive destruction of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly, as defined in article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
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The mission took a similar view of the attacks on the Gaza police which killed over 90 police at 
the Arafat City police headquarters alone. Gaza police stations were among the first targets to be 
attacked at the start of the operation on 27 December. Twenty four police stations were hit in the 
first minutes of the attack and a further fourteen the following day. These were the Shura or 
`civil police' and included 99 who were killed at Arafat City police headquarters while attending 
training exercises60. According to information presented to the mission, of the 248 Gaza police 
killed during Cast Lead the majority were intentionally killed in the attacks on the police 
stations61. Under IHL, police forces are to be regarded as civilian unless they have been 
incorporated into the military. If they have been incorporated they assume combat status. The 
Goldstone Mission found no evidence that this had been the case or that there was dual 
membership with a military cadre. Like any civilian they had protected status and could not be 
targeted `unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities' 62. The Goldstone 
Mission found that the Gaza police did not fall into any of these categories. Despite this clear 
finding, the Mission proceeded to consider the position if it were to be established that some of 
the police were also members of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (the military wing of 
Hamas). This raised the question of whether, in those circumstances, the attacks would have 
been proportionate. 
It will be recalled that proportionality only becomes relevant where the intended target is a 
military object. Hence, proportionality is only relevant if the civilian police officers were 
unintended casualties of an attack on a military object. If there were some police officers who 
were military targets by virtue of their membership of the al-Qassam Brigade, this would make 
them lawful military targets providing that the incidental civilian harm is not disproportionate. It 
will be recalled that the customary international law principle of proportionality is expressed in 
60 It had been thought that this was a graduation ceremony for new police recruits, but statements given to the 
Goldstone Mission confirm that it was a training event. 
61 The Goldstone Report, para. 424. 
62 Pursuant to article 51 (3) of Additional Protocol I, civilians enjoy immunity from attack `unless and for such 
time as they take a direct part in hostilities'. This is understood to reflect customary international law. 
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its codified form in Article 51(5)(b) of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 
1977 (First Additional Protocol) as, `An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. ' 
In the view of the Mission, even if the intended targets where those officers who were 
combatants by virtue of their dual membership of the police force and the al-Qassam Brigade, 
the large number of officers present who were not so affiliated made the attack disproportionate 
and unlawful. In short, the attack failed to meet the requirements of distinction, and, even if it 
did not, it was disproportionate. According to the Goldstone Report, on any viewing, the 
decision to target the police was legally wrong and the attacks were unlawful. If this is right, as 
in the case of the destruction of the Parliament Building and the Ministry of Justice, the IDF 
lawyers authorised an unlawful attack. However, this is not the position articulated in the Israeli 
report. 
The Israeli report, The Operation in Gaza 27 December 2008-18 January 2009 Factual and Legal 
Aspects sets out Israel's legal justification for its operations during Cast Lead. The report locates 
the context of the operation as a defensive response to Hamas rocket and suicide terrorist 
attacks. The operation is described as part of a long-running military conflict between the state 
of Israel and Hamas that has continued since the start of the Second Intifada in October 200063. 
This section of the report should not be written off as narrative background because the 
characterisation of Hamas as a terrorist organisation is key to understanding the nuances of the 
Israeli legal defence of the IDF targeting decisions. 
63 The Israeli Report, paras. 28 and paras. 36-66. 
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The Geneva Conventions and some of the First Protoco164 are recognised as applying to the 
conflict and Israel specifically claims to have complied with the requirements of distinction, 
proportionality and military necessity. However, as we have seen previously, the imprecision at 
the heart of IHL arising from the uneasy balancing of military and humanitarian principles 
results in grey areas where lawyers exercise choice in how they construct their advice. As will 
be seen, the characterisation of Hamas is key to understanding an Israeli legal approach that 
applies IHL to the conflict and, indeed, to conflicts between states and non-state actors. The 
main difference, as was emphasised by Benjamin, is the extent to which non-state actors 
disregard IHL by concealing themselves and their attacks amongst their own civilians. The 
Israeli Report devotes a lot of time to describing in detail Hamas' employment of these tactics65 
As we have previously noted, distinction and proportionality are linked to military necessity, 
which is the primary controlling principle. Only necessary destruction is allowed. Clearly, 
military necessity is linked to the objectives of the campaign, which are set out in the Israeli 
Report as: 
230. Consistent with its rules of engagement, IDF Forces sought to maintain equilibrium 
between two competing considerations: military necessity and humanitarian considerations. 
In the course of the Gaza Operation, IDF's military necessities included first and foremost the 
prevention of rocket and mortar fire against Israel and Israelis, as well as the dismantling of 
terrorist infrastructure, but also the protection of IDF forces operating in the Gaza Strip. 
The point to be emphasised here is that the military necessity of `the dismantling of terrorist 
infrastructure' requires a definition of terrorist infrastructure and specifically where the 
boundary lies between terrorist infrastructure and civilian infrastructure. In fact, this is the key 
conceptual battleground between the Goldstone Report and the Israeli Report. The discussion in 
64 As was discussed in chapter 3, Israel in common with the US is not a party to the First Protocol but recognises 
those articles that are an expression of customary international law, including the statements of the requirements 
of proportionality, distinction and military necessity. 
65 The Israeli Report para. 142-208 
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the Israeli Report begins with a disarmingly conventional claim in respect of Israeli targeting 
while continuing the narrative of Hamas' use of civilians and civilian property as shields, 
Consistent with the principle of distinction, IDF forces attacked military targets directly 
connected to Hamas and other terrorist organisations' military activities against Israel. For 
instance, IDF forces targeted Hamas rocket launchers, weapons stockpiles, command and 
control facilities, weapons factories, explosives laboratories, training facilities and 
communications infrastructure. That these objects were often concealed or embedded in 
civilian facilities such as residential buildings, schools, or mosques did not render them 
immune from attack. In accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict, civilian facilities that 
served military purposes did not enjoy protection from attack. Thus, a residential building that 
doubled as an ammunition depot or military headquarters was a legitimate military target for 
attack 66 . 
At first sight it is unclear how the attacks on the Parliament Building and the Ministry of Justice 
come within these parameters. The attacks are described in the following terms, 
Hamas' main headquarters compound in Gaza City (struck on 27 December): This compound 
served as Hamas' Gaza City headquarters, and the office of Ismail Haniya, head of the Hamas 
administration, is located in the compound. The headquarters also served as a point for 
Executive Force patrols to gather before they went out into the city. In addition, there were 
police cars and armoured patrol cars confiscated by Hamas when it took over the Gaza Strip. 
Ismail Haniyah's office in the Hamas compound in Gaza City (struck on 31 December): The 
office of Ismail Haniyah, attacked by Israeli Air Force on the nights of 30-31 December, was 
used for planning, supporting, and funding terrorist activities against Israel67. 
Clearly, justifying the destruction of the Parliament building on the grounds that Executive 
Force Patrols met up in the government compound and that there were some confiscated 
vehicles there amounts to a weak claim to military necessity. The real explanation is to be found 
in the following passage, 
It should be noted that Israeli forces have come under criticism from various international 
organisations for attacking a number of Hamas targets, such as various -ministries operated 
by Hamas, which were alleged to be civilian in nature. While Hamas operates ministries and 
is in charge of a variety of administrative and traditionally governmental functions in the 
Gaza Strip, it still remains a terrorist organisation. Many of the ostensibly civilian elements 
of its regime are in reality active components of its terrorist and military efforts. Indeed, 
Hamas does not separate its civilian and military activities in the manner in which a legitimate 
66 The Israel Report para. 233 
67 The Israel Report para. 234 
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government might. Instead, Hamas uses apparatuses under its control, including quasi- 
governmental institutions, to promote its terrorist activity68. (Emphasis added) 
It will be recalled that the IHL principle codified in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol 
provides that, 
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, 
military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use 
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage. (Emphasis added) 
It can readily be seen that the Israeli characterisation of Hamas as a terrorist organisation and not 
a legitimate government is behind the decision to target the Parliament Building and the 
Ministry of Justice. If there is no civil element of the Hamas government of Gaza then all 
aspects of government `by their nature' make an effective contribution to military action and 
their destruction is likely to offer a `definite military advantage'. This amounts to an assertion 
that, in practice Hamas mixes its civil and military government functions rather in the way it 
mixes its fighters with civilians and, as was seen in Case study 2, is consistent with the 
statements made about Hezbollah during the 2006 Lebanon War. The essence of the approach is 
to look at the nature of the organisation rather than the function of its specific parts. 
The Israeli legal analysis is in complete contrast with the Goldstone view that, `llamas is an 
organization with distinct political, military and social welfare components'69. The Goldstone 
Mission explicitly rejects the Israeli assertion that the distinction between the civilian and 
military parts of the Hamas government is no longer relevant as `a dangerous argument that 
should be vigorously rejected as incompatible with the cardinal principle of distinction'. This 
disagreement is at the heart of the legal controversy, and reflects a fundamental disagreement 
68 The Israel Report para. 235 
69 The Goldstone Report para. 382 
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about the extent to which the nature of terrorist organisations results in a more relaxed 
application of the constraining principle of distinction. Undoubtedly, the Israeli analysis makes 
all Hamas government institutions valid targets; from the Goldstone perspective, this resulted in 
unlawful and unnecessary destruction of the Gaza civil infrastructure. 
The Israeli Report's legal defence of the targeting of the Gaza police relies on a factual analysis 
to establish that the police were part of the Hamas `internal security' apparatus with standing 
orders to fight Israeli forces70. At first sight, the differing approaches of the two reports seem to 
amount to differing views of the available evidence about the nature and functions of the Gaza 
police. While the Goldstone Mission accepts the statements of its Hamas witnesses that the 
police carried out exclusively civilian duties, the Israeli Report relies on the history of the force 
and statements made by its members during the conflict that the police officers were under a 
duty to fight the invaders. The Israeli Report also takes a different view of the proportion of 
police officers that were also members of the militias. There is evidence to support both views 
and perhaps it is the wider narrative that informs the assessment of the available information. 
Although, the report does not rely on the previously expressed view that Hamas has no civil 
function, this is clearly the context within which the evidence is assessed, 
At that point [the Hamas take over in 2007], Hamas restructured the Executive Force and 
subdivided it into several units, including the `police'. The newly established police force 
thereafter assumed many traditional law enforcement functions, to the extent enforcing the 
unlawful rule of a terrorist organisation over a population could be termed `law 
enforcement'. As the leader of the Executive Force emphasised in an August 2007 interview, 
however, the force's members were also -resistance fighters, a common term for Hamas' 
military wing. Their weaponry continued to include machine guns and anti-tank weapons - 
not the tools of a regular civilian police force. " (Emphasis added) 
It is accepted by both reports that the normal position under IHL is that police forces are civilian 
institutions that may not be targeted. Israel argues that in practice the Gaza police had a military 
70 The Israeli Report para. 237-248. 
71 The Israeli Report para. 241. 
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function to engage the IDF invasion and on the face of it, this is a factual rather than a legal 
dispute. However, the Israeli framing of its legal defence suggests that there would have been 
little ethical objection to a legal position that found in favour of the attack. However, newspaper 
reports indicate that in the run up to Cast Lead there was an ongoing struggle between the IDF 
and the IDL over the legality of targeting the police. This appears to have caused by what was 
probably faulty intelligence that the target at the event at the Police Station was a graduation 
ceremony rather than a training session. 
Israel's use of warnings to the civilian population is another area of controversy. This is not 
because there is anything exceptional about giving warning of an attack. Indeed warnings are 
required by customary international law, which is restated in codified form in Article 57(2) (c) 
of Additional Protocol I, which provides that, `effective advance warning shall be given of 
attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. ' The 
controversy is about the proper implications to be drawn from the use of warnings when 
applying the rules of distinction and proportionality. As was discussed in Case Study 2 The 
Second Lebanon war, Israel had issued warnings to the villagers of southern Lebanon and the 
Shiite suburbs of Beirut to leave the areas before carrying out attacks in civilian 
neighbourhoods. The UNHRC Soares Report criticised Israel for the often vague wording of the 
warnings, the lack of directions to safe areas and the fact that there was no safe means of 
leaving. However, the force of the criticism was that it allowed the conclusion that Israel had the 
adopted a false presumption that the civilians had obeyed instructions and left the battlefield, 
which completely subverted the IHL restraints on targeting. 
As might be expected, the Goldstone Report and the Israel Report have different views of the 
significance of the Israeli system of civilian warnings. During Cast Lead, Israel institutionalised 
the use of warnings to an unprecedented degree, notifying the population in advance of planned 
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targeting of neighbourhoods and individual buildings and directing the citizens to safer areas. 
These warnings were delivered by written notices, calls to mobile phones and landlines and the 
innovative `knock on roof procedure' whereby non-fatal fire was directed at the roofs of 
buildings in advance of the attack to encourage the occupants to leave72. The Israeli Report 
claims that about 165,000 phone calls were made and some 2,500,000 leaflets were dropped. In 
addition, Israel broke into Radio Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Radio and Radio PFLP 
transmissions to issue warnings to the civilian population73. From the Israeli perspective, the 
warnings are evidence of a humanitarian conduct of the operation that was designed to minimise 
the harm to civilians. The Goldstone Report criticises the warnings as overly generic and 
unhelpful in directing the population to the centre of cities where there had already been 
extensive attacks. The `knock on roof procedure is seen as reckless and a form of attack rather 
than warning. In short, Goldstone finds that Israel had failed to comply with Article 57(2) (c)74. 
This finding can be understood within the wider Goldstone position that Cast Lead was designed 
to punish the people of Gaza for their support for Hamas that required the deliberate targeting of 
civilians, their homes and infrastructure 75. Indeed, from this perspective, it would be surprising 
if the warnings were not designed to terrify rather than protect. 
In fact there is good reason to suppose that the issue of warnings is of greater significance than 
either report reveals. As has been argued throughout this thesis, legal positions on operations are 
informed by ethical positions on the correct balance to be struck between humanitarian and 
military considerations. Whether or not civilians have been warned of intending attack 
influences the ethical position on whether or not the anticipated civilian harm is morally 
acceptable. This is not just a matter of assuming that the civilians have left the battlefield in 
72 The Israeli Report, para. 262-265 
73 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel Issues warnings to the Civilians of Gaza, 7 January 2009, available 
at, http: //www. mfa. pov. il/MFA/Govcrnment/Communiciucs/2009/IDF _warns_Gaza 12opulation_7-Jan- 2009. htm. (Last accessed 2 December 2010). 
74 The Goldstone Report, para. 1920 
75 The Goldstone Report, para. 1920 
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response to warnings. Rather, it is a question of the degree of consideration to be given to the 
civilians who have chosen to remain there. In strictly legal terms, the question can be put as: in a 
conflict against a non-state actor whose military operations are concealed among its own 
civilians, can an operation that would otherwise be disproportionate be viewed as proportionate 
by virtue of the fact that the civilians had been warned to leave vicinity? While neither the 
Goldstone Report nor the Israeli Report argues this point, it is certainly part of the ethical debate 
that informs Israeli positions on the right way to fight terrorism. 
As was noted in chapter four the influential Israeli ethicist Asa Kasher has worked with Major 
General (Rtd. ) Amos Yadin, former head of Israeli Military intelligence, to promote a particular 
ethical position on the responsibility of an attacking force when presented with an opponent that 
uses its own civilians as human shields. Kasher and Yadlin worked on the IDF code of conduct 
and their views are thought to be generally accepted in Israeli military circles76. The essence of 
Kasher's position is that there is no moral basis for endangering the life of a soldier to avoid 
killing the neighbour of an enemy or a terrorist77. Kasher reaches this position by the application 
of social contract theory to prioritise the duty of the state to protect its citizens, including its 
soldiers. 
A recurring theme of Kasher's work is the idea that Israel is developing customary international 
law to allow states to combat terror by warfare and that Western democratic countries are 
adopting Israeli tactics and, by implication, the Israeli view of what is legally permissible: 
We in Israel are in a key position in the development of the customary international law of 
war because we are on the front lines in the fight against terrorism. The more often Western 
states apply principles that originated in Israel to their own non-traditional conflicts in places 
like Afghanistan and Iraq, the greater the chance these principles have of becoming a valuable 
part of international law...... 
Our doctrine mandates that whenever possible, you must warn noncombatants that they are 
residents of a neighborhood where it is dangerous to stay. The responsibility for minimizing 
76 Amos Harel, 'The Philosopher Who Gave the IDF Moral Justification in Gaza', Haaretz, 2 June 2009, 
available at, http"//www haaret7. com/print-edition/news/the-philosopher-who-gave-the-idf-moral-justification- 
in-gaza-1.269527. (Last accessed 1 November 2010). 
77 Ibid, quoting Kasher, `There is no army in the world that will endanger its soldiers in order to avoid hitting the 
neighbors of an enemy or terrorist'. 
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injury to noncombatants entails the responsibility to separate them from terrorists and to 
remove them from the area of combat. In Gaza, the IDF employed a variety of effective 
efforts meant to minimize collateral damage, including widely distributed warning leaflets, 
more than 150,000 warning phone calls to terrorists' neighbors, and non-lethal warning fire 
(the so-called "knock on the roof") - unprecedented efforts in every respect. 
In a state of effective control, the responsibility for distinguishing between terrorists and 
noncombatants is placed upon Israel's shoulders. We do have effective control over Tel Aviv, 
Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and many other places, so there we do jeopardize the lives of 
police when necessary to prevent criminal acts without harming the neighbors. That is their 
duty. 
But there is no army in the world that will endanger its soldiers to avoid hitting the well- 
warned neighbors of an enemy or terrorist. When Israel does not have effective control over a 
territory, the moral responsibility for distinguishing between terrorists and noncombatants is 
not placed upon its shoulders. Gaza was not under our effective control... 
In sum, Israel should favor the lives of its own soldiers over the lives of the well-warned 
neighbors of a terrorist when it is operating in a territory that it does not effectively control, 
because in such territories it does not bear moral responsibility for properly separating 
between dangerous individuals and harmless ones, beyond warning them in an effective way. 
78(Emphasis added) 
Kasher's argument is designed to preserve Israel's capacity to use deadly military force against 
an enemy that locates its military among its civilians, while minimizing the risk to IDF soldiers. 
The traditional application of proportionality is skewed by the notion that responsibility for 
harm shifts from the attacker to the `well warned neighbour' and the enemy forces themselves. 
The application of this ethical reasoning is reinforced by a widely held Israeli belief that the 
traditional rules of IHL are unsuited to modern warfare so that Israeli legal scholars such as 
Amichai Cohen argue for a more permissive application of proportionality in armed conflicts 
against non-state actors. As with all things concerning proportionality, there is no clear 
expression of where to locate the dividing line between the legal and the illegal but there appears 
to be a developing consensus in Israeli legal and ethical scholarship that is in favour of giving 
the military greater latitude in wars against terrorists. 
78 Asa Kasher, Analysis: A moral evaluation of the Gaza War, Jerusalem Post, 2 July 2010, available at, 
http: //www. ipost. com/Israel/Article. aspx? id=168061_. (Last accessed 12 December 2010). 
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The Goldstone Report paints a picture of intentional attacks on Gaza civilians who have been 
deliberately terrorised by warnings, while the Israeli report describes proportionate attacks 
where civilians have largely left the battlefield. However, it is argued here that a more nuanced 
view of the conflict regards the warnings as genuine and the attacks as having been constrained 
by only a permissive construction of proportionality that put the limit somewhere short of 
deliberate targeting of civilians. 
The foregoing discussion has revealed that Israel' framing of Hamas as a terrorist organisation 
that mixed its civil and military functions weakened the constraint of distinction, enabling the 
targeting of government institutions. The Goldstone Report saw this as a dangerous 
development that undermines IHL. By linking the purpose of government to the function of 
government Israel stretched the definition of military object to suit its aims of targeting all 
aspects of Harnas' administration. This was achieved by a particularly permissive legal 
construction of distinction. The use of warnings enabled an elaborate ethical justification for a 
permissive view of proportionality, which accounts for the construction of legal advice that 
enabled Israel to employ its military might in the crowded residential areas of Gaza. 
The point to be emphasised is that, the Israeli conflation of Hamas' military and civil 
administration and the expansive view of the significance of warnings underpin a construction 
of IHL that enabled the IDF to launch operations that were judged by the IDL to be legal. These 
same operations were found by Goldstone to be unlawful through an application of IHL that 
characterised Hamas civil infrastructure targets as civilian institutions and Israeli warnings as at 
best irrelevant and at worst a form of unlawful attack in themselves. 
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5) The aftermath 
The Goldstone Report had run to over five hundred pages of condemnation of Israel's conduct 
of Cast Lead with the legal findings of fact contained within a powerful narrative of Palestinian 
oppression and dispossession. It was not only Cast Lead that was condemned as illegal but 
Israel's whole security policy towards the Palestinians in general and the citizens of Gaza in 
particular. The findings of the report coupled with the lingering images of Israeli warplanes over 
Gaza and the scenes of devastation formed a potent mix that challenged the legitimacy of the 
operation. Israeli spokespersons mounted a legal defense of Cast Lead while alleging that 
Goldstone and his colleges had let their political beliefs colour their legal findings- in legal 
terms jus ad bellum considerations had affected jus in Bello judgments. The legal discourse was 
understood by the Israeli government as a tool for the delegitimisation of the operation that had 
to be countered in similar terms. As Israeli PM Netanyahu, was reported to have told his cabinet, 
`The deligitimisation [of Israel] must be delegitimised'79. The legal discourse was the political 
discourse of delegitimisation. Law and lawyers became centre stage and, in an effort to promote 
the legality of the operation, the Israeli Report made great play of the involvement of the IDL in 
IDF operational decision making. 
Having reached its legal conclusions, the Goldstone Report called for prosecution of the Israeli 
military under the Universal Jurisdiction. While reference was made in Case Study 1 to the 
creation of a team within the Israeli Justice Ministry to defend universal jurisdiction cases, this 
development had more to do with the fallout from Goldstone than the Shehadeh case. It is 
interesting to note that the involvement of the IDL in operational decision making puts the 
lawyers at risk of such prosecutions. Sharvit-Baruch recognises that she is a likely target, 'These 
79 Barak Ravid, `Delegitimization of Israel must be delegitimized', Haaretz, 23 October 2010, available at, 
http: //www. haaretz. com/news/delegitimization-of-israel-niust-be-delegitimized-1.5970. (Last accessed 2 
December 2010). 
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cases are a political way to harass Israeli officers. I also can't go to London probably at the 
moment because there is also a responsibility on the lawyers. My involvement adds me to the 
list but doesn't really take the commanders off the list'80. 
In the meantime, Benjamin is facing calls from Palestinian groups for his prosecution in South 
Africa by virtue of his joint Israeli and South African citizenship. 81 While it is correct to say that 
Cast Lead attracted strong public support within Israel, it was by no means universal, as Sharvit- 
Baruch found on her retirement from the army to take up a teaching post in the law department 
of Tel Aviv University82. Some prominent members of the faculty objected to the appointment 
of a lawyer who could have given legal advice in support of Cast Lead and threatened strike 
action. For a time this threatened to pit the military and political elites against left wing elements 
of the legal institution and the dispute was the subject of a special cabinet meeting before the 
objectors melted away. Nevertheless, the incident was unprecedented and shows the possibility 
of legal institutional pressure being brought to bear on the IDL in opposition to the military 
institutional pressures. 
6) Conclusion 
In order for Israel to employ military power to counter Hamas' strategy of launching rocket 
attacks on Israeli population centres from Gaza without reoccupying Gaza or losing soldiers in 
the process, a way had to be found to engage Hamas combatants who concealed themselves and 
their weaponry among the civilian population, homes and institutions of Gaza. Israel had the 
technology and intelligence to employ accurate stand off power and a careful ground offensive. 
There was in place an ethical justification for minimising the risk to IDF soldiers where Harnas 
had the responsibility for placing them in danger. What was needed was a permissive 
80 Author's interview with Sharvit-Baruch 
81 Yotam Feldman, 'ICC may try IDF officer in wake of Goldstone Gaza report', Haaretz, 24 September 2009. 
82 Ofri Ilani, 'Protests as IDF colonel who ruled for attacks on Gaza civilians starts as TAU lecturer', Haaretz, 5 
March 2009. 
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construction of IHL that enabled a credible legal defence of targeting decisions. This was 
provided by the IDL, whose involvement had been expanded since the 2006 Lebanon war to 
include lawyers at HQ, Southern Command and divisional level. Close examination of the 
Goldstone Report and the Israeli Report show that the IDL relied heavily on an effective system 
of warnings to allow an assumption that the battlefield had been cleared of unwilling 
participants in the conflict and a legal analysis of Hamas that relied on the terrorist purpose of 
the organisation to expunge the distinction between its civil and military institutions. In this way 
the IDL made use of the grey areas in IHL to apply the lessons of Lebanon 2006 so that a war on 
Hamas terror could be fought within the principles of IHL. An examination of the Goldstone 
Report shows how far the Israeli construction of IHL differed from the IHL recognised by the 
mission. This led to an unprecedented public demonization of Goldstone in Israel and an 
international campaign by Israeli supporters to smear the report as a politically biased 
application of law. In the process lawyers and their rival constructions of IHL were deployed to 
challenge and defend the legitimacy of the operation. In this regard, the Goldstone Report and 
the Israeli Report do more than illustrate the rival constructions of IHL. They also show the 
extent to which legal discourse was employed in the battle for legitimacy. 
It will be recalled that there are three hypotheses raised in this thesis to account for the increased 
involvement of military lawyers in IDF operational decision-making: 
1) The application of international law by the Israeli Supreme Court, 
2) The threat of foreign prosecutions of Israeli decision-makers for war crimes and 
3) The increased use of International Humanitarian Law as a measure of the legitimacy of 
military action. 
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There is some support for the first hypothesis in that during Cast Lead the Israeli Supreme Court 
heard petitions from NGOs. In particular, the experience of the Court directing the suspension of 
hostilities to allow increased humanitarian aid to the citizens of Gaza reinforces the need for the 
IDL to be involved in contesting and implementing the court decisions. Furthermore, the 
Goldstone Report demanded that Israel mount its own legal investigations of wrongdoing during 
Cast Lead. There is certainly support for the second hypothesis given the Goldstone's explicit 
call for international jurisdiction prosecutions. 
The intensity of the international legal condemnation following Goldstone and the deployment 
of Israeli lawyers and legal argument in what Clarke calls strategies of legitimisation suggests 
support for the third hypothesis that increased use of International Humanitarian Law as a 
measure of the legitimacy of military action. Given the intensity of the Israeli domestic criticism 
of the decision by the Israeli government not to cooperate with the Goldstone Mission it seems 
likely that UN commissions of enquiry will develop into even more important sites of 
legitimisation through legal discourse, driving a greater IDF reliance on their lawyers. These 
missions are not going to go away; as the Goldstone Report puts it, `The Mission is firmly 
convinced that justice and respect for the rule of law are the indispensable basis for peace. The 
prolonged situation of impunity has created a justice crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
that warrants action'83. 
It will be recalled that it was also hypothesised that the IDF military lawyers exercise choice in 
the construction of their advice and apply a permissive construction of international 
humanitarian law to IDF targeting decision making and that their choice of IHL accords with a 
consensus among states conducting military actions against non-state actors and conflicts with 
legal positions adopted by communities of NGOs and UN commissions of enquiry. The analysis 
83 The Goldstone Report, para. 1958. 
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of the reports shows that a choice of law was made that met the needs of the IDF. Goldstone's 
`unjustifiable impunity' amounts to a legal and ethical regime that serves Israel's security 
agenda, but not just Israel's agenda. This legal frame work meets the needs of states conducting 
military operations against non-state actors that conceal their combatants and their military 
objects among their own civilians. Such states can be seen as constituting a community of 
purpose that is likely to adopt, rather than criticise, the Israeli construction of IHL, with a 
consensus position that weakens rather than strengthens civilian protection. Viewed from this 
perspective, the US criticism of Goldstone has less to do with a knee jerk defence of Israel's 
interests and more to do with a shared purpose in combating insurgents without the constraints 
associated with traditional inter-state warfare. The Goldstone position can be seen as an 
expression of a European liberal strand of a regime of IHL that promotes the protection of the 
individual as a civilian and finds favour among NGOs and states that are not engaged in fighting 
insurgencies - not a position that has any attraction for the IDF. 
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Chapter 9: Case Study 4: The 2010 Turkish Flotilla- the Mavi Marmara 
Affair 
1. Introduction 
The golden era of Israel's bi-lateral relations with Turkey spanned the 1990's to decline 
gradually with the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the electoral success of Erdogan's 
AKP in 2002. Ankara's increasingly uneasy combination of close commercial and military 
links with Israel while embracing popular support for the plight of the Palestinians began to 
unravel during Cast Lead, reaching a tipping point with the Mavi Marmara (Blue Marmara) 
Affair. While Israel the crisis can be analysed in the context of Israel's bi-lateral relations 
with Turkey, a broader perspective sees the affair as central to the legitimacy of Israel's 
closure of Gaza. 
As has been discussed throughout this thesis, legal and moral positions inform judgments of 
legitimacy, and it is not surprising that the legitimacy of Israel's naval operations is contested 
within both legal and humanitarian discourses. In Israel, the dominant moral position is that 
the personal and economic security of Israelis living in the South trumps the needs of the 
Palestinian residents of Gaza. This informs a construction of International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) that validates both the closure of Gaza and the naval blockade of the Gaza coast. 
Israel's international critics, who take a different moral position on the suffering of the 
residents of Gaza, identify a humanitarian catastrophe that produces a moral imperative for 
the lifting of the `siege' and a legal position that deems the Israeli naval blockade illegal. 
Each of the actors deploys their legal arguments to contest the legitimacy of Israel's naval 
action against the Mavi Marmara, its passengers and crew. Within the IDF, the corps of the 
Military Advocate General (MAG) played an important part in providing legal advice to both 
the military and the political echelon that lead to the imposition of a naval blockade and the 
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military operations arising from it. Subsequently, the MAG acted to defend the legality of the 
interception of the Mavi Marmara through the publication of legal opinion and in evidence to 
the Turkel Commission, the Israeli Commission of Enquiry into the affair. 
The following sections of this chapter comprise a detailed case study designed to reveal the 
role of the IDF's lawyers in the affair and their use of IHL. 
2. The interception of the flotilla 
What has come to be known as the `Turkish Flotilla' comprised six ships en route to Gaza 
that were intercepted by Israeli naval forces on 31 May 2010. This was not just a matter of 
Turkish human rights activists setting off from Istanbul. In fact, this was an international 
flotilla co-ordinated by the Free Gaza Movement and the Foundation for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Relief (IHH), a Turkish human rights organisation. The Free Gaza Movement 
is nominally based in Cyprus and operates as an international campaigning group with many 
organisational affiliates. Its web site mission statement is succinct, 
We want to break the siege of Gaza. We want to raise international awareness about the 
prison-like closure of the Gaza Strip and pressure the international community to review its 
sanctions policy and end its support for continued Israeli occupation. We want to uphold 
Palestine's right to welcome internationals as visitors, human rights observers, humanitarian 
aid workers, journalists, or otherwise. 
We have not and will not ask for Israel's permission. It is our intent to overcome this brutal 
siege through civil resistance and non-violent direct action, and establish a permanent sea lane 
' between Gaza and the rest of the world. 
As far as the Free Gaza Movement is concerned, the provision of humanitarian aid to Gaza 
by sea is a means to an end- breaking the siege. Their methods are avowedly non-violent. For 
the first six months following their formation in 2008 they organised five successful sailings 
to Gaza. Each mission comprised two small boats that the Israeli navy allowed in. From 
December 2008 there were three unsuccessful missions: December 2008 (rammed by the 
1 Available at: http: //www. frecgaza. orj/en/about-us/inission. (Last accessed 10 January 2011). 
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Israeli navy and diverted), January 2009 (diverted), and June 2009 (boarded and diverted to 
Ashdod). On each occasion there was only non-violent resistance to the Israeli military. 
There is no suggestion that the IHH had involvement in any sailings to Gaza before the Mavi 
Marmara and it is the participation of the IHH that was the first sign that this flotilla would 
be a different enterprise from those that had gone before. The IHH appears to have responded 
to a strategic decision by the Free Gaza Movement to work with partner organisations to 
construct an expanded flotilla. While not an exclusively IHH operation, the IHH certainly 
played a leading role, purchasing the Mavi Marmara as well as the M. V. Define Y and M. V, 
Gaue 1, The flotilla comprised eight vessels2, of which the Mavi Marmara was the largest 
and the lead ship, carrying 600 passengers and crew. In fact at the time of the interception 
there were only six ships, the Rachel Corrie having been delayed by a late sailing from Malta 
and the Challenger 2 having withdrawn with engine trouble. The six ships, set off separately 
from Malta, Greece and Turkey in late May 2010 and, after rendezvousing in the 
Mediterranean, set sail for Gaza on 30 May 2010 from a position 65 nautical miles west of 
Lebanon. The Israeli navy intercepted the flotilla the following day in international waters 
approximately 80 miles off the coast of Gaza. 
The flotilla refused Israeli orders to change course to Ashdod for the cargo to be unloaded in 
Israel, inspected and transferred by road to Gaza- effectively challenging the Israeli navy to 
either let them through or stop the ships by force. Details of the Israeli strategy and events at 
2 M. V. Mavi Marmara -a passenger ship registered in the Comoros64 and owned by IHH; 
M. V. Defne Y- a cargo boat registered in Kiribati and owned by IHH; 
M. V. Gaue I-a cargo boat registered in Turkey and owned by IHH; 
M. V. Sfendoni or Sfendonh -a passenger boat registered in Togo and owned by Sfendonh S. A. based in the 
Marshall Islands. 
M. V. Eleftheri Mesogios or Sofia -a cargo boat registered in Greece and owned by the Eleftheri Mesogios 
Marine Company based in Athens. 
Challenger I-a pleasure boat registered in the United States of America and 
owned by the Free Gaza Movement; 
Challenger 2-a pleasure boat registered in the United States of America and 
owned by Free Gaza Movement; and 
M. V. Rachel Currie -a cargo ship registered in Cambodia and owned by the Free 
Gaza Movement. 
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sea were presented in evidence to the Turkel Commission by Gabi Ashkenazi, IDF Chief of 
General staff3. All accounts agree that the first attempt to board the Mavi Marmara was by 
Zodiac boats simultaneously from the port and starboard at the rear of the vessel. The Israeli 
naval commando force, using non-lethal weapons, failed to scale the hull in the face of water 
hoses and other objects used to repel the boarders. Almost immediately, Israeli forces were 
landed from helicopters onto the top deck using fast ropes, where they encountered violent 
resistance from up to twenty passengers. The first Israeli force of fifteen was joined over a 
fifteen minute period by similar landings of twelve and fourteen soldiers4. During the fighting 
on the top deck three injured Israeli soldiers were removed by passengers losing control of 
their weapons. During the operation, which lasted close to one hour, nine passengers were 
killed and over twenty passengers injured by live ammunition. Once under Israeli control the 
ship was diverted to Ashdod along with the rest of the flotilla. The other ships had been 
boarded with only passive resistance and no significant injuries. Subsequently, the passengers 
were repatriated and the humanitarian cargo delivered to Gaza. 
3. The legitimacy of the naval operation 
Domestically, there was widespread support for the blockade and acceptance of the 
legitimacy of an operation understood as designed to prevent arms smuggling to Gaza and 
impose economic pressure on the Hamas administration. Within Israel the dominant 
3Ashkenazi, Gabi. Testimony to the Turkel Commission, Public Commission to 
Examine the Maritime Incident of May 31,2010, Session Number 4,8 November 2010, available at, 
http: //www. mfa. gov. il/NR/rdonlyres/3618ED21-0E84-40E1-AD3B-18548E] 37F85/0/TurkelCOSAugl 1 pdf. 
[Last accessed 11 March 20111. 
4 Ibid, Ashkenazi's testimony to Turkel describes the landing of the first soldiers who deployed on the second 
rope (the first having been disabled by the passengers) in the following terms, 'The second rope is dropped and 
the soldiers begin rappelling. All of the soldiers rappel to the roof within a minute of the start of rappelling. 
Over the course of the first minutes, a violent conflict develops on the roof. Each soldier that rappels is attacked 
by two to four activists, using knives, iron bars, and axes. The second soldier that rappelled was shot in his 
abdomen by one of the activists, and the soldiers encounter a threat to life, are forced to use live fire. In the 
course of the battle, five soldiers are wounded by stabbings, blows, and shooting. Three soldiers are thrown 
from the roof of the ship to the deck, and are taken below deck'. 
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discourse was security rather than humanitarian. Israeli domestic criticism was mainly 
directed towards the tactical blunders that apparently resulted in the humiliation of elite 
Israeli serviceman being thrown bodily from the deck and others facing a hostile mob. From 
this perspective, criticism was directed at the choice of tactics adopted rather than the 
strategic decision to intercept5. This resulted in both the Defence Minister Barak and Prime 
Minister Netanyahu6, in their evidence to the Turkel Commission, defending the strategy of 
maintaining a blockade while distancing themselves from the tactics employed. Meanwhile, 
in his testimony, Chief of General Staff Ashkenazi defended the strategy and the tactics, 
blamed the outcome on lack of intelligence while at the same time arguing that the outcome 
was inevitable once the passengers had embarked on violent resistance7. Defending his 
soldiers in forthright terms, he told the Committee, `The soldiers were at risk, they fired 
where they needed, they did not fire where they did not need. ' 
Internationally, Israel's defence of the legitimacy of its operation has been framed in security 
and legal terms. The security justifications seek to depict the humanitarian aid as a cover for 
arms smuggling- either directly or to open a conduit for future use. This conflates the flotilla 
with Hamas controlled smuggling tunnels and rocket attacks on Israel, thereby using the 
security discourse to challenge the humanitarian discourse. In the aftermath of the operation, 
s Responding to intense public criticism of the tactics employed in the operation, on 7 June the IDF, Ashkenazi 
ordered the establishment of an internal IDF investigatory committee to examine the tactical execution of the 
operation. The Eiland Committee reported on 12 July 2007 exonerating the commandos from allegations of 
wrongdoing and attributed blame instead to a failure of intelligence communication between IDF intelligence 
and Naval intelligenceas well as elements of operational planning. See also, Hanan Greenberg, `The Eiland 
Report Finds Mistakes but no Failures', YNet News. Com, 12, July 2010, available at: 
http: //www. ynetnews. com/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506, L-3918788,00. html. (Last 
accessed 12 January 2010). 
6 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PM Netanyahu's statement before the Turkel Commission, 9 August 2010, 
available at, http: //www. mfa. gov. il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2010/PM Netanyahus- 
statement before_the_TurkelCommission 09-Aug-2010. (Last accessed 12 January 2010). 
7 See, Yaakov Katz, 'Ashkenazi, IDF Actions in Flotilla Raid were Proportional', Jerusalem Post, 11 August 
2010, available at, http: //www. ipost. com/Home/Article. aspx? id=184389. (Last accessed 12 January 2010). 
Also, Herb Keinon, 'Turkel Commission: Er, where does the buck stop? ', The Jerusalem Post, 24 September 
2010, available at, http: //www. jpost. com/Features/FrontLines/Article. aspx? ID= 184620. (Last accessed 12 
January 2010). 
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the IHH was rapidly put on Israel's terrorist watch list and allegations made of IHH links to 
terrorism including al-Qaeda. This framing was used to make sense of the degree of violence 
encountered on the Mavi Marmara and to bolster Israel's claim that the ship had to be 
stopped. The defence was mounted within the wider narrative of Gaza as a hostile entity 
controlled by terrorists bent on the destruction of Israel, rightly subject to a defensive 
separation from Israel that requires the maintenance of a land and sea blockade8. 
Of course, Israel cannot escape the humanitarian discourse. After all, the very purpose of the 
flotilla was to focus international attention on the humanitarian plight of the people of Gaza. 
Israel's assertions that, following inspection at Ashdod, the elements of the cargo that 
complied with the terms of the Israeli embargo were to be transferred by land to Gaza, failed 
to engage with the real issue of the morality of daily civilian suffering. With international 
attention switching focus from the operation to the land blockade of Gaza, Israel moved 
rapidly to ease restrictions by technical changes to the identification of items to be allowed 
through border checkpoints9. As the Jerusalem Post reported, `The security cabinet on 
Sunday lifted nearly three years of restrictions on civilian goods allowed into the Gaza Strip, 
in the hope - according to senior diplomatic sources - that Israel would now have 
international legitimacy for the more important naval blockade, aimed at keeping out heavy 
weapons"° (emphasis added). 
8 See, for instance, Netanyahu's statement to Turkel, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PM Netanyahu's 
statement. 
9Janine Zacharia 'Israel eases restrictions on goods bound for Gaza Strip', Washington Post, 18 June 2010, 
available at: http: //www. washin tg onpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/17/AR20 1 006 1 700952 html, (last 
accessed 22 September 2010). This was in response of intense international pressure, particularly from the 
quartet to lift the restrictions on import of goods into Gaza. 
10 Herb Keinon, 'Yes to Corriander no to Kassams', Jerusalem Post, 20/6/2010, available at 
httn: //www. ipost. com/LandedPaaes/PrintArticle. aspx? id=178968. (Last accessed 22 September 2010). 
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Within Ian Clark's terms of analysis of legitimacy, Israel can be seen as engaging in a 
political contestation of the morality of the operation and the wider morality of its security 
strategy towards Gaza. Here, the moral question is whether Israel's security requirements 
justify the continuing strategic isolation of Gaza from its external environment with all that 
that entails for the people of Gaza. Within Israel, the construction of Israeli security needs 
collapses the moral discussion to the morality of protecting Southern Israel from rocket 
attacks from Gaza and more generally from a resumption of Harnas attacks on Israel's centres 
of population. While there is a moral constituency for easing the prohibition on categories of 
embargoed materials, the policy itself receives widespread moral affirmation. Internationally, 
where there is popular sympathy for Palestinian national aspirations, framing the Mavi 
Marmara affair within a narrative of historical injustice to the Palestinian people produces a 
wide moral consensus against the operation. In these circumstances the avowed aim of 
securing increased legitimacy for the blockade by easing the restrictions on the entry of goods 
by land looked hopeful at best. 
As Clark reminds us, morality is but one normative framework to be taken into account in 
the political process that produces a consensus on legitimacy. As we have observed, legality 
is another. It will be recalled that Clark's position is that legitimacy does not demand legality, 
but legality influences positions on legitimacy and is employed to both challenge and 
reinforce legitimacy. To be sure, both critics and defenders of the operation have deployed 
legal argument. 
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The IDF Military advocate General (MAG) statement of the legal position" relies for its 
definition of a blockade on Article 7.7.1 of the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations, published by the U. S Navy on July 2007, which describes a blockade as, 
Blockade is a belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft of all nations, enemy as well as 
neutral, from entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, 
or under the control of enemy nation. While the belligerent right of visit and search is designed to 
interdict the flow of contraband goods, the belligerent right of blockade is intended to prevent vessels 
and aircraft, regardless of their cargo, from crossing an established and published and publicized 
cordon separating the enemy from international waters and/or airspace. 
The Israeli MAG legal position promoted by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign affairs is based 
on the premise that Israel is `currently in a state of armed conflict with the Hamas regime that 
controls Gaza' 12. This is important since it is the condition of armed conflict that gives rise to 
the right to impose the blockade. Legally a blockade may be imposed in international or 
territorial waters providing that it does not interfere with neutral coasts or ports and, within a 
regime of communication and warning, vessels breaching or intending to breach the blockade 
may be forcibly detained 13. Israel declared the blockade during Cast Lead on 3 January 2009 
at a distance of twenty miles off the coast of Gaza 14. 
Framed in these terms, the legal discourse becomes confined to issues of whether the 
regulatory detail of notifications and intentions had been correctly communicated. An 
additional attraction of the argument is that, by relying on the state of armed conflict, Israel is 
able to justify the measure without compromising Jerusalem's position that the occupation of 
11 IDF MAG Corps, Interception of the Gaza flotilla-Legal aspects, available at: http: //www. mag. idf. il/5924071- 
en/patzar. aspx, (last accessed 22 September 2010). 
'ZIsrael Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Gaza flotilla and the maritime blockade of Gaza - Legal background, 
31, May 2010, available at: 
http: //www. mfa. gov. il/MFA/Governnient/Law/Legal+Issues+and+Rulings/Gaza flotilla maritime blockade G 
ara-Legal background__31-May-2010. htm, last accessed 22/9/10. 
13 Rule 1710.4, /CRC Model Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict for Armed Forces, 1999, indicates that: 
'Merchant vessels believed on reasonable ground to be breaching a blockade may be captured and those which, 
after prior warning, clearly resist capture may be attacked'. 
14 Marian Houk, 'Israel announces formal naval blockade of Gaza, surrounds Gaza City', American Chronicle, 
22 September 2010, available at: http: //www. americanchronicle. com/articles/view/86723. (Last accessed 12 
January 2010). 
273 
Gaza ended with the 2005 withdrawal. The law relating to naval blockades has arisen through 
treaty and was restated in 1994 as the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to 
Armed Conflict at Sea's. 
Section II of Part IV of the manual deals with the law relating to blockades. In particular 
paragraph 98, which is central to Israel's legal position provides that: `Merchant vessels 
believed on reasonable grounds to be breaching a blockade may be captured. Merchant 
vessels which, after prior warning, clearly resist capture may be attacked'. 
A more nuanced analysis of the legality of the naval blockade challenges the Israeli position 
on grounds of proportionality- joining the humanitarian narrative to the legal. Technically the 
argument relies on paragraph 102 of the San Remo Manual, which provides that, 
The declaration or establishment of a blockade is prohibited if: 
(a) it has the sole purpose of starving the civilian population or denying it other objects 
essential for its survival; or 
(b) the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be, excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the blockade. 
Assuming that the Gaza blockade is not for the sole purpose of starving the people of Gaza 
or of denying them the means to survive, the real legal argument relies on 102 (b) to allege 
that the suffering caused to the Gaza community is `excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated from the blockade'. This links to, but is not dependant 
on, a similar argument that the closure of Gaza is illegal in causing civilian harm that is 
excessive in relation to the military object- in other words disproportionate. 
A further legal challenge to the operation addresses the killing of nine unarmed civilians. 
The legality of the use of lethal force is analysed in IHL in terms of distinction and 
15 Available at, http: //www. icrc. org/THL. nsf/FULU560? OpenDocument. (Last accessed 12 January 2010). 
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proportionality and in criminal law/law enforcement in terms of self-defence 16. The Israeli 
Foreign Ministry has been quick to release images of the fighting on board the Mavi 
Marmara as well as intelligence assessments of IHH and the passengers in an effort to head 
off allegations of gratuitous violence. 
4. The Hudson-Phillips Report 
On 22 September 2010 the de Silva Mission (the Mission) released an advanced version its 
report '7. The Mission had been appointed on 23 July 2010 by the 2 June 2010 resolution 14/1 
of the Human Rights Council. Judge Karl T. Hudson-Phillips QC retired judge of the ICC 
and former AG of Trinidad and Tobago headed the Mission, the other members being Sir 
Desmond de Silva, QC former Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and 
Mary Dairiam, a noted advocate of women's' rights. 
It will be recalled that Judge Goldstone renegotiated the terms of his mandate before 
accepting the appointment to the Goldstone Mission. In an interesting parallel the Hudson- 
Phillips Mission expresses dissatisfaction with the terms of the UNHRC resolution that 
required the Mission to investigate, `violations of international law, including international 
humanitarian and human rights law, resulting from the Israeli attacks on the flotilla of ships 
carrying humanitarian assistance'. Instead of setting out to investigate `Israeli attacks on the 
flotilla' the Mission re-interpreted its mandate to investigate the `interception' by Israeli 
16 For a legal analysis that rejects the Israeli legal positioning see for example, Ben Saul, 'Israel's Security 
Cannot Come at Any Price', NLG International Global News, 2 June 2010, available at: 
http: //www. nlninternaiional. org/news/article. 12hp? nid=313 (last accessed 12 January 2010) 
17 UNHRC, Report of the international fact-finding mission to investigate violations of international law, 
including international humanitarian and human rights law, resulting from the Israeli attacks on the flotilla of 
ships carrying humanitarian assistance, A/HRC/15/21,22 September 2010, available at, 
ht(p-//www. al(ibalsecurity. org/miI itary/lihrary/report/2010/a-hrc-15-21_israel-flotilla 100922. htm. (Last 
accessed 8, March 2011). 
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forces18. In a further parallel to the Goldstone Mission, Israel refused to co-operate with the 
Mission 19, which then largely relied on evidence given to the Turkel Commission for its 
understanding of the Israeli case. Nevertheless, the Mission did not wait for the Turkel 
Commission to conclude its investigation before reaching its own conclusions, despite 
requests from Jerusalem that the Mission do so20. 
The report presents a narrative history of Israel's conflict with Hamas and the imposition of 
restrictions on the movement of people and goods between Gaza and Israel21. The Mission 
relies heavily on the conclusions of the Goldstone mission, statements of the United Nations 
and the Human Rights Committee and information provided to the Mission by the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to reach the conclusion that 
there is a humanitarian crisis. The report refers22 to the recently published opinion of the 
influential International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) that the closure amounts to a 
collective punishment in breach of international humanitarian law23. 
Having reached these conclusions, the mission makes its main legal findings by applying the 
San Remo provisions to find the blockade to be in breach of international law. It will be 
recalled that under paragraph 102 a blockade is to be regarded as illegal if, 
(a) it has the sole purpose of starving the civilian population or denying it other objects essential 
for its survival; or 
(b) the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be, excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the blockade. 
18 UNHRC, Report of the international fact-finding mission para 5-6. 
19 UNHRC, Report of the international fact-finding mission para 16. 
20 UNHRC, Report of the international fact-finding mission para 17. 
21 UNHRC, Report of the international fact-finding mission paras. 26-44. 
22 UNHRC, Report of the international fact-finding mission para. 38. 23 ICRC, 'Gaza Closure: not another year! ', ICRC News Release, 10/103,14 June 2010, 'The whole of Gaza's 
civilian population is being punished for acts for which they bear no responsibility. The closure therefore 
constitutes a collective punishment imposed in clear violation of Israel's obligations under international 
humanitarian law', available at, http: //www. icre. org/web/cn /sýng0. nsf/htmlall/palestine-update- 
14061O'OpgnDkocument&stylc=custo print. (Last accessed 10 January 2010). 
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Applying a particular interpretation of starving to include inducing hunger, the mission finds 
that the blockade is prohibited by paragraph 102(a). Further, the mission finds that the 
blockade causes disproportionate harm in breach of paragraph 102(b). The report states its 
main findings at paragraph 53 in a powerful synthesis of morality and law, 
In evaluating the evidence submitted to the Mission, including by the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the occupied Palestinian territory, confirming the 
severe humanitarian situation in Gaza, the destruction of the economy and the prevention of 
reconstruction (as detailed above), the Mission is satisfied that the blockade was inflicting 
disproportionate damage upon the civilian population in the Gaza strip and as such the 
interception could not be justified and therefore has to be considered illegal. 
It follows that naval action in support of the blockade is equally in breach of international 
law unless it can be justified in the context of the wider armed conflict. 
To be sure, parties to an armed conflict have the right in certain circumstances to board and 
seize neutral ships at sea. This raises the question of whether the Israeli operation was lawful 
even in the absence of a lawful blockade. In the absence of an immediate and overwhelming 
threat to the state justifying the use of force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, the relevant law is found in paragraph 118 of the San Remo Manual that allows 
interception if there is reasonable suspicion that the vessel is `was making an effective 
contribution to the opposing forces' war effort, such as by carrying weaponry or was 
otherwise closely integrated into the enemy war effort'. The mission has only to turn to 
Ashkenazi's evidence to the Turkel Commission to find confirmation that there was no such 
suspicion. All parties to the incident were clear about what was at stake- breaking the 
blockade, not arms smuggling. Indeed, the report finds at paragraph 58 that, 
Given the evidence at the Turkel Committee, it is clear that there was no reasonable suspicion 
that the Flotilla posed any military risk of itself. As a result, no case could be made to 
intercept the vessels in the exercise of belligerent rights or Article 51 self-defence. Thus, no 
case can be made for the legality of the interception and the Mission therefore finds that the 
interception was illegal. 
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These findings have the further significance of broadening the legal discussion from the 
particulars of the Mari Marmara Affair to the generality of the naval blockade and indeed the 
Israel's strategic closure of Gaza. By framing the legal findings within a condemnation of the 
humanitarian consequences of the military strategy, the mission presents a powerful moral 
and legal argument for a consensus position that the interception of the flotilla, the naval 
blockade and the closure of Gaza together amount to an illegitimate application of Israeli 
power. Read with the Goldstone report this amounts to a powerful legal and moral discourse 
of delegitimisation. 
Of course, the mission does not neglect its function of investigating the specifics of the nine 
deaths and numerous injuries to the passengers. Having borrowed so much from Ashkenazi's 
evidence to the Turkel Commission, the mission had a detailed Israeli account of events on 
board. The mission's own enquiries revealed that senior IHH leaders were, `prepared actively 
to defend the ship against any boarding attempt'. Passengers had used the ship's electric tools 
to cut lengths of metal railings to use as weapons and had armed themselves with lengths of 
metal chains and gas masks. 
The mission rules out allegations that the soldiers fired live ammunition while descending by 
rope. It is accepted that, 
Para 116. With the available evidence it is difficult to delineate the exact course of events on 
the top deck between the time of the first soldier descending and the Israeli forces securing 
control of the deck. A fight ensued between passengers and the first soldiers to descend onto 
the top deck that resulted in at least two soldiers being pushed down onto the bridge deck 
below, where they were involved in struggles with groups of passengers who attempted to 
take their weapons. 
Para 125. During the initial fighting on the top deck three Israeli soldiers were taken under 
control and brought inside the ship. While some passengers wished to harm the soldiers, other 
passengers ensured that they were protected and able to receive rudimentary medical 
treatment from doctors on board. Two of the soldiers had received wounds to the abdomen. 
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One of the soldiers had a superficial wound to the abdomen, caused by a sharp object, which 
penetrated to the subcutaneous tissue. 
The report analyses the evidence of the passengers to conclude that the soldiers used 
indiscriminate lethal force to gain control of the ship, 
Para 167. Nevertheless, throughout the operation to seize control of the Mavi Marmara, 
including before the live fire restriction was eased, lethal force was employed by the Israeli 
soldiers in a widespread and arbitrary manner which caused an unnecessarily large number of 
persons to be killed or seriously injured. Less extreme means could have been employed in 
nearly all instances of the Israeli operation, since there was no imminent threat to soldiers; for 
example in relation to the operation to move down to the bridge deck and seize control of the 
ship and the firing of live ammunition at passengers on the bow deck of the ship. Even in a 
situation where three individual soldiers have been injured and detained, the objective of 
freeing these soldiers does not legitimate the use of force outside applicable international 
standards and soldiers must continue to respect and preserve life and to minimize injury and 
damage. 
With a clear implications for universal jurisdiction cases against Israeli military and political 
elites the report finds: 
Para 265... there is clear evidence to support prosecutions of the following crimes within the 
terms of article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: 
" wilful killing; 
" torture or inhuman treatment; 
" wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health. 
The Mission also considers that a series of violations of Israel's obligations under 
international human rights law have taken place, including: 
" right to life (article 6, ICCPR); 
" torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (article 7, ICCPR; 
CAT); 
" right to liberty and security of the person and freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention 
(article 9, ICCPR); 
" right of detainees to be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person (article 10, ICCPR); 
" freedom of expression (article 19, ICCPR). 
It will be recalled that the Goldstone Mission concluded their report by recommending that 
Universal Jurisdiction cases be pursued. While the message from Hudson-Phillips is more 
circumspect, the implications for Israel elites travelling abroad remain clear. That said, 
279 
however, the real importance of the report is to be found within the context of Israel's 
struggle to maintain the legitimacy of its security policy. 
Jerusalem's refusal to co-operate with the mission is at first sight surprising, bearing in mind 
the very powerful tide of criticism of the decision not to co-operate with Goldstone. 
However, the explanation is to be found in Israel's co-operation with the UN Panel of Inquiry 
announced on 2 August 201024. The panel is chaired by the former Prime Minister of New 
Zealand, Geoffrey Palmer, and the outgoing President of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe is Vice- 
Chair. The ground-breaking significance is to be found in the fact that Israel and Turkey both 
have representatives on the panel. Israel's Panel member is Joseph Ciechanover while 
Turkey's Panel member is Özdem Sanberk. Both representatives have foreign affairs 
experience. Ciechanover, whose selection was the joint decision of Netanyahu, Lieberman 
and Barak, is a currently major figure in the Israeli finance community. Although it has thus 
far escaped comment, it is significant that Ciechanover is a member of the Israeli and 
American bar associations and had previously provided legal advice to the Israeli Ministry of 
Defence25. Whether or not this development is framed as a gesture towards reconciliation 
with Turkey, Israeli co-operation with a UN investigation into Israeli operations in Gaza 
represents a major departure. 
24 `UN chief announces panel of inquiry into Gaza flotilla incident', UN News Centre, 2 August 2010, available 
at, http: //www. un. org/, tpps/news/story. asp? Cr--flotilla&Crl=&NewsID=35607. (Last accessed 10 January, 
2011) 
25 See, 'Dr. Joseph Ciechanover Appointed as Israel's Representative on UN Secy. -Gen. 's Flotilla Panel', Prime 
Minister's Office, 8 August, 2010, available at, 
http"//www. nmo gov il/PMOEna/Communication/Spokesman/2010/08/spokepane1080810. htm. (Last accessed 
10 January, 2011). See also, Barak Ravid, 'Joseph Ciechanover to represent Israel at UN Gaza flotilla probe', 
Haaretz, 7 August 2010, available at, http: //www. haaretz. com/news/diplomacy-defense/Joseph-ciechanover-to- 
represent-israel-at-un-gaza-flotilla-probe-1.306573? localLinksEnabled=false. (Last accessed 10 January, 2011) 
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5. Israeli domestic enquiries and court proceedings 
The Public Commission to examine the Maritime Incident of May 31,2010, (the Turkel 
Commission) issued a partial report on 23 January 201126. This first part of the report 
examines the legality of the operation; intelligence and operational decision-making will be 
subject to a further report. The Commission has been subject to negotiation and domestic 
litigation since its announcement in June 2010. 
The insistence of the Commission on an expansion of their powers to those of a state 
Commission of Enquiry with powers to compel the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of documents implies that the investigation may be more than a formality27. 
Having made his dissatisfaction clear that the Commission had been given weaker rights than 
a state Commission of Enquiry the behind the scenes power struggle between the state and 
the Commission found its way to the Supreme Court. Here the lawyers hammered out a 
compromise while a petition from Israeli NGO, Gush Shalom, demanding a full state 
commission of enquiry added traction to the demands28. The political agenda of the 
petitioners is revealed in the celebratory posting on the Gush Shalom website, 
Uri Avnery, one of the signatories of the petition, said he sees the decision as a big victory. 
"For the first time, it was established that the High Court of Justice can interfere with 
government decisions regarding commissions of inquiry. Until today, the court avoided doing 
26 The Turkel Commission, Report of the Commission for Examining the Maritime Incident of May 31,2010 - 
Part One, 23 January 201 (, available at, http: //www. turkel-committee. Rov. i1/files/wordocs/8808report-eng. pdf. 
[Last accessed 14 March 2011. ] 
27 Roni Soler, 'Cabinet okays extended jurisdiction for Turkel committee', YNet News, 4 July 2010, available 
at, http: //www. ynetnews. com/articles/0,7340, L-3914719,00. html (Last accessed 10 January 2011) 
28 Gush Shalom, The /DF is not a state within the state; another Gush court victory, 12 July 2010. Available at, 
hit2: //zopg. ush-shalom. or2/home/events/1279061538. [Last accessed 11 March 2011]. 
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that. Also, the dangerous attempt to turn the army into an enclave, immune to outside 
criticism, was blocked". 9 
Negotiations produced a compromise that took the form of a court order. The fact that the 
Supreme Court was prepared to entertain petitions that demand Supreme Court intervention 
into the composition and powers of a commission of enquiry set up by the government in the 
first place is indicative of the lengths that the legal institutions are prepared to go to entrench 
civil control over the military. Further petitions successfully obtained an order from the 
Supreme Court that the Commission be expanded to include at least one woman 30. The fact 
that no woman has so far accepted the appointment is not the issue. The point to be 
emphasised here is that the Supreme Court is demanding and putting in place more rigorous 
control of the military and forcing the executive to go along with it. 
This is not to say that the Israeli courts are wading in to challenge the military conduct of the 
affair. When presented with the opportunity to rule on the legality of the blockade and the 
Naval interception of the flotilla, the court ducked the issue. On 2 June 2010 The President of 
the Supreme Court, Justice Dorit Beinisch, published a decision on several petitions 
concerning the treatment of the foreign detainees from the flotilla. The petitioners had alleged 
that the Israeli action had been illegal, but citing lack of time and the urgency of the petitions 
the court dealt with the cases without ruling on the lawfulness of the action31. The point to be 
emphasised here are limits to the extent to which the court will involve itself in security 
issues. The Supreme Court is more comfortable putting procedures for regulation and review 
in place than it is on ruling on the legality of key areas Israel's security policies. 
29 'Following Gush Shalom's appeal, Supreme Court opens way for Tirkel Committee to summon military 
personnel', Gush Shalom, available at, http: //zope. gush-shalom. org/home/en/events/1279017831. (Last accessed 
10 January 2011) 
30 Ben Hartman, 'High Court Turkel Must appoint a woman', The Jerusalem Post, 12 August 2010, available at, 
harp: //www. jpost. com/lsrael/Article. aspx? id=184518. (Last accessed 10 January 2011) 11 For a concise discussion see, Ido Rosenzweig and Yuval Shany, 'HCJ Rejects Petitions related to Foreign 
Civilians who Participated in Gaza Flotilla [HCJ 4169/10] [2.6.2010]', Terrorism and Democracy Newsletter, 
Issue No. 18, June 2010, available at, 
http: //www. idi. arg. iVsites/english/ResearchAndPrograms/NationalSecurityandDemocracy/Terrorism_and_Dem 
ocracy/Newslettcrs/Pages/l 8th%20Newsletter/2/2. aspx . (Last accessed 10 January 2011) 
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The Turkel Commission report conducts an exhaustive legal analysis before finding that 
Israel legally imposed a blockade and acted legally to enforce it. Without referring to the 
Hudson-Phillips report, Turkel covers the same arguments. The Commission heard powerful 
testimony from humanitarian NGOs to the effect that there was a humanitarian crisis in Gaza. 
The MAG argued that this was irrelevant to the legality of the blockade but this was 
explicitly rejected by the Commission, who adopted a similar legal framework to that of 
Hudson-Phillips. The difference lay in the conclusions, with Turkel concluding that the 
suffering of the population of Gaza was proportionate to the military advantage to be gained 
by preventing arms supply and by imposing economic sanctions on the Hamas 
administration. This recognition of economic warfare against Hamas required a careful 
framing in order to avoid admission of illegal collective punishment. While economic 
measures are recognised as part of warfare, a siege that acts to punish the population is not. 
By applying this analysis to a naval blockade, Turkel is adopting a harsh construction of IHL. 
As Cohen and Shany put it, 
Allowing naval blockades to be extended in order to sustain economic warfare appears to us 
to run contrary to existing legal standards and to represent an undesirable shift in the 
equilibrium between military necessity, humanitarian considerations and the rights of third 
parties -a balance which the San Remo Manual attempts to strike32. 
The IDF's official enquiry into the event was conducted by the Eiland Committee, which 
reported on 12 July 2010. The investigation headed by Major General (ret. ) Giora Eiland, was 
ordered by IDF Chief of Staff Ashkenazi to look into the conduct of the operation by Israeli 
32 Amichai Cohen and Yuval Shany, 'The Turkel Commission's Flotilla Report (Part One): Some Critical 
Remarks', Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 28 January 2011, available at, 
http: //www. ejihalk. ory-/the-turkel-coniniissions-flotilla-report-part-one-some-critical-remarks/#more-2992. [Last 
accessed 14 March 2011]. 
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troops and was largely based on records of operational debriefings. This is a report on the 
technical aspects of the operation that exonerates the Israeli forces from any wrongdoing. 
Criticism is limited to intelligence failings that failed to anticipate violent resistance and the 
absence of a backup plan that could have been put into operation once the extent of the 
resistance became clear. These findings were made available to Turkel to avoid soldiers being 
required to give evidence to the Commission. The report was withheld from Hudson-Phillips 
as part of the policy of non-cooperation but will probably be given to the UN enquiry. 
Paradoxically, the report suggests that even if intelligence had predicted violent resistence the 
outcome would probably have been the same. This echoes Ashkenazi's evidence to the 
Turkel Commission that violent resistance to the military seizure of a ship inevitably results 
in loss of life. At the time of writing, the second part of the Turkel Report has yet to be 
released. 
6. Policy formation and execution; the legal input 
Ashkenazi's statement to the Turkel Commission has some useful things to say about the 
decision to impose a naval blockade and the role of the lawyers in the process. Ashkenazi 
presents a very strong case for the blockade and does not waver throughout his evidence. This 
is not just a matter of a military commander defending a failed operation. Rather, he is 
claiming ownership of the policy and defending it to the hilt. The reason for this is that it was 
Ashkenazi that had pushed for the imposition of the blockade in the first place. 
Ashkenazi's defended the blockade in terms of a response to Harnas reinforcement. He 
referred to the arms cargoes found aboard the Karin-A and the Francop to illustrate how 
massive high quality arms shipments can be smuggled by ship. His argument was that the 
`maritime closure' was essential to prevent: 
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1) Smuggling of arms into Gaza. 
2) Attacks coming out of Gaza on Israeli off-shore installations and the state itself. 
3) Smuggling in expertise. 
4) Smuggling in money. 
Ashkenazi's evidence links the decision-making processes, which lead to the imposition of 
the blockade, to the start of the Free Gaza flotillas in 2008 that, `essentially represent the 
trigger for the imposition of the maritime closure'. His personal commitment to the idea of a 
blockade stems from this time, 
On this background [the flotillas], we began dealing with the phenomenon, and seeking or 
deciding to shape the political course of action, in our case, legal and operational, regarding 
how to stop it. From an analysis of the connotations stemming from the discussion of the 
flotillas, there formed for us, for me, the position according to which sailing vessels must be 
prevented from reaching the coast of Gaza. All of this, in light of the security consequences 
that I just described, that can stem from the description of the flotillas, and perhaps from a 
certain establishment of a sailing route, a line of ships from the Gaza coast to Cyprus, or to 
somewhere else. And essentially it would represent fertile ground for smuggling munitions, 
people, money, and perhaps even under the guise of humanitarian activity. 
Ashkenazi describes how the IDF and the navy began staff work to prepare operational plans 
to deal with the flotillas. Working with the Military Advocate General Mandelblit, the IDF 
put together an operational recommendation for a maritime closure. There were alternatives 
to a maritime closure but, 
what arose in a clear way, and so I also understood from the conversation and from reading 
the assessment and from the discussion, is that the royal road, as it is called, to prevent the 
passage of all vessels, and the powers required to prevent entry of sailing vessels..... is by 
means of a declaration of a maritime closure. There were other alternatives. Other legal 
sources that could have given us the ability to search, seize, divert from its route a sailing 
vessel that wants to reach the coast of Gaza. But the conclusion was quite clear that without a 
declaration of a maritime closure, there were regarding this doubts, limitations, and questions 
regarding the likelihood of implementing it. 
Ashkenazi recalls working with the MAG and the MAG bringing in the Attorney General to 
support the legal arguments in favour of the blockade. Nevertheless, this lobbying was 
initially unsuccessful; the political echelon rejected the advice of the military and allowed in 
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shipping until the end of the year. This was not a welcome decision and the IDF continued to 
clamor for a blockade, 
I thought that it was not correct to allow them to enter, and this has been my consistent 
opinion. I appealed in writing both to the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister, and 
recommended changing the existing policy and prohibiting the entry of the flotillas, once 
again, out of security concerns, in order not to open that sailing route between Gaza and 
Cyprus, or other places for that matter, while I detailed the recommended grades of action for 
the IDF for activities to stop the ships at sea. 
Towards the end of 2008 Askenazi again deployed recommendations from the MAG in an 
effort to get the blockade imposed. This time the twin recommendations of Ashkenazi and the 
MAG were accepted by the Minister of Defence and the blockade was imposed. As 
Ashkenazi testified, 
I received the recommendation and I brought up my recommendation together with the 
recommendation of the Military Advocate General to the Defense Minister. The Defense 
Minister accepted the recommendation, and authorized it, and directed us to impose a 
maritime closure on the Gaza Strip until further notice. We formulated the letter, the Defense 
Minister signed it, we appended to it the map and the tools demanded according to 
international law regarding how to publicize it. 
Ashkenazi had succeeded in putting in place a regime of maritime closure in January 2009 
that allowed for draconian measures to be taken against flotillas that sought to open a 
shipping route to Gaza. Interception no longer required suspicion of wrongdoing and 
boarding of flotillas was to become a standard operating procedure. 
The legal opinion provided by the MAG to the Minister of Defense is not publicly available. 
The opinion currently displayed on the MAG web site maintains that the blockade is properly 
declared in the context of a military conflict with Hamas and is a proportionate measure that 
does not contribute to a humanitarian crisis. In his evidence to the Turkel Commission, 
Mandelblit confirmed Ashkenazi's evidence of the MAG'S recommendations to government, 
maintaining that the blockade was legal and denying that there was a humanitarian crisis in 
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Gaza or that the suffering of its people were sufficiently severe to trigger the San Remo 
prohibitions33. The ICRC's claim that there is a humanitarian crisis is simply incorrect. 
As with so many areas of IHL, application of the law to specific operations is a matter of 
judging proportionality, or more precisely whether damage to the civilian population is, or 
may be expected to be, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated. While the MAG argues that, `According to the data presented to me, there has 
never been a humanitarian crisis in Gaza', the IDF will proceed on the understanding that the 
blockade is legal. Denial of any humanitarian crisis in Gaza is clear government policy. 
Indeed, Netanyahu's statement before the Turkel Commission makes the point very 
forcefully. 34 
Mandelblit made a point of explaining to the Commission that his lawyers were closely 
involved in operational matters35. In fact, IDF lawyers from the MAG corps would have 
been in close attendance during the planning of the operation as well as its execution- both 
with the commander at sea and at the headquarters in Tel Aviv. After all, it will be recalled 
that back in 1992 Daniel Reisman, then deputy head of the IDL, accompanied the Israeli 
naval commander to intercept a Palestinian ship of returning refugees. Asking what his role 
was, Reisner was told by the officer, `I want you to tell me when I can fire at them'. 
7. Conclusion 
Analysis of the Mavi Marmara affair does not reveal a clear connection between the role of 
the military lawyers and the Israeli Supreme Court or the threat in prosecutions abroad but it 
33 Dan Izenberg, 'Mandelblit: Gaza Blockade is Legal', Jerusalem Post, 27 August 2010, available at, 
http: //www. inost. com/Israel/Article. asi2x? id=186160. (Last accessed 10 January 2011). 
34 See, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PM Netanyahu's statement. 
35 'IDF MAG: "Commanders' best interest is to act according to the law"', IDF News, 26 August 2010, available 
at, http: //dover. idf. iVIDF/English[News/today/10/08/2602. htm. (Last accessed 10 January 2011). 
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does reveal a close involvement of lawyers in the construction of legal advice, the promotion 
of policy, the oversight of its operational execution and the promotion of its legitimacy. 
The boarding of the Mavi Marmara can be traced back to the 2008 crisis decision-making in 
response to the Free Gaza flotilla campaign. The campaign strategy was designed to open a 
sea route to Gaza to break the siege, expose the humanitarian suffering of the people and 
thereby render Israel's closure of Gaza unsustainable. Existing Israeli policy was to regulate 
the transfer of people and goods by way of an effective economic blockade that served to 
prevent the arming of Hamas during a period of sustained rocket attack from Gaza. 
International organisations were almost unanimous in identifying a developing humanitarian 
crisis. Israel has consistently denied that the hardships caused by its security policy amount to 
a humanitarian crisis, pointing to the supply of goods and humanitarian aid through the land 
crossings. Prior to the imposition of the blockade, Israel discouraged shipping from 
approaching the Gaza coast by warnings of military operations in the area and by exercising 
its rights under maritime law as a party to an armed conflict; this enabled the Israeli navy to 
intercept neutral shipping reasonably suspected of carrying military supplies intended for use 
by Hamas and other armed factions operating from within Gaza. Other shipping was either 
allowed in or persuaded to unload at the Israeli port of Ashdod. 
The change in policy came about as a result of sustained pressure by Chief of General staff 
Ashkenazi who was strongly personally committed to the land and sea closure of Gaza as 
essential to Israel's security. Indeed, his lobbying for the blockade went far beyond the 
conventional understanding that has the Chief of Staff presenting a number of possible 
strategic alternatives to the Defence Minister who then makes his choice36. Ashkenazi wanted 
36 for a concise background piece on Ashkenazi see, Amos Harel, 'Twenty-One Sabbaths to Go', Haaretz, 22 
September 2010, 'On the other hand, his attitude toward the political echelon - according to which the army 
must present several possible courses of action without recommending one in particular, and the ministers make 
the final decision - is controversial both within the government and on the General Staff. Available at, 
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the extra powers that come with a naval blockade of the coast of Gaza, which would enable 
the flotillas to be deterred by a legal and military regime that allowed the use of military 
force. 
Clearly Ashkenazi's recommendations to Government needed a strong legal opinion in 
support and this was duly provided by Military Advocate General Mandelblit whose own 
enthusiasm for the blockade is evident from his evidence to the Turkel Commission. Despite 
rejection by the Minister of Defence in August 2008, Ashkenazi stepped up his campaign 
with the Attorney General on board to confirm Mandelblit's advice. While the details of the 
legal opinion are not available, the basic legal position is discernable from subsequent 
statements of the MAG made in legal defence of the naval operation. 
Whether a blockade was necessary to Israel's security is a matter of debate. What is clear, 
however, is that it was essential to the legal use of force against neutral shipping where there 
was no evidence of arms smuggling. Without the blockade any attempt to divert peaceful 
flotillas would amount to an unlawful use of force. The subsequent imposition of the 
blockade gave Ashkenazi power to use Israel's elite naval commandos against the Mavi 
Marmara, at least in the eyes of the Israeli lawyers. 
This analysis suggests that the IDF armed with its own strategic analysis and a legal opinion 
from its enthusiastic MAG successfully applied pressure on a reluctant government to allow 
the use of military force to address what might otherwise be seen as a diplomatic problem. 
The hostile international reaction to the affair has challenged the legitimacy of Israel's 
military operation. Clarke's understanding of legitimacy envisions areas of legal, moral and 
constitutional contestation. The constitutional contestation is about procedures and 
expectations of behaviour, which would include considerations of whether Israel should have 
http: //www. ha. iretz. com/mi sc/art icle-print-patze/twenty-one-sabbaths-to-go- 
l. 3151hti". trailinLPath=2. I6' 2C2.2I2%2C2.2I5%2C. (Last accessed 10 January 2011). 
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adopted a diplomatic strategy to deal with the flotillas. The moral discussion is of the affair is 
framed in terms of the humanitarian needs of the people of Gaza and the use of force against 
a vessel whose declared aim is the peaceful provision of aid. The balancing of the right of 
Israelis living in the South of Israel to personal security unthreatened by rocket attack on the 
one hand, with the right of the Palestinian population of Gaza to a reasonable quality of life 
on the other, is central to the moral discussion. 
The legal argument also has much to do with the harm the blockade causes to the people of 
Gaza and, by conflating the two discourses, becomes the focus for contesting a consensus 
position on legitimacy. This puts the lawyers at both the centre of the construction of the 
policy to impose the blockade and the defence of its legitimacy. The case study shows that 
the defence is increasingly taking place in the context of international and domestic fact 
finding forums that assume the processes and discourses of courts of law where lawyers and 
legal thinking assume a privileged status. 
As has been noted, the legal challenge to the blockade focuses on the question of whether the 
harm done to the people of Gaza by the blockade is excessive in relation to the military 
benefit. This weighs the harm to the people of Gaza against the security of Israelis. In 
practice the balance depends on what view is taken of the harm caused to the people of Gaza 
and how much is excessive. It is reasonable to assume that Mandelblit and the human rights 
lawyers will disagree and it is that disagreement that puts Israeli constructions of the legality 
of the blockade and the seizure of the Mavi Marmara at odds with the Hudson-Phillips report 
and large sections of the international community. In effect, the case study locates the 
military lawyers at the centre of the defence of the legitimacy of Israel's security policy 
towards Gaza. 
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What then does this web of relationships reveal about the place of the military lawyers in the 
broader understanding of Israeli civil-military relations? To what extent are they actors or 
mere instruments of other power centres? 
The case study illustrates the plurality and contested application of international law to 
military conflict, with the legality of the blockade and the interception of the Mavi Marmara 
varying depending on the balance struck when weighing Israeli security against the quality of 
life of the residents of Gaza. In these circumstances where Israeli military action is subject to 
constant legal scrutiny a well-constructed legal position is essential to the promotion and 
defence of strategic military decision-making. The Government and the IDF each demand 
legal cover in order to protect their legitimacy and the legitimacy of their military operations 
and the personal liability of the civil and military elites. As providers of the legal cover the 
military lawyers perform an essential role and are included among the decision-making elites 
at three important foci of power: the formulation of strategic military policy, the execution of 
military operations and the post-facto defence of military actions. There is a clear 
instrumental role that is essential to the exercise of state power. The extent to which they 
have agency independent of the military remains unclear. It is to be expected that as military 
officers they will be influenced by a military culture that seeks to empower the military and 
constrained by a legal culture that promotes a professional role that places limits on legal 
creativity. Additionally, it is to be expected that the institutional pressures within the MAG 
corps would tend towards an accumulation of power and influence. With the MAG and his 
legal team playing such an important role there is the opportunity for institutional conflict 
between the IDF, the MAG and the Minister of Defence over whose conception of security 
should inform the construction of the legal advice. In the case of the blockade it appears that 
Ashkenazi and Mandelblit were of one mind and, although the political echelon was reluctant 
to impose a blockade, they certainly would not have welcomed a legal opinion based on a 
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finding that the closure of Gaza was producing a humanitarian crisis. While the MAG legal 
opinion appears to have been pivotal, it must be remembered that the Government has the 
Attorney General to provide it with legal advice, and it is significant that in lobbying for the 
blockade Ashkenazi obtained his legal opinions from Mandelblit and the Attorney General. 
Any conclusions about the independent exercise of power by the IDF lawyers remain 
tentative. However, it can be said with some certainty that military lawyers occupy an 
important political space at several foci of power and the ability to influence policy through 
the construction of legal advice independently of the wishes of their military masters allows 
at least for the possibility of independent agency. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
Speaking in June 2010, Daniel Reisner described international humanitarian law as `Swiss 
cheese where the holes are bigger than the cheese''. Adopting such a view of IHL maximises 
the agency of the lawyers to structure military behaviour and promote a new legality. The 
analysis adopted in this thesis identifies Reisner's `holes' as grey or unresolved areas, where 
multiple constructions of Il-IL compete within a complex legal and ethical regime. Here, law 
is pluralistic rather than absent. This does not deny agency so much as offer a textured 
explanation for its existence- not so much holes as political spaces where law is selected 
through institutional processes and political contestation. This selection of law creates a 
practice that promotes a construction of law forming an interactive relationship between 
agent and structure. 
The analysis of the involvement of the Israeli military lawyers in targeted killing shows that 
the IDL did more than decide that it was legal; supported by Kasher's ethical positioning, 
they created a legal regime that met the needs of the political, judicial and military actors, 
including preserving a political and legal veto on military operations that, on any view, were 
operating at the margins of the law. This was legal trail-blazing rather than norm- 
entrepreneurship. As Reisner puts it, `we invented it, now everyone is doing it'2. This 
international perspective is important. In the post 9/11 landscape, despite the Euro-centric 
human rights discourse, the Israeli lawyers correctly perceived a consensus among states 
fighting terror that could accommodate Israeli style targeted killing, provided that it operated 
within a framework of legal and political oversight. This mind-set runs through the 
statements of the IDL interviewees. 
1 Presentation at Tel Aviv July 2010 attended by the author. 
2 Interview with author 24 May 2009. 
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In more general terms, the research has shown that Israel is developing constructions of IHL, 
supported by detailed Just War ethical positioning, that enables the Israeli state to apply 
military force to its fight against terrorists and non-state actors who conceal themselves 
among their civilians. The case studies allow a historical analysis of the development of the 
IDL from the Second Intifada to the Mavi Marmara Affair that shows an increasing 
involvement in operational decision-making backed by a legal veto. The studies reveal 
controversial legal constructions of IHL that, to adopt the popular slogan, `allow the IDF to 
win', while meeting the political imperative of force protection. These legal strategies are 
promoted by the lawyers as allowing military behaviour that meets the needs of states 
fighting non-state actors, and can be seen in terms of communities of practice whose practice 
require a shared view of IHL. In fact, that shared view of IHL includes a shared view that the 
lawyers need to be involved in operational decision-making. As Yoram Dinstein, the noted 
Israeli commentator on IHL put it, `there is an emerging norm of international law that 
lawyers must be involved in targeting decision-making'3. Whether this is an emerging norm 
or an expectation, it can certainly be identified in the international regime that influences the 
conduct of military conflict. 
In addressing the questions why the lawyers have become so involved in Israel's military 
operations, this thesis examined the discussions between the Israeli Military Advocate 
General, the Israeli Attorney General and the eminent members of the Winograd Commission 
of Inquiry into the conduct of the Second Lebanon War. The analysis suggested three 
hypotheses to account for the increased involvement of military lawyers in IDF operational 
decision-making: 
1) The application of international law by the Israeli Supreme Court. 
3 Interview with the author 26 May 2009. 
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2) The threat of foreign prosecutions of Israeli decision-makers for war crimes. 
3) The increased use of International Humanitarian Law as a measure of the legitimacy of 
military action. 
Careful analysis of the case studies provided powerful support for each of the hypotheses, 
revealing a legal regime of IHL that is subject to political contestation within an institutional 
framework at both a domestic and international level with a demand for legal involvement 
from the military, political and judicial elites. 
A key aspect to the methodology employed in this thesis is the recognition of IHL as a legal 
regime of pluralistic and contradictory constructions of law. This reveals the political choice 
in the recognition of legal restraints on the conduct of warfare. Further, by adopting an 
international level of analysis and applying IR scholarship to supplement legal scholarship, 
an inter-disciplinary approach recognises the role of constructions of law in 
conferring/denying and defending/contesting legitimacy where legitimacy is a measure of 
acceptance to international and domestic communities of purpose. 
Clarke's legitimacy is influenced by legality, but is not dependant on legality. This means 
that law is influential but not itself determinant. Constructions of law are subject to political 
contestation and UN fact finding missions and their reports, such as the Goldstone Report and 
the oppositional Israeli Report, are sites of legal contestation. Constructions of law and their 
promotion can be understood as strategies in the defence/denial of legitimacy and gain 
traction by association with consensus positions of communities of purpose. Of course, 
communities of purpose are multiple and overlapping with differing shared values, 
expectations of behaviour and interests that generate differing constructions of what is 
ethically required by Just War doctrine and what is legal and what is not legal, as well as 
differing views of the role and importance of IHL. Indeed, it is the existence of multiple 
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communities of purpose that accounts for the legal pluralism of IHL and the element of 
choice that is often seen as the politicisation of IHL. It follows that, deciding whose IHL to 
apply has military utility but is itself a political decision with serious implications for Israel's 
domestic and foreign policy where security and legitimacy make conflicting demands.. 
Indeed, Israeli foreign policy community should not only be viewed in terms of hawks and 
doves. Rather, it can usefully be seen as split between those who value international 
legitimacy and constrain Israel's security policy accordingly and those who do not. This is 
well illustrated by the Mavi Marmara Affair where the political decision to impose a 
blockade and then to enforce it by force, required a balancing of the potential damage to 
Israel's legitimacy caused by enforcing the blockade against the perceived security 
imperative of maintaining the `siege'. 
The policy implications for this research, understood within a civil-military context, lie in the 
identification of the breadth of choice between constructions of law and the constraints on 
military lawyers in making that choice. Once this is understood, it can be seen that a political 
direction to the military to act in accordance with IHL lacks meaning. This thesis has shown 
that the IDL adopts permissive legal positions. Civil control of the military cannot be left to 
the preferences of the military enabled by helpful constructions of military law provided by 
their military lawyers- choice of law is a political decision and needs to identified as such and 
overseen by the political echelon. Further, these are choices that are key elements of Israel's 
claim to legitimate military action and they need to be defended both at home and overseas; 
Israel's apparent reversal of its long-standing policy of non-co-operation with UN fact 
finding missions is recognition of this. 
Clearly, it would be naive to suggest that the military lawyers are influenced only by the 
military. This analysis opens up possibilities of further research into the hierarchy of state and 
military lawyers and the relationship between the military lawyers and those of the Foreign 
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Ministry and the Attorney General. A broader perspective identifies the intersection of the 
military institution and the legal institution that generate contradictory institutional 
constraints on the behaviour of the IDL as has been revealed by the controversy surrounding 
Sharvit-Baruch's appointment to the University of Tel Aviv legal faculty. The research has 
demonstrated the power of a military culture on the military lawyers as a push towards 
`letting the IDF win', but the controversy over Sharvit-Baruch's university appointment 
reveals the power of the legal institutions , whose constructions of IHL, and the professional 
standards governing the choice of law when advising, cannot be ignored by legal 
practitioners. It is not just the judiciary through their legal decisions but the profession itself 
that demands oversight of the quality of legal advice. 
It has long been acknowledged that civil-military relations are more than a matter of charting 
whether civilians control the military or whether the military controls the civilians. Civil 
constraints on the military and the exercise of power by the military are a complex web of 
power relations and networks. The power relations and networks that make up legal-military 
relations have been under-researched, through the adoption of a framework of analysis that is 
overly reliant on the analytical value of court-based coercion. This thesis has fused legal and 
IR scholarship with original insights and presented original research into the involvement of 
lawyers in military operational decision-making that firstly, reveals the military lawyers to be 
influential actors occupying a political space at the intersection of legal and military regimes, 
secondly, provides a framework and methodology for further research and finally, and lastly 
has identified fruitful areas of further research that will breathe new life into legal-military 
relations. 
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